THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF POMPOSA
SALUDARES, REPRESENTED
BY ISABEL DATOR,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
128254
January 16, 2004
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS,
JOSE DATOR AND CARMEN
CALIMUTAN,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Assailed in the instant
petition for review on certiorari is the July 31, 1996 decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals reversing the August 27, 1992 decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 56, which in turn
dismissed
private respondents’ petition for reconveyance on the ground of
prescription
of action.
At the core of the present
controversy is a parcel of land, known as Lot 5793, measuring 8,916
square
meters, located at Mahabang Parang, Lucban, Quezon. The land formed
part
of the conjugal properties of spouses Juan Dator and Pomposa Saludares,
known as the Tanza estate.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pomposa died on May
1, 1923, leaving herein petitioners, Enrica, Petra, Restituto, Amado,
Delfina,
Beata, Vicenta and Isabel, all surnamed Dator, as her compulsory heirs
(hereinafter referred to as Heirs).cralaw:red
On February 28, 1940,
the Heirs and their father Juan executed a deed of extra-judicial
partition
of the share of Pomposa in the Tanza estate. The settlement conferred
the
eastern half of the Tanza estate to Juan and the western half to the
Heirs.cralaw:red
Before the aforementioned
partition, Juan was in possession of the entire Tanza estate. After the
partition, the Heirs took possession of their share and had the same
tenanted
by a certain Miguel Dahilig, husband of Petra, one of the Heirs, who in
turn managed the land in behalf of the other siblings. Juan, the
father,
remained in possession of his half of the land until his death on April
6, 1940.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 13, 1976,
Isabel Dator applied for a free patent over the entire Tanza estate,
including
Lot 5793, in behalf of the Heirs. On May 26, 1977, after all the
requirements
were complied with, the Register of Deeds of Quezon awarded Free Patent
No. 4A-2-8976 and issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
0-23617
in the names of the Heirs.cralaw:red
Sometime in 1988, the
Heirs were informed by their tenant that private respondents cut some
50
coconut trees located within the subject lot. Thus, the Heirs sent a
letter,[3]
dated July 26, 1988, to private respondents demanding an explanation
for
their intrusion into their property and unauthorized felling of trees.cralaw:red
On August 25, 1988,
private respondents retaliated by filing an action for reconveyance
against
petitioners, docketed as civil case no. 88-121, in the Regional Trial
Court
of Lucena City. Private respondents alleged in their complaint that:
(a)
they were the owners in fee simple and possessors of Lot No. 5793; (b)
they bought the land from the successors-in-interest of Petra Dator,
one
of the heirs; (c) they were in possession of the subject land from 1966
to the present and (d) petitioner Isabel Dator obtained free patent OCT
P-23617 over Lot 5793 in favor of the Heirs by means of fraud and
misrepresentation.
Thus, private respondents prayed for the cancellation of OCT P-23617
and
the issuance of a new title in their names.cralaw:red
In their answer, the
Heirs denied having sold any portion of the Tanza estate to anyone.
They
alleged that: (a) they and their predecessors-in-interest had been and
were still in actual, continuous, adverse and public possession of the
subject land in the concept of an owner since time immemorial and (b)
title
to Lot 5793 was issued in their favor after faithful compliance with
all
the requirements necessary for the issuance of a free patent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision dismissing the action primarily on the ground
of prescription of action:
More telling is plaintiff
Jose Dator’s admission that the adjacent lot which is 5794 is his and
he
was a cadastral claimant, in fact, filed (sic) an application for free
patent. By and large, if Jose Dator was personally claiming rights on
the
property now denominated as Lot 5793, the Court is intrigued and cannot
see its way clear why Jose Dator did not file any protest in the
application
of the heirs of Pomposa Saludares, neither had Jose Dator filed any
petition
for review within the time frame, instead it took them eleven (11) long
years to question the validity.cralaw:red
The doctrine of "stale
demands" or laches is even applicable in the case at bar. "Laches means
the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time, to do that
which
by exercising diligence could or should have been done earlier."
(Marcelino
versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94422, June 26, 1992)
x x
x
x x x x x x
The issues with respect
to ownership have already been amply discussed which brings us to the
issue
as to whether or not the action has prescribed and whether the original
certificate of title in the name of the heirs of Pomposa Saludares is
already
indefeasible.cralaw:red
The action for reconveyance
at bar was filed on August 28, 1988 or more than eleven (11) years from
the issuance of the title, a fact plaintiffs cannot deny. They cannot
claim
ignorance that the defendants-heirs of Pomposa Saludares are applying
for
a free patent of Lot No. 5793 because notices were sent.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x x x x x
In the absence of competent
and positive evidence that the title of the defendants has been secured
thru fraud which in the case at bar is wanting and which would
necessarily
invalidate it, the presumption is it has been issued regularly in the
absence
of actual fraud.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
There being no positive
evidence presented which would establish actual fraud in the issuance
of
Free Patent Title No. P-23617 in the defendants’ name, their title
deserves
recognition.cralaw:red
In like manner, in an
action for reconveyance after the lapse of one year from the date of
the
registration, actual fraud in securing the title must be proved (J.N.
Tuazon
Co., Inc. versus Macalindog, G.R. No. L-15398, December 29, 1962, 6
SCRA
938).cralaw:red
The plaintiffs’ claim
for reconveyance therefore cannot prosper.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs
ordering the dismissal of the case with costs against plaintiffs and
declaring
defendants, heirs of Pomposa Saludares, as the rightful owners of the
land.cralaw:red
The claim of defendants
in the matter of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses not having
been
proven by concrete evidence, the Court opts not to award the same.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the appellate
court reversed the trial court decision:
It is true that the
Torrens title issued upon a free patent may not be cancelled after the
lapse of ten years from the date of its registration because the
statute
of limitations bars such cancellation. But this doctrine has long been
qualified thusly:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
If the registered owner,
be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the Free patent
was transferred or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land described in
the patent and in the Torrens belonged to another who together with his
predecessors-in-interest were never in possession thereof, then the
statute
barring an action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent
does
not apply and the true owner may bring an action to have the ownership
or title to the land judicially settled and the Court in the exercise
of
its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the
Torrens
title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered
owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been
found
to be the true owner thereof. (Vital vs. Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 855,
Underscoring
ours.)
In this case, there
is clear evidence to show that appellee Isabel had full knowledge that
Lot 5793 had been sold to her brother-in-law Miguel Dahilig and her
sister
Petra, that Lot 5793 no longer belonged to her and to the heirs she
claimed
to represent. She was signatory to the deed of sale dated April 16,
1940
in favor of appellant. (Exh. I) With this knowledge, there is reason to
conclude that appellant Isabel misrepresented herself and the rest of
the
heirs as owners entitled to the free patent.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, all the above
considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Reversing the August
27, 1992 decision of the court below;
2. Ordering the Register
of Deeds of Quezon Province to cancel OCT No. P-23617 in the name of
the
Heirs of Pomposa Saludares and to issue another for the same property
in
the name of plaintiffs Jose Dator and Carmen Calimutan;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. Ordering appellees
to pay appellants ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos for attorney’s fees,
and to pay the costs.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved by the appellate
court ruling, the Heirs filed the instant petition, assigning the
following
errors:
The Court of Appeals
erred in tracing the history of the transactions involving the property
way back to the year 1923 and render judgment based on its findings,
considering
that petitioners are the registered owners of the property under a
torrens
certificate of title which is conclusive, incontrovertible and
indefeasible.cralaw:red
The Court of Appeals
erred when it did not consider that the complaint filed by the private
respondents for reconveyance and cancellation of title before the trial
court eleven (11) years after a torrens title over the property was
issued
in the name of the petitioners (had) prescribed.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Notwithstanding the
indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owner. The
rationale
for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to
review
the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance,
the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is
sought
instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been
wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful or
legal owner, or to the one with a better right.[7]
Nevertheless, the right
to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it
is subject to extinctive prescription. In Caro vs. Court of Appeals,[8]
the prescriptive period of an action for reconveyance was explained:
Under the present Civil
Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an
offspring
of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation
to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true
owner.
In this context, and vis-à-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the
Civil Code is applicable.cralaw:red
Article 1144. The following
actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation
created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.cralaw:red
x x
x
x x x x x x
An action for reconveyance
has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1529,
which provides:
In all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the
rights
of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original
petition
or application, x x x.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This provision should
be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Article 1456. If property
is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.cralaw:red
The law thereby creates
the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title
thereto
in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
Presidential
Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2)
of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance
of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned
from
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.cralaw:red
There is but one instance
when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that
is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.[9]
In a series of cases,[10]
this Court permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite
the
lapse of ten years and declared that said action, when based on fraud,
is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an innocent
purchaser
for value. But in all those cases including Vital vs. Anore[11]
on which the appellate court based its assailed decision, the common
factual
backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of the
disputed property. Instead, it was the persons with the better right or
the legal owners of the land who had always been in possession of the
same.
Thus, the Court allowed the action for reconveyance to prosper in those
cases despite the lapse of more than ten years from the issuance of
title
to the land. The exception was based on the theory that registration
proceedings
could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at
the
expense of another.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
however, it is the rule rather than the exception which should apply.cralaw:red
This Court does not
normally review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in a
petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But when the findings
of
fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court, the
Court
in the exercise of its power of review may inquire into the facts of a
case.cralaw:red
The trial court declared
the Heirs as having been in actual, open and continuous possession of
the
disputed lot. On the other hand, the appellate court ruled that it was
private respondents.cralaw:red
Private respondents
presented documents purportedly showing a series of transactions which
led to the alleged transfer of ownership of Lot 5793 from the Heirs to
them, namely: (1) a Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Lampasan, dated April
16,
1940, wherein the disputed lot was allegedly sold by the Heirs to their
sibling Petra Dator and her husband Miguel Dahilig; (2) an
extra-judicial
partition showing that, upon the death of Miguel, his heirs Petra,
Angel,
Anatalia, Catalina, Felimon and Jacinto, inherited Lot 5793 and (3) two
deeds of sale dated December 30, 1978 and March 15,1970 wherein Felimon
and Jacinto, and later Catalina, sold their undivided shares in Lot
5793
to private respondents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Other than the presentation
of these documents, however, private respondents failed to prove that
they
were in actual, open and continuous possession of Lot 5793.cralaw:red
On the other hand, Isabel
Dator, who testified for the Heirs, vehemently denied having signed the
Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Lampasan and pointed out the absence of the
signatures of her other siblings Vicenta, Barcelisa and Adoracion.cralaw:red
The Heirs likewise presented
proof of payment of realty taxes from 1956 to 1974 in the names of
their
deceased parents, and from 1975 to 1988 in their names.cralaw:red
More importantly, the
Heirs convincingly established their open and continuous occupation of
the entire Tanza estate, including Lot 5793, through their tenant
Miguel
Dahilig. After Miguel’s death, he was succeeded by Marcelo Saludares
who
testified during the trial that: (a) the farm was under the
administration
of Beata and Isabel Dator who took over its management after Petra
Dator
died; (b) he had been consistently tending the land since 1947; (c) he
was the one who planted the various crops and trees thereon, except for
some 100 coconut trees which he explained were planted by other people
in response to the Green Revolution project of then President Marcos.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Saludares identified
each and every landmark and boundary of the subject lot. He also
enumerated
all the trees planted on the subject lot and, when asked about the
fruits
of the land, he told the court that he shared the harvest with the
surviving
Heirs.cralaw:red
In stark contrast, private
respondents’ witness, farm worker Perpetuo Daya could not identify the
boundaries of the disputed property, its adjoining owners or recall the
dates he worked and tilled the subject lot.cralaw:red
Specially noteworthy
was the fact that the recorded cadastral claimant of Lot 5793, Angel
Dahilig,
testified that he executed a waiver in favor of the Heirs because they
were the true owners of the subject parcel of land.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, we note
private respondent Jose Dator’s declaration that he was the cadastral
claimant
of and free patent applicant for Lot 5794 which was adjacent to Lot
5793.
This being the case, we find private respondents’ inaction difficult to
understand, considering that they were among those who received notices
of petitioners’ free patent application dated January 2, 1979 from the
Bureau of Lands.[14]
If private respondents
indeed owned Lot 5793, they should have filed an application for free
patent
for it just as they did for Lot 5794, or at least opposed the Heirs’
application
for free patent over Lot 5793, to protect their interests. As a matter
of fact, they were aware that the Heirs’ tenant, Marcelo Saludares,
repeatedly
harvested the fruits of Lot 5793.cralaw:red
But even assuming that
private respondents indeed validly acquired Lot 5793 in 1966 as they
claimed,
they nevertheless slept on their right to secure title thereto. Their
unexplained
inaction for more than 11 years rendered their demand for reconveyance
stale. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt. The law aids
the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. This legal precept
finds
perfect application in the case at bar.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accordingly, we find
that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in disregarding
the
ten-year prescriptive period for the reconveyance of registered real
property
and in giving due course to said action despite the lapse of more than
11 years from the issuance of title thereto, which was clearly barred
by
prescription.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 31,
1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dated August 27, 1992, is REINSTATED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Vitug, J.,
(Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.cralaw:red
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and concurred in by
Associate
Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Romeo A. Brawner of the Tenth
Division.
[2]
Penned by Judge Ricardo O. Rosales, Jr.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Exhibit "5," exhibit for petitioners, Record.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 52-53, 55-56.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[6]
Rollo, p. 8.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Liwalug Amerol, et al. vs. Molok Bagumbaran,154 SCRA 396 [1987].
[8]
180 SCRA 401 [1989].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Millena vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 126 [2000] citing Almarza vs.
Argulles,
156 SCRA 718 [1987].
[10]
Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands, et al., 31 Phil. 272; Zarate vs.
Director
of Lands, 34 Phil. 416; Amerol vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396 [1987];
Caro
vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401 [1989].
[11]
90 Phil. 855 [1952].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Millena supra.
[13]
Rollo, p. 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Exhibit "9," exhibit for defendants. |