SECOND DIVISION.
.
CECILIA YAMBAO,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146173
December 11, 2003
-versus-
MELCHORITA
C.
ZUÑIGA,
LEOVIGILDO C. ZUÑIGA,REGINALDO C.
ZUÑIGA,
AND THE MINORS,HERMINIGILDO C.
ZUÑIGA, JR., AND LOVELY EMILY C. ZUÑIGA- BOTH REPRESENTED
BY THEIR LEGAL GUARDIAN,THE AFORENAMED
MELCHORITA
C. ZUÑIGA,
Respondents.
|
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This Petition for Review
on
Certiorari seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dated September 8, 2000, in CA-G.R. CV No.
52275.
The appellate court affirmed the Judgment[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8,
in
Civil Case No. 581-M-92, finding herein petitioner, among others,
liable
for the untimely death of Herminigildo Zuñiga in a vehicular
accident
and ordering her to indemnify his legal heirs, the respondents herein.
Also challenged in this petition is the resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals, dated November 27, 2000, denying the
petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner Cecilia Yambao
is the registered owner of "Lady Cecil and Rome Trans" passenger bus
with
Plate No. CVK 606, with a public transport franchise to ply the
Novaliches-via
Quirino-Alabang route.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondents are
the legal heirs of the late Herminigildo Zuñiga. Melchorita
Zuñiga
is the surviving spouse, while Leovigildo, Reginaldo, Herminigildo,
Jr.,
and Lovely Emily are their children.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The facts, as established
by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:
At around
3:30
p.m. of May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was being driven
by
her driver, one Ceferino G. Venturina along the northbound lane of
Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue (EDSA), within the vicinity of Bagong Barrio,
Kalookan
City. With Venturina was the bus conductor, Fernando Dumaliang.
Suddenly,
the bus bumped Herminigildo Zuñiga, a pedestrian. Such was the
force
of the impact that the left side of the front windshield of the bus was
cracked. Zuñiga was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital
where
he was given medical attention, but due to the massive injuries
sustained,
he succumbed shortly thereafter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Private
respondents,
as heirs of the victim, filed a Complaint[4]
against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 581-M-92 at the RTC of Malolos City. The complaint
essentially
alleged that Venturina drove the bus in a reckless, careless and
imprudent
manner, in violation of traffic rules and regulations, without due
regard
to public safety, thus resulting in the victim's premature death.
In her Answer, the
petitioner
vehemently denied the material allegations of the complaint. She tried
to shift the blame for the accident upon the victim, theorizing that
Herminigildo
bumped into her bus, while avoiding an unidentified woman who was
chasing
him. She further alleged that she was not liable for any damages
because
as an employer, she exercised the proper diligence of a good father of
a family, both in the selection and supervision of her bus driver.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 8, 1995,
the
trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In view of
the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the
plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the herein defendants
jointly
and severally, with Plaridel Surety & Insurance Co., and Times
Surety
& Insurance Co. Inc. to the extent of their respective liabilities
under their respective insurance policies to pay the herein plaintiffs
the following sums of money:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
1.
P50,000.00
as indemnity for the death of Herminigildo Zuñiga;
2. P92,000.00 as
funeral
expenses;
3. P200,000.00 as
moral
damages;
4. P30,000.00 as
exemplary
damages;
5. P30,000.00 as
attorney's
fees;
6. P5,000.00 as
litigation
expenses; and
7. To pay the cost
of the suit
to be paid by
all the
herein defendants and third party defendants within thirty (30) days
from
receipt of this Decision.
The counterclaim of
the
defendant Cecilia Yambao is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding for the
respondents
herein, the trial court observed:
The
allegations
and evidence presented by the defendants that it was the victim
Herminigildo
Zuñiga who bumped the bus owned by defendant Cecilia Yambao and
her husband x x x is incredible if not preposterous. No
sane
person would bump his head or body against a running bus along a big
highway
like EDSA at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and neither did any of the
defendants
presented (sic) any evidence or proof to show that the victim was
mentally
deranged at the time of the accident and the presumption therefore is
that
he was in his normal senses.[6]
In holding the
petitioner
liable for Herminigildo's death, the trial court applied Article 1756[7]
of the Civil Code, observing that petitioner had failed to prove that
she
observed the diligence required by Articles 1733[8]
and 1755[9]
of the said Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Dissatisfied,
Yambao
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
52275,
faulting the trial court for failing to appreciate that: (a) it was the
victim who ran into her bus, and (b) she had exercised the proper
diligence
of a bonus pater familias in the selection and supervision of her
employee,
the driver of said bus.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 8,
2000,
the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. CV No. 52275 as follows:
WHEREFORE,
on the foregoing modificatory premises, and considering that the same
result
has been reached by the trial court, its Decision dated September 8,
1995
is hereby AFFIRMED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Costs against
defendant-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[10]
While sustaining the
trial
court's findings that Venturina had been reckless and negligent in
driving
the petitioner's bus, thus hitting the victim with fatal results, the
appellate
court, however, found the trial court's reliance on Articles 1755 and
1756
of the Civil Code misplaced. It held that this was a case of
quasi-delict,
there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties.
Hence, the law on common carriers was inapplicable. The court a quo
then
found the petitioner directly and primarily liable as Venturina's
employer
pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code as she failed to present
evidence
to prove that she has observed the diligence of a good father of a
family
in the selection and supervision of her employees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Yambao then duly moved
for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for want of merit.[11]
Hence, this petition
for review, anchored on the following formulation of issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE
ALLEGATIONS
AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER, THE VICTIM HERMINIGILDO
ZUÑIGA
WAS THE ONE WHO BUMPED THE BUS OWNED BY HEREIN PETITIONER CECILIA
YAMBAO
AND HER HUSBAND AND WHO DISREGARDED THE TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS
AT
THE PLACE AND TIME OF THE INCIDENT WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY AND CONCLUSIVELY
PROVED
THAT IT WAS THE PLAINTIFF'S OWN NEGLIGENCE THAT WAS THE IMMEDIATE AND
PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF HIS DEATH.
II
WHETHER OR NOT,
PETITIONER
CECILIA YAMBAO IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES AND THAT SHE EXERCISED THE
PROPER DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY, BOTH IN THE SELECTION
AND SUPERVISION OF HER DRIVER AND/OR EMPLOYEE.[12]
At the outset, we must
state that the first issue raised by the petitioner is a factual one.
Whether
a person is negligent or not is a question of fact,[13]
which this Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on
certiorari,
as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[14]
The resolution of factual issues is the function of the trial court and
its findings on these matters are, as a general rule, binding on this
Court,[15]
more so where these have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[16]
We have carefully examined and weighed the petitioner's arguments on
the
first issue submitted, as well as the evidence on record, and find no
cogent
reason to disregard the cited general rule, much less to reverse the
factual
findings of the trial court as upheld by the court a quo. Hence, we
sustain
the trial court's finding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it
was Venturina's reckless and imprudent driving of petitioner's bus,
which
is the proximate cause of the victim's death.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
To our mind, therefore,
the only issue before the Court properly is whether petitioner
exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision
of her employees, thus absolving her from any liability.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner contends
that as an employer, she observed the proper diligence of a good father
of a family, both in the selection and supervision of her driver and
therefore,
is relieved from any liability for the latter's misdeed. To support her
claim, she points out that when Venturina applied with her as a driver
in January 1992, she required him to produce not just his driver's
license,
but also clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
the
Philippine National Police, and the barangay where he resides. She also
required him to present his Social Security System (SSS) Number prior
to
accepting him for employment. She likewise stresses that she inquired
from
Venturina's previous employer about his employment record, and only
hired
him after it was shown to her satisfaction that he had no blot upon his
record.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The petitioner's arguments
ring hollow and fail to sway this Court.cralaw:red
The law governing petitioner's
liability, as the employer of bus driver Venturina, is Article 2180 of
the Civil
Code, the full text of which reads:
Article
2180.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176[17]
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those
of persons for whom one is responsible.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The father and, in
case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Guardians are
liable
for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.
The owners and
managers
of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Employers shall be
liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not
engaged in any business or industry.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The State is
responsible
in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains,
in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Lastly, teachers
or
heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain
in their custody.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The responsibility
treated
of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent
damage. (Emphasis ours.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The "diligence of a
good
father" referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute
means
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.[18]
Thus, when an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to
persons
or property due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum
presumption
that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee
or in the supervision over him after the selection.[19]
For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed
by
his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
adequate
and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his
employee,
he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family.[20]
In the instant case, we find that petitioner has failed to rebut the
presumption
of negligence on her part.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner's claim that
she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her
driver,
Venturina, deserves but scant consideration. Her allegation that before
she hired Venturina she required him to submit his driver's license and
clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer in evidence
certified
true copies of said license and clearances. Bare allegations,
unsubstantiated
by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence.[21]
Moreover, as the court a quo aptly observed, petitioner contradicts
herself.
She declared that Venturina applied with her sometime in January 1992
and
she then required him to submit his license and clearances. However,
the
record likewise shows that she did admit that Venturina submitted the
said
requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal
accident
itself. (Italics for emphasis.) chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In other words, petitioner's
own admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not exercise
due diligence in the selection of her bus driver.cralaw:red
In any case, assuming
arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances when he
applied
with petitioner in January 1992, the latter still fails the test of due
diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Case law teaches that for
an employer to have exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family,
he should not be satisfied with the applicant's mere possession of a
professional
driver's license; he must also carefully examine the applicant for
employment
as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service.[22]
Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to this
extent
of verifying Venturina's qualifications, safety record, and driving
history.
The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection
of her bus driver, thus, remains unrebutted.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Nor did petitioner show
that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection.
For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did not present
any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and
guidelines
on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any
showing
that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road
safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption
from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of
Venturina.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In sum, petitioner's
liability to private respondents for the negligent and imprudent acts
of
her driver, Venturina, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is both manifest and clear. Petitioner, having failed to rebut
the legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of
her driver, is responsible for damages, the basis of the liability
being
the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's own negligence.[23]
Thus, this Court has no option but to uphold the ruling of the
appellate
court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated
September 8, 2000, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52275, as well as its resolution
dated
November 27, 2000, denying petitioner Cecilia Yambao's motion for
reconsideration
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 14–26. Per Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino, and
concurred
in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Perlita J.
Tria-Tirona.
[2]
CA Rollo, pp. 47–55.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
A separate criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 156134, was also filed against Venturina
before
the Metropolitan Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch 52. However, the
lower court could not proceed with the trial due to the failure and
refusal
of the accused Venturina to appear. See Rollo, p. 16.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id. at 35–36.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
CA Rollo, pp. 53–54.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons
of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, nos. 5, 6, and 7 while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in articles 1755 and 1756.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Rollo, p. 25.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Supra, note 3.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Rollo, p. 97.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, G.R. No. 131541, 20 October 2000, 344
SCRA 76, 82.
[14]
Almira v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115966, 20 March 2003, p. 7.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 68102-03, 16 July
1992,
211 SCRA 517, 537.
[16]
Supra, note 13 at 83.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Supra, note 15 at 544–545.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, G.R. Nos. 79050-51, 14 November
1989, 179 SCRA 384, 393.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141089, 1
August
2002, pp. 8–9 citing Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, supra,
note
19; Umali v. Hon. Bacani, 161 Phil. 351, 357 (1976).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
Manzano v. Perez, Sr., 414 Phil., 728, 738 (2001).chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 125 Phil. 701,
703–704
(1967) citing Campo v. Camarote, 100 Phil. 459, 463 (1956).
[23]
Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, 21
June
1993, 223 SCRA 521, 539.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |