Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ROGELIO ENGADA,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
140698
June 20, 2003
-versus-
HON. COURT
OF
APPEALS,
FORMER FOURTEENTH
DIVISION,MANILA, AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
D E C I S I
O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Petition for Review
seeks the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated May 31, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358,
which
affirmed with modification the judgment[2]
dated August 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch
29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC found petitioner guilty
beyond
reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting in physical injuries
and
damage to property, and sentenced him to (a) suffer imprisonment for
one
month and one day of arresto mayor, (b) pay private complainant, Mrs.
Sheila
Seyan, the amount of fifty one thousand pesos (P51,000) for the total
destruction
of the Toyota Tamaraw jeepney, and one hundred ten thousand pesos
(P110,000) for her hospital and medical expenses, and (c) pay the costs
of suit. The CA increased the prison term imposed on petitioner to four
months of arresto mayor.
The facts culled from
the records are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
On November 29, 1989,
at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota
Tamaraw
jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the
registered
owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the road along Barangay Acquit,
Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite
direction
a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The
pick-up
had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a
few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal
light
flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the
lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with
it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his
left
but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided
with
the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger
side.
The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from
its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a
ricefield.
The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road.cralaw:red
Seyan and Iran were
brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital.[3]
Seyan was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of shock
with her eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29,
1989,
she was transferred to St. Paul’s Hospital in Iloilo City where she was
confined. Her medical certificate revealed that she suffered a fracture
on the right femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple
contusions,
abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower
pole
of the right kidney.[4]
She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990.cralaw:red
Seyan incurred P130,000
in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the
junk
heap. Its total loss was computed at P80,000.cralaw:red
A criminal complaint
for damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious
physical
injuries was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Barotac Nuevo
against
petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran.[5]
Probable cause was found against petitioner, while the complaint
against
Iran was dismissed.[6]
Consequently, an Information
was filed against petitioner charging him with serious physical
injuries
and damage to property through reckless imprudence, thus:
That on or
about November 29, 1989, in the Municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,
the above-named accused Rogelio Engada driving an Isuzu Pick-up with
Plate
No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines, did then and
there
wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless imprudence drive said pick-up in
a careless, reckless and imprudent manner with disregard of traffic
laws
and regulations, and as a result of such negligent and reckless driving
the Isuzu Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a Toyota Tamaraw jeep
with
Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan and driven by Edwin
Iran thereby causing damage to the Toyota Tamaraw in the amount of
P80,000.00
and serious physical injuries to Mrs. Sheila Seyan who was riding said
vehicle, the injuries barring complications will heal in more than 30
days.chanrobles virtual law library
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
After trial, the court
rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple
Imprudence resulting [in] physical injuries and damage to property
defined
and penalized in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article
365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the
accused
Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY
of arresto mayor.
Accused is further
ordered
to pay complainant Mrs. Sheila Seyan the amount of P51,000.00 for the
total
destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw Jeepney and P110,000.00 for
indemnification
of hospital and medical expenses, and to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA dismissed the
appeal
and affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision, thus:
WHEREFORE,
the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed
decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty imposed upon the
accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4)
MONTHS
of arresto mayor.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioner filed a
motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the instant
petition,
wherein petitioner raises the issue of: WHETHER OR NOT THE
FINDINGS
OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR BASED
ON
A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS RESULTING IN A MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN INFERENCE
SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WHOSE
ACT WAS IT.[10]
Petitioner claims innocence
and seeks acquittal. He contends that in this case we should
relax
the rule that only legal questions can be raised in a petition for
review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the Court of
Appeals
misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion as to the
proximate
cause of the collision. He insists that the Court of Appeals erred when
it found him negligent for occupying the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney,
and
then failing to return to his original lane at the safest and earliest
opportunity.cralaw:red
Petitioner further contends
that the CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to
go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right signal light. He
submits
that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason
to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left, according to
petitioner,
the collision would have been avoided. It was Iran who was clearly
negligent,
says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[11]
petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the Tamaraw’s lane
was the initial act in the chain of events, Iran’s swerving to the left
after petitioner flashed his right turn signal, constituted a
sufficient
intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries and
damages
to private complainant.cralaw:red
Petitioner also claims
that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the pick-up
approached
the Tamaraw at a fast speed. He maintains that this was not borne by
the
evidence on record.chanrobles virtual law library
The Office of the Solicitor
General, as counsel for the state, counters that the Court of Appeals
did
not err in convicting the accused, now petitioner herein.
Petitioner’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, according to the
OSG,
for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no justifiable reason
occupied the opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong lane, petitioner
was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his own lane
only
at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, with no
opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the accident. Iran’s
swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioner’s wrongful act,
which
appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule.
The
rationale of this rule is that a person who is confronted with a sudden
emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt
decision
based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held
to
the same standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity to reflect,
even though it later appears that he made the wrong decision. Clearly,
under the emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran,
concludes
the OSG.cralaw:red
As to petitioner’s claim
that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up was running very
fast,
the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony of Seyan and Iran
who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a fast speed
when
it encroached on their lane immediately before the collision.cralaw:red
Did the Court of Appeals
err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio Engada, was the
proximate
cause of the collision? This is the crux of the present petition.cralaw:red
In our view, petitioner’s
attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, for
the vehicular collision is unfounded. Iran swerved to the left
only
to avoid petitioner’s pick-up, which was already on a head to head
position
going against Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles
collided.
This fact has been established by the evidence on record. No convincing
proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of the Tamaraw, Iran,
could
have avoided a head-on collision.cralaw:red
We note that petitioner
admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of the Tamaraw
jeepney.
Prosecution witness Nelson Alobin, one of those who went to the scene
of
the incident immediately, testified that when he arrived at the place
where
the collision took place, he saw the pick-up positioned diagonally at
the
center of the road.[12]
Its head was towards the direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires
were just a few inches beyond the center of the lane.[13]
Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two arms length away from the
pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12 inches long and located at the
left side of the center line going to the right side.[14]chanrobles virtual law library
The above circumstance
corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran that, immediately
before
the collision, the pick-up was not on its proper lane but on the other
lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on collision course
with the Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short distance
between
the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted to return to its
proper
lane.cralaw:red
It is a settled rule
that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that
the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in
safety.[15]
This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which
provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions
on overtaking and passing. - (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall
not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in
overtaking
or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless
such
left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a
sufficient
distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in
safety.cralaw:red
In the present case,
there was only a distance of 30 meters from the Tamaraw jeepney when
the
Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved to the left of the center
line.[16]
In addition, petitioner was running at a fast clip while traversing
this
lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran, unrebutted by
petitioner.
The resulting damage to the Tamaraw jeepney, at the point where the
head
and chassis were separated from the body, bolsters this conclusion that
petitioner was speeding. In our view, petitioner was negligent in
several
ways, and his negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision.
In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite
lane
was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe passage.
Further,
after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did not slow down,
contrary
to the rule set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC,[17]
thus:chanrobles virtual law library
x x
xor if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking
vehicle
finds that he cannot make the passage in safety, the latter must
slacken
his speed so as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his
car
to a stop if necessary.cralaw:red
For failing to observe
the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles
abandoning
their lane, petitioner must be held liable.cralaw:red
Iran could not be faulted
when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.
Petitioner’s
acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act
quickly.
An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and
is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if
he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.[18]
Petitioner tries to
extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last clear
chance. He avers that between him and Iran, the latter had the
last
clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.chanrobles virtual law library
The doctrine of last
clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity
of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent,
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident.[19]
But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced
by petitioner to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine.
Instead,
what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper
application
of the emergency rule. Petitioner’s act of swerving to the
Tamaraw’s
lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up
at
a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and
opportunity
to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak
of.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner
responsible
for the vehicular collision and the resulting damages, including the
injuries
suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of the Tamaraw
jeepney.
It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of four (4)
months of arresto mayor.[20]
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the
Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 26-34.
[2]
Records, pp. 374-381.chanrobles virtual law library
[3]
TSN, 6 September 1991, p. 9. However in the testimony of Seyan dated 7
October 1991, p. 6, it was Barotac Rural Health Center.
[4]
Records, p.16.chanrobles virtual law library
[5]
Id. at 6.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Id. at 31.
[7]
Id. at 1.
[8]
Id. at 381.
[9]
Rollo, p. 33.
[10]
Id. at 18.chanrobles virtual law library
[11]
G.R. No. 68102, 16 July 1992, 211 SCRA 517.
[12]
TSN, 13 September 1991, pp. 6-7.chanrobles virtual law library
[13]
Id. at 15.chanrobles virtual law library
[14]
Id. at 7.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128607, 31 January 2000, 324
SCRA 147, 153.
[16]
TSN, 6 September 1991, pp. 5 & 12.chanrobles virtual law library
[17]
G.R. Nos. L-74387-90, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 379, 384.
[18]
Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 374, 389 (1996).chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89880, 6 February 1991,
193 SCRA 603, 611.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by
reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor
in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have
constituted
a light-felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period
shall
be imposed.chanrobles virtual law library
Any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if it would have
constituted
a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period
shall be imposed.chanrobles virtual law library
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