EN BANC
ALEJANDRO
ESTRADA,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
P-02-1651
(formerly OCA
I.P.I.
No. 00-1021-P)
August 4, 2003
-versus-
SOLEDAD
S.
ESCRITOR,
Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
While I commend the thoroughly
researched and well-written ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Justice
Reynato Puno, I am unable to agree with the decision of the majority to
remand this case to the Office of the Court Administrator for reception
of further evidence. Indeed, my reading of the records of the case at
bar
revealed that there are no more factual issues to be resolved here.
Respondent
Soledad S. Escritor has admitted on more than one occasion her
cohabitation
with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr., a married man. However, the
distinguished
ponente has put forth the need to allow respondent to buttress the
sincerity
of her claimed religious belief and practice, and to require the
Solicitor
General to meet the test of compelling state interest to override
respondent's
religious belief and practice. These, to my mind, are unnecessary.
Respondent's
conduct need not only be measured against her religious beliefs. The
same
may even constitute offenses under our criminal statutes. Moreover, the
definition of disgraceful and immoral conduct under our civil service
law
is simple. Therefore, I submit, that there is extant in the records of
this case sufficient bases to hold respondent administratively liable.
The issue in this case
is simple. What is the meaning or standard of "disgraceful and immoral
conduct" to be applied by the Supreme Court in disciplinary cases
involving
court personnel?
The degree of morality
required of every employee or official in the public service has been
consistently
high. The rules are particularly strict when the respondent is a Judge
or a court employee.[1]
Even where the Court has viewed certain cases with human understanding
and compassion, it has insisted that no untoward conduct involving
public
officers should be left without proper and commensurate sanction.[2]
The compassion is shown through relatively light penalties. Never,
however,
has this Court justified, condoned, or blessed the continuation of an
adulterous
or illicit relationship such as the one in this case, after the same
has
been brought to its attention.chanrobles virtual law library
Is it time to adopt
a more liberal approach, a more "modern" view and a more permissive
pragmatism
which allow adulterous or illicit relations to continue provided the
job
performance of the court employee concerned is not affected and the
place
and order in the workplace are not compromised? When does private
morality
involving a court employee become a matter of public concern?chanrobles virtual law library
The Civil Service Law
punishes public officers and employees for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.[3]
Whether an act is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to
be
determined by respondent's concept of morality. The law provides the
standard;
the offense is complete if respondent intended to perform, and did in
fact
perform, the act which it condemns.[4]
The ascertainment of
what is moral or immoral calls for the discovery of contemporary
community
standards. For those in the service of the Government, provisions of
law
wind court precedents also have to be considered. The task is elusive.cralaw:red
The layman's definition
of what is "moral" pertains to excellence of character or disposition.
It relates to the distinction between right and wrong; virtue and vice;
ethical praise or blame. Moral law refers to the body of requirements
in
conformity to which virtuous action consists. Applied to persons, it is
conformity to the rules of morality, being virtuous with regards to
moral
conduct.[5]
That which is not consistent
with or not conforming to moral law, opposed to or violating morality,
and now, more often, morally evil or impure, is immoral. Immoral is the
state of not being virtuous with regard to sexual conduct.[6]
The term begs the definition.
Hence, anything contrary to the standards of moral conduct is immoral.
A grossly immoral act must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[7]
Anything plainly evil
or dissolute is, of course, unchangingly immoral. However, at the
fringes
or boundary limits of what is morally acceptable and what is
unacceptably
wrong, the concept of immorality tends to shift according to
circumstances
of time, person, and place. When a case involving the concept of
immorality
comes to court, the applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence take
center stage.chanrobles virtual law library
Those who choose to
tolerate the situation where a man and a woman separated from their
legitimate
spouses decide to live together in an "ideal" and yet unlawful union
state
— or more specifically, those who argue that respondent's cohabiting
with
a man married to another woman is not something which is willful,
flagrant,
or shameless — show a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community in a manner prejudicial to the
public
service.cralaw:red
Insofar as concepts
of morality are concerned, various individuals or cultures may indeed
differ.
In certain countries, a woman who does not cover herself with a burka
from
head to foot may be arrested for immoral behavior. In other countries,
near nudity in beaches passes by unnoticed. In the present case, the
perceived
fixation of our society over sex is criticized. The lesser degree of
condemnation
on the sins of laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice and
cowardice
is decried as discriminatory.cralaw:red
The issue in this case
is legal and not philosophical. It is a limited one. Is respondent
Soledad
S. Escritor guilty of "disgraceful and immoral" conduct in the context
of the Civil Service Law? Are there any sanctions that must be imposed?
We cannot overlook the
fact that respondent Escritor would have been convicted for a criminal
offense if the offended party had been inclined and justified to
prosecute
her prior to his death in 1998. Even now, she is a co-principal in the
crime of concubinage. A married woman who has sexual intercourse with a
man not her husband, and the man who has carnal knowledge of her
knowing
her to be married commit the crime of adultery.[8]
Abandonment by the legal husband without justification does not
exculpate
the offender; it merely mitigates the penalty.cralaw:red
The concubine with whom
a married man cohabits suffers the penalty of destierro.[9]
It is true that criminal proceedings cannot be instituted against
persons
charged with adultery or concubinage except upon complaint of the
offended
party.[10]
This does not mean that no actionable offense has been committed if the
offended party does not press charges. It simply cannot be prosecuted.
The conduct is not thereby approved, endorsed or commended. It is
merely
tolerated.cralaw:red
The inescapable fact
in this case is that acts defined as criminal under penal law have been
committed.cralaw:red
There are experts in
Criminal Law who believe that the codal provisions on adultery and
concubinage
are terribly outmoded and should be drastically revised. However, the
task
of amendment or revision belongs to Congress, and not to the Supreme
Court.chanrobles virtual law library
Our existing rule is
that an act so corrupt or false as to constitute a criminal act is
"grossly
immoral."[11]
It is not merely "immoral." Respondent now asks the Court to go all the
way to the opposite extreme and condone her illicit relations with not
even an admonition or a slight tap on the wrist.cralaw:red
I do not think the Court
is ready to render a precedent-setting decision to the effect that,
under
exceptional circumstances, employees of the judiciary may live in a
relationship
of adultery or concubinage with no fear of any penalty or sanction and
that after being discovered and charged, they may continue the
adulterous
relationship until death ends it. Indeed, the decision in this case is
not limited to court interpreter Soledad Escritor. It is not a pro hac
vice ruling. It applies to court employees all over the country and to
everybody in the civil service. It is not a private ruling but one
which
is public and far-reaching in its consequences.cralaw:red
In the 1975 case of
De Dios v. Alejo,[12]
the Court applied compassion and empathy but nonetheless recognized as
most important a mending of ways through a total breaking of
relationships.
The facts in that case are strikingly similar to those in this case.
Yet,
the Court required a high degree of morality even in the presence of
apparently
exculpating circumstances. It was stated:
While it is permissible
to view with human understanding and compassion a situation like that
in
which respondents find themselves, the good of the service and the
degree
of morality which every official and employee in the public service
must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the
government
in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his
part,
affecting morality, integrity and efficiency, while holding office
should
be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant
circumstances
taken into account. In the instant case, We cannot close our eyes to
the
important considerations that respondents have rendered government
service
for more than thirty-three and twenty-five years, respectively, and
that
there is no showing that they have ever been found guilty of any
administrative
misconduct during all those periods. In the case of respondent Alejo,
it
seems rather sadistic to make her suffer the extreme penalty of
dismissal
from the service after she had taken care of her co-respondent's four
children,
giving them the needed love and attention of a foster mother after they
were completely abandoned by their errant and unfaithful natural
mother.
Even respondent Marfil, if to a lesser degree, is deserving of
compassion.
Most importantly, respondents have amply demonstrated that they
recognize
their mistake and have, therefore, actually mended their ways by
totally
breaking their relationship complained of, in order to conform with the
imperatives of public interest. (Emphasis supplied.)chanrobles virtual law library
The standards for those
in the judicial service are quite exacting.cralaw:red
The Court has ruled
that in the case of public servants who are in the judiciary, their
conduct
and behavior, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all else,
must
be above suspicion.[13]
In Burgos v. Aquino,[14]
it was ruled:
The Code of
Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be
free
from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in
the
judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also
judged by his private morals. These exacting standards of morality and
decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to
those
in the service of the judiciary. Respondent, as a court stenographer,
did
not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life. Her act of
maintaining
relations with Atty. Burgos speaks for itself.
Respondent Aquino was
a court stenographer who was suspended for six months for maintaining
illicit
relations with the husband of complainant Virginia E. Burgos. The Court
therein stated that a second offense shall result in dismissal.chanrobles virtual law library
We should not lose
sight
of the fact that the judicial system over which it presides is
essentially
composed of human beings who, as such, are naturally prey to weakness
and
prone to errors. Nonetheless, in Ecube-Badel v. Badel,[15]
we imposed on respondent a suspension for six months and one day to one
year with warning of dismissal should the illicit relations be repeated
or continued.
In Nalupta v. Tapec,[16]
a deputy sheriff was suspended, also for six months, for having illicit
relations with a certain Cristian Dalida who begot a son by him. His
wife
complained and neighbors confirmed that Tapec was frequently seen
leaving
the house of Consolacion Inocencio in the morning and returning to it
in
the afternoon. Tapec and Inocencio begot two children. Consistently
with
the other cases, we imposed the penalty of suspension for the first
offense
with the graver penalty of dismissal for a second offense.cralaw:red
The earlier case of
Aquino v. Navarro[17]
involved an officer in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
who
was abandoned by her husband a year after their marriage and who lived
alone for eighteen years with their child. Pretending that she
sincerely
believed her husband to have died, she entered into a marital
relationship
with Gonzalo Aquino and had children by him in 1968 and 1969. Eighteen
days before their third child was born on May 25, 1975, the two decided
to get married. Notwithstanding the illicit relationship which
blossomed
into a bigamous marriage, the full force of the law was not applied on
her, "considering the exceptional circumstances that befell her in her
quest for a better life." Still, a penalty of six months suspension was
imposed with a warning that "any moral relapse on her part will be
severely
dealt with."
Times are changing.
Illicit sex is now looked upon more kindly. However, we should not
completely
disregard or overlook a relationship of adultery or concubinage
involving
a court employee and not order it to be terminated. It should not
ignore
what people will say about our moral standards and how a permissive
approach
will be used by other court employees to freely engage in similarly
illicit
relationship with no fear of disciplinary punishment.cralaw:red
As earlier mentioned,
respondent Escritor and Luciano Quilapio, Jr. had existing marriages
with
their respective legitimate spouses when they decided to live together.
To give an aura of regularity and respectability to what was undeniably
an adulterous and, therefore, immoral relationship, the two decided to
acquire through a religious ceremony what they could not accomplish
legally.
They executed on July 28, 1991 the "Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness"
to make their relationship what they alleged it would be — a binding
tie
before Jehovah God.chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, respondent
is charged not as a Jehovah's Witness but in her capacity as a court
employee.
It is contended that respected elders of the Jehovah's Witnesses
sanction
"an informal conjugal relationship" between respondent and her marital
partner for more than two decades, provided it is characterized by
faithfulness
and devotion to one another. However, the "informal conjugal
relationship"'
is not between two single and otherwise eligible persons where all that
is missing is a valid wedding ceremony. The two persons who started to
live together in an ostensible marital relationship are married to
other
persons.cralaw:red
We must be concerned
not with the dogmas or rules of any church or religious sect but with
the
legal effects under the Civil Service Law of an illicit or adulterous
relationship
characterized by the facts of this case.cralaw:red
There is no conflict
in this case between the dogmas or doctrines of the Roman Catholic
Church
and those of the Jehovah's Witnesses or any other church or
denomination.
The perceived conflict is non-existing and irrelevant.cralaw:red
The issue is legal and
not religious. The terms "disgraceful" and "immoral" may be religious
concepts,
but we are concerned with conduct which under the law and jurisprudence
is proscribed and, if perpetrated, how it should be punished.cralaw:red
Respondent cannot legally
justify her conduct by showing that it was morally right by the
standards
of the congregation to which she belongs. Her defense of freedom of
religion
is unavailing. Her relationship with Mr. Quilapio is illicit and
immoral,
both under the Revised Administrative Code[18]
and the Revised Penal Code,[19]
notwithstanding the supposed imprimatur given to them by their religion.cralaw:red
The peculiar religious
standards alleged to be those of the sect to which respondent belongs
can
not shield her from the effects of the law. Neither can her illicit
relationship
be condoned on the basis of a written agreement approved by their
religious
community. To condone what is inherently wrong in the face of the
standards
set by law is to render nugatory the safeguards set to protect the
civil
service and, in this case, the judiciary.chanrobles virtual law library
The Court cannot be
the instrument by which one group of people is exempted from the
effects
of these laws just because they belong to a particular religion.
Moreover,
it is the sworn mandate of the Court to supervise the conduct of an
employee
of the judiciary, and it must do so with an even hand regardless of her
religious affiliation.cralaw:red
I find that respondent's
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" does nothing for her insofar as
this administrative matter is concerned, for written therein are
admissions
regarding the legal impediments to her marrying Quilapio. In the said
document,
she even pledged to seek all avenues to obtain legal recognition by
civil
authorities of her union with Quilapio.[20]
However, the record is silent as to any effort on respondent's part to
effect this covenant.cralaw:red
The evidence shows that
respondent repeatedly admitted the existence of the legal infirmities
that
plague her relationship with Quilapio[21]
As a court interpreter, she is an integral member of the judiciary and
her service as such is crucial to the administration of justice. Her
acts
and omissions constitute a possible violation of the law — the very
same
law that she is sworn to uphold as an employee of the judiciary. How
can
she work under the pretense of being a contributing force to the
judicial
system if she herself is committing acts that may constitute breaking
the
law?
Respondent involves
her constitutional right to religious freedom. The separation of church
and state has been inviolable in this jurisdiction for a century.
However,
the doctrine is not involved in this case.[22]
Furthermore, the legislature made cohabitation with a woman who is not
one's wife a crime through the enactment of the Revised Penal Code.[23]
The legislative power has also seen fit to enact the Civil Service Law
and has given said law general application.chanrobles virtual law library
The argument that a
marital relationship is the concern of religious authorities and not
the
State has no basis.cralaw:red
In Reynolds v. United
States,[24]
the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
It is
impossible
to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was
intended
to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of
social
life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is,
nevertheless,
in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by
law.
Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring
social
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is
necessarily
required to deal.
The strengthening
of
marriage ties and the concomitant hostility to adulterous or illicit
marital
relations is a primary governmental concern. It has nothing to do with
the particular religious affiliations of those affected by legislation
in this field.
The relations,
duties,
obligations and consequences of marriage are important to the morals
and
civilization of a people and to the peace and welfare of society.[25]
Any attempt to inject freedom of religion in an effort to exempt
oneself
from the Civil Service rules relating to the sanctity of the marriage
tie
must fail.
The U.S. Supreme Court
in the above-cited case of Reynolds v. United States[26]
upheld federal legislation prohibiting bigamy and polygamy in
territories
of the United States, more specifically Utah. Members of the Mormon
Church
asserted that the duty to practice polygamy was an accepted doctrine of
their church. In fact, Mormons had trekked from the regular States of
the
Union to what was then a mere Territory in order to practice their
religious
beliefs, among them polygamy. The Court declared that while it
protected
religious belief and opinion, it did not deprive Congress of the power
to reach actions violative of social duties or subversive of good
order.
Polygamy was outlawed even for Mormons who considered it a religious
obligation.chanrobles virtual law library
We must not exempt illegal
conduct or adulterous relations from governmental regulation simply
because
their practitioners claim it is part of their free exercise of
religious
profession and worship.cralaw:red
Indeed, the Court distinguishes
between religious practices, including the seemingly bizarre, which may
not be regulated, and unacceptable religious conduct which should be
prevented
despite claims that it forms part of religious freedom.cralaw:red
In Ebralinag v. Division
Superintendent of Schools,[27]
we validated the exemption of Jehovah's Witnesses from coerced
participation
in flag ceremonies of public schools. Following the ruling in West
Virginia
v. Barnette,[28]
we declared that unity and loyalty; the avowed objectives of flag
ceremonies,
cannot be attained through coercion. Enforced unity and loyalty is not
a good that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.cralaw:red
The exemption from participation
in flag ceremonies cannot be applied to the tolerance of adulterous
relationships
by court personnel in the name of religious freedom.cralaw:red
A clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public morals, is a ground
for the reasonable regulation of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious
profession.[29]
In addition to the destruction of public morals, the substantive evil
in
this case is the tearing down of morality, good order, and discipline
in
the judiciary.cralaw:red
Jurisprudence on immoral
conduct of employees in the civil service has been consistent. There is
nothing in this case that warrants a departure from precedents. We must
not sanction or encourage illicit or adulterous relations among
government
employees.chanrobles virtual law library
Soledad S. Escritor
and Luciano D. Quilapio are devoted members of Jehovah's Witness.
Exemptions
granted under our Muslim Laws to legitimate followers of Islam do not
apply
to them.[30]
The Court has no legislative power to place Jehovah's Witness in the
same
legal category as Muslims.cralaw:red
In Bucatcat v. Bucatcat,[31]
it was held that conduct such as that demonstrated by the respondent is
immoral and deserving of punishment. For such conduct, the respondent,
another court interpreter, was dismissed from the service. It was held:chanrobles virtual law library
Every
employee
of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.
Like any public servant, he must exhibit the highest sense of honesty
and
integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his
personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the
court's
good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a
court
of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel
who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality
and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve
the good name and integrity of courts of justice.
All those who work in
the
judiciary are bound by the most exacting standards of ethics and
morality
to maintain the people's faith in the courts as dispensers of justice.
In Liguid v. Camano,[32]
it was ruled:
Surely,
respondent's
behavior of living openly and scandalously for over two (2) decades
with
a woman not his wife and siring a child by her is representative of the
gross and serious misconduct penalized by the ultimate penalty of
dismissal
under Section 22 (c), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
IV
of Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative
Code of 1987. As defined, misconduct is a transgression of some
established
or definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross
negligence by the public officer. Respondent's conduct is an example of
the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct that so quickly and surely
corrodes
the respect for the courts without which government cannot continue and
that tears apart the bonds of our polity.
Earlier, in Navarro v.
Navarro,[33]
the penalty of suspension was imposed on a court employee for
maintaining
illicit relations with a woman not his wife, thus:
Time and
again
we have stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a
public
trust. All government officials and employees must at all times be
accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
This constitutional mandate should always be in the minds of all public
servants to guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in
the
government service. The good of the service and the degree of morality
which every official and employee in the public service must observe,
if
respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the
enforcement
of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part, affecting
morality,
integrity and efficiency while holding office should be left without
proper
and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into
account.chanrobles virtual law library
The exacting standards
of ethics and morality imposed upon court judges and court employees
are
required to maintain the people's faith in the courts as dispensers of
justice, and whose image is mirrored by their actuations. As the Court
eloquently stated through Madame Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma:
[T]he image of the court
of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise,
of the men and woman who work thereat, from the judge to the least and
lowest of its personnel — hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty
of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and
standing
as a true ample of justice.[34]
The high degree of moral
uprightness that is demanded of employees of the government entails
many
sacrifices that are peculiar to the civil service. By aspiring to these
positions, government employees are deemed to have submitted themselves
to greater scrutiny of their conduct, all in the pursuit of a
professional
civil service. The Court has repeatedly applied these principles in
analogous
cases.[35]chanrobles virtual law library
Immorality is punishable
by suspension of six (6) months and one day to one (1) year for the
first
offense and dismissal for the second offense.[36]
Considering that respondent's misconduct is in the nature of a
continuing
offense, it must be treated as a first offense, and her continued
cohabitation
with Luciano E. Quilapio, Jr. must be deemed a second offense, which
will
warrant the penalty of dismissal.cralaw:red
ACCORDINGLY, I vote
that respondent Soledad S. Escritor be found GUILTY of immorality and
disgraceful
conduct and that she be SUSPENDED for a period of Six (6) months and
One
day without pay, with a warning that the continuance of her illicit
cohabitation
with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. shall be deemed a second offense which
shall
warrant the imposition of the appropriate penalty.
____________________________
Endnotes:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting opinion:
[1]
Lacuata v. Bautista, A.M. No. P-94-1005, 12 August 1994, 235 SCRA 290.
[2]
De Dios v. Alejo, A.M. No. P-137, 15 December 1975, 68 SCRA 354.
[3]
Revised Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 46
(b)
(5).
[4]
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 Sup. Ct. 13 (1946).
[5]
Oxford Universal Dictionary, Vol. 2, p. 1280.
[6]
Id., p. 961.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Sibal, Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 406; Soberano v. Villanueva,
116
Phil. 1208 (1962); Reyes v. Wong, A.M. No. 547, 29 January 1975, 63
SCRA
668.
[8]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 333.chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Revised Penal Code, Art. 334.chanrobles virtual law library
[10]
Quilatan v. Caruncho, 21 Phil. 399, 403 (1912), Rules of Court, Rule
110,
Section 5.
[11]
Reyes v. Wong, supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Lacuata v. Bautista, supra.
[14]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
339 Phil. 510 (1997).
[16]
A.M. No. P-88-263, 30 March 1993, 220 SCRA 505.
[17]
220 Phil. 49 (1985).chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
E.O. 292, Sec, 46 (5).
[19]
Art. 334.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Rollo, Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 14-15.
[21]
TSN, October 12, 2000, pp. 11-15.
[22]
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6; 1973 Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 15.
[23]
Art. 334.chanrobles virtual law library
[24]
98 U.S. 145; 25 L. Ed. 244 (1879).
[25]
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190; 31 L. Ed. 654.
[26]
Supra.chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
G.R. No. 95770, 1 March 1993, 219 SCRA 256.
[28]
319 U.S. 624 (1943).chanrobles virtual law library
[29]
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
[30]
Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong v. Malik, A.M. No.
MTJ-92-691,
10 September 1993, 226 SCRA 193.
[31]
380 Phil. 555 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[32]
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1509, 8 August 2002.
[33]
A.M. No. OCA-00-61, 6 September 2000, 339 SCRA 709.chanrobles virtual law library
[34]
Id., at 716-717; citing Lim-Arce v. Arce, A.M. No. P-89-312, 9 January
1992, 205 SCRA 21 and Sy v. Cruz, 321 Phil. 231 [1995].
[35]
Benavidez v. Vega, A.M. No. P-01-1530, 13 December 2001; Alday v. Cruz,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530, 14 March 2001, 354 SCRA 322
[36]
Civil Service Rules, Rule XIV, Section 23 (o). |