SECOND DIVISION
NELIA A. ZIGA,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
MTJ-99-1203
June 10, 2003
-versus-
JUDGE RAMON A.
AREJOLA,
Respondent.
D E C I S I
O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a complaint filed
by Nelia A. Ziga against Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), Daet, Camarines Norte, for appearing as counsel in a land
registration case without permission from the Supreme Court and asking
for attorney’s fees for his legal services.chanrobles virtual law library
Nelia Arejola-Ziga and
Judge Ramon Arejola are two of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola. By virtue
of inheritance, they and eight others became owners in fee simple of a
19,664 sq. m. land in Calauag, Naga City owned by Fabiana. On January
23,
1995, while respondent was employed as an attorney in the Public
Attorney’s
Office (PAO) of Naga City, he filed in behalf of his co-heirs, an
application
for registration of title of the lot, docketed as Land Registration
Case
No. 95-142.[1]
In its decision dated
October 25, 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Naga City,
granted
the petition and ordered the imperfect title of the heirs to the
property
confirmed and registered in the name of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola,
flee
from liens and encumbrances of any kind whatsoever.[2]
Subsequently, a substantial portion of the lot, or 17,894 sq. m., has
been
agreed to be sold in favor of the City of Naga, as evidenced by a Deed
of Conditional Sale.[3]
The remaining portion of 1,770 sq. m. is subject of a dispute between
the
heirs of Fabiana Arejola and Josefina Vda. De Segarra.[4]
On June 9, 1997, respondent
was appointed judge of the MTC of Daet, Camarines Norte. He took his
oath
on August 1, 1997.cralaw:red
Despite his appointment,
respondent Judge continued to appear in the land registration case. On
October 31, 1997, he was requested by the court hearing the land
registration
case to submit his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear
as
counsel in the said case.[5]
This order was reiterated on June 15, 1998.[6]
On April 6, 1998, respondent
Judge wrote the City Mayor of Naga City, insisting (1) that the amounts
due under the contract of sale of the property of the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola should be paid by individual checks drawn out in equal
proportionate
amounts in favor of each heir, and (2) that his claim for contingent
attorney’s
fees and agent’s fees be segregated and paid to him in an amount
equivalent
to 30% of the gross selling price before any payment is made to the
heirs.
He further added that unless his demands are met, no contract for the
absolute
sale of the property would be finalized.[7]chanrobles virtual law library
In the present complaint,
Nelia Arejola Ziga alleges that respondent should be disciplined for
appearing
before a court as counsel without securing the permission of the
Supreme
Court and for asking contingent attorney’s fees and agent’s commission
amounting to 30% of the gross selling price of the property subject of
the land registration case.cralaw:red
In his Comment dated
August 24, 1998, respondent argues: He does not need to ask permission
from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) or from the Supreme Court since
he has every right to appear before the lower court as co-heir.
According
to him, he has been appearing in the land registration case as
representative
of the heirs of Fabiana Arejola and not as counsel. Respondent
explained
that being one of the heirs of the late Fabiana Arejola, he is a
party-litigant
and therefore a party-in-interest in the land registration case. He
filed
the application for the confirmation of land title in his own behalf
and
in representation of his co-heirs. Hence, he had every right to appear
and prosecute the case. The permission of the PAO was not required.
Respondent
further explains that since he alone actively participated in the case,
he has every right to demand contribution from the other heirs who
benefited
from his work, to be taken from the proceeds of the sale of the
property.
He believes that this case was filed to harass him because of the
misspelled
name of the complainant in the RTC decision on the registration of land
title.[8]
He further claims that complainant is shown to have a disturbed mind
and
to be suffering from manic depression.[9]
Pursuant to the Court’s
Resolution on June 30, 1999, the complainant and respondent manifested
their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings.[10]
On October 2, 2000,
the Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, for investigation, report and
recommendation.cralaw:red
On August 13, 2001,
Executive Judge Jose G. Dy submitted his report recommending that
respondent
be warned for using intemperate and unkind language towards
complainant.
Anent the alleged unauthorized practice of law, Executive Judge Dy
opines
that the same is without any basis. He finds that since the complainant
did not question the act before the Department of Justice where PAO is
a line agency, and considering that the RTC trying the case did not
insist
on the inhibition of respondent, the actions of the latter in appearing
on his own behalf and that of his co-heirs in the land registration
case
is not malicious.chanrobles virtual law library
After the investigation
report of Executive Judge Dy was noted, the Court, in a Resolution
dated
May 29, 2002, referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator
for evaluation, report and recommendation.cralaw:red
In its Memorandum dated
August 20, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) disagreed
with the findings of the Executive Judge and recommended that
respondent
judge be found guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and
accordingly
be suspended for a period of three months without pay.cralaw:red
The report of OCA reads:
We do not
agree
with the findings and recommendation of the investigating judge. It
must
be pointed out that Judge Dy arrived at his findings and recommendation
on the basis only of the records at hand. He did not conduct any
investigation
but merely evaluated the pleadings and evidence submitted by the
parties.
Section 35, Rule
138
of the Revised Rules of Court categorically provides that: "No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of
the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the
bar or give professional advice to clients." Further, Canon 5, Rule
5.07
of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that: "A judge shall not engage
in the private practice of law."
Contrary to the
findings
of the investigating judge, the facts of this case clearly show that
respondent
Judge Arejola violated the foregoing rules prohibiting judges from
engaging
in private law practice.chanrobles virtual law library
Records disclose
that
respondent was appointed to the Judiciary on 9 June 1997. He assumed
office
on 1 August 1997. Yet, he still submitted, on 9 June 1998, a Motion for
Reconsideration dated 5 June 1998 of an Order of the court in subject
land
registration case. Again, on 28 July 1998, Judge Arejola filed a
"Manifestation"
dated 24 July 1998 in the aforesaid case. Further, he appeared as
counsel
in the hearing conducted on 12 August 1998. All this he did without the
required permit from the Supreme Court and despite having been
required,
in at least two (2) occasions, by then Judge Ernesto A. Miguel, RTC,
Br.
23, Naga City, before whom the case was pending, to secure the
necessary
permission to appear as counsel.
No less than
respondent
himself admitted in his comment that he indeed appeared as counsel in
the
land registration case but sought to justify his act by alleging that
he
did so to protect his rights as one of the heirs to the disputed land.
He went as far as saying that as such, he need not request permission
from
the Supreme Court and that it was incorrect for Judge Miguel to require
him to secure a permit to appear as counsel.
Time and again,
the
Court has imposed sanctions on judges who engage in the practice of law
without first securing a permit therefor. In the case of Judge Arejola,
his offense is aggravated by the fact that he stubbornly continued to
appear
as counsel in the land registration case despite having been twice
required
by the court to first apply for permission to do so.
Under Sec. 22,
Rule
XIV of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the offense of engaging
in the private practice of a civil servant’s profession without the
necessary
authorization is punishable by suspension for six (6) months to one (1)
year, for the first offense.
Also, under Sec.
3,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
are serious offenses which, under Sec. 10 of the said Rule, are
punishable
by, among others, suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without
salary
and benefits.
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
the undersigned most respectfully recommends that Judge Ramon A.
Arejola,
MTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, be FOUND GUILTY of violating the Code of
Judicial
Conduct and accordingly SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months
without
pay.chanrobles virtual law library
The findings and
recommendations
of the Office of the Court Administrator are on the main well taken
except
for the recommended penalty.
First. As the OCA correctly
observed, no hearing was conducted by the Executive Judge when the
instant
case was referred to him for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, we find that the requirements of due process have been met.
Due
process does not mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity
or
right to be heard. A trial-type hearing is not always de rigueur in
administrative
proceedings.[11]
One may be heard not solely through oral presentation but also, and
perhaps
many times more creditably and practicable than oral arguments, through
pleadings,[12]
for as long as the element of fairness is not ignored.[13]
In this case, respondent was afforded ample opportunity to be heard.cralaw:red
Based on the records
of this case, he filed his comment to the complaint filed against him
and
he filed a manifestation stating that he is willing to submit the
instant
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. In his
comment,
he justified his claim for payment from his co-heirs for his fruitful
work.
That what he was asking is attorney’s fees can be clearly gleaned from
the Notice of Attorney’s Lien,[14]
dated March 31, 1997, which he filed before the court hearing the land
registration case, wherein he admitted to being "the attorney of the
applicants
and their lawful representative."[15]
Although the notice was filed before he was appointed municipal trial
judge,
he continued his practice of law after his appointment without prior
permission
from this Court. In his letter, dated April 6, 1998, respondent Judge
insisted
on his claim for "attorney’s fees."[16]
Also, respondent failed
to refute the documents submitted by complainant stating that he signed
as counsel for the heirs.[17]
Against these documentary evidence, the defense of respondent, that he
merely participated in the land registration case as a party-litigant
and
a co-heir, fails.cralaw:red
Second. The term "practice
of law" is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or
participation
in court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or
papers
in anticipation of a litigation, giving advice to clients or persons
needing
the same,[18]
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal
rights
are secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and
special
proceedings.[19]
Based on the records
of the instant case, the practice of law exercised by the respondent
from
the time he was appointed MTC Judge on June 9, 1997 and took his oath
on
August 1, 1997 can be enumerated thus:
1. October
21, 1997 - Respondent signed
an answer to the petition for relief from judgment filed by Josefina De
Segarra.[20]
2. October 31,
1997
- Respondent appeared for the applicants in the land registration
case.
He was ordered by RTC Judge Ernesto Miguel to file his written
authority
from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel in the said case.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
3. April 6,
1998
- Respondent wrote a letter to Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo, asking
for
the issuance of individual checks to the heirs of Fabiana Arejola, and
insisting on his claim for attorney’s fees.[22]
4.June 5,
1998
- Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the order of the RTC
directing
the suspension of the registration of the certificate of title in view
of the filing by an oppositor of a petition for relief from judgment.[23]
5.June 15,
1998
Respondent appeared in the land registration case, filing the motion
for
reconsideration.[24]
6. July 1,
1998
Respondent requested permission from the Supreme Court, through the
Court
Administrator, to appear as counsel in the Land Registration Case No.
95-142
in connection with the Petition for Relief from judgment filed by an
oppositor
in said case.[25]
7. August 12,
1998
- Respondent appeared in the land registration case hearing on the
petition
for relief from judgment and on his motion for reconsideration.[26]
8. January 25,
1999
Respondent wrote Naga City Mayor Sulpicio Roco, requesting that he be
paid
partial advance payment of the balance on the sale of the lot. He also
admitted in his letter that he is the counsel of the heirs of Fabiana
Arejola
in the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Petition for Relief from
Judgment
filed by Josefina Segarra.[27]
9. February 8,
1999
Respondent signed as authorized representative and as counsel of the
heirs
of Fabiana Arejola in a partial compromise agreement with the
oppositor,
Josefina Cedo Vda. De Segarra, and the City of Naga.[28]
10. May 20,
1999
Respondent appeared in the land registration case, agreeing to submit
pre-trial
brief in support of the motion to treat the petition for relief from
judgment
as an ordinary action for reconveyance. He was ordered by the court,
through
RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla, to submit his permit to appear as counsel
in
the case.[29]
11. July 27,
1999
- He signed a pre-trial brief for the heirs of Fabiana Arejola.[30]
12.October 19,
1999
- RTC Judge Corazon Tordilla ordered respondent disqualified from
appearing
in the land registration case in view of the latter’s failure to submit
to the court a permit to appear as counsel. All pleadings
submitted
by him were not acted upon by the said court by reason of such
disqualification.[31]
His rationalization
that
he represented the heirs as a co-heir and not as counsel is
hair-splitting.
The respondent’s act of writing pleadings and defending the rights of
his
co-heirs amounts to private practice of law. The tenor of the letters
and
pleadings, taken with his acts of appearing, representing and defending
the rights of the heirs over the property, show that respondent, as
representative
of the heirs, was defending the latter’s rights over the disputed
property,
and these constituted private practice of law.
It should be clarified
that prohibited "private practice" of a profession is more than an
isolated
court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self
to the public as a lawyer.[32]
It is evident that the instances when respondent appeared and
represented
his co-heirs are not isolated, thus, constituting the "private
practice"
of the law profession as contemplated by law.chanrobles virtual law library
Under Rule 138, Section
35 of the Revised Rules of Court, judges are prohibited from engaging
in
the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients.
This
is reiterated in Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins
members of the bench to regulate their extra-judicial activities to
minimize
the risk of conflict with their judicial duties. Rule 5.07 of the Code
in particular states:
A judge shall not engage
in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution
or
law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession
provided
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial
functions.chanrobles virtual law library
These provisions are
based on public policy for there is no question that the rights,
duties,
privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are
inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion
and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give
their
full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from
extending
special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of
their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives
are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the
public
interest.[33]
Third. Respondent failed
to obtain a written permission to appear as counsel in the land
registration
case from the head of the Department, which is this Court, as required
by Rule XVIII, Section 12 of the Revised Civil Service Rules,[34]
thus:
Sec. 12. No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural,
or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government;
Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission
is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which
do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests
and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise
or become an officer of the board of directors. (Emphasis ours)
As a Civil Service
employee,
he cannot engage in private practice without the written permission
from
this Court. The public expects him to devote full time to his judicial
work. As a general rule, the appointment or election of an attorney to
a government office disqualifies him from engaging in the private
practice
of law. The reason for the disqualification is that a public office is
a public trust, and a public officer or employee is obliged not only to
perform his duties with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency but also with exclusive fidelity. The
disqualification
is intended to preserve the public trust in a public office, avoid
conflict
of interests or a possibility thereof, assure the people of
impartiality
in the performance of public functions and thereby promote the public
welfare.[35]chanrobles virtual law library
Also, Section 7 of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees
[R.A. No. 6713] prohibits a public officer from undertaking certain
business
transactions or doing certain acts which may compromise his position as
a public official. This provision applies to judges. The said section
reads
in part:
Sec. 7.
Prohibited
Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials
and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
(a)
x
x x
(b)
Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public
officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:
x
x x
(2) Engage in the
private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
by
law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions; x
x
x
There is no dispute
that
when respondent agreed to file the complaint in behalf of the heirs of
Fabiana Arejola, he was not yet a member of the judiciary. He was a
lawyer
of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Naga City. He claimed that he
was authorized to engage in practice in behalf of his relatives but
presented
no documentary authority. The Court takes judicial notice of PAO
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1998, amending Sec. 5, Art. II of
the Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1997. It states thus:
Sec. 5-A.
Other
Persons Qualified for Assistance. -Immediate members of the family and
relatives within the 4th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
PAO
lawyers may avail of his services regardless of qualification under the
indigency test, with the approval of the Regional Director, if the case
is within his region or the Chief Public Attorney, if the case is
outside
of his region and provided further that the lawyer files a leave of
absence
on the day of the hearing.chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, while PAO
lawyers
may represent their family and relatives, they are required to get the
approval of either the Regional Director or the Chief Public Attorney.
However, considering that respondent filed the application for
registration
of title in behalf of his co-heirs in 1995 before he was appointed to
the
Bench, said circular does not apply to him. Despite this, respondent is
not exculpated from liability.
While respondent insists
that he performed the alleged acts of private practice before he joined
the judiciary, he failed to mention that even after he assumed office
as
a municipal judge on August 1, 1997, he continued to act as counsel for
the heirs.cralaw:red
Respondent was twice
required by the RTC judge presiding over the land registration case[36]
to submit his written authority from the Supreme Court to appear as
counsel,
to which he did not comply.cralaw:red
On July 1, 1998, respondent
requested the Court Administrator for authority to appear as counsel of
his co-heirs, in LRC Case No. 95-142.[37]
On July 15, 1998, he was required by then Court Administrator Alfredo
Benipayo
to furnish the Court with copy of the pleadings he filed, and to state
the date of filing of each, the stage of the proceedings and the
background
of the case.[38]
Unfortunately, however, he did not comply.cralaw:red
The fact that respondent
made a request for authority to appear as counsel in the said case is
an
admission not only that he was appearing as counsel but also that he
was
aware that he needed the permission of this Court to do so.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court always emphasizes
the importance of the role played by judges in the judicial system,
thus:
The
integrity
of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer
justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community
that
the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict
manner
by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not
necessarily
create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served.
Hence,
in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly
judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive
and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must
possess
the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness,
both
in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be
reassured
that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and
equity,
thus creating confidence in the judicial system.[39]
Under Section 9 (3) of
the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which took effect on October
1, 2001, an unauthorized practice of law of a judge constitutes a less
serious charge. Under Section 11, if a judge is guilty of a less
serious
charge, he may be imposed either (a) suspension from office without
salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months,
or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.chanrobles virtual law library
The OCA recommended
that respondent should be suspended for a period of 3 months without
pay.
Considering that Rule 140 as amended took effect only in 2001 and this
is respondent’s first offense,[40]
in lieu of suspension, we find the imposition of fine amounting to
P10,000.00,
just and reasonable.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the Court
finds Judge Ramon A. Arejola of the Municipal Trial Court, Daet,
Camarines
Norte LIABLE for illegal practice of law, in violation of the Code of
Judicial
Conduct, the Revised Rules of Court, the Revised Civil Service Rules,
and
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
He is ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00)
and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts or omissions
will
be dealt with more severely.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Entitled, "Application for Registration of Title of Lot 1883, Cad. 290,
Naga Cadastre, Heirs of Fabiana Arejola, represented by Atty. Ramon A.
Arejola, Applicants." Petition, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 115-119.
[2]
RTC Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 124.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
Rollo, p. 125.chanrobles virtual law library
[4]
Partial Compromise Agreement with Motion, p. 1; Rollo, p. 141.
[5]
Rollo, p. 10.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Rollo, p. 9.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 6-7.chanrobles virtual law library
[8]
Nelia Ziga was spelled "Lilia" Ziga.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 19-22.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Manifestation filed by complainant on August 6, 1999 (Rollo, p. 213);
Manifestation
filed by respondent on August 16, 1999 (Rollo, p. 221).
[11]
See Richards vs. Asoy, 152 SCRA 45,49(1987).chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
See Paat vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, 178-179 (1997).
[13]
Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237, 250 (1987).
[14]
Rollo, pp. 93-94.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Rollo,p.93.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 6-7.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Letter to Mayor Sulpicio Roco, dated January 25, 1999 (Rollo, p. 148);
Partial Compromise Agreement, dated February 8, 1999 (Rollo, pp.
141-142).
[18]
Carual vs. Brusola, 317 SCRA 54, 65 (1999), citing Dia-Anonuevo vs.
Bercacio,
68 SCRA 81 (1975).chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Ulep vs. Legal clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378, 397 (1993); Philippine
Lawyers
Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173, 176-177 (1959).
[20]
Rollo, pp. 226-228.
[21]
Rollo, p. 10.
[22]
Rollo, pp. 6-7.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 65-66.
[24]
Rollo, p. 9.
[25]
Rollo, p. 57.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 81-92.
[27]
Rollo, p. 148.
[28]
Rollo, pp. 141-142.
[29]
Rollo, p. 214.
[30]
Rollo, pp. 215-216.
[31]
Rollo, p. 252.chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ladaga, 350 SCRA 326, 331 (2001),
citing People vs. Villanueva, 121 Phil. 894 (1965).
[33]
Tuzon vs. Purugganan, A. M. No. RTJ-01-1662, November 26, 2001, citing
Carual vs. Brusola, 317 SCRA 54 (1999); Tabao vs. Asis, 252 SCRA 581
(1996);
Omico Mining and Industrial Corp. vs. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285 (1975).chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
See Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ladaga, 350 SCRA 326, 332
(2001);
Abeto vs. Garcesa, 251 SCRA 539, 541 (1995).
[35]
Agpalo, Ruben E., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, Seventh Ed., 2002, p. 588.chanrobles virtual law library
[36]
By Judge Ernesto Miguel on October 31, 1997 (Rollo, p. 10); By Judge
Corazon
Tordilla on May 20, 1999 (Rollo, p. 214).
[37]
Rollo, p. 57.chanrobles virtual law library
[38]
Rollo, p. 58.chanrobles virtual law library
[39]
Sadik vs. Casar, 266 SCRA 1, 14-15 (1997), citing Talens-Dabon vs.
Arceo,
259 SCRA 354 (1996).chanrobles virtual law library
[40]
The case filed against him in A.M. No. IPI-99-677-MTJ for gross
misconduct
and dishonesty was dismissed on October 24, 2001. |