SECOND DIVISION
MONICA A.
VILLASEÑOR,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
P-03-1685
March 20, 2003
-versus-
PATRICIA S.J. DE
LEON,CLERK III,
RTC-OCC,
NAGA CITY,
Respondent
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RESPONDENT PATRICIA S.J.
DE LEON, Clerk III, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Naga City, borrowed P20,000.00 from complainant Monica A.
Villaseñor
on 1 November 1996 at five percent (5%) interest per month which she
agreed
to pay in full once she received her year-end bonus for that year as a
court employee. On the agreed date of payment, she failed to
settle
her indebtedness, and continues to do so despite several demands and
years
passing; hence, the instant complaint.
It appears that on 3
February 1998 Monica A. Villaseñor filed her complaint against
respondent
Patricia S.J. de Leon with the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial
Court, Naga City, for "willful failure to pay just debt," an
administrative
offense constituting conduct unbecoming of a public official.cralaw:red
In her Letter-Comment
of 4 February 1998 respondent admitted the existence of the loan and
its
terms together with her default in the payment thereof. She also
alleged that the proceeds of the loan were divided among employees of
the
Office of the Clerk of Court, including herself, and those of the
Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor, but none of them paid his share
therein.
To resolve the matter, respondent asked for time to clear the entire
obligation
within April 1998. Apparently, complainant agreed to the
extension.
Despite the break given her, however, respondent paid only P500.00 and
thereafter, ignoring repeated demands, reneged on her commitment and
altogether
refused to pay the loan.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This prompted complainant
Monica A. Villaseñor to file on 13 May 1998 a similar complaint
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). On 31 August
1998
the Court Administrator endorsed the complaint to respondent for her
comment
but the endorsement was not acted upon by her. Three (3) years
later
or on 29 January 2001, there being no progress still on her complaint,
complainant wrote OCA another Letter-Complaint begging for immediate
assistance
and pleading that she needed the money desperately for her medical
check-up
and sustenance.cralaw:red
On 14 March 2001 the
OCA again endorsed the complaint to respondent who, finally, on 14 June
2001 filed her Letter-Comment. Like her initial comment, she
admitted
the loan but interposed as defense an alleged payment scheme that began
in November 2000. Under the arrangement, complainant was to be
paid
P1,000.00 per month until the loan and its interests were fully paid.cralaw:red
In the 14 August 2002
Resolution we required complainant to file her reply to respondent's
Letter-Comment
within ten (10) days from notice of the order. The Resolution was
returned to this Court unserved with the notation "MOVED." On 9
December
2002 we treated this Resolution as having been served upon complainant
by substituted service on the date thereof which was 30 September 2002.cralaw:red
No reply has since been
filed by complainant. Hence, the Court considers her to have
waived
her right to file a reply and to have submitted the case for decision.[1]
In any event, since respondent had several times admitted her failure
to
pay her indebtedness despite complainant's repeated demands, which
constitute
the elements of the administrative offense, no further investigation is
necessary.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Willful failure to
pay just debts" is a light offense punishable by reprimand for the
first
transgression.[2]
A "just debt" applies to "claims the existence and justness of which
are
admitted by the debtor,"[3]
a fact so clearly established in the instant case. On the other
hand,
the willfulness of respondent's act in not paying her just obligation
is
conclusively shown by the several years beginning in 1996 that the loan
remained unpaid notwithstanding the never-ending appeal for settlement
and pleas for humanitarian consideration, the number of
letter-complaints
that complainant had to file to air her grievance, and the many payment
offers promised by respondent. This attitude towards an elderly
citizen
in poor health reflects not only on respondent's absence of
credit-worthiness
but more so on her character that is unbecoming of a public employee.[4]
For reasons known only
to her, respondent did not state her basis for refusing to pay the
acknowledged
debt and inflicting unnecessary inconvenience upon complainant.
The
indebtedness was incurred as early as 1 November 1996 and it was not
until
April 1998 as a result of the complaint filed with the Acting Clerk of
Court that respondent made her first partial payment of P500.00 to the
poor lady. When the looming scandal dissipated, she broke her
commitment
to pay the whole indebtedness within April of 1998. It is clearly
unfair to complainant to be treated this way as well as unethical for
respondent
to renege on her promises.cralaw:red
Respondent alleged that
she and complainant had already arranged for another payment scheme
that
began in November 2000 whereby complainant was being paid the amount of
P1,000.00 per month until the loan and its interests were completely
satisfied.
We doubt however if this allegation is true or that it is being
fulfilled
faithfully by her. As late as 29 January 2001, complainant was
still
protesting that respondent was not paying the debt. In any case,
even if the agreement be accurate and observed to the letter, the fact
remains that respondent backtracked twice on her promise - first, when
she promised to pay the loan from her year-end bonus in 1996, and
second,
when she pledged to satisfy the obligation in April 1998 - enough
grounds
for us to impose administrative sanction.cralaw:red
As we have observed
in Perez v. Hilario,[5]
the discharge of a court employee's debt does not render the
administrative
case moot. For, the proceedings are not directed at respondent's
private life but at her actuations unbecoming a public employee.
Disciplinary
actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal
matters.
They cannot be made to depend upon the will of the parties nor are we
bound
by their unilateral act in a matter that involves the Court's
constitutional
power to discipline its personnel. Otherwise, this power may be
put
to naught or otherwise undermine the trust character of a public office
and the dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While it may be just
for an individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that
he
is a public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the
occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the
image
of the public office.[7]
In the instant case, we clearly discern some reasonably foreseeable
specific
connection between respondent's shameful conduct and the injury to the
nobility of the service.cralaw:red
As it is, respondent
used her compensation as Clerk III of the RTC-OCC as some sort of
collateral
and inducement so that complainant would lend her the money. And,
as she herself admitted, the proceeds of the loan were divided among
the
staff of the RTC-OCC and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, thus
involving virtually the entire office in her private transaction.
In addition, the loss of man-hours on her part attending to the instant
complaint is clearly prejudicial to her efficiency in her job.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is not also illogical
to conclude that respondent's audacity in avoiding payment of the debt
sprang from her being an employee of the judiciary, as if she could use
her service badge to evade a rightful obligation. Not even the
formal
complaints filed with the proper disciplining authorities could induce
her to undergo a change of heart. We must likewise point out that
respondent occupies a sensitive position in the Office of the Clerk of
Court. If moved by sinister or ulterior motives arising from the
loan morass she found herself in, she could undermine the
administration
of justice by simply failing to act or by tampering with the record
books
for a consideration with which to pay her debts. Verily, under
this
all too possible scenario, respondent can unilaterally imperil the
orderly
dispensation of justice as a result of her contractual obligations.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Clearly, respondent's
willful failure to pay her just debt is unbecoming of a public employee
and a ground for disciplinary action against her. Her unethical
conduct
has diminished the honor and integrity of her office, stained the image
of the judiciary and caused unnecessary interference directly or
indirectly
in the efficient and effective performance of her functions.
Certainly,
to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply
with
just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards.
Like all court personnel, respondent is expected to be a paragon of
uprightness,
fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in
her
personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so
as to avoid becoming her court's albatross of infamy.cralaw:red
At all times, respondent
should avoid situations which tend to arouse suspicion that she is
utilizing
her official position for personal gain or advantage to the prejudice
of
the public. We need not exaggerate the importance of being absolutely
free
from any doubt that relations with others constitute an element in the
determination of a pending case. Such distrust gratuitously
erodes
the faith and confidence of the people in the dispensation of
justice.
As the Constitution categorically declares, "[p]ublic office is a
public
trust. Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree
of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain
accountable to the people."[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Truly, this Court is
not a collection agency for faltering debtors.[9]
Hence, in a disciplinary proceeding, we cannot adjudicate on the
existence
and amount of the loan if such facts are disputed by the parties.[10]
At the same time, it is not proper in these proceedings to issue writs
of execution or order the levy of respondent's properties, including
her
salaries to satisfy the indebtedness. For, the purpose of an
administrative
proceeding is to protect public service and maintain its dignity based
on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust.
Evidently, disciplinary cases involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance, as they are undertaken and prosecuted
solely
for the public welfare. The complainant or the person who calls
the
attention of the court to the alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party,
and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens
may have in the proper management of justice.[11]
Consistent with the
realm of an administrative case, we are dutybound to correct whatever
we
perceive as an improper conduct among court employees by ordering them
to do what is proper in the premises. In the instant case,
therefore,
we direct respondent to pay her indebtedness to complainant, i.e.,
inclusive
of principal and interest agreed upon, in accordance with their
agreement,
if any, or within a reasonable time from receipt of this Decision.[12]
A violation of this order could become the basis of another
administrative
charge for a second offense of "willful failure to pay just debts"
punishable
by suspension of one (1) to thirty (30) days, among other serious
charges
arising from a willful violation of a lawful order of this Court. With
this command, we hope that respondent will stay away from such misdeed
and shun a subsequent offense of the same nature, or any other offense
for that matter.cralaw:red
The payment of respondent's
debt is in addition to the penalty of reprimand with warning that
commission
of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
This ruling should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an
erring court employee to whom a passage in the Book of Proverbs must
have
a reverberating significance, "A single reprimand does more for a man
of
intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool."
WHEREFORE, respondent
PATRICIA S.J. DE LEON, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Office of the
Clerk
of Court of Naga City, is REPRIMANDED for "Willful Failure to Pay Just
Debts," which amounts to conduct unbecoming an employee of the court.
Furthermore,
she is directed to pay complainant Monica A. Villaseñor or her
heirs
or assigns, as the case may be, the whole amount of her indebtedness,
which
originally stood at P20,000.00, i.e., inclusive of principal and
interest
agreed upon, less previous payments thereon, in accordance with the
agreement
between respondent and complainant, if one has been stipulated in the
meantime,
or if none has been reached, within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this
Decision. A commission of the same or similar acts in the future,
including a violation of this Decision, will be dealt with more
severely.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Mendoza, Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Nawan Community Rural Bank v. Martinez, A.M. No. P-02-1587, 5 June 2002.
[2]
Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service
(Resolution No. 99-1936).
[3]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Garciano v. Oyao, A.M. No. P-208, 27 January 1981, 102 SCRA 195.
[5]
A.M. No. P-02-1603, 23 July 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Arañes v. Occiano, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, 11 April 2002.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Art. XIII, Sec. 1.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Martinez v. Muñoz, A.M. No. P-94-1006, 6 October 1995, 249 SCRA
14; Taboada v. Cabrera, A.M. No. 980-CTJ, 16 August 1977, 78 SCRA 105.
[10]
De Guzman v. Burce, A.M. No. P-01-1460, 28 February 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Tajan v. Hon. Vicente Cusi, Jr., No. L- 28899, 30 May 1974, 57 SCRA 154.
[12]
Mariano v. Roxas, A.M. No. CA-02-14-P, 31 July 2002, citing Lim v.
Judge
Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr., Adm. Matter No. RTJ-99-1517, February 26,
2002;
Garciano v. Oyao, 102 SCRA 195 (1981); Manalo v. Demaala, 104 SCRA 30
(1981);
and Fabrigas v. Nemeño, 146 SCRA 61 (1986). |