FIRST DIVISION
OFFICE
OF THE
COURT
ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-01-1370
April 25, 2003 -versus-
JUDGE
AGUSTIN T.
SARDIDO,MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF KORONADAL,SOUTH COTABATO,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO,
J.:
The Case
This is an administrative
case against Respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido ("Judge Sardido")
formerly
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South
Cotabato,
for gross ignorance of the law. Judge Sardido issued an Order
dated
20 October 1998 excluding Judge Braulio Hurtado, Jr. ("Judge Hurtado")
of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato as one of the
accused
in an Amended Information.[1]
Judge Sardido ruled that Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 requires that
Judge Hurtado be dropped from the Amended Information and his case be
forwarded
to the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Facts
Private complainant
Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo Ong of the
crime of "Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified
Document."[2]
The Amended Information included Judge Hurtado. The case,
docketed
as Criminal Case No. 14071, was raffled to Judge Sardido, then
presiding
judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato
("MTC-Koronadal").chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 8 August 1993, private complainant Magbanua and six other
vendors
allegedly sold two parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. 47873 and 33633
and located at the commercial district of Koronadal, to Davao Realty
Development
Corporation, represented by accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan, as
broker.
Judge Hurtado, who at that time was the Clerk of Court of RTC-Koronadal
and ex-officio notary public, notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, private
complainant
Magbanua denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993
which
states that the consideration for the sale was only P600,000.00.
Private complainant asserts that what she and the other vendors signed
was a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 August 1996 for a consideration of
P16,000,000.00. Under the terms of the sale, the vendee agreed to
pay for the capital gains tax. The consideration in the 8 August
1993 Deed of Absolute Sale was apparently undervalued.
Subsequently,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue assessed the vendors a deficiency
capital
gains tax of P1,023,375.00.
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Judge Hurtado filed
a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded
to
the Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado claimed that Circular No.
3-89 dated 6 February 1989 requires "all cases involving justices and
judges
of the lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts
apparently
unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of
immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc." to be
forwarded
to the Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado asserted that since the
case against him is one involving a judge of a lower court, the same
should
be forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to Circular No. 3-89.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Provincial
Prosecutor
opposed Judge Hurtado’s motion, arguing that the case against Judge
Hurtado
is not within the scope of Circular No. 3-89 since it is not an
IBP-initiated
case. Moreover, the offense charged was committed in 1993 when Judge
Hurtado
was still a clerk of court and ex-officio notary public.
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On 20 October 1998,
Judge Sardido issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:
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The issue to be
resolved
in the instant case is, whether the case of Judge Hurtado, who is
charged
for acts committed prior to his appointment as an RTC Judge, falls
within
the purview of the afore-said Circular No. 3-89.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is the humble
submission
of the Court that the case of Judge Hurtado, an RTC Judge of the
Regional
Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato, falls within the meaning and
intent
of the said circular.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For reasons being,
firstly, the said circular provides that all cases involving justices
and
judges of lower courts shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
appropriate
action, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently
unrelated
to the discharge of their official functions, and regardless of the
nature
of the crime, without any qualification whether the crime was committed
before or during his tenure of office. Under the law on Legal
Hermeneutics,
if the law does not qualify we must not qualify. Secondly, it would
sound,
to the mind of the Court, awkward for a first level court to be trying
an incumbent judge of a second level court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For reasons
afore-stated,
this Court can not and shall not try this case as against Judge
Hurtado,
unless the Honorable Supreme Court would order otherwise.
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Wherefore, the
foregoing
premises duly considered, the name of Judge Braulio L. Hurtado, Jr. is
ordered
excluded from the amended information and the case against him is
ordered
forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to the afore-said
Circular
No. 3-89 of the Supreme Court, dated February 9, 1989.
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Accordingly, Maxima
S. Borja ("Borja"), Stenographer I and Acting Clerk of Court II of the
MTC-Koronadal, South Cotabato, wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999
forwarding
the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator for
appropriate action.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Then Court
Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated 25 October 2000 pointing
out that Circular No. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints
filed
with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The
Circular
does not apply to criminal cases filed before trial courts against such
justices and judges.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, in the Resolution
of 6 December 2000, the Court directed that the letter of Acting Clerk
of Court Borja be returned to the MTC-Koronadal together with the
records
of the criminal case. The Court directed Judge Sardido to explain
in writing why he should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the
law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information and for
transmitting
the records of Judge Hurtado’s case to the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In his Explanation
dated 26 January 2001, Judge Sardido reasoned out that he excluded
Judge
Hurtado because Circular No. 3-89 directs the IBP to "forward to the
Supreme
Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of
lower courts x x x." Judge Sardido claims that the Circular
likewise "applies to courts in cases involving justices or judges of
the
lower courts," especially so in this case where "Judge Hurtado was
charged
with falsification of public document as a notary public while he was
still
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the 11th Judicial
Region
in Koronadal, South Cotabato."
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In the Resolution of
28 March 2001, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court
Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation, report and recommendation.
On 10 July 2001, the OCA submitted a Memorandum recommending that this
case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Judge Sardido filed
his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001 stating that he is submitting
the case for decision based on the pleadings and records already
filed. Judge Sardido insisted that he did "what he had done in
all
honesty and good faith."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
OCA’s Findings and Conclusions
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The OCA found that
Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in
the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 14071. The OCA held
that Circular No. 3-89, which is Judge Sardido’s basis in issuing the
Order
of 20 October 1998, refers to administrative complaints filed with the
IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular
does
not apply to criminal cases filed against justices and judges of lower
courts. The OCA recommended that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed
on
Judge Sardido for gross ignorance of the law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court’s Ruling
The Court issued Circular
No. 3-89 in response to a letter dated 19 December 1988 by then IBP
President
Leon M. Garcia, seeking clarification of the Court’s En Banc Resolution
of 29 November 1998 in RE: Letter of then Acting Presiding Justice
Rodolfo
A. Nocon[3]
and Associate Justices Reynato Puno[4]
and Alfredo Marigomen[5]
of the Court of Appeals.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A certain Atty. Eduardo
R. Balaoing had filed a complaint against Court of Appeals
Justices
Nocon, Puno and Marigomen relating to a petition filed before their
division.
In its En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988, the Court required the
IBP
to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action the complaint[6]
filed by Atty. Balaoing with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.
The Court stated that the power to discipline justices and judges of
the
lower courts is within the Court’s exclusive power and authority as
provided
in Section 11, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.[7]
The Court Administrator publicized the En Banc Resolution of 29
November
1988 by issuing Circular No. 17 dated 20 December 1988.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court issued Circular
No. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 clarifying the En Banc Resolution of 29
November
1988. Circular No. 3-89 provides in part as follows:
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(1) The IBP (Board
of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the
Supreme
Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of
lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently
unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as acts of
immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. x x
x. (Emphasis supplied) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Circular No. 3-89 clarified
the second paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
which
states that:
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The IBP Board of
Governors
may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute
proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government
service. (Emphasis supplied). chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As clarified, the
phrase
"attorneys x x x in the government service" in Section 1 of Rule
139-B does not include justices of appellate courts and judges of lower
courts who are not subject to the disciplining authority of the
IBP.
All administrative cases against justices of appellate courts and
judges
of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, Rule 139-B
refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is
administrative
and not criminal in nature. The cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89
are administrative cases for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys,
including justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower
courts.
The Court has vested the IBP with the power to initiate and prosecute
administrative
cases against erring lawyers.[8]
However, under Circular No. 3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to
refer
to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all administrative cases
filed
with IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower
courts.
As mandated by the Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive
power
to discipline administratively justices of appellate courts and judges
of lower courts.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Circular No. 3-89 does
not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate courts
or judges of lower courts. Trial courts retain jurisdiction over
the criminal aspect of offenses committed by justices of appellate
courts[9]
and judges of lower courts. This is clear from the Circular
directing
the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases
filed
against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the
Supreme Court. The case filed against Judge Hurtado is not an
administrative
case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case filed with the
trial
court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law.
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The acts or omissions
of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act and
an administrative offense. Whether the criminal case against Judge
Hurtado
relates to an act committed before or after he became a judge is of no
moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will be trying an RTC
judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney
or
judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against
him.
The dismissal of the criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of an
administrative case arising from the same set of facts. The
quantum
of evidence that is required in the latter is only preponderance of
evidence,
and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in
criminal
cases.[10]
As held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from
and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
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The burden of proof
for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment
or suspension, ‘clearly preponderant evidence’ is all that is required.
Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question
even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the
administrative
proceedings.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It should be emphasized
that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily
result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondent’s
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In
the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the
respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative
action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in
the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.
The
basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different
from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two
will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this
reason,
it would be well to remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen, which
we quote:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x x x Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a
suit,
but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of
its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, they are in
no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. They may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members
who by their misconduct have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.
x x x"chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A judge is called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural
rules. He must be conversant with basic legal principles and
well-settled
doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth
with
passion.[12]
Judge Sardido failed in this regard. He erred in excluding Judge
Hurtado
as one of the accused in the Amended Information and in forwarding the
criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
One last point. This
administrative case against Judge Sardido started before the amendment[13]
of Rule 140 classifying gross ignorance of the law a serious offense
punishable
by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
The
amendment cannot apply retroactively to Judge Sardido’s case.
However,
the fine of P5,000.00 recommended by the OCA is too light a
penalty
considering that this is not the first offense of Judge Sardido.
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In RE: Hold Departure
Order Issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido,[14]
the Court reprimanded Judge Sardido for issuing a hold-departure order
contrary to Circular No. 39-97. In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,[15]
the Court fined Judge Sardido P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave a
stern warning to Judge Sardido that a commission of the same or similar
act would be dealt with more severely. In Almeron v. Judge
Sardido,[16]
the Court imposed on Judge Sardido a stiffer fine of P10,000.00 for
gross
ignorance of the law. He was again sternly warned that the
commission
of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more
severely
including, if warranted, his dismissal from the service.
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In a more recent
administrative
case, Torcende v. Judge Sardido,[17]
the Court found Judge Sardido again guilty of gross ignorance of the
law
and of gross misconduct. This time the Court dismissed Judge Sardido
from
the service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits. The dismissal was with prejudice to reemployment
in
any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The records of the
OCA further disclose that Judge Sardido has other similar
administrative
complaints[18]
still pending against him. Such an unflattering service record erodes
the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. It is the duty of
every member of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to
protect
the image and integrity of the judiciary.[19]
The Court may still impose a fine on Judge Sardido in the instant case
despite his dismissal from the service.
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WHEREFORE, respondent
Judge Agustin T. Sardido is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for
gross
ignorance of the law. The fine may be deducted from his accrued leave
credits.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
For Falsification by Private Individual
and
Use of Falsified Document.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
As defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the same Code.
[3]
Now retired Supreme Court Justice.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Now retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals and retired
member
of the Judicial and Bar Council.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Docketed as CBD Case No. 055.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Section 11, Article VII provides that: "The members of the Supreme
Court
and judges of the lower courts shall hold office during good behavior
until
they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge
the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by vote
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Section 1, Rule 139-B.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Referring to the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan and not to the
Supreme
Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Diaz, 362 Phil. 580 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
A.C. No. 4017, 29 September 1999, 315 SCRA 406.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Tabao v. Espina, 368 Phil. 579 (1999), citing Conducto v. Monzon, 353
Phil.
796 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Effective 1 October 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
A.M. No. 01-9-245-MTC, promulgated on 5 December 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
316 Phil. 134 (1995).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
346 Phil. 424 (1997).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1239, promulgated on 24 January 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
1) 97-414-MTJ for Gross Misconduct, Gross
Violation of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, Jurisprudence and Legal
Procedure;
and 99-687-MTJ for Grave Abuse of Discretion, Partiality and Ignorance
of the Law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245, 19 January 2000, 322
SCRA
255.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |