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EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 120034. August 20, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEFINA A. ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED, Accused-Appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J.:

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 759 for importing into the country twenty (20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal Case No. 94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 114.

After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995, the trial court found her guilty as charged and imposed on her the death penalty.

As the accused remains at large up to the present time, the issue that confronts the Court is whether or not it will proceed to automatically review her death sentence. The issue need not befuddle us. In the 1910 ground-breaking case of U.S. vs. Laguna, et al., ¹ we already held thru Mr. Justice Moreland, that the power of this Court to review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or by the courts, viz.:

Necessarily, our case law under the 1935 Constitution reiterated the Laguna ruling. Thus, in the 1953 case of People vs. Villanueva, ⁵ we held that the withdrawal of an appeal by a death convict does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to review his conviction, viz.:

"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to withdraw his appeal like any other appellant, in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the jurisdiction of this court which under the law is authorized and called upon to review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In fact, as was said by this court through Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this court of a decision imposing the death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade."

The 1971 case of People vs. Cornelio, et al ., ⁶ involves the escape of a death convict. In no uncertain terms, we held that the escape of a death convict does not relieve this Court of its duty of reviewing his conviction. In the 1972 case of People vs. Daban, et al ., ⁷ the ponencia of former Chief Justice Fernando further stressed, to wit:

"xxx xxx xxx"

"Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is unaware of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: `The records of all cases in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of First Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for review and judgment as law and justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier than fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in the form prescribed by Section 11 of Rule 41. The transcript shall also be forwarded as provided in Section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days after the filing thereof by the stenographer.' The penalty imposed on appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969 being one of death, the case was properly elevated to this Court. Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be attached to the lower court decision. As explained in former Chief Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: `In this connection, it must be emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; and that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and this automatic review by the Supreme Court is something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.' The mere fact of escape of appellant, therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's brief."

Then came the 1973 Constitution which likewise did not prohibit the death penalty. ⁸ Section 9, Rule 122 continued to provide the procedure for review of death penalty cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted this procedure of review. Significantly, it expressly used the term "automatic review and judgment" by this Court. Our case law continued its fealty to the Laguna rule. Thus, in the 1976 case of People vs. Saliling, et al., ⁹ we held, thru former Chief Justice Aquino, that this Court is not precluded from reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In the 1984 case of People vs. Buynay, et al ., ¹⁰ we reiterated the rule that the escape of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal of his appeal.

Finally, we have the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress so provides. ¹¹ On December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived the procedure by which this Court reviews death penalty cases pursuant to the Rules of Court. It remains automatic and does not depend on the whims of the death convict. It continues to be mandatory, and leaves this Court without any option. ¹² cräläwvirtualibräry

With due respect to the dissenting opinions, of our esteemed colleagues, section 8 of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court which, inter alia, authorizes the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant jumps bail, has no application to cases where the death penalty has been imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is mandatory. This is the text and tone of section 10, Rule 122, which is the more applicable rule, viz.:

"Section 10. Transmission of Records in Case of Death Penalty. - In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."

Similarly, the reliance in People v. Codilla, ¹³ by our dissenting colleagues is misplaced. Codilla is not a death penalty case. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on appellant. Consequently, we ruled that the escape of the appellant or his refusal to surrender to the proper authorities justifies dismissal of his appeal.

Our dissenting brethren also make a distinct cut between "x x x a death convict, i.e. one convicted to death by a trial court who remains in the custody of the law, and who voluntarily withdraws his appeal and a death convict, i.e. one convicted to death by the trial court but who escapes from the custody of the law during the pendency of the appeal." They rationalize the distinction by holding:

"It should be clear in the first case, that even if the death convict withdraws his appeal from the trial court's judgment convicting him to death, the appellate court may still and nonetheless review the judgment of conviction for the convict-appellant has at least remained in the custody of the law to await final verdict in his case. In the second case, however, the accused no longer recognizes and respects the authority of law and the duly-constituted authorities in general and this Court in particular. Such supercilious conduct of an escapee cannot and should not be taken lightly by the Court. Respect for and recognition of the authority of the Court is an essential and implicit element in an effective and credible judicial system.

"No one, it should be stressed, should be allowed to make a mockery of the justice system by, in one breath, seeking its protection and even vindication via an automatic review of a death sentence and, in another breath, continuing to be a fugitive from justice and repudiating the very authority of the system whose protection he seeks and invokes."

We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. We must strive to realize this objective, however elusive it may be, and our efforts must not depend on whether appellant has withdrawn his appeal or has escaped. Indeed, an appellant may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of his wrong perception of the law. Or because he may want to avail of the more speedy remedy of pardon. Or because of his frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice from the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict escapes. Ours is not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of a citizen is our concern not only in crimes that slight but even more, in crimes that shock the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.

The Court is not espousing a "soft, bended, approach" to heinous crimes for as discussed above, we have always reviewed the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the will of the convict. Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy that the State should not be given the license to kill without the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last, effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of a one-judge trial court. This enlightened policy ought to continue as our beacon light for the taking of life ends all rights, a matter of societal value that transcends the personal interest of a convict. The importance of this societal value should not be blurred by the escape of a convict which is a problem of law enforcement. Neither should this Court be moved alone by the outrage of the public for the rise in statistics of heinous crimes for our decisions should not be directed by the changing winds of the social weather. Let us not for a moment forget that an accused does not cease to have rights just because of his conviction. This principle is implicit in our Constitution which recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for the accused is given a new period of thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to file the Brief of the accused Josefina A. Esparas.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., in the result.

Francisco and Panganiban , JJ., concur in separate opinion.

Padilla , J., dissents.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Melo, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., join Justice Padilla's dissenting opinion.