EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R.
No.
152154
November 18, 2003
-versus-
HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION),FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS:IMELDA R. MARCOS,
MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC,FERDINAND R. MARCOS,
JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA),AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS,
Respondents. |
R E S O L U T I O
N
CORONA,
J.:
Before us are Motions
dated August 1, 2003, August 2, 2003 and August 25, 2003 of respondents
Imelda R. Marcos, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Ma. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr., respectively, seeking reconsideration of our Decision
dated
July 15, 2003 which ordered the forfeiture in favor of the Republic of
the Philippines of the Swiss deposits in escrow at the Philippine
National
Bank (PNB) in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of
January 31, 2002.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Imelda Marcos,
in her motion for reconsideration, asks this Court to set aside the
aforesaid
decision dated July 15, 2003, premised on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF
THIS
HONORABLE COURT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED RESPONDENT OF HER CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENSHRINED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A.
FORFEITURE
PROCEEDINGS UNDER R.A. 1379, IN RELATION TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE
CRIMINAL/PENAL
IN NATURE, HENCE, RESPONDENT HAS ALL THE RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION; AND THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
RESPONDENT'S
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
B. CONSIDERING
THE CRIMINAL/PENAL
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, THE DENIALS RAISED BY RESPONDENT IN HER
ANSWER
WERE SUFFICIENT TO TRAVERSE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION FOR
FORFEITURE.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
C. THE
PROSECUTION HAD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH EVEN A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT, MUCH
LESS
PROVEN ITS CASE FOR FORFEITURE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
D. EVEN ASSUMING
THAT
THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE, A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
CANNOT BE RENDERED IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS. RESPONDENT HAS THE RIGHT
TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OVERTHROW THE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
E. THE FACTUAL
FINDING
THAT THE FOUNDATIONS INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS ARE
CONSIDERED BUSINESSES, AND WERE MANAGED BY RESPONDENT TOGETHER WITH HER
LATE HUSBAND, WILL PERNICIOUSLY AFFECT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS FILED
BY
THE REPUBLIC AGAINST RESPONDENT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
THE DECISION OF
THE
SUPREME COURT, WHICH IMPROPERLY CONVERTED THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION INTO
A REGULAR APPEAL, DIVESTED RESPONDENT OF HER RIGHT TO APPEAL THE CASE
ON
THE MERITS, THEREBY DEPRIVING HER OF DUE PROCESS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A. THE
RESOLUTION
DATED 31 JANUARY 2002 RAISED BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT ON A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI, WAS OBVIOUSLY A MERE INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. THE DECISION
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DELVED ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE,
IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO APPEAL, WHICH IS EXPRESSLY
CONFERRED BY THE RULES.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Imelda
Marcos
further alleges that our July 15, 2003 decision will prejudice the
criminal
cases filed against her.
Respondents Ferdinand,
Jr. and Imee Marcos also pray that the said decision be set aside and
the
case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan to give petitioner Republic the
opportunity
to present witnesses and documents and to afford respondent Marcoses
the
chance to present controverting evidence, based on the following:
I
THE LETTER AND
INTENT
OF RA 1379 FORBID/PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS THE PROCESS TO DECIDE
FORFEITURE
UNDER RA 1379. THUS, IT PROVIDES FOR SPECIFIC JURISDICTIONAL
ALLEGATIONS
IN THE PETITION AND MANDATES A WELL-DEFINED PROCEDURE TO BE STRICTLY
OBSERVED
BEFORE FORFEITURE JUDGMENT MAY BE RENDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN
THE DECISION UNDER RECONSIDERATION DIMINISHES/MODIFIES OR REPEALS VIA
JUDICIAL
LEGISLATION SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF RESPONDENTS GRANTED AND GUARANTEED BY
RA 1379 AND IS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III
THE DECISION IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY
INVALID FOR FAILURE TO EXPRESS CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY THE TRUE/GENUINE
STATEMENT OF FACTS (ADDUCED AFTER TRIAL/PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE) ON
WHICH
IT IS BASED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV
THE LAW(S) ON
WHICH
THE DECISION IS BASED IS/ARE NOT APPLICABLE/PROPER AND/OR ARE
FORCEFULLY
STRAINED TO JUSTIFY THE UNWARRANTED CONCLUSIONS REACHED, VIOLATIVE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY INJUNCTIONS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
V
THERE BEING A
DEPRIVATION
OF DUE PROCESS, THE COURT AXIOMATICALLY OUSTED ITSELF OF JURISDICTION.
HENCE, THE DECISION IS VOID.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VI
ASSUMING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
IS APPLICABLE AND PROPER, IT IS NOT WARRANTED UNDER THE PREMISES.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VII
ASSUMING THAT A
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS PROPER, THE AVERMENTS OF THE PETITION FORFEITURE ARE
INCOMPLETE
AND INCONCLUSIVE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUISITE IMPERATIVES. JUDGMENT
VIOLATES
THE CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON TO BE OBSERVED TO RENDER A VALID DECISION
OF
FORFEITURE UNDER RA 1379.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
VIII
THE STATEMENT OF
OPERATIVE
FACTS/FACTUAL NARRATION AS WELL AS THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE
DECISION
ARE CONTRADICTED OR REFUTED BY THE PLEADINGS OF THE PARTIES, THE
JUDICIAL
ADMISSIONS OF PETITIONER, THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE
ORDERS ISSUED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Irene
Araneta,
in her motion for reconsideration, merely reiterates the arguments
previously
raised in the pleadings she filed in this Court and prays that the
Court's
decision dated July 15, 2003 be set aside.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In its consolidated
comment dated September 29, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General
argues
that:
I
THE MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION
DO NOT RAISE ANY NEW MATTER AND WERE FILED MANIFESTLY TO DELAY THE
EXECUTION
OF THE DECISION DATED JULY 15, 2003.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IS
APPLICABLE TO A PETITION FOR FORFEITURE, AS LONG AS THERE IS NO GENUINE
FACTUAL ISSUE WHICH WOULD CALL FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
III
THE DECISION DATED
JULY
15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CLEARLY EXPRESSED THE FACTS ON WHICH
IT
IS BASED, MOST OF WHICH WERE ADMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
PLEADINGS
SUBMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IV
CERTIORARI IS THE
APPROPRIATE
AND SPEEDY REMEDY OF PETITIONER REPUBLIC, GIVEN THE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN TOTALLY REVERSING ITS OWN
DECISION
DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 2000 AND IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION DATED
JANUARY
31, 2002, AND CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE IS IMBUED WITH IMMENSE PUBLIC
INTEREST,
PUBLIC POLICY AND DEEP HISTORICAL REPERCUSSIONS.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
V
A FORFEITURE
PROCEEDING
UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO.1379 IS CIVIL AND NOT CRIMINAL IN NATURE. VI
THE DECISION DATED
JULY
15, 2003 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE CRIMINAL
ACTIONS
FILED AGAINST RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS FOR VIOLATION OF THE
ANTI-GRAFT
AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
On October 6, 2003,
respondents
Marcos, Jr. and Imee Marcos filed a motion for leave to file a reply to
petitioner Republic's consolidated comment, which this Court granted.
On
October 22, 2003, they filed their reply to the consolidated comment.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
As the aforequoted issues
are interwoven, the Court shall discuss them together.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
At the outset, we note
that respondents, in their motions for reconsideration, do not raise
any
new matters for the Court to resolve. The arguments in their motions
for
reconsideration are mere reiterations of their contentions fully
articulated
in their previous pleadings, and exhaustively probed and passed upon by
the Court.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
Respondent Marcoses
argue that the letter and intent of R.
A. 1379 forbid and preclude summary judgment as the process to
decide
forfeiture cases under the law. It provides for specific jurisdictional
allegations in the petition and mandates a well-defined procedure to be
strictly observed before a judgment of forfeiture may be rendered.cralaw:red
According to respondents,
Section 5 of R.
A. 1379 requires the court to set a date for hearing during which
respondents
shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the
court, how they acquired the property. They contend that the
proceedings
under R. A.
1379
are criminal in character, thus they have all the rights of an accused
under the Constitution such as the right to adduce evidence and the
right
to a hearing. They claim that it is petitioner which has the burden of
proving respondents' guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that forfeiture
of property should depend not on the weakness of their evidence but on
the strength of petitioner's. Accordingly, respondents maintain that,
due
to the criminal nature of forfeiture proceedings, the denials raised by
them were sufficient to traverse all the allegations in the petition
for
forfeiture.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The issue of the propriety
of summary judgment was painstakingly discussed and settled in our July
15, 2003 decision:
A summary
judgment
is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of
the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
posed
and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the
issues
presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of
substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.
It
is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition
of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy. Summary
judgment
is a procedural devise for the prompt disposition of actions in which
the
pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material
fact.[1]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS?
The
principal
contention now of respondent Marcoses is limited to their argument that
our aforementioned decision effectively deprived them of their
constitutionally
enshrined right to due process.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
According to
respondents, R.
A. 1379
is penal in substance and effect, hence, they are entitled to the
constitutional
safeguards enjoyed by an accused. Respondents further argue that the
reinstatement
of the decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 19, 2000, which
ordered
the forfeiture of the properties subject of the instant case by summary
judgment, diminished or repealed, by judicial legislation, respondents'
rights guaranteed by RA 1379 for failure to set a date for hearing to
benefit
respondents.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
We disagree.
Due process of law
has
two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that a
particular
act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there
must
be compliance with both substantive and the procedural requirements
thereof.[2]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In the present context,
substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that
interferes with the rights of a person to his property.[3]
On the other hand, procedural due process means compliance with the
procedures
or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with
the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those
who
are called upon to administer it.[4]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Insofar as substantive
due process is concerned, there is no showing that R.
A. 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. In other words,
respondent
Marcoses are not being deprived of their property through forfeiture
for
arbitrary reasons or on flimsy grounds. As meticulously explained in
the
July 15, 2003 decision of the Court, EO No. 1[5]
created the PCGG primarily to assist then President Corazon Aquino in
the
recovery, pursuant to RA 1379, of vast government resources amassed and
stolen by former President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives,
close associates and other cronies. These assets were stashed away here
and abroad.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A careful study of the
provisions of R.
A. 1379 readily discloses that the forfeiture proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan
did not violate the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These
proceedings
are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the Marcoses that it is
penal
in character.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
In Almeda, Sr., et al.
vs. Perez, et al.,[6]
we suggested a test to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture
is civil or criminal:
"x
x
x Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in
nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If they are under a statute
such
that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in
the
criminal case they are criminal in nature, although they may be civil
in
form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil.
If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer
for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under
statutes which specifically so provide, where the act or omission for
which
the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture
may
be sued for and recovered in a civil action." (37 CJS, Forfeiture, Sec.
5, pp. 15-16)
In the case of Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario Asistio, Jr.,[8]
this Court categorically declared that:
The rule is
settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and therefore
civil
in nature.
The proceedings under R.
A. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely
in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the
State. Section 6 of said law provides:chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction
of
the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State,
and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become
property
of the State x x x.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The procedure outlined
in the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action:
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x Sec. 3. The
petition.-
The petition shall contain the following information:
(a) The
name
and address of the respondent.
(b) The public
office
or employment he holds and such other public offices or employments
which
he has previously held.
(c) The
approximate
amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past
and
present offices and employments.
(d) A
description of
said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor
General.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
(e) The total
amount
of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from
legitimately
acquired property, and
(f) Such other
information
as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has
unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x Sec. 4. Period
for the answer. — The respondent shall have a period of fifteen days
within
which to present his answer.
In short, there is a
petition, then an answer and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary
investigation
required prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with
Section
2 of the Act, is expressly provided to be similar to a preliminary
investigation
in a criminal case. The similarity, however, ends there for, if the
investigation
were akin to that in a criminal case but all the other succeeding steps
were those for a civil proceeding, then the process as a whole is
definitely
not criminal. Were it a criminal proceeding, there would be, after
preliminary
investigation, a reading of the information, a plea of guilty or not
guilty,
a trial and a reading of judgment in the presence of respondents. But,
these steps, as above set forth, are clearly not provided for in the
law.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Prescinding from the
foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of
its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to
all kinds of actions.[9]chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The proceedings in R.
A. 1379 and EO No. 14 were observed in the prosecution of the
petition
for forfeiture. Section 1 of E. O. No. 14-A, dated August 18, 1986,
amending
Section 3 of E. O. No. 14, provides that civil suits to recover
unlawfully
acquired property under R.
A. 1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence. Under R.
A. 1379 and E. O. Nos. 1 and 2, the Government is required only to
state the known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie
presumption
of illegal provenance to attach. As we fully explained in our July 15,
2003 decision, petitioner Republic was able to establish this prima
facie
presumption. Thus, the burden of proof shifted, by law, to the
respondents
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were
lawfully
acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. This,
respondent
Marcoses did not do. They failed - or rather, refused - to raise any
genuine
issue of fact warranting a trial for the reception of evidence
therefor.
For this reason and pursuant to the State policy to expedite recovery
of
ill-gotten wealth, petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment which
the Sandiganbayan appropriately acted on.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondents also claim
that summary judgment denies them their right to a hearing and to
present
evidence purposely granted under Section 5 of RA 1379.cralaw:red
Respondents were repeatedly
accorded full opportunity to present their case, their defenses and
their
pleadings. Not only did they obstinately refuse to do so. Respondents
time
and again tried to confuse the issues and the Court itself, and to
delay
the disposition of the case.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Section 5 of R.
A. 1379 provides:
The court shall set
a date for a hearing which may be open to the public, and during which
the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the
satisfaction
of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
And pursuant to Section
6 of the said law, if the respondent is unable to show to the
satisfaction
of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question,
then
the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Marcoses
erroneously understood "hearing" to be synonymous with "trial." The
words
"hearing" and "trial" have different meanings and connotations. Trial
may
refer to the reception of evidence and other processes. It embraces the
period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. Hearing, as
known
in law, is not confined to trial but embraces the several stages of
litigation,
including the pre-trial stage. A hearing does not necessarily mean
presentation
of evidence. It does not necessarily imply the presentation of oral or
documentary evidence in open court but that the parties are afforded
the
opportunity to be heard.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
A careful analysis of
Section 5 of R.
A. 1379 readily discloses that the word "hearing" does not always
require
the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties
are
given the occasion to participate and explain how they acquired the
property
in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of the
court
that they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court
shall
declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.[10]
There is no provision in the law that a full blown trial ought to be
conducted
before the court declares the forfeiture of the subject property. Thus,
even if the forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court is not
precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the
property
in question even in a summary proceeding.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Due process, a constitutional
precept, does not therefore always and in all situations require a
trial-type
proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the reasonable
opportunity
to be heard and submit one's evidence in support of his defense. What
the
law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice but the
absence
thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard.[13]
This opportunity was made completely available to respondents who
participated
in all stages of the litigation.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
When the petition for
forfeiture was filed at the Sandiganbayan, respondent Marcoses argued
their
case and engaged in all of the lengthy discussions, argumentation,
deliberations
and conferences, and submitted their pleadings, documents and other
papers.
When petitioner Republic moved for summary judgment, respondent
Marcoses
filed their demurrer to evidence. They agreed to submit the case for
decision
with their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. They moved
for
the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan resolution dated September 19,
2000 which granted petitioner Republic's motion for summary judgment
(which
was in fact subsequently reversed in its January 31, 2002 resolution.)
And when the case finally reached this Court, respondent Marcoses were
given, on every occasion, the chance to file and submit all the
pleadings
necessary to defend their case. And even now that the matter has been
finally
settled and adjudicated, their motion for reconsideration is being
heard
by this Court.cralaw:red
For twelve long years,
respondent Marcoses tried to stave off this case with nothing but empty
claims of "lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief,"
or "they were not privy to the transactions," or "they could not
remember
(because the transactions) happened a long time ago" or that the assets
"were lawfully acquired." And they now allege deprivation of their
right
to be heard and present evidence in their defense?chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
It would be repulsive
to our basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow respondents to
further
delay the adjudication of this case and defeat the judgment of this
Court
which was promulgated only after all the facts, issues and other
considerations
essential to a fair and just determination had been judiciously
evaluated.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Petitioner Republic
has the right to a speedy disposition of this case. It would readily be
apparent to a reasonable mind that respondent Marcoses have been
deliberately
resorting to every procedural device to delay the resolution hereof.
There
is justice waiting to be done. The people and the State are entitled to
favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays,
the salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss
deposits
to the rightful owner, the Republic of the Philippines, within the
shortest
possible time.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
The respondent Marcoses
cannot deny that the delays in this case have all been made at their
instance.
The records can testify to this incontrovertible fact. It will be a
mockery
of justice to allow them to benefit from it. By their own deliberate
acts
— not those of the Republic or anybody else — they are deemed to have
altogether
waived or abandoned their right to proceed to trial.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos likewise asserts that the factual finding that the foundations
involved
in the instant forfeiture proceedings were businesses managed by her
and
her late husband, will adversely affect the criminal proceedings filed
by the Republic against her. The contention is bereft of merit. The
criminal
cases referred to by said respondent are actions in personam, directed
against her on the basis of her personal liability. In criminal cases,
the law imposes the burden of proving guilt on the prosecution beyond
reasonable
doubt, and the trial judge in evaluating the evidence must find that
all
the elements of the crime charged have been established by sufficient
proof
to convict.cralaw:red
But a forfeiture proceeding
is an action in rem, against the thing itself instead of against the
person.
Being civil in character, it requires no more than a preponderance of
evidence.[14]
And by preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.[15]
Hence, the factual findings of this Court in its decision dated July
15,
2003 will, as a consequence, neither affect nor do away with the
requirement
of having to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal
cases
against her.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
One final note. We take
judicial notice of newspaper accounts that a certain Judge Manuel Real
of the US District Court of Hawaii issued a "global freeze order" on
the
Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. We reject this order
outrightly
because it is a transgression not only of the principle of
territoriality
in public international law but also of the jurisdiction of this Court
recognized by the parties-in-interest and the Swiss government itself.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
WHEREFORE, the motions
for reconsideration are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno,
Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., took no
part.chan robles virtual
law
library
____________________________
Endnotes:
[1]
G.R. No. 152154, Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, July 15, 2003, p. 55.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[2]
Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 597 [1991].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[3]
Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659 [1987].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[4]
Tupas vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70
[1988].
[5]
Promulgated on February 28, 1986.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[6]
G.R. No. L-18428, August 30, 1962.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[7]
Footnote text and reference not found in the original.
[8]
200 SCRA 667 [1991].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[9]
Articles 48 and 60, Family Code of the Philippines; Roque vs.
Encarnacion,
95 Phil. 643 [1954].
[10]
Section 6, RA 1379.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[11]
Footnote text and reference not found in the original.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[12]
Footnote text and reference not found in the original.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[13]
Mutuc vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 43 [1990].chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[14]
Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court, as amended.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
[15]
Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184.chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
chanrobles virtuallaw libraryred
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