THIRD DIVISION
TEXON
MANUFACTURING
AND BETTY CHUA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
141380
April 14, 2004
-versus-
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
GRACE MILLENA AND
MARILYN MILLENA,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For resolution is a Petition
for Review on
Certiorari
assailing the decision[1]
dated August 9, 1999 and Resolution[2]
dated December 29, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51838,
"Texon Manufacturing and/or Betty Chua vs. Grace and Marilyn Millena."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts as culled
from the records are:
Sometime in February
1990 and May 1990, Marilyn and Grace Millena, respondents, were
employed
by Texon Manufacturing, petitioner company.cralaw:red
However, in the summer
of 1995, petitioner company terminated the services of respondent Grace
Millena, prompting her to file with the Labor Arbiter, on August 21,
1995,
a complaint for money claims representing underpayment and non-payment
of wages, overtime and holiday pay. Impleaded as respondents were
petitioner
company and its owner, Betty Chua. The case was docketed as NLRC Case
No.
00-08-05918-95.cralaw:red
Similarly, on September
8, 1995, petitioner company terminated the services of respondent
Marilyn
Millena. The following day, she went to petitioner’s office to get her
salary. Betty Chua then offered her the sum of P1,500.00 as a starting
capital for a small business. At that instance, Francisco Tan, Betty
Chua’s
husband, asked her to sign a blank piece of paper. Thinking that it was
a receipt for the amount of P1,500.00 given by Betty Chua, respondent
signed
the blank sheet. However, it turned out that it was a resignation
letter
and quitclaim of her back salaries. Thus, on September 11, 1995, she
filed
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for
payment of full backwages and benefits, docketed as NLRC Case No.
00-09-06215-95.
Forthwith, the two (2) cases were consolidated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 21, 1995,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both complaints on the ground of
prescription.cralaw:red
On January 10, 1996,
the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[3]
denying the motion to dismiss.cralaw:red
Petitioners then interposed
an appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).cralaw:red
On February 27, 1997,
the NLRC promulgated an Order[4]
dismissing the appeal and affirming the Arbiter’s Order.cralaw:red
Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC.cralaw:red
Consequently, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.cralaw:red
On August 9, 1999, the
Appellate Court rendered a Decision affirming the NLRC Order. In
sustaining
the denial by the NLRC of petitioners’ motion to dismiss, the Court of
Appeals held:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Admittedly, the three
year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code, is
supposedly
counted from the time the cause of action accrued.cralaw:red
x x x
"We repeat, Grace and
Marilyn were employed in May 1990 and February 1990, respectively, but
were terminated in the summer of 1995 and September 8, 1995.cralaw:red
"We rule, the three-year
period did not yet prescribe, considering that Grace filed her
complaint
on August 21, 1995, while Marilyn filed her complaint in September 1995.cralaw:red
x x x
"Indeed, there is no
merit in the contention of petitioner that Article 291 of the Labor
Code
is applicable in the case at bar insofar as respondent Marilyn Millena
is concerned. The action for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
holiday pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay was filed by
private
respondent Marilyn Millena on September 11, 1995, or two (2) days after
the alleged effectivity date of her dismissal on September 8, 1995
which
was well within the four (4) year prescriptive period provided for in
Article
1146 of the New Civil Code.cralaw:red
"Article 291 of the
Labor Code however, is applicable insofar as private respondent Grace
Millena
is concerned. Nevertheless, the claim for underpayment of wages,
non-payment
of overtime pay, holiday pay should still subsist. It should be noted
that
private respondent Grace Millena filed her claim for underpayment of
wages,
non-payment of overtime pay and holiday pay, one (1) year, one (1)
month
and twenty one (21) days after the last effectivity of her employment
on
May 31, 1994, which is well within the three (3) year prescriptive
period
provided for in Article 291 of the Labor Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x
"THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED,
the contested Resolution dated February 27, 1997, is affirmed; and the
Petition for Certiorari is hereby dismissed.cralaw:red
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated December 29, 1999.cralaw:red
Petitioners, in the
instant petition for review on certiorari, contend (1) that
prescription
has extinguished respondents’ money claims considering that under
Article
291 of the Labor Code, as amended, the three-year prescriptive period
is
counted from the time their causes of action accrued; and (2) that
their
appeal to the NLRC should have been sustained by the Court of Appeals,
being in accordance with Article 223 of the same Code.cralaw:red
ON THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION
The pivotal question
is when respondents’ causes of action accrued for this will determine
the
reckoning date of the prescriptive period.cralaw:red
In Baliwag Transit,
Inc. vs. Ople,[5]
we held:
"Since a cause of action
requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the
plaintiff
and a correlative obligation of the defendant but also an act or
omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the cause of action
does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or
impliedly,
to comply with its duty."
ON RESPONDENT GRACE
MILLENA'S MONEY CLAIMchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The applicable law is
Article 291 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:
"Article 291. Money
claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three years
from
the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever
barred."
We disagree with petitioners’
contention that respondent Grace Millena’s cause of action for money
claims
accrued "in the summer of 1991 and 1992" when, by reason of her
employment,
she became entitled to the company’s monetary benefits. Records show
that
it was only after petitioner company terminated her services, sometime
in the summer of 1995, that she decided to file with the Labor Arbiter
her complaint for money claim. The three (3) year prescriptive period
should
then be counted, not from 1991 or 1992, but from 1995. Respondent’s
complaint
was filed on August 21, 1995 or barely three (3) months after the
termination
of her employment in the summer of 1995. There is, therefore, no
question
that her complaint was seasonably filed.cralaw:red
ON RESPONDENT MARILYN
MILLENA’S SUIT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
Article 1146 of the
New Civil Code provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Art. 1146. The following
actions must be instituted within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to
the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict."
Our ruling in Callanta
vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.[6]
is pertinent, thus:
"One’s employment or
profession is a ‘property right’ and the wrongful interference
therewith
is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within
the
protection of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Clearly
then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means
of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one’s
dismissal
from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated ‘upon an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff,’ as contemplated under Article
1146
of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within 4 years."
Respondent’s complaint
for illegal dismissal with prayer for the grant of money claims and
benefits
is one covered by Article 1146 of the Civil Code, quoted earlier, that
must be filed with the Labor Arbiter within four (4) years.
Respondent’s
complaint was filed on September 11, 1995 or only three (3) days after
petitioners terminated her services on September 8, 1995. Clearly, her
suit was filed on time.cralaw:red
We thus hold that the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that both respondents’ actions have
not
yet prescribed.cralaw:red
Petitioners also contend
that the NLRC should not have dismissed their appeal from the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter, citing Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended,
which provides:
"Article 223. Appeal.
– Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten
(10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. x x x.cralaw:red
In dismissing petitioners’
appeal, the NLRC relied on the provisions of Section 15, Rule V (now
Section
3, Rule V) of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended by NLRC
Resolution
No. 01-02, Series of 2002, quoted as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Section 3. Motion to
Dismiss. x x x. An order denying the motion to dismiss or suspending
its
resolution until the final determination of the case is not appealable."
The Solicitor General,
in his comment, maintains that the above Rule does not contravene
Article
223 of the Labor Code. Hence, the NLRC’s reliance on the same Rule is
in
order. The Solicitor General explains:
"The orders contemplated
in Article 223 of the Labor Code are decisions, awards or orders which
are final in character and not merely interlocutory orders, as in the
case
of an order denying a motion to dismiss.cralaw:red
x x x
In the instant case,
the order of the Labor Arbiter denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss
was
not yet final as there was something else to be done, namely the filing
of the answer and the subsequent proceedings wherein the respective
parties
would ventilate their respective sides."
We agree with the Solicitor
General.cralaw:red
The Order of the Labor
Arbiter denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss is interlocutory. It is
well-settled that a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an
interlocutory
order and hence, cannot be appealed, until a final judgment on the
merits
of the case is rendered.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision dated August 9, 1999 and Resolution dated December 29, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51838 are hereby AFFIRMED. The
case
is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.cralaw:red
Costs against petitioners.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Vitug, Corona, and Morales,
JJ., concur.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Annex "A" of the Petition for Review, Rollo at 20-31.
[2]
Annex "B", id. at 32-33.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Annex "E", id. at 45.
[4]
Annex "D", id. at 38-44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
G.R. No. 57642, March 16, 1999, 171 SCRA 250, cited in Serrano vs.
Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 139420, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 223, 230.
[6]
G.R. No. L-70615, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 268, 279, cited in Baliwag
Transit, Inc. vs. Ople, supra at 257.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
129184,
February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 89, 92, citing Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals,
277 SCRA 518 (2000). |