Republic
of the Philippines
SUPREME
COURT
Manila
EN BANC .
.
FRANCISCO ALONSO
(DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED
BYMERCEDES V ALONSO,
TOMAS V. ALONSOAND
ASUNCION V.
ALONSO,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
130876
December 5, 2003
-versus-
CEBU COUNTRY
CLUB,
INC.,
Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
TINGA,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A piece of land designated
as Lot 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, on which part
of the Cebu Country Club now stands, is the subject of the present
controversy.
For a finer appreciation of the issues, it may be helpful to recall the
bare facts, as culled from this Court's decision[1]
of January 31, 2002.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner's father,
Tomas N. Alonso, after having been assigned the sales certificate over
the subject lot by one Leoncio Alburo on December 18, 1919, completed
the
required payments thereon under Act No. 1120, also known as the Friar
Lands
Act. Thereafter, a sales patent was issued in Tomas Alonso's name on
March
24, 1926, and a final deed of sale was executed in his favor by the
Director
of Lands on March 27, 1926. The deed of sale was not registered with
the
Register of Deeds, however, because of the lack of approval by the
Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources (sic).[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
What happened in the
interim is a matter of dispute but it is clear from the record that on
July 26, 1948, United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of
respondent
Cebu Country Club, Inc., managed to obtain an administratively
reconstituted
title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1310 (T-11351),[3]
allegedly from the owner's duplicate certificate of title. Respondent
has
not explained how it or its predecessor acquired title to the property
or how they attained possession thereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In 1983, this Court,
in the case of Heirs of Ramon Cabrera and Graciano Ingles v. Cebu
Country
Club, Inc.,[4]
affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Cebu
Country
Club, Inc. obtained its title to Lot 783, also of the Banilad Friar
Lands
Estate and covered by TCT No. RT-1313 (T-14139),[5]
through fraud. A Deed of Exchange executed in 1985 involving Lot 783
and
part of Lot 727 between petitioners in said case and Cebu Country Club,
Inc. resulted in the partial cancellation of TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351)
and the subdivision of Lot 727.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Alleging that respondent
also acquired the subject property through fraudulent means, petitioner
on September 25, 1992 filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu
City a complaint against respondent for the declaration of nullity of
title,
the cancellation of certificates of title and recovery of the subject
property.
On May 7, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in respondent's favor, which
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This Court, in its
decision
of January 31, 2002, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals,
but:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN LIEU
THEREOF,
we DISMISS the complaint and counterclaim of the parties in Civil Case
No. CEB 12926 of the trial court. We declare that Lot No. 727 D-2 of
the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate covered by Original Certificate of Title
Nos.
251, 232, and 253 legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines.[6] chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As in every action
for reconveyance,[7]
the question posed by this case, is who between petitioner and
respondent
has a better right to the property.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court ruled that
petitioner was not entitled to reconveyance because he failed to prove
his imputations of fraud on the part of respondent by clear and
convincing
evidence.[8]
That ruling, as this Court stated at the outset of the Decision, rests
on the postulate that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals,
particularly
as to the validity of the reconstitution of respondent Cebu Country
Club,
Inc.'s title, is binding on this Court.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I do not agree with
that premise. Whether fraud attended the reconstitution of respondent's
title calls for a conclusion drawn from facts and is, therefore, a
question
of law, not merely of fact.[10]
And while this Court did address such issue, I submit that the
conclusion
that there was no fraud in the reconstitution of respondent's title is
erroneous.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The evidence of fraud
in this case is, to me, clear and convincing.cralaw:red
The face of the reconstituted
title alone exhibits badges of spuriousness.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On March 8, 1960, the
Court of First Instance of Cebu ordered the change of the name of the
registered
owner from United Service Country Club, Inc. to that of respondent's.
Then
Section 18 of the old Corporation Law (Act No. 1459, as amended), then
in effect, required that a copy of the Amended Articles of
Incorporation
changing respondent's name from "United Service Country Club, Inc." to
"Cebu Country Club, Inc." be filed with the Securities & Exchange
Commission
(SEC). To effect a change of name in the certificate of title over a
piece
of land, the SEC certification of the amendment to the Articles of
Incorporation
should be presented in court, which shall then order the Register of
Deeds
to cause the change of name in the title. The court cannot directly
order
the change of the corporation name in the title without the SEC
certification.
The SEC certification, in the form of a memorandum, should appear not
on
the face of the title — which should remain untouched — but at the back
thereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This procedure was not
followed in the change of name of the owner registered in TCT No.
RT-1310
(T-11351). The requisite SEC certification authorizing the change of
name
by respondent is not reflected at the back of the title; only the CFI
Order
appears thereat:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Entry No.
761-V-6-D.B.
Order — By the Court of First Instance, Province of Cebu, ordering the
Register of Deeds of Cebu to change the name United Service Country
Club
Inc., to "Cebu Country Club, Inc." and to insert the technical
description
of the parcel of land herein described. File No. RT-1310.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Date of the
Instrument
— March 3, 1960.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Date of the
Inscription
— March 8, 1960 at 10:16 A.M.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Instead, on the face
of the title, the phrase "United Service" was merely crossed out and,
in
lieu thereof, the word "Cebu" was inserted. Thus:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IT IS
HEREBY
CERTIFIED THAT CERTAIN LAND SITUATED IN THE CITY OF CEBU, PHILIPPINES
bounded
and described as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
El
terreno
que se traspasa es el Lote No. 727 de la "Banilad Friar Lands Estate."
Expediente No. 5988 del Tribunal del Registro de la Propiedad.
(Exemption
from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved)
is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration
Act in the name of UNITED SERVICE "CEBU COUNTRY CLUB (Incorporated), of
Morga, Cebu, Cebu, P.I. (Emphasis supplied.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I consider such
irregular
procedure as a telltale sign of spuriousness. Indeed, the same modus
operandi
was employed in the change of the registered owner's name in TCT No.
RT-1313
(T-14139)[11]
involved in the Cabrera-Ingles case. The change in names in both titles
was effected on the same date at the same time.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Note, too, the
denomination
enclosed in parenthesis "(T-11351)" in "TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351)."
Circular
No. 6 (RD-3),[12]
issued by Enrique Altavas, Chief of the former General Land
Registration
Office, on August 5, 1946 provides in part:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
TO ALL
REGISTERS
OF DEEDS:
In view of the
change
in the form of our government, all Registers of Deeds are hereby
requested
to number all certificates of title issued after the inauguration of
the
Republic of the Philippines, beginning with number one in consecutive
order,
in the following manner:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
(c) In the case of
transfer
certificates of title, irrespective of their origin, the new numbers,
which
must start from number one shall be preceded by a dash and the letter
T,
e.g., T-1, T-2, T-3, etc. (Emphasis supplied.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Clearly, only transfer
certificates of title issued after the inauguration of the Republic in
1946 are required to be preceded by a dash and the letter "T." In the
case
of TCT No. T-11351, the impression is that it was issued after 1946.
How
then can respondent explain the notation at the bottom of the
reconstituted
title, stating:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Entered at
CITY OF CEBU Philippines on the 19th day of November, in the year
nineteen
hundred [sic] and thirty one at 9:00 a.m.[13]
(Emphasis
supplied.)
which it also
capitalizes
on.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
GLRO Circular No.
6
(R.D.-3) dated August 5, 1946 is further clarified as regards the use
of
the dash in the numbering of the title by GLRO Circular No. 17[14]
dated February 19, 1947, also issued by Enrique Altavas. The pertinent
provisions of the latter Circular read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
17. Reconstituted
certificates
of title shall be given new number in the following manner:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c) In the case of
transfer
certificates of title, irrespective of their origin, the new numbers,
which
must be in consecutive order starting from number one, shall be
preceded
by a dash and the capital letters RT, and followed, in parenthesis, by
the number, if known, of the respective lost of destroyed certificate
of
title, e.g., RT-1 (12837), RT-2 (6783), RT-3 (893), etc. (Emphasis
supplied.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, for reconstituted
titles, the letters "RT" and a dash should precede the new number. The
old number, in turn, is enclosed in parentheses but is not preceded by
a dash.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The foregoing observations
stress the relevance of the findings of the Court of Appeals in the
Cabrera-Ingles
case. Wrote the Appellate Court:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We say that
the appellee's reconstituted title bears on its face its own culpable
nullity.
The parent titles it cites are irrelevant and immaterial, if not
fictitious,
as such, and hence appellee's title coming from such a questionable, if
not spurious or polluted source, cannot be a source of right. It is in
the contemplation of the law, null and void ab initio and inexistent.[15]
(Emphasis
supplied.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court's Decision
in the Cabrera-Ingles case, moreover, provides compelling proof of
fraud
in the reconstitution of respondent's title. Generally, under the rule
of res inter alios, evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing
at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the
same
or a similar thing at another time.[16]
Nevertheless, such evidence may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, customs, usage and
the like.[17]
The Cabrera-Ingles case constitutes evidence proving intent, even a
scheme,
on the part of respondent to deprive the rightful owners of the lands
on
which its club once stood and still now stands. Both that case and the
one at bar involve titles both administratively reconstituted by the
same
person, both issued on the same day (July 26, 1948), both supposedly
based
on an owner's duplicate certificate of title, and both bearing the same
hallmarks of fraud.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Any presumption of good
faith in favor of respondent has been overthrown by this Court's
resolution
in the Cabrera-Ingles case, as well as by the undeniable indications of
fraud appearing in the title itself. There being no more presumption in
its favor, it was incumbent upon respondent to offer evidence of good
faith
on its part. It has offered none.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Owner's duplicate
Certificate of Title, which was supposedly the basis for the
reconstituted
title, is nowhere to be found. Its purported loss does not help
respondent's
cause any. Worse, it gives rise to questions of jurisdiction on the
part
of the Register of Deeds to issue the reconstituted title. As Mr.
Justice
Melo, who participated in the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Cabrera-Ingles,
wrote in his penetrating dissent to this Court's Decision of January
31,
2002:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The issue of fraud
rests on a number of facts and circumstances duly established by the
evidence
on record but simply ignored below. The first such circumstance is the
total absence of proof of the due execution, existence, and contents of
TCT No. 11351, the owner's duplicate which is supposed to be the source
document used in the reconstitution. The same is true with regard to
TCT
No. 1021, which is supposed to be the parent title. The Court of
Appeals
admitted that there is no record of the existence of both documents.
Assuming
its innocent loss, then its contents should have been established by
appropriate
secondary evidence under Section 3, Rule 130, Revised Rules of
Evidence.
None was presented by private respondent. The net result is that the
reconstituted
title itself appears to be the only evidence available to prove its own
existence, due execution, and contents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In any case, I am convinced
that the loss of the source documents is anything but innocent. The
Cabrera-Ingles
decision, made part of petitioner's evidence, sufficiently establishes
the fraudulent character of their "disappearance" and the bogus nature
of the reconstituted title. The handling of the source documents was
not
only irregular and improper but plainly illegal, being violative of the
rule of irremovability of public records (Rule 132, Sec. 26, Revised
Rules
of Evidence) as well as constitutive of the crime of infidelity in the
custody of official documents (Art. 226, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
The
Register of Deeds and his subordinates had the duty of keeping safely
in
their vault all the documents used in the reconstitution, most
especially
the alleged owner's duplicate used as the sole basis for the
administrative
reconstitution. Instead of keeping that basic document safely, the
Office
of the Register of Deeds allowed its removal by giving it to the
applicant!
The act can only be viewed, in proper context, as part of a fraudulent
conspiracy to conceal the spurious nature of the document.cralaw:red
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
Moreover, the genealogy
of the reconstituted title is actually in limbo. The supposed parent
title,
TCT No 1021, has not been shown to be a transfer from the mother
titles,
OCTs No. 251, 252, and 253. And while private respondent alleged in its
answer to the complaint below that it had acquired Lot No. 727 in good
faith and for value, it failed to prove that it did so. Neither did it
allege from whom it bought the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To my mind, the evidence
of fraud is clear and convincing. The rule that factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court finds no application here,
there being material facts and circumstances which, plainly, have been
overlooked but which, when taken into account, will alter the result
(Morales
vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 391 [1991]).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As regards the issue
of nullity due to want of jurisdiction, it is essential to note the
difference
in law between judicial and administrative reconstitution under
Republic
Act No. 26. The authority granted by said law to the Register of Deeds
to make an administrative reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
transfer
certificate of title is limited by Section 5 to only two kinds of
source
documents: (a) the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title, and
(b)
the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate
of
title. These two kinds are mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section
3, Republic Act No. 26. On the other hand, the power of a court to
effect
a judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed transfer certificate
of
title encompasses all the six (6) kinds of source documents enumerated
by Section 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The owner's duplicate
of the certificate of title, if authentic, cannot be without a
technical
description of the covered lot, in view of the provisions of Sections
40,
41, and 42 of Act No. 496. The clear mandate of these provisions is
that
the technical description of the land as determined by the land
registration
court shall be inscribed upon the decree of registration, which in turn
shall be transcribed upon the original certificate of title and, in the
event of a transfer, upon the transfer certificate of title. To make a
[sweeping] pronouncement that the lack of a technical description in a
reconstituted title is not a bar to reconstitution of the title is to
be
imprecise. It may be correct in the case of a judicial, but wrong in
the
case of an administrative, reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
transfer
of certificate of title.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I am, therefore convinced
that the absence of the technical description from the face of the
reconstituted
title, TCT No. RT-1310 (T-11351), unmistakably establishes the
spuriousness
of the "missing" source document used in its administrative
reconstitution.
The reason is simple: the source document itself also did not have it.
Reconstitution denotes the restoration of a lost or destroyed
certificate
of title in its original form or condition. (Zafra Vda. de Anciano vs.
Caballes, 93 Phil, 876). In other words, the reconstituted title merely
reproduces the contents of the source document used; it mirrors the
latter
document. Indubitably, the source document used in the administrative
reconstitution
or private respondent's title was not a genuine owner's duplicate for
lack
of a technical description of the land. Consequently, the Register of
Deeds
had no authority at all to effect an administrative reconstitution of
this
particular title.[18]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Plainly, fraud attended
the reconstitution of respondent's alleged title. Apparently, the
majority
shares this conclusion. For one, the Revised Draft Resolution denying
the
motions for reconsideration notes: "Surprisingly there is not even one
evidence to show when and how its (respondent's)
predecessor-in-interest,
United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from anybody."[19]
For another, the same Revised Draft Resolution, following the Court's
Decision,
seeks to void the reconstituted title. On what ground can such a
disposition
be based other than a finding of fraud or want of jurisdiction?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I likewise agree with
justice Melo's disposition of the issues of prescription and laches.
But
more fundamentally, with the voiding of respondent's reconstituted
title,
it is puerile to even discuss respondent's defenses of prescription and
laches in the first place.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In any event, respondent
cannot successfully invoke the defense of extinctive prescription.
Petitioner's
complaint is not merely an action for reconveyance on the ground of
fraud
but also to declare void a reconstituted title for want of
jurisdiction.
The latter action does not prescribe.[20]
Neither can respondent be deemed the owner of the property by
acquisitive
prescription. As part of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, the subject
lot
was covered by OCT Nos. 251, 252 and 253 of the Register of Deeds of
Cebu.[21]
A title once registered under the Torrens system cannot be defeated
even
by adverse, open and notorious possession; neither can it be defeated
by
prescription.[22]
Laches, on the other hand, is a principle in equity.[23]
One who invokes equity, it is often said, must do equity. Respondent,
being
guilty of fraud, cannot avail itself of the principle of laches. The
question
of prescription or laches cannot work to defeat justice or to
perpetuate
fraud and injustice.[24]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Significantly, the Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration echoes the points elucidated
above.
It posits, thus: "Neither may the rewards of prescription be
successfully
invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that prescription
can
never be against the Government x x x the public
interests
should (not) be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents
to whose care they are confided."[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Clearly, respondent
is not entitled to the disputed property. Thus, I share this Court's
conclusion
in its Decision that respondent has not "been able to establish a clear
tide over the contested property,"[26]
as well as the Resolution's denouement that the reconstituted title
which
respondent solely banks on "by itself does not determine or resolve the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title."[27]
It is to petitioner's cause that I now turn.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Without any doubt in
my mind, petitioner has sufficiently established his ownership over the
disputed property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This Court held in its
Decision that petitioner is not the owner of the disputed land because
the sales patent issued in his name was not registered with the
Register
of Deeds. Such failure, in turn, was attributed to the absence of the
signature
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (sic)[28]
in the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands, thereby
rendering
the said deed void.[29]
Authority for this conclusion is laid on the provisions of the Friar
Lands
Act, and amendments thereto, as well as on this Court's ruling in Solid
State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals.[30]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 12 of Act No. 1120
provides in part:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x
x x the Chief of the Bureau of
Public
Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which
shall
set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to such
settler
and occupant the amount of land so held by him at the price so fixed
payable
as provided in this Act at the Office of the Chief of the Bureau of
Public
Lands x x x and that upon the payment of the
final
installment together with all accrued interest the Government will
convey
to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by proper
instrument
of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration
Act."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Also, Sec. 18 of
the same Act provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"No lease
or
sale made by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the
provisions
of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary of the
Interior." (Emphasis ours) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Similarly, Sec.
2 of C.A. No. 32, as amended by C.A. No. 316 provides in part:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"x
x x The persons, who, at the time
of
the subdivision survey are actual and bona fide occupants of any
portion
of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten hectares, shall be given
preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private sale and at a
price to be fixed in such case, by the Director of the Lands, subject
to
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce, after taking
into consideration its location, quality, and any other circumstances
as
may affect its value, the provisions of section twelve of Act Numbered
Eleven [H]undred and [T]wenty, as amended, to the contrary." (Emphasis
ours) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is clear from the
forgoing provisions that the friar lands were purchased by the
government
for sale to actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are
acquired
by the government. The Bureau of Lands shall first issue a certificate
stating therein that the government has agreed to sell the land to such
settler or occupant. The latter then shall accept the certificate and
agree
to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the
interest
specified in the certificate.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The conveyance executed
in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so called certificate of sale,
is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is
not
paid for in full. The purchaser becomes the owner upon the issuance of
the certificate of sale in his favor subject only to the cancellation
thereof
in case the price agreed upon is not paid (Pugeda vs. Trias, No.
L-16925,
March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 849.)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon payment of the
final installment together with all accrued interests, the government
shall
then issue a final deed of conveyance in favor of the purchaser.
However,
the sale of such friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the
Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce. In short, the approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce is indispensable for the validity of the sale.[31]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I hold, however, that
the sales certificate in this case is not void, the absence of the
Department
Secretary's approval notwithstanding.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 18 of the Friar
Lands Act does not explicitly declare void sales or leases entered into
by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands without the approval of the
Secretary of Interior, stating only that "(N)o lease of sale made by
the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands under the provisions of the Act
shall
be valid until approved by the Secretary of Interior." There is a
difference
between stating that the sale is void on one hand and stating that the
sale is not valid on the other. Moreover, the injunction against
validity
is conditioned or even tempered by the key phrase "until approved." In
other words, pending approval of the sale by the Department Secretary,
title to the land is not formally conveyed to the purchaser. The latter
is not deprived but, on the contrary, remains entitled to all the
property
rights. To be more precise, he acquires full ownership rights while the
Government retains through the Department Secretary the function to
execute
the final deed of sale, which, however, becomes a mere formality upon
full
payment of the price.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Worthy of note here
is that Tomas Alonso had mortgaged the land to the Government itself,
represented
by the Bureau of Lands, effective on July 30, 1915 and for a period of
12 months.[32]
The Government's acceptance of the mortgage from Tomas Alonso
indubitably
shows its recognition of his ownership of the property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
What then is the significance
of the signature of the Department Secretary? What is the rationale of
the law in requiring his signature on the deed of sale? Section 18
should
be correlated with Section 15, which establishes a reservation of title
in favor of the Government pending full payment of the purchase price.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Applying the provisions
of said Section 15, this Court ruled in Director of Lands v. Rizal[33]
that although the Government reserves the bare and naked title to the
land,
the purchaser is deemed to be the actual owner thereof even before the
payment of the full price and before the execution of the final deed of
conveyance, the role or position of the Government being that of a mere
lien holder or mortgagee. This principle has consistently been applied
in subsequent cases.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
This kind of resolutory
condition,[35]
i.e., the non-payment of the purchase price, is imposed to guarantee
complete
payment of the agreed purchase price. Similarly, Section 18 requires
the
signature of the Secretary on the deed of sale to ensure verification
of
payment by no less than the Department Secretary before title is issued
and full ownership conveyed to the purchaser. The absence of the
Department
Secretary's signature where payment of the purchase price has already
been
completed does not cancel or invalidate the transaction. Verily, the
full
payment of the purchase price constitutes the fulfillment of the
condition.
It is not disputed that Tomas Alonso had effected full payment.[36]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
I fail to see any compelling
public policy that would call for a narrow construction of the law and
warrant a nullification of the sale for lack of the requisite approval.
On the contrary, the historical context of the Friar Lands Act and the
provisions of the Act itself indicate that the law was intended to be
applied
liberally to favor ownership.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
From the beginnings
of Spanish colonization up to the establishment of American
sovereignty,
religious corporations had acquired large tracts of land in the
Philippines,
breeding feelings of unrest and agitation among Filipino tenants
occupying
those lands.[37]
In order to avert any outbreak of violence, the Philippine Bill of 1902
authorized the Insular Government to exercise the power of eminent
domain
over lands which, on August 13, 1898, were owned or held by religious
orders
in such tracts or parcels or in such manner as in the opinion of the
Philippine
Commission injuriously affected the peace and welfare of the people.[38]
Actual settlers at the time the lands were acquired by the Government
were
given preference over all others to lease, purchase or acquire their
holdings
within such reasonable time as may be determined by the Government.[39]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The intent behind the
Friar Lands Act was to appease the restless Filipinos and to curtail
and
diminish the influence of the Catholic Church.[40]
These, the law proposed to do, by unclenching the latter's grip over
its
vast holdings through the acquisition by the Government and the
disposition
thereof to their actual settlers.[41]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The provisions of the
law reflect the intention to favor ownership over friar lands. Thus,
Section
11 of the Act allows the occupant to purchase the land at actual cost.
Section 13, moreover, limits leases to three years only.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Jurisprudence
interpreting
the provisions of Act No. 1120 has also hewed closely to this intent.
Applying
Section 16 of the law, which provides that, in the event of the death
of
a holder of a sales certificate prior to the execution of a deed by the
Government, the widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
upon
a showing that she has complied with the requirements of the law for
the
purchase of the same, this Court in Jocson P. Soriano[42]
held that:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Act Nos. 1120 and 926
were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special
privileges
under the laws of the United States and the various states of the
Union.
The statutes of the United States as well as of the various states of
the
Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of homesteads.
Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government,
where
his family may shelter and live beyond the reach of financial
misfortune,
and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of independence which
are
essential to the maintenance of free institutions. Furthermore, the
state
itself is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means
of support, and reduced to pauperism. (Cook and Burgwall vs.
McChristian,
4 Cal., 24; Franklin vs. Coffee, 70 Am. Dec., 292; Richardson vs.
Woodward,
104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21. Cyc., 459)chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The conservation of
a family house is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the
state
is to foster families as the factors of society, and thus promote
general
welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and independence, the spirit of
free
citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated
and fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own
home, with a sense of its protection and durability. (Waples on
Homestead
and Exemptions, p. 3)
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Under the statutory
and constitutional provisions of the various states of the Union it has
been held that "homestead privilege does not terminate on the husband's
death but is transmitted to his widow and children." (21 Cyc., 562)[43]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is in light of this
intent that I maintain that the approval of the Department Secretary
has
been rendered moot by the acceptance of the Government of payments
thereon
because the objective of the law, which is the transfer of ownership,
has
been accomplished. Verily, the condition of the law for such transfer
is
the full payment of the purchase price. Thus, in an analogous case[44]
involving Section 29 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act),
which prohibits conveyances by the purchaser, this Court upheld such
conveyance
notwithstanding the lack of approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and
Natural Resources, as required by law:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
But such approval becomes
unnecessary after the purchaser had complied with all the requirements
of the law, even if the patent has not been actually issued, for in
that
case the rights of the purchaser are already deemed vested, the
issuance
of the patent being a mere ceremony. Thus, "the execution and delivery
of the patent after the right to it has become complete, are the mere
ministerial
acts of the officers charged with that duty" (Simmons vs. Wagner, 101
U.S.
260). And, as it has been held, "One who had done everything which is
necessary
in order to entitle him to receive a patent for public land has, even
before
the patent is actually issued by the land department, a complete
acquirable
estate in the land which he can sell and convey, mortgage or lease. A
fortiori
a contract to convey land made before the issuance of a patent but
after
final proof had been made and the land paid for is not illegal" (38
C.J.S.,
section 228, p. 875).[45]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The foregoing rationale
should apply more forcefully in this case. Note that Section 29, C.A.
No.
141 expressly declares "null and void" any conveyance without the
requisite
approval. Nevertheless, this Court stamped its imprimatur to such a
transaction.
What more in a case involving Section 18, Act No. 1120, which does not
define the precise effect for a similar lack of approval?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, it appears
that the purpose of said Section 18 in requiring the Secretary's
approval
is merely to ensure that the price for the sale is adequate. While the
initial authority to fix the price of the land was vested in the Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands, and later, in the Director of Lands,
final
approval was reposed upon the Secretary of Interior and, later, upon
the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Section 2, C.A. No. 32, as
amended
by C.A. No. 316, provides:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The persons, who, at
the time of the subdivision survey are actual and bona fide occupants
of
any portion of the Friar Lands Estates, not exceeding ten hectares,
shall
be given preference to purchase the portion occupied at a private sale
and at a price to be fixed in such case, by the Director of the Lands,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
after
taking into consideration its location, quality, and any other
circumstances
as may affect its value, the provisions of section twelve of Act
Numbered
Eleven [H]undred and [T]wenty, as amended, to the contrary. (Emphasis
supplied.)
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While this provision
does not appear in Section 18, Act No. 1120 but only in the amendatory
laws, it is a confirmation of the original purpose of the law, which,
to
repeat, is to ensure the adequacy of the price of the land.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the face of petitioner's
clear right to the property, it is incumbent upon the Government, not
the
petitioner, to explain the absence of the Department Secretary's
signature
on the final deed of sale. The Government has not proffered any reason
for such lack of approval. It does not claim that the absence of the
Secretary's
approval was due to inadequacy of the price, and the proposition that
petitioner
may have purchased friar lands beyond the limits set by the law[46]
is pure speculation. Be it noted that under Act No. 3024 which was the
law in force at the time the area limit for the purchase of Friar Lands
by an individual was 100 hectares. The subject property is 37 hectares
only.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither has the Government
produced the original of the final deed of sale. As the Court of
Appeals
pointed out, to which Mr. Justice Melo agreed in his Dissent, the
Secretary's
signature could not be expected to appear on the archive copy offered
by
petitioner in evidence.[47]
Under the circumstances, the unjustified withholding by the Department
Secretary of his signature constitutes not merely an "arbitrary"[48]
exercise of power but an outright deprivation of property without due
process
of law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
That the sales patent
issued in petitioner's name has not been registered is of little
consequence.
Registration, as this Court has repeatedly ruled, does not create or
vest
title but merely confirms title already created and vested.[49]
Thus, the failure to register did not negate petitioner's ownership
over
the subject property. In any case, petitioner having complied with all
the requirements of the law, registration should issue as a matter of
right.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The "important moiety"
that supposedly distinguishes this case from Cabrera-Ingles, therefore,
has been rendered irrelevant. In the Decision sought to be
reconsidered,
this Court referred to a "directive [by the Director of Lands] to the
Register
of Deeds to register the lot in question in favor of Graciano Ingles,"
which "superseded the administrative reconstitution, rendering
allegations
of fraud irrelevant."[50]
Having performed all that is necessary, petitioner in this case is just
as entitled to registration as the petitioners in Cabrera-Ingles.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Now, I address the Solid
State[51]
ruling and the obiter dictum in Liao v. Court of Appeals[52]
on which the Decision and the Revised Draft Resolution are anchored.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Arrayed against Solid
State and Liao are a significant number of cases involving Friar Lands,
all handed down by a unanimous full[53]
court, to wit:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Director of Lands v.
Rizal,[54]
per J. Montemayor:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
equitable
and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the moment he paid
the
first installment and was given a certificate of sale. The reservation
of title in favor of the government is made merely to protect the
interest
of the government so as to preclude or prevent the purchaser from
encumbering
or disposing of the lot purchased before the payment in full of the
purchase
price.[55]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bacalzo v. Pugeda,[56]
per J. Gutierrez-David:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is not
the
issuance of the deed of conveyance that vests ownership in the
purchaser
under the Friar Lands Act x x x"in the sale of friar lands
under Act No. 1120, the purchaser, even before the payment of the full
price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is
considered
by law as the actual owner of the lot purchased under the obligation to
pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government
being that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee."[57]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Pugeda v. Trias,[58]per
J. Labrador:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A study of
the above quoted provision clearly indicates that the conveyance
executed
in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale,
is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the
resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is
not
paid for in full.[59]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Alvarez v. Espiritu,[60]
per J. Regala:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The
reservation
of the title in favor of the government, which refers to the bare,
naked
title, is made merely for the protection of its interest so that the
lot
may not be disposed of by the purchaser before the price is paid in
full.
But outside of this protection, the government retains no right as an
owner.[61] chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Fabian v. Fabian,[62]
per. J. Castro.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
De la Torre v. Court
of Appeals,[63]
per J. Ynares-Santiago.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
FACTS: Following the
issuance of the certificate of sale in 1938, full payment was made in
1944.
But no final deed of conveyance was issued to the buyer who died in
1946.
In 1979, after discovering that an uncle had wrongfully obtained a deed
of conveyance from the Director of Lands and a transfer certificate of
title over the land, the heirs of the buyer and their transferee
brought
suit for reconveyance and annulment of title. HELD: Under the Friar
Lands
Act, the certificate of sale is a conveyance of the ownership of the
property,
subject only to the resolutory condition that "the sale may be
cancelled
if the price agreed upon is not paid in full." This is unlike in the
sale
of public lands under the Public Lands Act where actual occupancy is
required.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, notwithstanding
the absence of a final deed of conveyance and the lapse of 41 years,
the
rights of the buyer's heirs were upheld.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the case at bar,
the Court of Appeals acknowledged the execution of a final deed of
sale,
duly approved by the Department Secretary, in favor of Tomas Alonso.
Wrote
the appellate court:[64]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
However, the absence
of the secretary's signature in the Deed of Conveyance executed in
favor
of plaintiff's father (Exh. 'C') does not necessarily mean the absence
of the Secretary's approval as would invalidate the sale of Lot 727 to
Tomas Alonso. As plaintiff explains, the copy of the Deed of Conveyance
was merely a certified copy of the duplicate original existing in the
Records
Management and Archives Office of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, Manila (Exh. 'C-5'). Being merely an archive copy of the
document,
not the original, the Secretary's signature could not be expected to
appear
thereon. (Emphasis supplied.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
But, as noted before,
the absence of a final deed of sale cannot nullify the ownership rights
of Tomas Alonso. So too, even without such a final deed neither Solid
State
nor Liao can be invoked to defeat the rights of the petitioner as the
heir
of Tomas Alonso.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Involving conflicting
claims to a Friar Lands lot, Solid State presented a choice between an
administratively reconstituted title, backed neither by a sales
certificate
or a final deed of sale approved by the Department Secretary,[65]
and a regularly issued title based on a deed of sale approved by the
Department
Secretary.[66]
The choice for the Court was inexorable and it was made more so by its
finding that the holder of the reconstituted title was a pretender as
"no
previous title to the same land existed."[67]
Hence, the Court upheld the title which was sourced from the deed of
sale
duly approved by the Department Secretary.[68]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Liao, which was penned
by Justice Pardo, who also penned the Decision in this case, is however
different. Upon petition of Estrella Mapa, the RTC of Quezon City,
acting
as a land court, ordered the reconstitution of certain titles covering
Friar Lands lots which were allegedly lost. It turned out that the
reconstituted
titles were in conflict with existing titles. This resulted in the
filing
of petitions[69]
in the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the order of
reconstitution
against Mapa and her lot purchasers. It was followed by complaints
before
the RTC of Quezon City, seeking the quieting of title and an NBI
investigation
into the matter. In due time, the RTC branches concerned rendered their
decisions, nullifying the reconstituted titles and titles derived
therefrom.[70]
On separate appeals interposed by Liao, who in the meantime purchased
the
lots from Mapa's buyers, the Court of Appeals through two Divisions[71]
rendered decisions affirming the judgments of the Quezon City courts.
The
decisions of the Court of Appeals in turn were brought up to this
Court.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for annulment of
judgment.[72]
The decision was also elevated to this Court. After the consolidation
of
the petitions, this Court rendered the Liao decision.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The main issue raised
before the Court of Appeals per the Montoya ponencia was whether the
RTC,
as a land court, had jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution
of title,[73]
and in the other two cases whether a branch of the RTC could nullify
the
decision of another branch thereof.[74]
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals resolved the cases mainly on said
issues.[75]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When brought to this
Court, the same principal issue was raised.[76]
Like in the Court of Appeals, the application of Section 18 of the
Friar
Lands Act was not brought up before this Court in any of the pleadings.[77]
Neither was Solid State mentioned.[78]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court, however,
decided the cases on the basis of Solid State. 79 But then Solid State
was obviously misapplied. The ponencia[80]
ratiocinated that the sales are void because they were approved by the
Secretary of Interior, instead of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural
Resources as intimated in Solid State. But under the law in 1913 when
the
questioned sales certificates were issued, it was still the Secretary
of
Interior who could legally approve the deeds of sale.[81]
Clearly, therefore, reference to Solid State was an erroneous obiter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court could have
very well decided the cases principally on the "double sale" rule to
which
it devoted three paragraphs in the Decision.[82]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Solid State is good
law for the facts of that case. Only that much may be conceded. It
should
be applied only when there is a conflict between two titles covering
the
same Friar Land lot which emanated from different origins, one derived
from a deed of sale approved by the Department Secretary and the other
without such a basis. There, the choice is obvious.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the other hand, Solid
State should not be applied where the clashing rights originated from a
common basis, as in this case, or none of the contending parties has
come
out with a final deed of sale duly approved by the Department
Secretary.
What should be applied are the precedents led by Bacalzo, Pugeda and
Rizal.
Of course, this also means that the Government cannot invoke Section 18
of the Friar Lands Act against a purchaser, especially one who has
already
made full payment. I submit that this is the only sound conclusion.
For,
with its acceptance of full payment, the Government has irretrievably
lost
its rights to the property. Interestingly, the first position of the
OSG
based on the records of the Bureau of Lands was that "it can no longer
be disputed that. Tomas Alonso had validly acquired the disputed
Lot 527."[83]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, I have
to dispute this Court's disposition awarding the subject property to
the
Government,[84]
which has already ceded its rights to the lot to petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For an action for reconveyance
based on fraud to prosper, the party seeking reconveyance must prove by
clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of
fraud.[85]
I find that petitioner in this case has met his burden, that he has
established
his entitlement to the subject property and that he has a better right
thereto than respondent, and more so, the Government. Following the law
and the precedents, petitioner is entitled to the ownership and
possession
of the subject property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
ACCORDINGLY, I vote
to GRANT petitioner's motion for reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
____________________________
DISSENTING OPINION
Endnotes:
TINGA, J.:
[1]
375 SCRA 390 (2002).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
The Decision states that the failure to register was on account of the
lack of approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(Id., at 393-394). The prevailing law at the time of the execution of
the
final deed of sale on March 27, 1996 was Act No. 1120 dated April 26,
1904,
Section 18 of which required the approval of the Secretary of Interior
(not Agriculture and Natural Resources). Subsequently, Section 2 of
Commonwealth
Act No. 32 dated September 15, 1936, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
316 dated June 9, 1938, transferred such function to the Secretary of
Agriculture
and Commerce (not Natural Resources). See Solid State Multi-Products
Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, infra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Exhibit D. Also Exhibit 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
G.R. No. 60392, August 29, 1983.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Exhibit R. Also Exhibit 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Note 1, supra, at 410.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
See De Ocampo v. Arlos, G.R. No. 135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA
716;
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120652, February 11, 1998, 286
SCRA 230.
[8]
Id., at 402.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id., at 399.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Dauan v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 125 Phil. 639
(1967).
[11]
Vide, See Note 5, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Vide, Decision in CA-G.R. No. 41918, p. 18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Id., at 19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Id., at 18-19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Vide, Decision, CA-GR No. 65559, Exh. F.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 34.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., Note 1, supra, at 413-416.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Revised Draft Resolution, per J. Martinez, p. 8 (Word in parenthesis
supplied).
[20]
Id., at 422.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id., at 411.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA
483; Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118982, 19 February 2001,
352 SCRA 47; Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142056, 19 April 2001,
356
SCRA 768; Heirs of Leopoldo Vencilao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, Phil.
815
(1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137566, 28 February 2001, 353
SCRA
179.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Cometa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141855, 6 February 2001, 351 SCRA
294.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Resolution, per J. Martinez, p. 9 (Word in parenthesis supplied).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., Note 1, supra, at 405.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Resolution, per J. Martinez, p. 9.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Vide, Note 2, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
Id., at 403.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
G.R. No. 83383, 6 May 1991, 196 SCRA 630.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
Id., at 639-640.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[32]
Vide, Exh. "A-7"; Records, p. 367, et seq.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
87 Phil. 806 (1950).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113095, 8 February 2000, 325
SCRA
11; Fabian P. Fabian, 130 Phil. 214 (1968); Alvarez P. Espiritu, G.R.
No.
L-18833,14 August 1965,14 SCRA 892; Pugeda v. Trias, G.R. No. L-16925,
31 March 1962, 4 SCRA 849; Bacalzo v. Pacada, 107 Phil. 520 (1960).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[36]
Vide, Exh. "A-2"; Records, p. 367, et seq.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[37]
A. Mañalac and R. Mañalac, Land Registration 3rd ed. 95.
[38]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[39]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[40]
DePersio, Edward, S.S.C., THE FRIAR LANDS QUESTION IN THE PHILIPPINES,
World Mission Summer 1960, Vol. II, No. 2. The author even quotes the
following
statement of then Governor General William Howard Taft: "On behalf of
the
Philippine Government it is proposed to buy the lands of the religious
orders with the hope that the funds thus furnished may lead to their
withdrawal
from the Islands." x x xThe purchase of the Friar Lands,
the division of the proceeds, the application of a large part thereof
for
the benefit of the Philippine Church, the establishment of the American
hierarchy here, and the gradual withdrawal of the Spanish Friars, all
will
bring about what we so much desire — the Americanizing of the Roman
Catholic
Church in the Philippines, pp. 30, 31;" Escalante, Rene, THE AMERICAN
FRIAR
LANDS POLICY: ITS FRAMERS, CONTEXT, AND BENEFICIARIES, 1898-1916, De La
Salle University Press, Inc. "The primary reason for purchasing the
friar
lands was largely political. It was to get rid of a class that
disturbed
political stability. The Republican administration believed that the
settlement
of the friar lands issue would yield several benefits without
necessarily
incurring cash outlay. First, the sale of friar lands would free the
friars
from their attachments to the country. Once they had liquidated their
assets
in the Philippines, the Americans expected that the friars would leave
the country. Second, the purchase of the friar lands and their
subsequent
sale to the tenants would bolster their propaganda that the Americans
came
to the Philippines to promote the welfare of the Filipinos. In the eyes
of the Americans and Filipinos, the Mckinley administration would
appear
benevolent and pro-Filipino. Third, the American leaders considered the
settlement of the problems concerning the friar lands an inexpensive
way
to pacify the country, Financially, the settlement would not affect the
Americans because the money would float. In short, the friar lands
policy
was an effective political instrument in quelling Filipino resistance
to
American rule." pp. 69-71.
[41]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[42]
45 Phil. 375 (1923).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[43]
Id., at 378-379.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[44]
Juanico and Barredo v. American Land Commercial Co., Inc., et al., 97
Phil.
221 (1955), cited in Tan V. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80479, 28 July
1989,
175 SCRA 656, 665.
[45]
Id., at 227.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[46]
Separate Concurring Opinion, Carpio, J., p. 5.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[47]
Note 1, supra, at 417.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[48]
Separate Concurring Opinion, Carpio, J., p. 4.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[49]
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
129471,
28 April 2000, 331 SCRA 267; Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 107
(1999); Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 544 (1998); Heirs
of
Teodoro Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 652.
[50]
Alonso v. Cebu Country, Note 1, supra, at 407.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[51]
Note 30, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[52]
G.R. Nos. 102961-62, 107625 & 108759, 323 SCRA 430 (2000).
[53]
Except Dela Torre P. Court of Appeals, supra, which is a Division case.
[54]
Note 33, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[55]
87 Phil., at 810.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[56]
Note 33, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[57]
107 Phil., at 524-525.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[58]
Note 33, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[59]
4 SCRA, at 859.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[60]
Note 33, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[61]
14 SCRA, at 897-898.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[62]
Note 33, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[63]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[64]
See CA Decision, p. 10.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[65]
196 SCRA, at 641–642.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[66]
Ibid, at 640–641.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[67]
Ibid, at 643.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[68]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[69]
CA-G.R. Nos. 20381 & 22098.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[70]
See Rollo, G.R. Nos. 107625 & 108759.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[71]
First Division, composed of justice Chua, as ponente, and justices Cui
and Rasul, concurring in the Decision promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No.
28422
on October 23, 1992; Rollo, G.R. No. 107625, pp. 31-34; Seventh
Division,
composed of justice Austria-Martinez, as ponente, and Justices De Pano
and Lapina, concurring, in Decision promulgated in CA GR-SP No. 28368
on
February 4, 1993; Rollo, G.R. No. 108759, pp. 26-33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[72]
Decision in CA GR-SP Nos. 20381 & 22098 of Former Twelfth Division
with justice Montoya, as ponente, and justices Purisima and Cacdac,
concurring,
promulgated on August 29, 1991; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 102961-62, pp. 349-350.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[73]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 102961-62, pp. 349-358.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[74]
Rollo, G.R. No. 107625, pp. 31-34; Rollo, G.R. No. 108759, pp. 26-33.
[75]
Notes 73 & 74, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[76]
Note 52, supra, at 442.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[77]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[78]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[79]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[80]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[81]
Sec. 18, Act No. 1120.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[82]
Note, 52, supra, 443–444.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[83]
OSG Comment dated 8 November 2000; Rollo, pp. 651-678, at 670.
[84]
Note 1, at 424, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[85]
Barrera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123935, December 14, 2001, 372
SCRA
312; Abejaron v. Nabasa, G.R. No. 84837, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47. |