THIRD DIVISION.
LIGAYA S. NOVICIO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
141332
December 11, 2003
-versus-
ALMA AGGABAO,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:
Before us is a Petition
for Review on
Certiorari
seeking the reversal of the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated June 10, 1999 and its resolution dated
December
28, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46777. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts follow.cralaw:red
On April 20, 1995, petitioner
Ligaya Novicio, stockholder and treasurer of Philippine International
Life
Insurance Company (Philinterlife), sent a letter to Philinterlife's
depository
banks, namely, Far East Bank and Trust Company, China Banking
Corporation
and First Bank, informing these banks that several stockholders of
Philinterlife,
including respondent Alma Aggabao, had been restrained by the Court of
Appeals' Twelfth Division, in a separate action for annulment of sale
of
the company's shares, from exercising their rights as shareholders of
Philinterlife.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Upon learning of the
petitioner's letter, respondent filed a complaint-affidavit in the
Prosecutor's
Office of Quezon City charging petitioner with libel. Respondent
claimed
that the letter injured her reputation and credibility as the corporate
secretary and chief accountant of Philinterlife. The city prosecutor,
however,
dismissed respondent's complaint. Respondent filed a petition for
review
in the Department of Justice. On April 15, 1997, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño granted the petition and directed the city
prosecutor
to file informations for three counts of libel against Novicio
Consequently,
on June 9, 1997, the city prosecutor filed three informations for libel
pursuant to the directive of the Chief State Prosecutor, as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The undersigned accuses
LIGAYA NOVICIO of the crime of Libel, committed as follows:
That on or
about the 21st day of April, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously write
a letter to Far East Bank, which purport to be an official act of the
officers
of Philinterlife, pertinent portions of which reads as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Please be informed
that
the Court of Appeals (12th Division) has issued a Resolution dated
April
10, 1995 restraining Jose C. Lee, Carlos Lee, Carmencita V. Tan, Angel
Ong, Benjamin C. Lee, Alma Aggabao and Ma. Paz C. Lee from, among
others,
exercising their rights and privileges (sic) as shareholders of
Philippine
International Life Insurance Company until further orders from said
Court.
A copy of such Resolution is hereto attached for your immediate
reference.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In pursuance of
the
subject Resolution, the remaining members of the Board of Directors of
Philinterlife who were duly constituted prior to the controversy, had
decided
to change the bank signatories of its corporate account in your bank.
The
new signatories are any two of the following:
(a) Ms.
Ligaya
Novicio;
(b) Mr. Jose
Gatchalian;
and/or Mr. Jose Ortañez.
Enclosed please find
the
requisite Secretary's Certificate attesting to such change.
You are therefore,
put
on notice not to deal with the afore-mentioned persons who were
restrained
by the Court of Appeals from exercising their rights as Shareholders of
Philinterlife. The company shall not honor any transaction that may be
entered into by said persons for and its behalf.
and other words of
similar
import, when in truth and in fact, as the accused very well know, the
same
are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other
purpose
than to convey to all those whoever read it an imputation on Alma
Aggabao
injurious to her position as Corporate Secretary and Chief Accountant
of
Philinterlife as an impostor and without authority to act for and in
behalf
of Philinterlife, thereby exposing her to public ridicule, casting
dishonor,
discredit and contempt upon the person of the said offended party, to
her
damage and prejudice.[2]
The three informations,
identically worded except as to the names of the depository banks, were
docketed as criminal case nos. Q-97-71379, Q-97-71380 and Q-97-71381,
and
raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92.[3]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Before arraignment,
Novicio moved to quash the informations alleging that the facts charged
therein did not constitute libel. The trial court, in an order dated
October
7, 1997, denied the motion to quash on the ground that the allegations
therein were evidentiary in nature and should thus be presented, proved
and resolved in a full-blown trial. Novicio moved for reconsideration
but
it was denied by the trial court. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Novicio then filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals. On
September
21, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor-General filed a manifestation
recommending
the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On June 10, 1999, however,
the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision dismissing
Novicio's
petition, finding that the trial court committed no grave abuse of
discretion
in denying her motion to quash. Novicio's subsequent motion for
reconsideration
was likewise denied by the appellate court.cralaw:red
Hence, Novicio brought
the instant petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the Court
of
Appeals erred in ruling that the facts alleged in the informations
constituted
libel.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In fine, the only issue
here is whether or not the letter written by petitioner Novicio was
libelous.cralaw:red
The provisions of law
applicable to the instant case are Articles 353 and 354 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Art. 353.
Definition
of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt
of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who
is
dead.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Art. 354.
Requirement
for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making
it is shown, except in the following cases:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. A
private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal,
moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and
true report,
made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For an imputation to
be
libelous, the following requisites must concur:
(a) it
must
be defamatory;
(b) it must be
malicious;
(c) it must be
given
publicity and
(d) the victim must
be identifiable.[4]
At the outset, it
should
be stressed that, except for the element of identification, the
informations
filed against petitioner failed to establish the three other elements
of
libel.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In determining whether
a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning
as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless
it
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[5]
In this case, the words used by petitioner in her letter did not cast
aspersion
on respondent's character, integrity and reputation. They were intended
merely to notify the banks concerned of the change of bank signatories
of Philinterlife as a consequence of the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
No veiled and malicious suggestion or innuendo could be inferred from
the
fact that respondent, who used to be an authorized signatory of the
company,
was being replaced as such. The letter did not in any way convey the
idea
that respondent was guilty of any offense which besmirched her
integrity
and reputation. On the contrary, the language used by petitioner was
plain,
simple, direct and factual. The words could not be interpreted to mean
other than what they intend to say — that respondent had ceased to be a
bank signatory and all transactions entered into by her were no longer
going to be honored by Philinterlife.cralaw:red
More importantly, the
informations failed to allege the existence of malice. There is malice
when the author is prompted by personal ill will or spite and speaks
not
in response to a duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person
who claims to have been defamed.[6]
In this case, however, petitioner's letter was written to inform the
banks
in which Philinterlife maintained its corporate accounts of the court's
resolution and the corresponding change of bank signatories. It is,
thus,
a qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The rule on privileged
communication means that a communication made in good faith on any
subject
matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which
he
has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
duty.
Petitioner's letter was clearly a private communication made in the
performance
of her duty as the treasurer of Philinterlife. In this capacity,
petitioner
was primarily tasked to hold and safeguard the company's finances,
monitor
its bank accounts and deposits, and carry out company rules and
policies
pertaining to financial matters. Clearly, the letter was an official
act
done in good faith and constituted an honest narration of the events
that
transpired within the company. It emanated from a moral and legal
obligation
which petitioner certainly owed Philinterlife in the performance of her
duties. Thus, she cannot be said to have been prompted by malice or by
a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on respondent's reputation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Likewise, the element
of publication was not present in this case. In libel, publication
means
making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone
other
than the person against whom it has been written.[7]
Petitioner sent the letter only to the branch managers of the banks
concerned.
She did not disseminate the letter and its contents to third persons,
nor
was the letter published and circulated to the public. Doubtlessly,
there
was no publicity and the matter fell within the ambit of Article 354(1)
of the Revised
Penal Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Where it appears from
the allegations in the information that the person accused of libel
acted
in good faith and for justifiable ends in making the allegedly libelous
imputations, there is no need to prolong the proceedings to the
prejudice
of the accused.[8]
Ligaya Novicio is certainly entitled to the dismissal of the case
against
her. She has suffered enough. There is no point in proceeding with a
defective
information that can never be the basis of a valid conviction. In this
case, the facts alleged in the informations did not constitute libel.
The
court a quo should have granted the motion to quash filed by petitioner.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 10,
1999 and its resolution dated December 28, 1999 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and criminal case nos. Q-97-71379, Q-97-71380 and Q-97-71381
are ordered DISMISSED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez
and Carpio Morales, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera, concurred in by
Associate
Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Bernardo P. Abesamis of the Tenth
Division.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 65–66.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Judge Juan Q. Enriquez.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51 [1995].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Gonzales vs. Arcilla, 203 SCRA 609 [1991].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 656 [1997].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
People vs. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046 [1960].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |
