SECOND
DIVISION
THE ANDRESONS GROUP, INC.,
Petitioner,
G. R. No. 114928
January 21, 1997
-versus-
COURT
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES WILLIE A. DENATE
and MYRNA LO DENATE,
Respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner, The
Andresons Group, Inc., questions
the decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals which set aside the two orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 122 which denied private
respondents'
Motion to Dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground of lis
pendens.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that private
respondent
Willy Denate entered into an agency agreement with petitioner as its
commission
agent for the sale of distilled spirits [wines and liquors] in Davao
city,
three [3] Davao provinces and North Cotabato.
On November 18,
1991, private respondents filed
a civil action for collection of sum of money against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, docketed as Civil Case No. 21,
061-91. In the complaint, private respondent Willie Denate alleged that
he was entitled to the amount of P882,107.95, representing commissions
from petitioner but that the latter had maliciously failed and refused
to pay the same. A month later, or on December 19, 1991,
petitioner
likewise filed a complaint for collection of sum of money with damages
and prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City,
Branch
22, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15214. Petitioner alleged in the
complaint
that private respondent still owed it the sum of P1,618,467.98 after
deducting
commissions and remittances.cralaw:red
On February 5,
1992, private respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. C-15214 with the Kalookan RTC on the
ground that there was another action pending between the same parties
for
the same cause of action, citing the case earlier filed with the RTC of
Davao City.cralaw:red
On February 14,
1992, petitioner filed its opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC of Davao had not
acquired
jurisdiction over it.cralaw:red
On April 24,
1992, the RTC of Kalookan City issued
the questioned order, the decretal portion of which states:
The Court finds the instant motion
without
merit.
Admittedly, the
Davao case involves the same parties,
and involves substantial identity in the case of action and reliefs
sought,
as in the instant case. Perusal of the record in this case, however,
shows
that jurisdiction over the parties has already been acquired by this
Court,
as herein defendants received their summons as early as January 8,
1992,
and the plaintiff's prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment
has been set for hearing last January 21, 1992, but which hearing was
cancelled
until further notice because of the filing of the instant motion to
dismiss
by the defendants herein on February 17, 1992, after asking for
extension
of time to file their responsive pleading. Clearly, the instant case
has
been in progress as early as January of this year. On the other hand,
the
summons in the Davao case has not yet been served as of April 21, 1992,
the date of the hearing of the instant motion, so much so that the said
Davao Court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties.
On May 29, 1992,
private respondents filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court on July 1,
1992.
The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which set aside the
order of the trial court.cralaw:red
Hence, this
petition.cralaw:red
The sole issue
set for resolution before the Court
is: Should the action in the Kalookan RTC be dismissed on the
ground
of lis pendens?
We hold in the
affirmative.cralaw:red
Lis pendens as
a ground for the dismissal
of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is
pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action.[2]
To constitute the defense of lis pendens, it must appear that not only
are the parties in the two actions the same but there is substantial
identity
in the cause of action and relief sought.[3]
Further, it is required that the identity be such that any judgment
which
may be rendered in the other would, regardless of which party is
successful,
amount to res judicata on the case on hand.[4]
All these
requisites are present in the instant
case. The parties in the Davao and Kalookan cases are the same. They
are
suing each other for sums of money which arose from their contract of
agency.
As observed by the appellate court, the relief prayed for is based on
the
same facts and there is identity of rights asserted. Any judgment
rendered
in one case would amount to res judicata in the other.
In conceptualizing lis pendens, We have
said that like the res judicata doctrine, litis pendentia
is a sanction of public policy against multiplicity of suits.[5]
The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained
is that the latter action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.[6]
Petitioner
asserts that the Davao Court had not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the parties as the summons had not been
served as of April 21, 1992 and it claims that pendency of a case, as
contemplated
by the law on lis pendens, presupposes a valid service of
summons.
This argument is untenable. A civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court.[7]
The phraseology adopted in the Rules of Court merely states that
another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause is a ground
for motion to dismiss. As worded, the rule does not contemplate that
there
be a prior pending action, since it is enough that there is a pending
action.[8]
Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis
pendens should apply.cralaw:red
In Salacup v.
Maddela,[9]
We said:
The rule of lis pendens refers
to
another
action. An action starts only upon the filing of a complaint in court.
The fact that when appellant brought the present case, it did not know
of the filing of a previous case against it by appellees, and it
received
the summons and a copy of the complaint only after it had filed its own
action against them, is immaterial. Suffice it to state that the fact
is,
at the time it brought the present case, there was already another
pending
action between the same parties seeking to assert identical rights with
identical prayers for relief based on the same facts, the decision in
which
would be res judicata herein.
It must be
emphasized that the rule on litis pendentia does not require
that the later case should yield to the
earlier.[10]
The criterion used in determining which case should be abated is which
is the more appropriate action[11]
or which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests of
justice."[12]
Applying these criteria, and considering that
both cases involve a sum of money collected in and around Davao, the
Davao
Court would be in a better position to hear and try the case, as the
witnesses
and evidence would be coming from said area.
WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Regalado, Puno,
Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
_______________________________
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo , p. 30.
[2]
Rule 16, Sec. 1[e], Revised Rules of Court.
[3]
J. Northcatt and Co. v. Villa-Abrille, 41 Phil. 462.
[4]
Alarcon v. Torres , 19 SCRA 706 [1967]; Del Rosario v. Jacinto, 15 SCRA
15 [1965]; Olayvar v. Olayvar, 51 O.G. 5219; Hongkong and Shanghai Bank
v. Alderva, 30 Phil. 285; Manuel v. Wigett, 14 Phil. 9.
[5]
Investors Finance Corp. v. Elarde, 163 SCRA 60 [1988].
[6]Victrionics
Computers, Inc. v.
Logarto, 217 SCRA 517 [1993]; Arceo v. Oliveros, 134 SCRA 308 [1985].
[7]
Rule 2, Sec. 6, Rules of Court.
[8]
Teodoro v. Mirasol, 53 O. G. No. 22, p. 8088.
[9]
91 SCRA 275, 279 [1979], citing Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Ocfemia, 18
SCRA
407 [1966].
[10]
Ramos v. Peralta, 203 SCRA 412 [1991].
[11]
Teodoro v. Mirasol, supra.
[12]
Roa-Magsaysay v. Magsaysay, 98 SCRA 529 [1980]. |