THIRD
DIVISION
GONPU
SERVICES CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 111897
January 27, 1997
-versus-
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
OSCAR AGONOY and MANUEL FREGILLANA,
Respondents.
R
E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J.:
The facts, as
stated by public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission, are as follows:
Complainants [Private Respondents] Oscar
Agonoy
and Manuel Fregillana started employment with the respondent
[petitioner]
in August 3, 1987 and February 1, 1982, respectively. While employed,
both
actively participated in the formation of the GONPU Services
Corporation,
Local-PFL. In fact, both were elected union officer as president
and director, respectively. Sometime on June 15, 1989, both were
informed
of a transfer of assignment to PUREX MINERAL CORPORATION at Cagayan de
Oro City. In response, complainants [private respondents] sought
reconsideration
of said transfer order citing the incoming certification election and
as
to complainant Fregillana, he cited family dislocation. Subsequently,
they
were issued termination orders for insubordination for failure to heed
such transfer orders.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor
Arbiter
cited the fact that the explanation given by complainants [private
respondents]
herein in refusing transfer was not laudable enough as to reconsider
transfer
order. The Labor Arbiter also pointed to the managerial prerogative to
select, hire and transfer employees in the best way a company may see
it
fit and convenient.[1]
Private respondents appealed before the
NLRC.
In a decision dated September 13, 1993, the NLRC reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter and entered a new one declaring the dismissal of
private
respondents illegal and ordering their immediate reinstatement. Without
filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, petitioner Gonpu
Services
Corporation filed the instant petition substantially premised on the
NLRC's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in finding it guilty of illegal
dismissal
and unfair labor practice. Acting on the petition, the Court required
the
respondents to comment thereon.[2]
Thereafter, on July 6, 1994 the Court gave due course to the petition
and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[3]
The parties filed their manifestations adopting their petition and
reply
to comment, in the case of petitioner, and their comment, in the case
of
respondents, as their memoranda.
At the outset,
the Court notes petitioner's inexcusable
failure to move for the reconsideration of the assailed decision. While
in some exceptional cases we allowed the immediate recourse to this
Court,
we find nothing herein that could warrant an exceptional treatment to
this
petition which justifies the omission on the dubious pretext that "the
motion for reconsideration is not necessary insofar as the instant
petition
is concerned."[4]
A motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC
an
opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed
before
resort to the courts can be had. We have had an occasion to stress this
significant matter in Zapata v. NLRC.[5]
Thus:
Petitioner cannot, on its bare and
self-serving
representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally
disregard
what the law requires and deny respondent NLRC its right to review its
pronouncements before being haled to court to account therefor. On
policy
considerations, such prerequisite would provide an expeditious
termination
to labor disputes and assist in the decongestion of court dockets by
obviating
improvident and unnecessary recourse to judicial proceedings. The
present
case exemplifies the very contingency sought to be, and which could
have
been, avoided by the observance of said rules.
Likewise, a
motion for reconsideration is an adequate
remedy, hence certiorari proceeding, as in this case, will not prosper.[6]
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that:
When any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising
judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any
plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the
facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying
the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board, or
officer
xxx
On the merits,
we fail to see any cogent reason to
set aside the NLRC's decision. As correctly declared by the NLRC, the
prerogative
of the employer to transfer an employee from one work station to
another
is not unlimited.[7]
Thus:
In the case at bar, it is of judicial
notice
that dictates of business exigencies demand utmost flexibility. On the
part of respondent's guards as to be ready to assume any given and
required
posting upon notice of clients. But then, even the nature of this
business
could not be governed by hard and fast rule of complete and total
subservience.
Unlike in any other case, it should admit certain exceptions.
Respondent
in the instant case would want Us to swallow hook, line and sinker that
complainants were dismissed simply because of insubordination.
Initially,
the same does appear to be the reason. A closer perusal of the records
which the Labor Arbiter should have done, would reveal otherwise. In
the
first place, what appears to be simply an order of transfer actually
rules
with attempts to stifle efforts at labor union formation. The records
of
this case are bereft of any evidence why complainant was being
transferred
and who requested the transfer. Moreso, the fact that the two
transferees
were union officers and there is a pre-set certification election
hearing
should have forewarned the Labor Arbiter and made him see through this
alleged order of transfer. Indeed, why picked on the union president
and
director as possible replacement guards in a far away province such as
Cagayan de Oro at a most crucial time such as a pre-set certification
election?
Why picked on the president and director, unless there is veiled
attempt
to weaken the union and set the stage for its ultimate dissipation come
certification election day, what with the absence of the union head? In
short, the Labor Arbiter could have been more prudent and not appeared
so naive as to be immediately taken by respondent's drama. As it
appears,
the Labor Arbiter erred in concentrating on the fortitude of individual
respondents while the union which complainants herein have been forming
is being scuttled. This to Us is a clear case of unfair labor practice.
Allegation that people were being asked to withdraw said petition which
is unrebutted per records, adds support to Our now considered opinion
that
they were attempts to discourage the formation of the union.
Consequently,
complainants' dismissal for alleged insubordination is hereby declared
illegal and respondent ordered to reinstate them to their former
positions
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and with backwages
limited to three (3) years.[8]
We find that
there is a strong basis for the NLRC's
conclusion that the controversial transfer was not prompted by
legitimate
reason. Petitioner indeed arbitrarily chose private respondents, high
ranking
officers of the union, to be transferred to a far-flung assignment at
the
height of a certification election. The burden of proof to establish
the
validity of the dismissal of private respondents lies on the
petitioner.
It is thus incumbent upon it to satisfactorily prove that respondent
NLRC
acted capriciously and whimsically in reversing the Labor Arbiter's
decision
which petitioner failed to do.
ACCORDINGLY,
finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Narvasa, C.J.,
Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.cralaw:red
___________________________
Endnotes
[1]
NLRC Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[2]
Rollo, p. 61.
[3]
Rollo, p. 111.
[4]
Reply to Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 104.
[5]
175 SCRA 56, 61-62.
[6]
P.A. Aviles Placement Services/Surety and Insurance Company v. NLRC and
Sinsuan, G. R. No. 120990, October 9, 1996; Antonio v. NLRC, G.R. No.
101755,
January 27, 1992.
[7]
Yuco Chemical Industries Inc. MOLE, 185 SCRA 727.
[8]
NLRC Decision, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 37-39. |