THIRD DIVISION
DOLE PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
146650
January 13, 2003
-versus-
PAWIS NG
MAKABAYANG
OBRERO (PAMAO-NFL),
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,
J.:
Before us is a petition
for review filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing
the January 9, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied
petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of its September 22, 2000 decision[1]
which in turn upheld the Order issued by the voluntary arbitrator[2]
dated 12 October 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant.
Respondent
is hereby directed to extend the "free meal" benefit as provided for in
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the collective bargaining agreement to
those
employees who have actually performed overtime works even for exactly
three
(3) hours only.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.[3]
The core of the present
controversy is the interpretation of the provision for "free meals"
under
Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining
Agreement
(CBA) between petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. and private respondent
labor union PAMAO-NFL. Simply put, how many hours of overtime work must
a Dole employee render to be entitled to the free meal under Section 3
of Article XVIII of the 1996-2001 CBA? Is it when he has rendered (a)
exactly,
or no less than, three hours of actual overtime work or (b) more than
three
hours of actual overtime work? chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The antecedents are
as follows:
On February 22, 1996,
a new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement for the period starting
February 1996 up to February 2001, was executed by petitioner Dole
Philippines,
Inc., and private respondent Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL
(PAMAO-NFL).
Among the provisions of the new CBA is the disputed section on meal
allowance
under Section 3 of Article XVIII on Bonuses and Allowances, which
reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 3. MEAL ALLOWANCE.
The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL ALLOWANCE of TEN PESOS (P10.00) to
all
employees who render at least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime
work on a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not
exceeding
TWENTY FIVE PESOS (P25.00) after THREE (3) hours of actual overtime
work.[4]
Pursuant to the above
provision of the CBA, some departments of Dole reverted to the previous
practice of granting free meals after exactly three hours of actual
overtime
work. However, other departments continued the practice of granting
free
meals only after more than three hours of overtime work. Thus, private
respondent filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and
Mediation
Board alleging that petitioner Dole refused to comply with the
provisions
of the 1996-2001 CBA because it granted free meals only to those who
rendered
overtime work for more than three hours and not to those who rendered
exactly
three hours overtime work. chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The parties agreed to
submit the dispute to voluntary arbitration. Thereafter, the voluntary
arbitrator, deciding in favor of the respondent, issued an order
directing
petitioner Dole to extend the "free meal" benefit to those employees
who
actually did overtime work even for exactly three hours only.cralaw:red
Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the above order but the same was denied. Hence,
petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
review
on certiorari.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On September 22, 2000,
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the assailed
order.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Thus, the instant petition.cralaw:red
Petitioner Dole asserts
that the phrase "after three hours of actual overtime work" should be
interpreted
to mean after more than three hours of actual overtime work.cralaw:red
On the other hand, private
respondent union and the voluntary arbitrator see it as meaning after
exactly
three hours of actual overtime work.cralaw:red
The "meal allowance"
provision in the 1996-2001 CBA is not new. It was also in the 1985-1988
CBA and the 1990-1995 CBA. The 1990-1995 CBA provision on meal
allowance
was amended by the parties in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement. The clear
changes
in each CBA provision on meal allowance were in the amount of the meal
allowance and free meals, and the use of the words "after" and "after
more
than" to qualify the amount of overtime work to be performed by an
employee
to entitle him to the free meal.cralaw:red
To arrive at a correct
interpretation of the disputed provision of the CBA, a review of the
pertinent
section of past CBAs is in order.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The CBA covering the
period 21 September 1985 to 20 September 1988 provided:
Section 3. MEAL ALLOWANCE.
The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL ALLOWANCE of FOUR (P4.00) PESOS to
all
employees who render at least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime
work on a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, after THREE
(3) hours of actual overtime work.[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The CBA for 14 January
1990 to 13 January 1995 likewise provided: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 3. MEAL ALLOWANCE.
The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL ALLOWANCE of EIGHT PESOS (P8.00) to
all employees who render at least TWO (2) hours or more of actual
overtime
work on a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not
exceeding
SIXTEEN PESOS (P16.00) after THREE (3) hours of actual overtime work.[6]
The provision above
was later amended when the parties renegotiated the economic provisions
of the CBA pursuant to Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Section 3 of
Article
XVIII of the 14 January 1993 to 13 January 1995 Supplement to the
1990-1995
CBA reads: chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 3. MEAL ALLOWANCE.
The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL SUBSIDY of NINE PESOS (P9.00) to all
employees who render at least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime
work on a workday, and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not
exceeding
TWENTY ONE PESOS (P21.00) after more than THREE (3) hours of actual
overtime
work (Section 3, as amended).[7]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We note that the phrase
"more than" was neither in the 1985-1988 CBA nor in the original
1990-1995
CBA. It was inserted only in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement. But said
phrase
is again absent in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1996-2001 CBA,
which
reverted to the phrase "after three (3) hours".chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner asserts that
the phrase "after three (3) hours of actual overtime work" does not
mean
after exactly three hours of actual overtime work; it means after more
than three hours of actual overtime work. Petitioner insists that this
has been the interpretation and practice of Dole for the past thirteen
years.cralaw:red
Respondent, on the other
hand, maintains that "after three (3) hours of actual overtime work"
simply
means after rendering exactly, or no less than, three hours of actual
overtime
work.cralaw:red
The Court finds logic
in private respondent’s interpretation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The omission of the
phrase "more than" between "after" and "three hours" in the present CBA
spells a big difference.cralaw:red
No amount of legal semantics
can convince the Court that "after more than" means the same as "after".cralaw:red
Petitioner asserts that
the "more than" in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement was mere surplus age
because,
regardless of the absence of said phrase in all the past CBAs, it had
always
been the policy of petitioner corporation to give the meal allowance
only
after more than 3 hours of overtime work. However, if this were true,
why
was it included only in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement and the parties
had
to negotiate its deletion in the 1996-2001 CBA?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Clearly then, the reversion
to the wording of previous CBAs can only mean that the parties intended
that free meals be given to employees after exactly, or no less than,
three
hours of actual overtime work.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The disputed provision
of the CBA is clear and unambiguous. The terms are explicit and the
language
of the CBA is not susceptible to any other interpretation. Hence, the
literal
meaning of "free meals after three (3) hours of overtime work" shall
prevail,
which is simply that an employee shall be entitled to a free meal if he
has rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of overtime work,
not
"after more than" or "in excess of" three hours overtime work.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner also invokes
the well-entrenched principle of management prerogative that "the power
to grant benefits over and beyond the minimum standards of law, or the
Labor Code for that matter, belongs to the employer x x x". According
to
this principle, even if the law is solicitous of the welfare of the
employees,
it must also protect the right of the employer to exercise what clearly
are management prerogatives.[8]
Petitioner claims that, being the employer, it has the right to
determine
whether it will grant a "free meal" benefit to its employees and, if
so,
under what conditions. To see it otherwise would amount to an
impairment
of its rights as an employer.cralaw:red
We do not think so.cralaw:red
The exercise of management
prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations found in
law, a collective bargaining agreement or the general principles of
fair
play and justice.[9]
This situation constitutes one of the limitations. The CBA is the norm
of conduct between petitioner and private respondent and compliance
therewith
is mandated by the express policy of the law.[10]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner Dole cannot
assail the voluntary arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA for the
supposed
impairment of its management prerogatives just because the same
interpretation
is contrary to its own.cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, petition
is hereby denied.cralaw:red
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos and concurred in
by
Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Edgardo P. Cruz of the
Special
Twelfth Division.
[2]
Voluntary Arbitrator Art O. Tan.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 89-94.
[4]
Rollo, p. 42.
[5]
Rollo, p. 43.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Rollo, p. 44.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Abbot Laboratories Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
University of Santo Tomas vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 758 [1990] as cited in
Metrolab
Industries, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confessor, 254 SCRA 182 [1996].
[10]
E. Razon, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 222 SCRA 1 [1993]. |