SECOND DIVISION
COMMISSIONER
ANDREA
D. DOMINGO,
Complainant,
A.M.
No.
RTJ-03-1751
June 10, 2003
-versus-
EXECUTIVE
JUDGE
ERNESTO
P. PAGAYATAN,
RTC, BRANCH 46,
SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO,
Respondent.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
R E S O L U T I O
N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a Letter-Complaint dated
December 7, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator,
Commissioner
Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) charged Executive
Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental
Mindoro (Branch 46) with gross ignorance of the law relative to
Criminal
Case No. R-5075 for Estafa, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Ernesto
M. Peñaflorida.
Complainant alleged:
On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of
Commissioners
(BOC) issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against
Ernesto
M. Peñaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an
overstaying
and undocumented alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of
Commonwealth
Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
Peñaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands
indicted
in the United States for health care fraud which resulted in more than
$1,376,000.00 losses to the U.S. Federal Government. No appeal was
filed
with the Office of the President. The SDO became final and executory on
October 15, 2001. On the same date, respondent issued a Notice of
Arraignment
requiring the production of Peñaflorida on November 19 and 20,
2001.
On the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied the
P40,000.00
bail recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional
release
of the accused on the ground that the crime Peñaflorida was
charged
with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable offense. Respondent
ordered
the commitment of Peñaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day, the BOI
received information that respondent had allowed the release from
detention
of Peñaflorida, who is an alien federal fugitive, without the
interdepartmental
courtesy of affording prior notice to the BOI of such action. She is
appalled
not only by the respondent’s employment of legal subterfuges in
ordering
the release of Peñaflorida whose Summary Deportation Order had
already
become final and executory, but also by the respondent’s bad faith in
deceiving
them into surrendering the custody of an undesirable alien federal
fugitive
to the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.[1]
In his Comment, dated
March 22, 2002, respondent explained: On November 20, 2001,
Peñaflorida
filed an urgent motion to fix bail. When the prosecution and the
defense
jointly manifested that it would be fair and just if the court would
fix
the bail bond for the provisional release of the accused
Peñaflorida
at P250,000.00, he granted the motion to fix bail on November 21, 2001;
and, at the time he issued the Order fixing the bail bond of the
accused
at P250,000.00, he was not aware that a deportation order had already
been
issued by the BOI against the latter.[2]chanrobles virtual law library
In a Resolution dated
January 15, 2003, the Court re-docketed the administrative complaint as
a regular administrative matter and required the parties to manifest
within
ten days from notice if they are willing to submit the case for
decision
based on the pleadings filed by the parties.[3]
In compliance, the complainant
and the respondent manifested their willingness to submit the case on
the
basis of the pleadings.[4]
In addition to his manifestation, however, respondent averred: Upon
learning
that an order of deportation was issued against Peñaflorida, he
ordered the cancellation of the bail bond posted by Peñaflorida
and issued a warrant for the latter’s arrest on April 26, 2002; and
that
Peñaflorida voluntarily surrendered himself on October 24, 2002
and is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro.[5]
In its Evaluation Report,
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends to the Court
that
respondent be fined P5,000.00 for Gross Ignorance of the Law, reasoning
that:
After going over the
records of the case, it is very evident that respondent Judge acted
with
undue haste in issuing the order granting bail considering the fact
that
in his earlier Order dated November 19, 2001, he did not grant a bail
of
P40,000.00 which the Provincial Prosecutor had previously recommended
for
the provisional release of the accused. His denial was based on the
ground
that the case filed against the accused could be considered large-scale
Estafa, an unbailable offense. Respondent Judge should not have granted
bail simply on the lack of readiness on the part of the prosecution to
present any witness to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused
was strong but should have endeavored to determine the existence of
such
evidence.cralaw:red
Under the present rules,
a hearing is required before granting bail whether it is a matter of
right
or discretion. The prosecution must always be given an opportunity to
present
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to
introduce
before the Court may resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution
refuses
to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for
bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
searching
and clarificatory questions.cralaw:red
Moreover, since the
accused was accompanied by the personnel of the Bureau of Immigration
when
brought to the RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, for his
arraignment
in Criminal Case No. R-5075 respondent Judge could have easily verified
from his escort if the former was being detained for other crimes aside
from the one where he was being arraigned in respondent’s sala. Had he
done so, respondent could have been informed outright by the B.I.
personnel
escort that the accused had already been the subject of a Summary
Deportation
Order and, thus, he could have deferred action on the latter’s
(accused)
Motion to Fix Bail and afforded the Bureau of Immigration the chance
and
opportunity to interpose their objection to the grant thereof.[6]
(Citations omitted).cralaw:red
The Court agrees with
the findings and recommendation of the OCA.chanrobles virtual law library
Under the rules on bail,
a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right
or discretion.[7]
A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions
from
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack
of
it, against the accused, in cases where the offense is punishable by
death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[8]
After hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain
a summary of the evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the
judge
should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so
presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the accused.[9]
Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may
be
invalidated because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which
contains
the judge’s evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect
of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense.[10]
The herein respondent
granted bail to the accused Peñaflorida without conducting a
hearing
despite his earlier pronouncement in the Order dated November 19, 2001
denying bail as he considered the crime the accused Peñaflorida
was charged with to be a non-bailable offense. The manifestation of the
prosecutor that he is not ready to present any witness to prove that
the
prosecution’s evidence against the accused is strong, is never a basis
for the outright grant of bail without a preliminary hearing on the
matter.[11]
A hearing is required even when the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence
or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail.[12]
The joint manifestation
of the prosecution and the defense that it would be fair and just if
the
court would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of the
accused
at P250,000.00 does not justify the granting of bail without a hearing
in a case involving a non-bailable offense. A hearing is necessary for
the court to take into consideration the guidelines in fixing the
amount
of bail[13]
set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure,
which reads:
Sec. 9.
Amount
of bail; guidelines. - The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering
primarily,
but not limited to the following factors:
(a)
Financial liability of the accused to give bail;chanrobles virtual law library
(b)
Nature and circumstance of the offense;chanrobles virtual law library
(c)
Penalty for the offense charged;chanrobles virtual law library
(d)
Character and reputation of the accused;chanrobles virtual law library
(e)
Age and health of the accused;chanrobles virtual law library
(f)
Weight of the evidence against the accused;chanrobles virtual law library
(g)
Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;chanrobles virtual law library
(h)
Forfeiture of other bail;chanrobles virtual law library
(i)
The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; andchanrobles virtual law library
(j)
Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Excessive bail
shall
not be required."chanrobles virtual law library
Needless to stress,
judicial
discretion is the domain of the judge and the duty to exercise
discretion
cannot be reposed upon the will or whim of the prosecution or the
defense.
Respondent should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of
guilt
is strong and endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of
bail
recommended. To do away with the requisite bail hearing "is to dispense
with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness."[14]
It must always be remembered that imperative justice requires the
proper
observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure
its proper dispensation.[15]chanrobles virtual law library
There is no evidence
of malice or bad faith on the part of respondent when he granted bail
to
Peñaflorida. Complainant failed to prove that respondent had
prior
knowledge of the existence of a deportation order or that the latter
was
informed by the BOl of the deportation order dated September 14, 2001.
The deportation order became final only on October 15, 2001. Prior
thereto,
respondent issued on September 18, 2001 a hold-departure order against
Peñaflorida. Respondent directed the BOI not to allow
Peñaflorida
from leaving the country since a warrant for his arrest was already
issued
by the court.[16]
On October 15, 2001, the Notice of Arraignment in Criminal Case No.
R-5075
was served to Peñaflorida through the BOI.[17]
In the hearing of November 19, 2001, the personnel of the BOI escorted
Peñaflorida by reason of the warrant of arrest and hold
departure
order issued by the court.[18]
From these facts, we
cannot simply conclude that respondent had prior knowledge of the
deportation
order and maliciously thwarted its effect by granting bail to
Peñaflorida.
However, respondent cannot escape administrative liability by invoking
unawareness of the deportation order. Absent evidence of malice,
respondent’s
lack of knowledge of the deportation order will only free him from
administrative
liability for gross misconduct but not for gross ignorance of the law
for
disregarding the rules on bail.[19]
The Court has held that
a judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous ruling
on first impression, and malice cannot be inferred from his having
rendered
a decision rectifying an earlier impression without proof beyond doubt
of a conscious and deliberate intent on his part to commit an injustice
by such acts.[20]
Nonetheless, so basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in
connection
with the grant of bail that it would amount to judicial apostasy for
any
member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.[21]
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, respondent owes the
public
and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. When a judge
displays
utter lack of familiarity with the basic rules of law, he erodes the
public’s
confidence in the competence of our courts.[22]
Ignorance of the law excuses no one - certainly not a judge.[23]
Respondent’s explanations
that he ordered the cancellation of the bail bend posted by the accused
Peñaflorida and issued a warrant for the latter’s arrest on
April
26, 2002 upon learning that an order of deportation was issued against
the latter;[24]
that accused Peñaflorida voluntarily surrendered himself on
October
24, 2002 and that he is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of
Occidental
Mindoro,[25]
cannot serve to exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him.
Significantly,
the order of revocation was made only on April 26, 2002, or five months
after the issuance of the erroneous Order of November 21, 2001 which
was
sought to be corrected. It is unfathomable that respondent realized his
fallacious granting of bail only after he filed his Comment herein
dated
March 22, 2002. The Order of April 26, 2002 is but a futile attempt to
evade respondent’s administrative liability which had already attached
five months before when he granted bail without the required hearing.
Fundamental
knowledge of the law and a reasonable understanding of recent
jurisprudence
ought to have guarded respondent against the precipitate and
unjustified
granting of bail or should have at least prompted him to invalidate the
same immediately thereafter,[26]
not five months later after a complaint against him had been filed by
BOl
Commissioner Domingo.chanrobles virtual law library
As to the recommended
penalty by the OCA, the amount of P5,000.00 appears to be commensurate
with respondent’s infraction which amounts to gross ignorance of law.
Under
Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court
on the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October
1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge
which
carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension
or a fine of more then P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
However,
considering that malice or bad faith on the part of respondent has not
been established by the complainant, and, in the absence of a showing
that
respondent had earlier been found to have committed an administrative
offense,[27]
the Court deems it just and reasonable to impose upon respondent a fine
of P5,000.00.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, respondent
Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46) is found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and is hereby FINED the amount of Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00).
He is further STERNLY WARNED that the commission of similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-3.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 21-25.
[5]
Rollo, p. 25.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 15-18.chanrobles virtual law library
[7]
Bangayan vs. Butacan, 345 SCRA 301, 306 (2000).
[8]
Santos vs. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56, 64 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[9]
Marzan-Gelacio vs. Flores, 334 SCRA 1, 18 (2000).
[10]
Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505, 516-517 (2000).
[11]
Directo vs. Bautista, 346 SCRA 223, 227 (2000).chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
Cortes vs. Catral, 279 SCRA 1, 14 (1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
People vs. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334, 351 (2000).
[14]
Tabao vs. Espina, 309 SCRA 273, 286 (1999).chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Alvarez, 287 SCRA 325, 331 (1998).
[16]
Rollo, p. 9.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
Annex "B" of the letter-complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Annex "C" of the letter-complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Annex "D" of the letter-complaint.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
Castaños vs. Escaño, 251 SCRA 174, 193-194 (1995).chanrobles virtual law library
[21]
Basco vs. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220, 244 (1997).chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Vileña vs. Mapaye, A.M. No. MTJ-02-l424, April 24, 2002, p. 4.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Cabatingan, Sr. vs. Arcueno, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1323, August 22, 2002, p.
9; Espino vs. Salubre, 352 SCRA 668, 675 (2001).
[24]
Rollo, p. 27.chanrobles virtual law library
[25]
Rollo, p. 28.chanrobles virtual law library
[26]
Bantuas vs. Pangadapun, 292 SCRA 622, 628 (1998).chanrobles virtual law library
[27]
See Berin vs. Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443, July 31, 2002, p. 6;
Esguerra
vs. Loja, 338 SCRA 1, 4 (2000); Conducto vs. Monzon, 291 SCRA 619, 637
(1998). |