THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
G.R.
No.
136860
January 20, 2003
-versus-
AGPANGA LIBNAO Y
KITTENand
ROSITA NUNGA
Y VALENCIA,
Accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO Y
KITTEN,
Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO,
J.
:
Before us is an appeal
from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and her
co-accused
Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No.
6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1]
For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant and her co-accused
were charged under the following Information:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"That on or about October
20, 1996 at around 1:00 o’clock dawn, in the Municipality of Tarlac,
Province
of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping with one
another, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell
marijuana leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing
approximately
eight (8) kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA
6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
During their arraignment,
both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It appears from the
evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996,
intelligence
operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac,
Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug
dealers
in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from
Tajiri,
Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs
once a month in big bulks. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 19, 1996,
at about 10 o’clock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo,
Tarlac
Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office
received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be
making
a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a
checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness
SPO1
Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were
assigned
to man the checkpoint. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At about 1:00 o’clock
in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer
flagged
down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside,
who
were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her
co-accused
Rosita Nunga.[3]
In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the
two’s
uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the
officers
invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They
brought with them the black bag.cralaw:red
Upon reaching the center,
PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening
of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were
turned
over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the
barangay
captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the
appellant,
her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight
bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The
leaves were suspected to be marijuana. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To determine who owns
the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. Rosita
Nunga
stated that it was owned by the appellant. The latter, in turn,
disputed
this allegation. Thereafter, they were made to sign a confiscation
receipt
without the assistance of any counsel, as they were not informed of
their
right to have one. During the course of the investigation, not even
close
relatives of theirs were present. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The seized articles
were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando,
Pampanga
on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a
laboratory
examination on them. She concluded that the articles were marijuana
leaves
weighing eight kilos.[4] chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For their part, both
accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that
in the evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy medicine for her
ailing
child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was
suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to
their
house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she
resides.
Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a
policeman
at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the
officer
invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted
with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana
leaves.
She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She also denied
sitting
beside the appellant in the passenger’s seat inside the tricycle,
although
she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Remarkably, appellant
did not appear in court and was only represented by her lawyer. The
latter
marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit executed by one Efren
Gannod,
a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The
sworn statement declared that at about 0220H on October 20, 1996, SPO2
Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a certain woman who
boarded
their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in the company’s logbook.
Gannod, however, was not presented in court to attest that the woman
referred
in his affidavit was the appellant.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial, the court
convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, finding
both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation
of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are
hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of two million pesos. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED."[5] chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Aggrieved by the verdict,
appellant interposed the present appeal. In her brief, she assigned the
following errors: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"1. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the contention of
the
defense that the right of accused against illegal and unwarranted
arrest
and search was violated by the police officers who arrested both
accused.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. The
Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the defense that
the right of the accused to custodial investigation was deliberately
violated
by the peace officers who apprehended and investigated the accused.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. The
Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material
inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses which inconsistencies
cast doubt and make incredible the contention and version of the
prosecution.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
4. The
Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it appreciated and
considered
the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution not formally
offered
amounting to ignorance of the law."[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We are not persuaded
by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be dismissed. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In arguing that her
arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence of a warrant
for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was apprehended by
the
police officers, she was not committing any offense but was merely
riding
a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search made on her
belongings
as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or under
circumstances
when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently, any evidence
obtained
therein is inadmissible against her.cralaw:red
These arguments fail
to impress. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law
enforcers
only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided
in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable,
and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."[7]
The constitutional guarantee
is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates
only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. Searches and
seizures
are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded
by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police
must
stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to
issue
or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Be that as it may, the
requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the
carrying
out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar
exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving
vehicles.[9]
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in
recognition
of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant may be sought.[10]
Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks
where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.[11]
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such
would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable
cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known
to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In earlier decisions,
we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a)
where
the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried
by the accused;[13]
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was
observed
to be acting suspiciously;[14]
(c) where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and
searched
by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said
accused
would transport a quantity of marijuana;[15]
(d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian
coming
from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs
and
when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a
conspicuous
bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other
identification
papers when requested to do so;[16]
(f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of
intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy
-- one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate
to which the accused belong -- that said accused were bringing
prohibited
drugs into the country;[17]
(g) where the arresting officers had received a confidential
information
that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established
in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia
and
probably carrying shabu with him;[18]
(h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who
was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport
marijuana
in a bag to Manila;[19]]
and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he
was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset.[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The warrantless search
in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac
Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
three
months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once
a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in
big
bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that
the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle.
Surely,
the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and
carrying
a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in
bulk.
When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became
uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure
of
appellant’s bag was not illegal. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is also clear that
at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense.
She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court,
one
of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
warrantless
arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime
in
flagrante delicto, thus: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Section 5. Arrest without
Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without
warrant, arrest a person: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(a) When
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(b) When
an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause
to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(c) When
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement
to another. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x."[21]
Appellant also takes
issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police
officers
interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her
right
to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence,
she
argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be
considered
inadmissible in evidence against her. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
These contentions deserve
scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her
custodial
investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her
co-accused,
the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses
and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana. We quote the
relevant
portion of its decision: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Earlier in the course
of the proceedings, the court then presided by Judge Angel Parazo,
granted
bail to accused Agpanga Libnao, ruling that the confiscation receipt
signed
by both accused (Exhibit 'C') is inadmissible because they were not
assisted
by a counsel. Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the
postulate
to rest on good authority and will therefore reiterate its
inadmissibility.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since the prosecution
had not presented any extrajudicial confession extracted from both
accused
as evidence of their guilt, the court finds it needless to discuss any
answer given by both accused as a result of the police interrogation
while
in their custody. By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to
be
resolved by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecution’s
evidence,
both accused can be convicted."[22]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant then faults
the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and
documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to
formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they
again
must be deemed inadmissible. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The contention is untenable.
Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as
they have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they
have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.[23]
All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly
identified,
presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of
marijuana.[24]
Even without their formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still
establish
the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and
their
testimonies are recorded.[25]
Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses
who testified on the exhibits.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Appellant also assails
the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She
first
cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea,
who
said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black bag containing the
marijuana;
and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was already open
when
he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police
officers’
failure to remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where
she allegedly rode, claiming that this is improbable and contrary to
human
experience. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Again, appellant’s arguments
lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to
minor
details and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the
crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect the credibility
of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant
and
her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses
need
only corroborate each other on important and relevant details
concerning
the principal occurrence.[27]
The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly immaterial to
the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the
testimony
of witnesses regarding the same incident may be inconsistent in some
aspects
because different persons may have different recollections of the same
incident.[28] chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Likewise, we find nothing
improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember
the
name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for
them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in complicity with
the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To be sure, credence
was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who
are law enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify
falsely
against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold this presumption.[29]
In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper
motive
on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Against the credible
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s defense
of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has
been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily
be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases
involving
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]
It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[31]
The sole proof presented in the lower court by the appellant to support
her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement, which was not even
affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her
defense.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding
appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article
II,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659, and sentencing
her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two
million
pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur. chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Criminal Case No. 9384.
[2]
Information, Original Records, p. 1; Rollo, p. 4.
[3]
A male passenger was seated at the back of the tricycle driver.
[4]
Exhibit E.
[5]
Decision, Criminal Case No. 9484, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[6]
Appellant’s Brief, p. 5; Rollo, p. 44.
[7]
Art. III, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution.
[8]
People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
The following cases are recognized in our juriprudence: warrantless
search
incidental to a lawful arrest; seizure of evidence in "plain view;"
consented
warrantless search; customs search; stop and
frisk; and exigent and emergency
circumstances.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 (1994).
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997).
[13]
People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (1988).
[14]
People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 (1990).
[15]
People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 (1990).
[16]
People v. Malmsteadt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991).
[17]
People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991).
[18]
People v. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 (1994).
[19]
People v. Balingan, 241 SCRA 277 (1995).
[20]
People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 (1999).
[21]
Rule 113, Section 5, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[22]
Decision, p.3; Rollo, p. 19.
[23]
Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650 (1991).
[24]
Exhibits 'D-1' and series, TSN, August 15, 1997; TSN, October 22, 1997,
pp. 2-6.
[25]
People v. Mate, 103 SCRA 484 (1981).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
People v. Napat-a, 179 SCRA 403 (1989).
[27]
People v. Inocencio, 229 SCRA 517 (1994).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
People v. Sy Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28 (1999).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
People v. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 (2000).
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
People v. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 (1998). |