THIRD DIVISION
JERRY E. ACEDERA,
ANTONIO PARILLA,
AND OTHERS LISTED IN ANNEX "A,"[1]
Petitioners-Appellants,
G.R.
No.
146073
January 13, 2003
-versus-
INTERNATIONAL
CONTAINER
TERMINAL
SERVICES, INC. (NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents-Appellees.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES,
J.:
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
For consideration is the
petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision of the Court
of
Appeals affirming that of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)
which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter denying herein
petitioners-appellants’
Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention.
The antecedent facts
are as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners-appellants
Jerry Acedera, et al. are employees of herein private respondent
International
Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are officers/members of
Associated
Port Checkers & Workers Union-International Container Terminal
Services,
Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labor organization duly registered
as a local affiliate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers
Union
(APCWU).cralaw:red
When ICTSI started its
operations in 1988, it determined the rate of pay of its employees by
using
304 days, the number of days of work of the employees in a year, as
divisor.[2]
On September 28, 1990,
ICTSI entered into its first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with
APCWU with a term of five years effective until September 28, 1995.[3]
The CBA was renegotiated and thereafter renewed through a second CBA
that
took effect on September 29, 1995, effective for another five years.[4]
Both CBAs contained an identically-worded provision on hours and days
of
work reading: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Article IX
Regular Hours of Work
and Days of Labor
Section 1. The regular
working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to
Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior
notice
unless any of this day is declared a special holiday.[5]
(Underscoring
omitted) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In accordance with the
above-quoted provision of the CBA, the employees’ work week was reduced
to five days or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI, however, continued
using
the 304-day divisor in computing the wages of the employees.[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On November 10, 1990,
the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board (RTWPB) in the
National
Capital Region decreed a P17.00 daily wage increase for all workers and
employees receiving P125.00 per day or lower in the National Capital
Region.[7]
The then president of APCWU, together with some union members, thus
requested
the ICTSI’s Human Resource Department/Personnel Manager to compute the
actual monthly increase in the employees’ wages by multiplying the
RTWPB
mandated increase by 365 days and dividing the product by 12 months.[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Heeding the proposal
and following the implementation of the new wage order, ICTSI stopped
using
304 days as divisor and started using 365 days in determining the daily
wage of its employees and other consequential compensation, even if the
employees’ work week consisted of only five days as agreed upon in the
CBA.[9]
In early 1997, ICTSI
went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees.[10]
This prompted the APCWU-ICTSI to file a notice of strike which included
as cause of action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also
ICTSI’s use of 365 days as divisor in the computation of wages.[11]
The dispute respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise
settlement[12]
while that respecting the computation of wages was referred to the
Labor
Arbiter.[13]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On February 26, 1997,
APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated,
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI which was
dismissed
for APCWU’s failure to file its position paper.[14]
Upon the demand of herein petitioners-appellants, APCWU filed a motion
to revive the case which was granted. APCWU thereupon filed its
position
paper on August 22, 1997.[15]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On December 8, 1997,
petitioners-appellants filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Complaint-in-Intervention
with Motion to Intervene.[16]
In the petition at bar, they justified their move to intervene in this
wise:
[S]hould the union succeed
in prosecuting the case and in getting a favorable reward it is
actually
they that would benefit from the decision. On the other hand, should
the
union fail to prove its case, or to prosecute the case diligently, the
individual workers or members of the union would suffer great and
immeasurable
loss. - [t]hey wanted to insure by their intervention that the case
would
thereafter be prosecuted with all due diligence and would not again be
dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the union.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Labor Arbiter rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision
is hereby rendered declaring that the correct divisor in computing the
daily wage and other labor standard benefits of the employees of
respondent
ICTSI who are members of complainant Union as well as the other
employees
similarly situated is two hundred fifty (250) days such that said
respondent
is hereby ordered to pay the employees concerned the differentials
representing
the underpayment of said salaries and other benefits reckoned three (3)
years back from February 26, 1997, the date of filing of this complaint
or computed from February 27 1994 until paid, but for purposes of
appeal,
the salary differentials are temporarily computed for one year in the
amount
of Four Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Forty Pesos (P468,040.00).[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the same decision,
the Labor Arbiter denied petitioners-appellants’
Complaint-in-Intervention
with Motion for Intervention upon a finding that they are already well
represented by APCWU.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed APCWU’s
complaint
for lack of merit.[20]
The denial of petitioners-appellants’ intervention was, however,
affirmed.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Unsatisfied with the
decision of the NLRC, APCWU filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court
of Appeals while petitioners-appellants filed theirs with this Court
which
referred the petition[22]
to the Court of Appeals. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court of Appeals
dismissed APCWU’s petition on the following grounds: failure to allege
when its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed,
failure
to attach the necessary appendices to the petition, and failure to file
its motion for extension to file its petition within the reglementary
period.[23]
As for petitioners-appellants’
petition for certiorari, it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in
this
wise: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is clear from the
records that herein petitioners, claiming to be employees of respondent
ICTSI, are already well represented by its employees union, APCWU, in
the
petition before this Court (CA-G.R. SP. No. 53266) although the same
has
been dismissed. The present petition is, therefore a superfluity that
deserves
to be dismissed. Furthermore, only Acedera signed the Certificate of
non-forum
shopping. On this score alone, this petition should likewise be
dismissed.
We find that the same has no merit considering that herein petitioners
have not presented any meritorious argument that would justify the
reversal
of the Decision of the NLRC.cralaw:red
Article IX of the CBA
provides:
Regular Hours of Work
and Days of Labor chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Section 1. The regular
working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to
Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior
notice
unless any of this day is declared a special holiday."
This provision categorically
states the required number of working days an employee is expected to
work
for a week. It does not, however, indicate the manner in which an
employee’s
salary is to be computed. In fact, nothing in the CBA makes any
referral
to any divisor which should be the basis for determining the salary.
The
NLRC, therefore, correctly ruled that" xxx the absence of any express
or
specific provision in the CBA that 250 days should be used as divisor
altogether
makes the position of the Union untenable." chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x x x
Considering that herein
petitioners themselves requested that 365 days be used as the divisor
in
computing their wage increase and later did not raise or object to the
same during the negotiations of the new CBA, they are clearly estopped
to now complain of such computation only because they no longer benefit
from it. Indeed, the 365 divisor for the past seven (7) years has
already
become practice and law between the company and its employees.[24]
x x x
Hence, the present petition
of petitioners-appellants who fault the Court of Appeals as follows:
I In
rejecting
the CBA of the parties as the source of the divisor to determine the
workers’
daily rate totally disregarded the applicable landmark decisions of the
Honorable Supreme Court on the matter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II [IN]
disregard[ING] applicable decisions of this Honorable Court when it
ruled
that the petitioners-appellants are already in estoppel.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III in
ruling
that the petitioners-appellants have no legal right to intervene in and
pursue this case and that their intervention is a superfluity.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV in
holding,
although merely as an obiter dictum, that only petitioner Jerry Acedera
signed the certificate of non-forum shopping.[25]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The third assigned error
respecting petitioners-appellants’ right to intervene shall first be
passed
upon, it being determinative of their right to raise the other assigned
errors.cralaw:red
Petitioners-appellants
anchor their right to intervene on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,
Section 1 of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 1. Who may intervene.-
A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or
not the intervenor’s right may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
They stress that they
have complied with the requisites for intervention because (1) they are
the ones who stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and
effect
of any judgment that may be rendered in this case, (2) no undue delay
or
prejudice would result from their intervention since their
Complaint-in-Intervention
with Motion for Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was
still
hearing the case and before any decision thereon was rendered, and (3)
it was not possible for them to file a separate case as they would be
guilty
of forum shopping because the only forum available for them was the
Labor
Arbiter.[26]
Petitioners-appellants,
however, failed to consider, in addition to the rule on intervention,
the
rule on representation, thusly:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Sec. 3. Representatives
as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended
by
a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be
the
real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized
by law or these Rules.[27]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A labor union is one
such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of
the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the
representative
of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority
includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of
enforcing
the provisions of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative
capacity
"for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees similarly
situated,"
the title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiter’s Office so
expressly
states.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
While a party acting
in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to
intervene
in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented
will not be permitted to do the same[28]
except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the
representative
will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests
represented
by him.[29]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners-appellants
cite the dismissal of the case filed by ICTSI, first by the Labor
Arbiter,
and later by the Court of Appeals.[30]
The dismissal of the case does not, however, by itself show the
existence
of fraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of APCWU.
There
must be clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack of
good faith independently of the dismissal. This, petitioners-appellants
failed to proffer. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioners-appellants
likewise express their fear that APCWU would not prosecute the case
diligently
because of its "sweetheart relationship" with ICTSI.[31]
There is nothing on record, however, to support this alleged
relationship
which allegation surfaces as a mere afterthought because it was never
raised
early on. It was raised only in petitioners-appellants’ reply to
ICTSI’s
comment in the petition at bar, the last pleading submitted to this
Court,
which was filed on June 20, 2001 or more than 42 months after
petitioners-appellants
filed their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene with the
Labor Arbiter.cralaw:red
To reiterate, for a
member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative
action,
fraud or collusion or lack of good faith on the part of the
representative
must be proven. It must be based on facts borne on record. Mere
assertions,
as what petitioners-appellants proffer, do not suffice.
The foregoing
discussion
leaves it unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the present
petition is hereby denied.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Annex 'A' to the petition lists 858 other petitioners.
[2]
Rollo, p. 30.
[3]
Id. at 31.
[4]
Id. at 75.
[5]
Id. at 31.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Wage Order Nos. NCR-01 and NCR-01-A.
[8]
Rollo, p. 31-32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Id. at 32.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Id. at 33.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Dated March 19, 1997; CA Rollo, pp. 106-108.
[13]
Rollo, p. 34.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Id. at 35, 105-106.
[19]
Id. at 35, 106.
[20]
Id. at 35, 96.
[21]
Id. at 96.
[22]
CA G. R. No. 53266.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Rollo, p. 176.
[24]
Id. at 78-80.
[25]
Id. at 37-38.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Id. at 175-176.
[27]
Rule 3, Rules of Court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
67A C.J.S. Parties 76.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[29]
State ex rel. Kiser, Cohn & Shumaker, Inc. v Sammons et al., 57
N.E.2d.
587, 589-590 (1944).
[30]
Rollo, p. 176.
[31]
Id. at 174.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |