THIRD DIVISION.
.
MANILA BANKERS
LIFE
INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
139791
December 12, 2003
-versus-
EDDY NG KOK WEI,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1]
dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution[2]
dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504,
entitled
"Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corporation". chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The factual
antecedents
as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent,
is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the
Philippines.
On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to
Manila
Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention
to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.cralaw:red
Subsequently or on December
5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000.00 for
the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued at
P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase
price
in the sum of P729,830.00.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, petitioner,
through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract to
Sell
in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the
subject
condominium unit "shall substantially be completed and delivered" to
the
respondent "within fifteen (15) months" from February 8, 1989 or on May
8, 1990, and that "(S)hould there be no substantial completion and
fail(ure)
to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total
amount paid (by respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner)".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Considering that the
stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to the
Philippines
sometime in April, 1990.cralaw:red
In a letter dated April
5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President, Mr.
Mario
G. Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial completion of his
condominium
unit, however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup
d'etat
attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage), the final turnover is
reset to May 31, 1990.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Meanwhile, on July 5,
1990, upon receipt of petitioner's notice of delivery dated May 31,
1990,
respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still
uninhabitable
for lack of water and electric facilities.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Once more, petitioner
issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building
administrator
advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on August
22,
1990.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 5, 1990,
respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his
condominium
unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send
petitioner
a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages he
sustained.
But petitioner ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with
the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 150, Makati City, a complaint against the
former for specific performance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
90-3440.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Meanwhile, during the
pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit
and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondent's cause of
action
has been limited to his claim for damages.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 18, 1992,
the trial court rendered a Decision[3]
finding the petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the delay
in
the performance of its obligation to the respondent. The dispositive
portion
reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant,
ordering Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff
Eddy
Ng Kok Wei the following:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. One
percent
(1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;
2. P100,000.00 as
moral
damages;
3. P50,000.00 as
exemplary
damages;
4. P25,000.00 by
way
of attorney's fees; and
5. Cost of suit.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in toto the trial
court's award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate
Court
in a Resolution dated August 5, 1999.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals
erred
in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner incurred
unreasonable
delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to respondent.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On petitioner's contention
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section
1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
"SECTION 1.
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree
No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory
Board (HLURB)] 4 shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases
of the following nature:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
"C. Cases
involving
specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x."
Pursuant to the above
provisions,
it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. We have
consistently
held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or
condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the
exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While it may be true
that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case,
petitioner's
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such
lack of it. We have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision
and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Here, petitioner failed
to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the
Appellate
Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court's
jurisdiction
over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer
question
the trial court's jurisdiction.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On petitioner's claim
that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual
issue.
Time and again, we have ruled that "the factual findings of the trial
court
are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries
more
weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals."[7]
Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay
damages
as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The jurisdiction of
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed
are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is
based
on a misapprehension of facts.[8]
These exceptions are not present here.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999 and Resolution
dated
August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs against the petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Vitug, Corona and Carpio
Morales, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Annex "A" of the Petition for Review, Rollo at 27-57.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Annex "C", id. at 63-65.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Annex "H", id. at 83-89.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Jurisdiction was originally vested in the National Housing Authority
(NHA)
under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344. Under E.O. No. 648 of
February 7, 1981, this jurisdiction was transferred to the Human
Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of December
17, 1986, was renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
[5]
See Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, G.R. No. 84811, August 29, 1989, 177
SCRA 72; C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs. Hibionada, G.R. No. 80916,
November
9, 1990, 191 SCRA 268; Tejada vs. Homestead Property Corporation, G.R.
No. 79622, September 29, 1989, 178 SCRA 164; Alcasid vs. Court of
Appeals,
G.R. No. 94927, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 437; Fajardo vs. Bautista,
G.R.
Nos. 102193-97, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 291.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
See Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, et al, G.R. No. 118069,
November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 517; TCL Sales Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals,
G.R. No. 129777, January 5, 2001, 349 SCRA 35; Alday vs. FGU Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 138822, January 23, 2001, 350 SCRA 113.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Lim vs. Chan, G.R. No. 127227, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 55, 59,
citing
Valgoson's Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 449 (1998).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Cosmos Bottling Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 146397, July 1, 2003,
citing
De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 94 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |
