THIRD DIVISION.
.
HEIRS OF PEDRO
LAURORA
AND LEONORA LAURORA,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
146815
April 9, 2003
-versus-
STERLING
TECHNOPARK
III
AND S.P. PROPERTIES, INC.,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
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PANGANIBAN,
J.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
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The owners of a property
have no authority to use force and violence to eject alleged usurpers
who
were in prior physical possession of it. They must file the
appropriate
action in court and should not take the law into their own hands.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Case
Before us is a Petition
for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the June 27,
2000 Decision[2]
and the January 22, 2001 Resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals[4]
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 54667. The dispositive part of the Decision
reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED and the RTC Decision dated 06 May 1999 and the RTC Order
dated
03 August 1999 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and corollarily, the
MCTC Decision is AFFIRMED."[5]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The assailed Resolution
denied petitoners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The factual antecedents
are summarized by the CA as follows:
"In a Complaint for
Forcible Entry with Damages filed on 27 September 1997 before the Fifth
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and Gen. Mariano Alvarez,
plaintiffs
therein, x x x Pedro Laurora and Leonora Laurora [herein
petitioners]
alleged that they were the owners of Lot 1315-G, SWD-40763 of the
Yaptinchay
Estate with an area of 39,771 sq. meters and located in Carmona,
Cavite.
Pedro Laurora planted trees and has possessed the land up to the
present.
On 15 September 1997, respondents Sterling Technopark III and S.P.
Properties,
Inc. x x x through their Engr. Bernie Gatchalian bulldozed and uprooted
the trees and plants, and with the use of armed men and by means of
threats
and intimidation, succeeded in forcibly ejecting petitioners. As
a result of their dispossession, petitioners suffered actual damages in
the amount of P3,000,000.00 and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"In their Answer to
the Complaint, respondents averred that petitioners were not the owners
of the land because they disposed of it sometime in 1976 as shown by
legal
documents. On 02 April 1969, the Land Authority issued an order
of
award in favor of petitioners, approving the application of Pedro
Laurora
to buy the subject Lot 1315-G from the government. On 01 March
1974,
petitioners requested the Department of Agrarian Reform for the
transfer
of the lot to Juan Manaig. Favorably acted upon, the DAR issued a
permit to transfer dated 03 June 1975 through its Regional Director
Benjamin
R. Estrellado. On 03 July 1975, Juan Manaig, as transferee and
buyer,
paid the required amount of P10,643.65 under Official Receipt No.
8304707
to the government as full payment for the transfer of said lot to
him.
On 26 March 1976, the petitioners as sellers and witnessed by their
sons,
Efren Laurora and Dominador Laurora, executed a ‘Kasulatan ng
Paglilipatan
ng Lupa’ transferring the land to Juan Manaig as buyer. On 11
June
1976, the [petitioners] again witnessed by their sons, Efren and
Dominador,
executed a ‘Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan’ or Deed of Sale wherein they
sold Lot 1315-G including all improvements therein, in favor of Juan
Manaig.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was approved by the Department of Agrarian
Reform
on 14 June 1976 in ‘DAR Approval of Transfer of Rights’ signed by DAR
Regional
Director, Benjamin R. Estrellado. After the approval of the sale
from the [petitioners] to Juan Manaig, the latter paid its real estate
taxes. The tax declarations of the land in the name of its
previous
owners, Yaptinchays, were cancelled and transferred in the name of
petitioner
Pedro Laurora as owner-transferee. Thereupon, the heirs of the
late
‘JUAN MANAIG’ sold the land to Golden Mile Resources Development
Corporation
which likewise sold it to respondent S. P. Properties, Inc.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"After summary proceedings
in the MCTC, x x x, a judgment was rendered dismissing the
complaint.
The case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court. In due course,
the said court rendered a decision reversing the MCTC judgment. x x x"[6]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Ruling of the
Court
of Appeals
The CA reversed the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and reinstated the Order of dismissal issued
by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). It held that there
was
no evidence to support the claim of petitioners to the prior physical
possession
of the property. The evidence allegedly showed that they had
already
sold the land with the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR).
Accordingly, their subsequent entry into and possession of the land
constituted
plain usurpation, which could not be the source of any right to occupy
it. Being planters in bad faith, they had no right to be
reimbursed
for improvements on the land, in accordance with Article 449 of the New
Civil Code.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issue
In their Memorandum,[8]
petitioners raise this sole issue for our consideration:
"x x x Whether private
respondents have a valid and legal right to forcibly eject petitioners
from the premises despite their resistance and objection, through the
use
of armed men and by bulldozing, cutting, and destroying trees and
plants
planted by petitioners, without court order, to the damage and
prejudice
of the latter."[9]
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.cralaw:red
Main Issue:
Physical Possession of the Land
The only issue in forcible
entry cases is the physical or material possession of real property --
possession
de facto, not possession de jure.[10]
Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.[11]
If ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court may pass upon such
question,
but only to determine the question of possession.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The ownership claim
of respondents upon the land is based on the evidence they
presented.
Their evidence, however, did not squarely address the issue of prior
possession.
Even if they succeed in proving that they are the owners of the land,[13]
the fact remains that they have not alleged or proved that they
physically
possess it by virtue of such ownership. On the other hand,
petitioners’
prior possession of the land was not disputed by the CA, which merely
described
it as usurpation.[14]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We stress that the issue
of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is
intimately
intertwined with the issue of possession,[15]
to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession cannot
be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the
land
is.[16]
No such intertwinement has been shown in the case before us.
Since
respondents’ claim of ownership is not being made in order to prove
prior
possession, the ejectment court cannot intrude or dwell upon the issue
of ownership.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Notwithstanding the
actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession
cannot
be ejected by force, violence or terror -- not even by the owners.[18]
If such illegal manner of ejectment is employed, as it was in the
present
case, the party who proves prior possession -- in this case,
petitioners
-- can recover possession even from the owners themselves.[19]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Granting arguendo that
petitioners illegally entered into and occupied the property in
question,
respondents had no right to take the law into their own hands and
summarily
or forcibly eject the occupants therefrom.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Verily, even if petitioners
were mere usurpers of the land owned by respondents, still they are
entitled
to remain on it until they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Under
appropriate circumstances, respondents may file, other than an
ejectment
suit, an accion publiciana -- a plenary action intended to recover the
better right to possess;[20]
or an accion reivindicatoria -- an action to recover ownership of real
property.[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The availment of the
aforementioned remedies is the legal alternative to prevent breaches of
peace and criminal disorder resulting from the use of force by
claimants
out to gain possession.[22]
The rule of law does not allow the mighty and the privileged to take
the
law into their own hands to enforce their alleged rights. They
should
go to court and seek judicial vindication.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, J., (Chairman),
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.chan
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____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-22.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Id., pp. 24-29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Rollo, p. 31.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Special Seventh Division. Written by Justice Buenaventura J.
Guerrero
(Division chairman), concurred in by Justice Martin S. Villarama Jr.
and
Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.
[5]
Assailed CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
Id., pp. 2-3 & 25-26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on November 13, 2001, upon
the Court’s receipt of petitioners’ Memorandum signed by Atty. Franco
L.
Loyola. Respondents’ Memorandum, filed on November 12, 2001, was
signed by Atty. Benjamin E. Mendoza.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 123-142.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 127.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Go Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 755, August 14, 2001; Amagan v.
Marayag,
326 SCRA 581, February 28, 2000; Diu v. Ibajan, 322 SCRA 452, January
19,
2000; Carreon v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 271, June 22, 1998; Dizon
v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 429, November 19, 1996; Hilario v. Court
of Appeals, 329 Phil. 202, August 7, 1996.
[11]
German Management and Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 495,
September 14, 1989; Ganadin v. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613, September 11,
1980; Baptista v. Carillo, 72 SCRA 214, July 30, 1976.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
§16 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Court; Diu v. Ibajan, supra;
Dizon
v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[13]
In their Memorandum, petitioners claim that the issue of ownership over
the property "is still with the DARAB of Cavite."
[14]
Assailed CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 28.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Paz v. Reyes, 327 SCRA 605, March 9, 2000; Vda. de Cruz v. Court of
Appeals,
363 Phil. 539, March 4, 1999.
[16]
Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, July 5, 1996.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id., p. 1006.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[18]
Muñoz v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 216, September 23, 1992;
Joven
v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 700, August 20, 1992; German Management
and
Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.; Supia and Batioco v.
Quintero
and Ayala, 59 Phil. 312, December 23, 1933.
[19]
Gener v. de Leon, 367 SCRA 631, October 19, 2001; Ceremonia v. Court of
Appeals, 314 SCRA 731, September 21, 1999; Gachon v. Devera, 274 SCRA
540,
June 20, 1997.
[20]
Arcal v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 813, January 26, 1998; Chico v.
Court
of Appeals, 348 Phil. 37, January 5, 1998; Ybañez v.
Intermediate
Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743, March 6, 1991; Concepcion v. Presiding
Judge
et al., 204 Phil. 564, December 15, 1982.
[21]
Evadel Realty and Development Corporation v. Soriano, 357 SCRA 395,
April
20, 2001; Vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 12, February
1, 2001; Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, June 1, 1906.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Villaflor v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 392, January 30, 1968; Pitargue v. Sorilla,
92 Phil. 5, September 17, 1952.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |