February 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 154798 : February 12, 2007] CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., AND/OR A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, PETITIONERS VS. DEO P. NATIVIDAD, RESPONDENT. :
[G.R. No. 154798 : February 12, 2007]
CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., AND/OR A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, PETITIONERS VS. DEO P. NATIVIDAD, RESPONDENT.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Special First Division of this Court dated February 12, 2007.
G.R. 154798 - (CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., and/or A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, petitioners versus DEO P. NATIVIDAD, respondent)
In this Motion for Reconsideration,[1] petitioner Crystal Shipping, Inc. and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen seek a reversal of this Court's Decision[2] dated October 20, 2005 which affirmed the resolutions dated July 2, 2002, and August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals. Said resolutions affirmed the resolution dated April 9, 2002 of the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 23333-2000 which ordered petitioners to pay respondent US$60,000.00 representing total disability benefits.
Petitioners contend that the Court committed serious and grave errors since:
Respondent's claims for disability benefits are governed by the POEA Contract and not the labor Code.
Since the company-designated doctors [have] assessed respondent's disability to be Grade 9, respondent is only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to [G]rade 9, pursuant to the POEA Contract.
The Court of Appeals and the Honorable Court have rendered nugatory the explicit provisions of the POEA Contract providing for the assessment of the [c]ompany-designated [physician] as determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.[3]
We note that the parties have executed, on January 12, 2006, a Compromise Agreement[4] whereby petitioners paid respondent the amount of US$63,000 or P3,294,900, as full satisfaction of our decision dated October 20, 2005. With that, the matter should have been laid to rest. Nevertheless, we shall take time to explain the issues raised in this Motion if only to clear any lingering doubt on the matter.
Concerning the first ground, petitioners argue that the Court erred in defining permanent disability as inability to work for mote than 120 days based on decisions applying the provisions of the Labor Code. Petitioners add that such provisions apply only to disability benefit claims under the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System. Petitioners further contend that there was no provision in the POEA Contact providing that disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days shall be deemed total and permanent.
Petitioners misread our decision, which we quote in part:
It is clear from the foregoing that any item in the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and illness contracted classified under Grade 1 necessarily constitutes total and permanent disability.
Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 does not measure disability in terms of number of days but by gradings only. Since respondent's physician classified his disability as Grade 1, the same was necessarily total and permanent regardless of the number of days he was disabled.
However, if only to bolster respondent physician's grading and its concomitant classification as total and permanent disability, this Court noted that responden's inability to work lasted from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, or for more than 120 days. Even without this observation though, we would have reached the same conclusion since respondent's physician classified his disability as Grade 1[6] while the company-designated physicians declared him "disabled permanently."[7] More importantly, these findings were fully supported by the Labor Arbiter [8] and the NLRC[9] which both concluded that respondent's disability was total and permanent.
The second and third grounds are interrelated and we shall discuss them jointly. Petitioners aver that since the company-designated physicians had assessed respondent's disability as Grade 9, respondent was only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to Grade 9 pursuant to the POEA Contract. Petitioners also contend that by relying on the classification made by respondent's physician, this Court rendered nugatory the explicit provisions of the POEA Contract providing that assessments made by company-designated physicians are determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.
These arguments had already been passed upon and found to be without merit by the NLRC. In its Resolution[10] dated April 9, 2002, the NLRC declared that medical certificates issued by company-designated physicians are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of the company who sought their services and therefore should not be given evidentiary weight and value.
This pronouncement finds significance when viewed in the light of the company-designated physician's conclusion that respondent could no longer go back to sea-duty and hence, was disabled permanently. Yet, such company-designated physician and the two others who subsequently examined respondent gave the latter a partial impediment Grade 9 classification. In effect, they declared respondent's disability as partial and permanent.
As borne out by the records, respondent became unfit for sea-duty due to his need for regular check-up and treatment which would otherwise be unavailable if he were at sea. More specifically, respondent was unable to work as chief mate for almost three years. As we have said, permanent total disability is the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.[11]
Having said that, the findings of respondent's physician was more attuned to respondent's actual physical state which led not only this Court but also the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to conclude that the findings of the company-designated physicians could not be given evidentiary weight and value.
As a final note, we reiterate that the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seaman in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.[12]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration is hereby DENIED with definite finality. No further pleadings will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. 154798 - (CRYSTAL SHIPPING, INC., and/or A/S STEIN LINE BERGEN, petitioners versus DEO P. NATIVIDAD, respondent)
In this Motion for Reconsideration,[1] petitioner Crystal Shipping, Inc. and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen seek a reversal of this Court's Decision[2] dated October 20, 2005 which affirmed the resolutions dated July 2, 2002, and August 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals. Said resolutions affirmed the resolution dated April 9, 2002 of the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 23333-2000 which ordered petitioners to pay respondent US$60,000.00 representing total disability benefits.
Petitioners contend that the Court committed serious and grave errors since:
I.
Respondent's claims for disability benefits are governed by the POEA Contract and not the labor Code.
II.
Since the company-designated doctors [have] assessed respondent's disability to be Grade 9, respondent is only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to [G]rade 9, pursuant to the POEA Contract.
III.
The Court of Appeals and the Honorable Court have rendered nugatory the explicit provisions of the POEA Contract providing for the assessment of the [c]ompany-designated [physician] as determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.[3]
We note that the parties have executed, on January 12, 2006, a Compromise Agreement[4] whereby petitioners paid respondent the amount of US$63,000 or P3,294,900, as full satisfaction of our decision dated October 20, 2005. With that, the matter should have been laid to rest. Nevertheless, we shall take time to explain the issues raised in this Motion if only to clear any lingering doubt on the matter.
Concerning the first ground, petitioners argue that the Court erred in defining permanent disability as inability to work for mote than 120 days based on decisions applying the provisions of the Labor Code. Petitioners add that such provisions apply only to disability benefit claims under the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System. Petitioners further contend that there was no provision in the POEA Contact providing that disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days shall be deemed total and permanent.
Petitioners misread our decision, which we quote in part:
In resolving the merits of the case, we find pertinent Section 30 of the POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996, which provides the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered ad illness contracted. The particular illness of the respondent is not within those enumerated. But, the same provision supplies us with the guideline that any item in the schedule classified under grade 1 constitutes total and permanent disability.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or mote than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. As gleaned from the records, respondent was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or mote than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was permanent.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
Although the company-designated doctors and respondent's physician differ in their assessments of the degree of respondent's disability, both found that respondent was unfit for sea-duty due to respondent's need for regular medical check-ups and treatment which would not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that respondent's disability was total.[5] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that any item in the schedule of disability or impediment for injuries suffered and illness contracted classified under Grade 1 necessarily constitutes total and permanent disability.
Admittedly, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 does not measure disability in terms of number of days but by gradings only. Since respondent's physician classified his disability as Grade 1, the same was necessarily total and permanent regardless of the number of days he was disabled.
However, if only to bolster respondent physician's grading and its concomitant classification as total and permanent disability, this Court noted that responden's inability to work lasted from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, or for more than 120 days. Even without this observation though, we would have reached the same conclusion since respondent's physician classified his disability as Grade 1[6] while the company-designated physicians declared him "disabled permanently."[7] More importantly, these findings were fully supported by the Labor Arbiter [8] and the NLRC[9] which both concluded that respondent's disability was total and permanent.
The second and third grounds are interrelated and we shall discuss them jointly. Petitioners aver that since the company-designated physicians had assessed respondent's disability as Grade 9, respondent was only entitled to disability benefits equivalent to Grade 9 pursuant to the POEA Contract. Petitioners also contend that by relying on the classification made by respondent's physician, this Court rendered nugatory the explicit provisions of the POEA Contract providing that assessments made by company-designated physicians are determinative of the disability and the various disability gradings thereunder.
These arguments had already been passed upon and found to be without merit by the NLRC. In its Resolution[10] dated April 9, 2002, the NLRC declared that medical certificates issued by company-designated physicians are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of the company who sought their services and therefore should not be given evidentiary weight and value.
This pronouncement finds significance when viewed in the light of the company-designated physician's conclusion that respondent could no longer go back to sea-duty and hence, was disabled permanently. Yet, such company-designated physician and the two others who subsequently examined respondent gave the latter a partial impediment Grade 9 classification. In effect, they declared respondent's disability as partial and permanent.
As borne out by the records, respondent became unfit for sea-duty due to his need for regular check-up and treatment which would otherwise be unavailable if he were at sea. More specifically, respondent was unable to work as chief mate for almost three years. As we have said, permanent total disability is the disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.[11]
Having said that, the findings of respondent's physician was more attuned to respondent's actual physical state which led not only this Court but also the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to conclude that the findings of the company-designated physicians could not be given evidentiary weight and value.
As a final note, we reiterate that the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seaman in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.[12]
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration is hereby DENIED with definite finality. No further pleadings will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
ENRIQUETA ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Assistant Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA
Assistant Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, pp. 280-293.
[2] Id. at 270-279.
[3] Id. at 281-282.
[4] Id. at 299.
[5] Id. at 277-278.
[6] Id. at 50.
[7] Id. at 70.
[8] Id. at 90.
[9] Id. at 139.
[10] Id. at 138-140.
[11] Id. at 277.
[12] Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123891, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 47, 54.
