SECOND DIVISION
FAR EAST BANK AND
TRUST CO.(NOW BANK OF
THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS),
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
144018
June 23, 2003
-versus-
TOMAS TOH, SR.,
AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MANDALUYONG CITY,
BRANCH 214,
Respondents.
R E S O L U
T I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Assailed in this Petition
for Review on
Certiorari is
the Resolution[1]
dated June 26, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59234,
which
dismissed petitioner’s petition and affirmed the Order[2]
dated May 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City,
Branch 214 in Civil Case No. MC-99-643 granting private respondent’s
motion
for discretionary execution because of private respondent’s advanced
age.
Likewise challenged is the appellate court’s Resolution[3]
dated July 10, 2000, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59234.chanrobles virtual law library
The factual antecedents
of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On March 17, 1999, Tomas
Toh, Sr., private respondent herein, filed Civil Case No. MC-99-643
against
petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTCO now merged in Bank of
the Philippine Islands), seeking recovery of his bank deposits with
petitioner
in the amount of P2,560,644.68 plus damages. In his complaint, Toh
claimed
that petitioner had debited, without Toh’s knowledge and consent, said
amount from his savings and current accounts with petitioner bank and
then
applied the money as payment for the Letters of Credit availed of by
Catmon
Sales International Corporation (CASICO) from petitioner. Thus,
when
Toh issued two checks to Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were
dishonored
by FEBTCO allegedly for having been drawn against insufficient funds,
although
Toh alleged as of February 4, 1999, he had an outstanding withdrawable
balance of P2,560,644.68.cralaw:red
It appears that earlier
on August 29, 1997, private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr., together with
his
sons, Tomas Tan Toh, Jr., and Antonio Tan Toh, had executed a
Comprehensive
Security Agreement in favor of petitioner, wherein the Tohs jointly and
severally bound themselves as sureties for the P22 million credit
facilities,
denominated as Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, earlier granted
by
petitioner to CASICO. Said credit line expired on June 30, 1998, but
the
parties renewed the same for another year, subject to the following
amendments:
(1) a reduction in the credit line from P22 million to P7.5 million;
and
(2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as one of the sureties of CASICO.chanrobles virtual law library
In its answer to private
respondent’s complaint, petitioner bank averred that the debiting of
Toh’s
bank accounts was justified due to his surety undertaking in the event
of the default of CASICO in its payments. Petitioner further claimed
that
the reduction of credit line does not relieve Toh, Sr. from his
continuing
surety obligation, citing the absence of a new surety undertaking or
any
provisions in the renewal agreement releasing Toh, Sr., from his
personal
obligation. It pointed out that CASICO’s default in its obligations
became
inevitable after CASICO filed a Petition for Declaration in a State of
Suspension of Payments before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).cralaw:red
On July 30, 1999, private
respondent filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which
petitioner
opposed. On October 15, 1999, the lower court granted the
aforesaid
motion. In its Order dated March 10, 2000, the lower court
rendered
a decision in favor of Toh, Sr., the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to restore
immediately
to plaintiff’s savings/current accounts the amount of P2,560,644.68
plus
the stipulated interest thereon from February 17, 1999, until fully
restored;
and to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P100,000.00, as moral
damages;
and the amount of P50,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees.
With
costs against the defendant.[4]
On March 29, 2000, Toh
Sr., filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2,[5]
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. He prayed that execution pending
appeal be granted on the ground of old age and the probability that he
may not be able to enjoy his money deposited in petitioner’s bank.
Petitioner
duly opposed said motion.
On March 31, 2000, while
private respondent’s motion was pending before the RTC, petitioner
filed
a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order of March 10, 2000.cralaw:red
On May 26, 2000, the
RTC issued its order granting private respondent’s Motion for
Discretionary
Execution, thus:
WHEREFORE,
the motion for discretionary execution is GRANTED. The issuance
of
the corresponding writ of execution for the enforcement and
satisfaction
of the aforesaid decision against the defendant is hereby ordered.[6]chanrobles virtual law library
On May 30, 2000,
petitioner’s
appeal was given due course.
In granting Toh’s motion,
the trial court held that discretionary execution may be issued upon
good
reasons by virtue of Section 2(a),[7]
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Citing De Leon v. Soriano,[8]
where we held that the approach of the end of one’s life span is a
compelling
cause for discretionary execution pending appeal,[9]
the trial court used the circumstance of Toh’s advanced age as a "good
reason" to allow execution pending appeal.cralaw:red
On June 16, 2000, petitioner
decided to forego filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s
order of May 26, 2000. Instead, it brought the matter to the
Court
of Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R.
SP No. 59234.cralaw:red
On June 26, 2000, the
appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 59234 as follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED.[10]
The Court of Appeals
pointed
out that petitioner filed its petition for certiorari without filing a
motion for reconsideration. It held that the fact that the lower
court already ordered the execution of its judgment did not constitute
a situation of extreme urgency as to justify petitioner’s by-passing
the
remedy of reconsideration. The appellate court declared it found no
grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in granting
discretionary
execution. For the trial court had determined that Toh Sr. was already
79 years old and given his advanced age, might not be able to enjoy the
fruits of a judgment favorable to him if he were to wait for the
eventual
resolution of the appeal filed by petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner filed its
Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it on July
10,
2000.cralaw:red
Hence, this petition
where petitioner submits the following issues for our resolution:
(1) WHETHER OR
NOT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY BEFORE
PETITIONER
BANK CAN ASSAIL THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2000 IN A SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.
(2) WHETHER OR
NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ORDER
OF MAY 26, 2000.[11]
At the outset, it bears
stressing that the first issue is now moot. We find that the
appellate
court did note petitioner’s procedural by-pass or oversight.
Nonetheless
it proceeded to rule on the petition on its merits. The appellate
court’s action is not wanting in precedents as a special civil action
for
certiorari may be given due course, notwithstanding that no motion for
reconsideration has been filed before the lower court under certain
exceptional
circumstances.[12]
These exceptions include instances where: (1) the issue raised is
purely
one of law; (2) public interest is involved; (3) the matter is one of
urgency;
(4) the question of jurisdiction was squarely raised, submitted to, met
and decided by the lower court; and (5) where the order is a patent
nullity.[13]
Hence, the only relevant
issue for our resolution now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming
the lower court’s Order granting execution pending appeal on the ground
of advanced age of private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr.chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the lower court when it granted the motion for
discretionary
execution based on private respondent’s bare allegation that he was
already
79 years old.cralaw:red
Private respondent avers
that Section 2, Rule 49 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states the
requisites for a grant of a motion pending appeal. All these
requirements
and conditions were complied with as evidenced by respondent’s motion
for
discretionary execution, petitioner’s opposition to the motion and the
special order issued by the Regional Trial Court stating the good
reason
for the grant of the motion. Hence, the Regional Trial Court could not
have committed any grave abuse of discretion.[14]
In our view, the Court
of Appeals committed no reversible error in sustaining the lower court.
Discretionary execution is permissible only when "good reasons" exist
for
immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or
even before the expiration of the time to appeal. "Good reasons"
are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest
judgment
becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time,
become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party
who may apparently have no case except to delay.[15]
The Rules of Court does
not state, enumerate, or give examples of "good reasons" to justify
execution.
The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be
addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the
issuance
of the writ of execution must necessarily be controlled by the judgment
of the judge in accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of
justice
and equity, free from the control of another’s judgment or
conscience.
It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast
rule.[16]chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, the trial
court granted private respondent’s motion for discretionary execution
due
to his advanced age, citing our ruling in De Leon v. Soriano.[17]
It concluded that old age is a "good reason" to allow execution pending
appeal as any delay in the final disposition of the present case may
deny
private respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has with
defendant
bank.[18]
The Court of Appeals found said ruling in conformity with sound logical
precepts, inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of time
would
render the ultimate judgment ineffective. It further stressed
that
the trial court was in the vantage position to determine whether
private
respondent’s advanced age and state of health would merit the execution
private respondent prayed for.cralaw:red
In De Leon, we upheld
immediate execution of judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman. We
ruled
that her need of and right to immediate execution of the decision in
her
favor amply satisfied the requirement of a paramount and compelling
reason
of urgency and justice, outweighing the security offered by the
supersedeas
bond.[19]
In the subsequent case of Borja v. Court of Appeals,[20]
we likewise allowed execution pending appeal in favor of a 76 year-old
man on the ground that the appeal will take years to decide with
finality,
and he might very well be facing a different judgment from a Court
higher
than any earthly tribunal and the decision on his complaint, even if it
be in his favor, would have become meaningless as far as he himself was
concerned.[21]
In the present case,
private respondent Toh is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any
stretch
of imagination, be denied that he is already of advanced age. Not a few
might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no one could
claim
with certainty that his tribe would be always blessed with long life.cralaw:red
Private respondent obtained
a favorable judgment in the trial court. But that judgment in
Civil
Case No. MC-99-643 is still on appeal before the Court of
Appeals.
It might even reach this Court before the controversy is finally
resolved
with finality. As well said in Borja, "while we may not agree
that
a man of his years is practically moribund, the Court can appreciate
his
apprehension that he will not be long for this world and may not enjoy
the fruit of the judgment before he finally passes away."[22]chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner avers that
private respondent’s claim of old age was unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. In essence, petitioner wants us to
re-evaluate
this factual issue. Needless to stress, such re-examination is
improper
in a petition for review on certiorari. Here, only questions of law
should
be raised.[23]
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court,
bind this Court and are entitled to utmost respect.[24]
No cogent reason having been given for us to depart therefrom we shall
stand by this salutary rule.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed resolutions of the Court of
Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 59234 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.cralaw:red
Bellosillo, J., (Chairman),
and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J.,
on official leave.
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 18-22.
[2]
Id. at 29-30.
[3]
Id. at 23.
[4]
Rollo, p. 28.
[5]
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. -chanrobles virtual law library
(a)
Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. -
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party
filed
in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession
of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may
be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion,
order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration
of the period to appeal.chanrobles virtual law library
After
the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary
execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order
after due hearing.
(b)
Execution of several, separate, or partial judgments. - A
several,
separate or partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and
conditions
as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.chanrobles virtual law library
[6]
Supra, note 4 at 30.
[7]
Supra, note 5.
[8]
95 Phil. 806, 815 (1954).
[9]
Id. at 815-816.
[10]
Rollo, p. 22.
[11]
Id. at 7-8.chanrobles virtual law library
[12]
See Abraham v. NLRC, G.R. No. 143823, 6 March 2001, 353 SCRA 739,
744-745.
[13]
Feria and Noche, II Civil Procedure Annotated (1st Ed. 2001) 473.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 80-82.chanrobles virtual law library
[15]
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126158,
23 September 1997, 279 SCRA 364, 372.
[16]
City of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35253, 26 July 1976, 72
SCRA 98, 103-104.
[17]
95 Phil. 806 (1954).chanrobles virtual law library
[18]
Rollo, p. 30.chanrobles virtual law library
[19]
Id. at 814-815.chanrobles virtual law library
[20]
G.R. No. 95667, 8 May 1991, 196 SCRA 847.
[21]
Id. at 850.chanrobles virtual law library
[22]
Ibid.chanrobles virtual law library
[23]
Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135999, 19
April 2002, p. 10.
[24]
Sarming v. Dy, G.R. No. 133643, 6 June 2002, p. 16. |