THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF
DEMETRIO
MELCHOR,
REPRESENTED BY CLETO
MELCHOR,
Petitioners,
G.R.
No.
150633
November 12, 2003
-versus-
JULIO MELCHOR,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The Municipal Trial
Court would not have jurisdiction over a purported unlawful detainer
suit,
if the complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts.
The Case
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to nullify the August 16, 2001 Decision[2]
and the October 18, 2001 Resolution[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 63465. The dispositive
portion
of the assailed Decision is as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Joint Decision dated
February
5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela
which
embodied the assailed judgment in Civil Case No. 20-1125 and affirmed
the
Decision dated September 1, 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Cauayan,
Isabela, dismissing the complaint for ejectment of the petitioners in
Civil
Case No. 2325, entitled 'Heirs of Demetrio Melchor represented by Cleto
Melchor v. Julio Melchor,' is hereby AFFIRMED and REITERATED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Costs against the
petitioners."[4]
The assailed Resolution
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts
The facts of the case
are narrated by the CA as follows:
"Petitioners,
who are the heirs of DEMETRIO MELCHOR, claim to be the owners, by way
of
succession, of the subject property allegedly in possession of
respondent
JULIO MELCHOR. The subject property is a portion of the twenty (20)
hectares
of land registered in the name of PEDRO MELCHOR, evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. I-6020 of the Registry of Deeds for Isabela.
The
said property was purchased by the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR from PEDRO
MELCHOR,
the deceased father of herein respondent JULIO MELCHOR. During the
lifetime
of the late DEMETRIO MELCHOR, a request for the approval of the Deed of
Sale dated February 14, 1947 between DEMETRIO MELCHOR and PEDRO MELCHOR
was made to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on
September
4, 1953, which was subsequently approved. Since February 14, 1947 up to
the present, petitioners further allege that respondent has been
occupying
the subject property and has been harvesting crops thereon and using it
for grassing cows and carabaos.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"A demand letter
dated
August 21, 1999 was allegedly sent by the petitioners to the
respondent,
demanding him to vacate and surrender the said property, but the latter
refused. The disagreement reached the barangay authorities, which case
was not amicably settled, resulting in the issuance of a certification
to file action.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"Petitioners filed
against
respondent a complaint for ejectment before the MTC of Cauayan, Isabela
which they subsequently refiled in their Second Amended Complaint,
docketed
as Civil Case No. 2325 and dated May 31, 2001, to accommodate
additional
allegations therein.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"For his part, the
defendant
(now respondent) in Civil Case No. 2325 principally raised the matter
of
ownership by alleging affirmative/special defenses, among others, that
the parcel of land in possession of the defendant is registered in the
name of ANTONIA QUITERAS, the deceased mother of the defendant, as per
Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-274828 of the Registry of Deeds
for Isabela, and that the same property is now owned by the defendant
and
his three (3) sisters and one (1) brother, having inherited the same
from
their late mother, ANTONIA QUITERAS.
"The Decision
dated
September 1, 2000, which was penned by acting MTC Judge BERNABE B.
MENDOZA,
was rendered in favor of the respondent, the pertinent portions of
which
read:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'There is
no
allegation that plaintiffs have been deprived of the possession of the
land by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
'The
dispossession was
made in 1947. As such, ejectment is not the proper remedy.
'WHEREFORE, a
judgment
is hereby rendered dismissing the case.
'No
pronouncement as
to costs.
'SO ORDERED.'
"On appeal, the
Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20 of Cauayan, Isabela, presided over by Executive
Judge HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, rendered, together with another related
complaint
for ejectment, i.e., Civil Case No. 20-1126, the Joint Decision dated
February
5, 2001, the decretal portion of which reads:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'WHEREFORE,
judgment is hereby rendered:
'1.
Affirming
the decision in Civil Case No. Br. 20-1126 entitled, 'Heirs of Liberato
Lumelay, et al. vs. Heirs of Julio Melchor.' Costs against the
appellants.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'2. Affirming
the decision
in Civil Case No. 201-1125, entitled, 'Heirs of Demetrio Melchor, et
al.
vs. Julio Melchor,' Costs against the appellants.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
'SO ORDERED.'"[5] Ruling of
the
Court of Appeals
Sustaining the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), the CA ruled that petitioners had failed to make a
case
for unlawful detainer. It opined that the MTC had never acquired
jurisdiction
over the case, because there was no allegation that the parties had
entered
into a contract — express or implied — or that there was possession by
tolerance.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Furthermore, the appellate
court held that the proper remedy should have been a plenary action for
recovery of possession, not a summary action for ejectment.cralaw:red
Hence, this Petition.[6]
The Issue
In their Memorandum,[7]
petitioners raised only one alleged error:
"The Court
of Appeals committed a grave error when it ruled that the Second
Amended
Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action for
x x x unlawful detainer."[8]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The Court's
Ruling
The Petition has no
merit.cralaw:red
Lone Issue:
Sufficiency of the Complaint for Ejectment
Petitioners filed a
summary action for ejectment based on Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Under
Section 1 of the Rule, two separate remedies are available — one for
forcible
entry and another for unlawful detainer.[9]
Petitioners maintain that while the Complaint does not support a cause
of action for forcible entry, the allegations therein certainly
indicate
one for unlawful detainer. They add that they did not commit any
jurisdictional
infirmity in failing to allege prior physical possession, because that
fact is not an element of unlawful detainer.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We do not agree. Even
if petitioners may be correct in saying that prior physical possession
by the plaintiff need not be alleged in an action for unlawful detainer,[10]
the absence of such possession does not ipso facto make their Complaint
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the MTC.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In ejectment cases,
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.[11]
The test for determining the sufficiency of those allegations is
whether,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in
accordance
with the prayer of the plaintiff.[12]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A review of the Second
Amended Complaint of petitioners discloses these pertinent allegations:
the absolute owner of the subject land was their father, Demetrio
Melchor,
who bought it on February 14, 1947 from respondent's father, Pedro
Melchor;[13]
being the heirs of Demetrio Melchor, petitioners became the owners of
the
property by reason of succession;[14]
as such, they sent a formal demand letter to respondent, who had been
using
the property since February 14, 1947, for grazing cows and carabaos and
for planting crops;[15]
and in that letter, they asked him to vacate and surrender the property,[16]
but he failed to do so.[17]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Accordingly, petitioners
prayed for judgment ordering respondent to vacate the property and to
pay
P500,000, which represented the income earned from February 14, 1947 to
the present, as well the costs of the suit.[18]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It is clear from the
foregoing that the allegations in the Complaint failed to constitute a
case for either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. These actions,
which
deal with physical or de facto possession,[19]
may be distinguished as follows:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"(1) In an
action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege and prove that he
was in prior physical possession of the premises until deprived
thereof,
while in illegal detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior
physical
possession; and (2) in forcible entry, the possession by the defendant
is unlawful ab initio because he acquires possession by force,
intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, while in unlawful detainer, possession is
originally lawful but becomes illegal by reason of the termination of
his
right of possession under his contract with the plaintiff. In pleadings
filed in courts of special jurisdiction, the special facts giving the
court
jurisdiction must be specially alleged and set out. Otherwise, the
complaint
is demurrable."[20]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As correctly held by
the
appellate court, "[f]orcible entry must be ruled out as there was no
allegation
that the petitioners were denied possession of the subject property
through
any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court."[21]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Neither was unlawful
detainer satisfactorily alleged. In determining the sufficiency of a
complaint
therefor, it is not necessary to employ the terminology of the law.[22]
Not averred in this case, however, were certain essential facts such as
how entry was effected, or how and when dispossession started.[23]
Petitioners merely alleged their ownership of the land, which had
supposedly
been possessed by respondent since 1947. There was no allegation
showing
that his possession of it was initially legal — by virtue of a
contract,
express or implied — and that it became illegal after the expiration of
his right to possess.cralaw:red
Neither did the Complaint
claim as a fact any overt act on the part of petitioners showing that
they
had permitted or tolerated respondent's occupancy of the subject
property.[24]
It is a settled rule that in order to justify an action for unlawful
detainer,
the owner's permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of
the possession.[25]
Furthermore, the complaint must aver the facts showing that the
inferior
court has jurisdiction to try the case; for example, by describing how
defendant's possession started or continued.[26]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The prayer of petitioners
contradicts, however, the existence of possession by tolerance. It must
be noted that they seek to be paid P500,000 as payment for the use of
the
property by respondent from 1947 to the present. This allegation
implies
that they never permitted him to possess the land.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Since the Complaint
did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause for
forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, the appellate court was correct in holding
that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Verily, the failure
of petitioners to properly allege a case for ejectment does not leave
them
without any other remedy. Under the proper circumstances, what may be
filed
is a case either for accion publiciana, which is a plenary action
intended
to recover the better right to possess; or an accion reivindicatoria, a
suit to recover ownership of real property.[27]
This principle was laid down in Ong v. Parel as follows:[28]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"The
jurisdictional
facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint
fails
to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where
it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"If private
respondent
is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was
unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she
should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court
in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For
even
if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested
from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the
same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment.
This is especially true where his possession thereof was not obtained
through
the means or held under the circumstances contemplated by the rules on
summary ejectment."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the Petition
is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ.,
concur.chan
robles virtual law library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 8-18.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez Jr. (Division chairman) and Eliezer R. de los Santos
(member); id., pp. 20-26.
[3]
Rollo, p. 27.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 26.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[5]
Id., pp. 1-3 & 20-22.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
The case was deemed submitted for decision on October 22, 2002, upon
this
Court's receipt of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty.
Diosdado
B. Ramirez. Petitioners' Memorandum, filed on October 9, 2002, was
signed
by Atty. Ernesto S. Carreon.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 142-151.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[8]
Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 144.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarychanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
"SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the
provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of
any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth,
or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with
damages and costs."chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[10]
Barba v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126638, February 6, 2002; citing
Spouses
Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 216, January 16, 1997.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Spouses Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, October 10, 2001; Hilario
v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 202, August 7, 1996.
[12]
Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 499, March 5, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Second Amended Complaint, par. 5, p. 2; rollo, p. 29.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Id., par. 9; ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[16]
Id., par. 10; ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[17]
Id., par. 12, p. 3; id., p. 30.chan
robles virtual law librarychan robles virtual law library
[18]
Id., p. 3; ibid.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[19]
Amagan v. Marayag, 383 Phil. 486, February 28, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[20]
Spouses Tirona v. Hon. Alejo, supra, p. 299, per Quisumbing, J.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[21]
CA Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 24-25.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[22]
Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525, September 18, 2000.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[23]
Ibid.; Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, October 8, 1998.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[24]
Ong v. Parel, 355 SCRA 691, March 28, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[25]
Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, August 14, 2001.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[26]
Hilario v. Court of Appeals, supra.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[27]
Heirs of Laurora v. Sterling Technopark III, GR No. 146815, April 9,
2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[28]
Supra, p. 699, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J; citing Sarmiento v. CA, 320
Phil.
146, 156, November 16, 1995, per Regalado J.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred |