SECOND DIVISION.
.
ESTELITA BURGOS
LIPAT
AND ALFREDO LIPAT,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
142435
April 30, 2003
-versus-
PACIFIC BANKING
CORPORATION,
REGISTER OF
DEEDS,
RTC EX- OFFICIO
SHERIFF
OF QUEZON
CITYAND THE HEIRS OF
EUGENIO D. TRINIDAD,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This Petition for
Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41536
which dismissed herein petitioners’ appeal from the Decision[2]
dated February 10, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City,
Branch 84, in Civil Case No. Q-89-4152. The trial court had
dismissed
petitioners’ complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and the
extra-judicial
foreclosure thereof. Likewise brought for our review is the
Resolution[3]
dated February 23, 2000 of the Court of Appeals which denied
petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts, as culled
from records, are as follows:
Petitioners, the spouses
Alfredo Lipat and Estelita Burgos Lipat, owned "Bela’s Export Trading"
(BET), a single proprietorship with principal office at No. 814 Aurora
Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City. BET was engaged in the manufacture
of garments for domestic and foreign consumption. The Lipats also
owned the "Mystical Fashions" in the United States, which sells goods
imported
from the Philippines through BET. Mrs. Lipat designated her
daughter,
Teresita B. Lipat, to manage BET in the Philippines while she was
managing
"Mystical Fashions" in the United States.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In order to facilitate
the convenient operation of BET, Estelita Lipat executed on December
14,
1978, a special power of attorney appointing Teresita Lipat as her
attorney-in-fact
to obtain loans and other credit accommodations from respondent Pacific
Banking Corporation (Pacific Bank). She likewise authorized
Teresita
to execute mortgage contracts on properties owned or co-owned by her as
security for the obligations to be extended by Pacific Bank including
any
extension or renewal thereof.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sometime in April 1979,
Teresita, by virtue of the special power of attorney, was able to
secure
for and in behalf of her mother, Mrs. Lipat and BET, a loan from
Pacific
Bank amounting to P583,854.00 to buy fabrics to be manufactured by BET
and exported to "Mystical Fashions" in the United States. As
security
therefor, the Lipat spouses, as represented by Teresita, executed a
Real
Estate Mortgage over their property located at No. 814 Aurora Blvd.,
Cubao,
Quezon City. Said property was likewise made to secure "other
additional
or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and credit accommodations,
of whatever amount, which the Mortgagor and/or Debtor may subsequently
obtain from the Mortgagee as well as any renewal or extension by the
Mortgagor
and/or Debtor of the whole or part of said original, additional or new
loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and other credit accommodations,
including
interest and expenses or other obligations of the Mortgagor and/or
Debtor
owing to the Mortgagee, whether directly, or indirectly, principal or
secondary,
as appears in the accounts, books and records of the Mortgagee."[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 5, 1979,
BET was incorporated into a family corporation named Bela’s Export
Corporation
(BEC) in order to facilitate the management of the business. BEC
was engaged in the business of manufacturing and exportation of all
kinds
of garments of whatever kind and description[5]
and utilized the same machineries and equipment previously used by
BET.
Its incorporators and directors included the Lipat spouses who owned a
combined 300 shares out of the 420 shares subscribed, Teresita Lipat
who
owned 20 shares, and other close relatives and friends of the Lipats.[6]
Estelita Lipat was named president of BEC, while Teresita became the
vice-president
and general manager.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Eventually, the loan
was later restructured in the name of BEC and subsequent loans were
obtained
by BEC with the corresponding promissory notes duly executed by
Teresita
on behalf of the corporation. A letter of credit was also opened
by Pacific Bank in favor of A. O. Knitting Manufacturing Co., Inc.,
upon
the request of BEC after BEC executed the corresponding trust receipt
therefor.
Export bills were also executed in favor of Pacific Bank for additional
finances. These transactions were all secured by the real estate
mortgage over the Lipats’ property.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The promissory notes,
export bills, and trust receipt eventually became due and
demandable.
Unfortunately, BEC defaulted in its payments. After receipt of
Pacific
Bank’s demand letters, Estelita Lipat went to the office of the bank’s
liquidator and asked for additional time to enable her to personally
settle
BEC’s obligations. The bank acceded to her request but Estelita
failed
to fulfill her promise.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Consequently, the real
estate mortgage was foreclosed and after compliance with the
requirements
of the law the mortgaged property was sold at public auction. On
January
31, 1989, a certificate of sale was issued to respondent Eugenio D.
Trinidad
as the highest bidder.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 28, 1989,
the spouses Lipat filed before the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment
of the real estate mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure and the
certificate
of sale issued over the property against Pacific Bank and Eugenio D.
Trinidad.
The complaint, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-4152, alleged,
among others, that the promissory notes, trust receipt, and export
bills
were all ultra vires acts of Teresita as they were executed without the
requisite board resolution of the Board of Directors of BEC. The
Lipats also averred that assuming said acts were valid and binding on
BEC,
the same were the corporation’s sole obligation, it having a
personality
distinct and separate from spouses Lipat. It was likewise pointed
out that Teresita’s authority to secure a loan from Pacific Bank was
specifically
limited to Mrs. Lipat’s sole use and benefit and that the real estate
mortgage
was executed to secure the Lipats’ and BET’s P583,854.00 loan only.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In their respective
answers, Pacific Bank and Trinidad alleged in common that petitioners
Lipat
cannot evade payments of the value of the promissory notes, trust
receipt,
and export bills with their property because they and the BEC are one
and
the same, the latter being a family corporation. Respondent
Trinidad
further claimed that he was a buyer in good faith and for value and
that
petitioners are estopped from denying BEC’s existence after holding
themselves
out as a corporation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
After trial on the merits,
the RTC dismissed the complaint, thus:
WHEREFORE,
this Court holds that in view of the facts contained in the record, the
complaint filed in this case must be, as is hereby, dismissed.
Plaintiffs
however has five (5) months and seventeen (17) days reckoned from the
finality
of this decision within which to exercise their right of
redemption.
The writ of injunction issued is automatically dissolved if no
redemption
is effected within that period.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The counterclaims
and
cross-claim are likewise dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The trial court ruled
that
there was convincing and conclusive evidence proving that BEC was a
family
corporation of the Lipats. As such, it was a mere extension of
petitioners’
personality and business and a mere alter ego or business conduit of
the
Lipats established for their own benefit. Hence, to allow
petitioners
to invoke the theory of separate corporate personality would sanction
its
use as a shield to further an end subversive of justice.[8]
Thus, the trial court pierced the veil of corporate fiction and held
that
Bela’s Export Corporation and petitioners (Lipats) are one and the
same.
Pacific Bank had transacted business with both BET and BEC on the
supposition
that both are one and the same. Hence, the Lipats were estopped
from
disclaiming any obligations on the theory of separate personality of
corporations,
which is contrary to principles of reason and good faith.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Lipats timely appealed
the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41536.
Said appeal, however, was dismissed by the appellate court for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals found that there was ample evidence
on
record to support the application of the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction. In affirming the findings of the RTC, the
appellate
court noted that Mrs. Lipat had full control over the activities of the
corporation and used the same to further her business interests.[9]
In fact, she had benefited from the loans obtained by the corporation
to
finance her business. It also found unnecessary a board
resolution
authorizing Teresita Lipat to secure loans from Pacific Bank on behalf
of BEC because the corporation’s by-laws allowed such conduct even
without
a board resolution. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
mortgage property was not only liable for the original loan of
P583,854.00
but likewise for the value of the promissory notes, trust receipt, and
export bills as the mortgage contract equally applies to additional or
new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts, and credit accommodations
which
petitioners subsequently obtained from Pacific Bank.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Lipats then moved
for reconsideration, but this was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution of February 23, 2000.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this petition,
with petitioners submitting that the court a quo erred - chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(1)
IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE FICTION
APPLIES IN THIS CASE.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(2)
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE REAL
ESTATE MORTGAGE NOT ONLY FOR THE AMOUNT OF P583,854.00 BUT ALSO FOR THE
FULL VALUE OF PROMISSORY NOTES, TRUST RECEIPTS AND EXPORT BILLS OF
BELA’S
EXPORT CORPORATION.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(3)
IN HOLDING THAT "THE IMPOSITION OF 15% ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE
EXTRA-JUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE IS BEYOND THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION FOR IT IS BEING RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS APPEAL."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(4)
IN HOLDING PETITIONER ALFREDO LIPAT LIABLE TO PAY THE DISPUTED
PROMISSORY
NOTES, THE DOLLAR ACCOMMODATIONS AND TRUST RECEIPTS DESPITE THE EVIDENT
FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT SIGNED BY HIM AND THEREFORE ARE NOT VALID OR
ARE
NOT BINDING TO HIM.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(5)
IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND IN HOLDING THAT
SAID MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS "AN UNAUTHORIZED MOTION, A MERE
SCRAP
OF PAPER WHICH CAN NEITHER BIND NOR BE OF ANY CONSEQUENCE TO
APPELLANTS."[11]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum, the following
are
the relevant issues for our resolution:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1. Whether
or not the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is
applicable
in this case;chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
2. Whether or not
petitioners'
property under the real estate mortgage is liable not only for the
amount
of P583,854.00 but also for the value of the promissory notes, trust
receipt,
and export bills subsequently incurred by BEC; andchanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
3. Whether or not
petitioners
are liable to pay the 15% attorney’s fees stipulated in the deed of
real
estate mortgage.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the first issue,
petitioners
contend that both the appellate and trial courts erred in holding them
liable for the obligations incurred by BEC through the application of
the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction absent any clear
showing
of fraud on their part.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents counter
that there is clear and convincing evidence to show fraud on part of
petitioners
given the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals,
that BEC was organized as a business conduit for the benefit of
petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners’ contentions
fail to persuade this Court. A careful reading of the judgment of
the RTC and the resolution of the appellate court show that in finding
petitioners’ mortgaged property liable for the obligations of BEC, both
courts below relied upon the alter ego doctrine or instrumentality
rule,
rather than fraud in piercing the veil of corporate fiction. When
the corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person,
the separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded.[12]
This is commonly referred to as the "instrumentality rule" or the alter
ego doctrine, which the courts have applied in disregarding the
separate
juridical personality of corporations. As held in one case,chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Where one corporation
is so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it
is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the
fiction
of the corporate entity of the ‘instrumentality’ may be
disregarded.
The control necessary to invoke the rule is not majority or even
complete
stock control but such domination of finances, policies and practices
that
the controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or
existence of its own, and is but a conduit for its principal. xxx[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find that the evidence
on record demolishes, rather than buttresses, petitioners’ contention
that
BET and BEC are separate business entities. Note that Estelita Lipat
admitted
that she and her husband, Alfredo, were the owners of BET[14]
and were two of the incorporators and majority stockholders of BEC.[15]
It is also undisputed that Estelita Lipat executed a special power of
attorney
in favor of her daughter, Teresita, to obtain loans and credit lines
from
Pacific Bank on her behalf.[16]
Incidentally, Teresita was designated as executive-vice president and
general
manager of both BET and BEC, respectively.[17]
We note further that: (1) Estelita and Alfredo Lipat are the owners and
majority shareholders of BET and BEC, respectively;[18]
(2) both firms were managed by their daughter, Teresita;[19]
(3) both firms were engaged in the garment business, supplying products
to "Mystical Fashion," a U.S. firm established by Estelita Lipat; (4)
both
firms held office in the same building owned by the Lipats;[20]
(5) BEC is a family corporation with the Lipats as its majority
stockholders;
(6) the business operations of the BEC were so merged with those of
Mrs.
Lipat such that they were practically indistinguishable; (7) the
corporate
funds were held by Estelita Lipat and the corporation itself had no
visible
assets; (8) the board of directors of BEC was composed of the Burgos
and
Lipat family members;[21]
(9) Estelita had full control over the activities of and decided
business
matters of the corporation;[22]
and that (10) Estelita Lipat had benefited from the loans secured from
Pacific Bank to finance her business abroad[23]
and from the export bills secured by BEC for the account of "Mystical
Fashion."[24]
It could not have been coincidental that BET and BEC are so intertwined
with each other in terms of ownership, business purpose, and
management.
Apparently, BET and BEC are one and the same and the latter is a
conduit
of and merely succeeded the former. Petitioners’ attempt to
isolate
themselves from and hide behind the corporate personality of BEC so as
to evade their liabilities to Pacific Bank is precisely what the
classical
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and
remedy. In our view, BEC is a mere continuation and successor of
BET, and petitioners cannot evade their obligations in the mortgage
contract
secured under the name of BEC on the pretext that it was signed for the
benefit and under the name of BET. We are thus constrained to
rule
that the Court of Appeals did not err when it applied the
instrumentality
doctrine in piercing the corporate veil of BEC.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the second issue,
petitioners contend that their mortgaged property should not be made
liable
for the subsequent credit lines and loans incurred by BEC because,
first,
it was not covered by the mortgage contract of BET which only covered
the
loan of P583,854.00 and which allegedly had already been paid; and,
second,
it was secured by Teresita Lipat without any authorization or board
resolution
of BEC.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find petitioners’
contention untenable. As found by the Court of Appeals, the
mortgaged
property is not limited to answer for the loan of P583,854.00.
Thus:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Finally, the extent
to which the Lipats’ property can be held liable under the real estate
mortgage is not limited to P583,854.00. It can be held liable for
the value of the promissory notes, trust receipt and export bills as
well.
For the mortgage was executed not only for the purpose of securing the
Bela’s Export Trading’s original loan of P583,854.00, but also for
"other
additional or new loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and credit
accommodations,
of whatever amount, which the Mortgagor and/or Debtor may subsequently
obtain from the mortgagee as well as any renewal or extension by the
Mortgagor
and/or Debtor of the whole or part of said original, additional or new
loans, discounting lines, overdrafts and other credit accommodations,
including
interest and expenses or other obligations of the Mortgagor and/or
Debtor
owing to the Mortgagee, whether directly, or indirectly principal or
secondary,
as appears in the accounts, books and records of the mortgagee.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As a general rule, findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive, and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court, provided they are borne out by
the record or based on substantial evidence.[26]
As noted earlier, BEC merely succeeded BET as petitioners’ alter ego;
hence,
petitioners’ mortgaged property must be held liable for the subsequent
loans and credit lines of BEC.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Further, petitioners’
contention that the original loan had already been paid, hence, the
mortgaged
property should not be made liable to the loans of BEC, is unsupported
by any substantial evidence other than Estelita Lipat’s self-serving
testimony.
Two disputable presumptions under the rules on evidence weigh against
petitioners,
namely: (a) that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;[27]
and (b) that things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature
and the ordinary habits of life.[28]
Here, if the original loan had indeed been paid, then logically,
petitioners
would have asked from Pacific Bank for the required documents
evidencing
receipt and payment of the loans and, as owners of the mortgaged
property,
would have immediately asked for the cancellation of the mortgage in
the
ordinary course of things. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence contradicting or overcoming said disputable presumptions.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners contend
further that the mortgaged property should not bind the loans and
credit
lines obtained by BEC as they were secured without any proper
authorization
or board resolution. They also blame the bank for its laxity and
complacency in not requiring a board resolution as a requisite for
approving
the loans.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Such contentions deserve
scant consideration.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Firstly, it could not
have been possible for BEC to release a board resolution since per
admissions
by both petitioner Estelita Lipat and Alice Burgos, petitioners’
rebuttal
witness, no business or stockholder’s meetings were conducted nor were
there election of officers held since its incorporation. In fact,
not a single board resolution was passed by the corporate board[29]
and it was Estelita Lipat and/or Teresita Lipat who decided business
matters.[30]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Secondly, the principle
of estoppel precludes petitioners from denying the validity of the
transactions
entered into by Teresita Lipat with Pacific Bank, who in good faith,
relied
on the authority of the former as manager to act on behalf of
petitioner
Estelita Lipat and both BET and BEC. While the power and
responsibility
to decide whether the corporation should enter into a contract that
will
bind the corporation is lodged in its board of directors, subject to
the
articles of incorporation, by-laws, or relevant provisions of law, yet,
just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts for
and
on his behalf, the board of directors may validly delegate some of its
functions and powers to officers, committees, or agents. The
authority
of such individuals to bind the corporation is generally derived from
law,
corporate by-laws, or authorization from the board, either expressly or
impliedly by habit, custom, or acquiescence in the general course of
business.[31]
Apparent authority, is derived not merely from practice. Its
existence
may be ascertained through (1) the general manner in which the
corporation
holds out an officer or agent as having the power to act or, in other
words,
the apparent authority to act in general, with which it clothes him; or
(2) the acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or
constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of
his
ordinary powers.[32]
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In this case, Teresita
Lipat had dealt with Pacific Bank on the mortgage contract by virtue of
a special power of attorney executed by Estelita Lipat. Recall
that
Teresita Lipat acted as the manager of both BEC and BET and had been
deciding
business matters in the absence of Estelita Lipat. Further, the
export
bills secured by BEC were for the benefit of "Mystical Fashion" owned
by
Estelita Lipat.[33]
Hence, Pacific Bank cannot be faulted for relying on the same authority
granted to Teresita Lipat by Estelita Lipat by virtue of a special
power
of attorney. It is a familiar doctrine that if a corporation
knowingly
permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope
of an apparent authority, it holds him out to the public as possessing
the power to do those acts; thus, the corporation will, as against
anyone
who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped
from
denying the agent’s authority.[34]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We find no necessity
to extensively deal with the liability of Alfredo Lipat for the
subsequent
credit lines of BEC. Suffice it to state that Alfredo Lipat never
disputed the validity of the real estate mortgage of the original loan;
hence, he cannot now dispute the subsequent loans obtained using the
same
mortgage contract since it is, by its very terms, a continuing mortgage
contract.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On the third and final
issue, petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals for not
taking cognizance of the issue on attorney’s fees on the ground that it
was raised for the first time on appeal. We find the conclusion
of
the Court of Appeals to be in accord with settled jurisprudence.
Basic is the rule that matters not raised in the complaint cannot be
raised
for the first time on appeal.[35]
A close perusal of the complaint yields no allegations disputing the
attorney’s
fees imposed under the real estate mortgage and petitioners cannot now
allege that they have impliedly disputed the same when they sought the
annulment of the contract.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum, we find no reversible
error of law committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering the
decision
and resolution herein assailed by petitioners.
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated October 21, 1999 and the Resolution
dated February 23, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41536
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Bellosillo, J.,
(Chairman),
Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 45-62. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona, with
Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 65-74.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Id. at 63-64.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Records, Civil Case No. Q-89-4152, pp. 12-14.
[5]
Id. at 77-85.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id. at 81-82.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Rollo, p. 74.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Id. at 70.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at 56.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Supra, note 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Rollo, pp. 14-15.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78413, 8
November 1989, 179 SCRA 218, 230.
[13]
Concept Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108734, 29 May 1996, 257 SCRA
149, 158.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Id. at 16-17.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Rollo, p. 87.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
TSN, 17 August 1990, pp. 26-27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Supra, note 14.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Rollo, p. 50.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Id. at 51.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Id. at 56; TSN, 20 March 1992, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 19.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Id. at 21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Rollo, pp. 60-61,chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. and William L. Perez v. CA, G.R. No.
135999,
19 April 2002, p. 8.
[27]
Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(d).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Id. at Sec. 3(y).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
See TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 29 and TSN, 20 March 1992, p. 6.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[30]
See TSN, 20 March 1992, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[31]
See People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R.
No. 117847, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 170, 182.
[32]
Id. at 183-184.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[33]
TSN, 17 August 1990, p. 21.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[34]
Supra, note 31 at 184-185.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[35]
Orosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111080, 5 April 2000, 329 SCRA 652,
661.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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