August 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009] IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. NO.179120 :
[A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009]
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. NO.179120
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 11, 2009
"A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC (In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120)
RESOLUTION
Law and justice are no brooding omnipresence in the sky, for they are encountered in no other way than in human form, particularly through the officers of the court. The image of the court is inescapably etched in the conduct and actuations of those who compose it and who, in turn, are judged according to the public perception of accountability, responsibility and morality. Thus, to court officials, theirs is the unqualified and invariable duty to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of official functions in order to preserve the good name and standing of the Judiciary in the community.
For consideration is the Motion to Set Aside Decision dated April 15, 2009 of retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes by way of compliance and motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Court dated February 24, 2009 directing him to show cause within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the said Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated February 24, 2009 reads:
Justice Reyes seeks to set aside and annul the Decision dated February 24; 2009, insofar as it pertains to him, on the following grounds:
The Court finds the explanation to the show cause directive as unsatisfactory, and the Motion to Set Aside Decision, treated as motion for reconsideration, is denied with finality for lack of merit.
First. Preliminarily. Justice Reyes claims that the Decision dated February 24, 2009 should be set aside and struck down as a nullity for being violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandating that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, and the following provisions of the law, to wit: Rules of Court (Section 1, Rule 36; Section 5, Rule 51; and Section 1, Rule 120), statute (Section 40, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980]), and Supreme Court circular (paragraph 5.3 of Administrative Circular No.1 dated January 28, 1988) for the following reasons � the Decision partakes of a "memorandum decision" (decision by adoption or incorporation) which is allowed only where the facts are uncontroverted and easily determined or in simple litigations; the Decision contains no clear, distinct explanation or citation of authority pertaining to a Supreme Court Justice in a similar situation as to why he is fined half a million pesos and disqualified to hold any office or employment in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This argument is flawed. Paragraph 5.3 of Administrative Circular No. 1 states that judges should make complete findings of fact in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,[2] the Court explained that the constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, does not preclude the validity of a "memorandum decision" that adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It has sanctioned the use of "memorandum decision," a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg.129. as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience, and docket status of our courts.
In the present case, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, entitled Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, was able to obtain a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia, which prompted the Court in its Resolution dated December 10, 2008, to direct the creation of an Investigating Committee that would investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, Paras v. Nograles, and Villando v. COMELEC, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41, respectively, to determine who were responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal document of the en banc. The Investigating Committee, composed of the incumbent Honorable Justices of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson and Mme. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members, made the following findings and recommendations:
EVALUATION
The Investigating Committee, after evaluating the testimonies of the 18 witnesses or resource persons,[4] had thoroughly set forth in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that Justice Reyes was the one who caused the leakage of his own unpromulgated ponencia. Consequently, it recommended that he be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating his oath as a member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility and be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension as a member of the Bar; and that he be also found liable for grave misconduct for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and be fined in the amount of P500.000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits. Akin to adopting the "memorandum decision" or incorporating by reference a decision of a lower court or tribunal, the Court incorporated (he Report of the Investigating Committee to form part of its Decision for purposes of expediency and easy perusal of the public, so as to transparently bring to fore what actually transpired in the proceedings and to make the same of record.
Second. Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment. Since removal from office is a disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that there is no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for acts done during his incumbency. Considering that the power to impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, the Court is without authority to proceed against and discipline its former Member. He added that what constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage is not one of the impeachable offenses.
This postulate is misplaced. In Bar Matter No. 979 - In re 1999 Bar Examinations, Justice Fidel P. Purisima, then an incumbent Justice and Chairperson of the 1999 Bar Examinations, was censured by the Court en banc[5] in a Resolution dated March 22, 2000,[6] for failure to disclose that his nephew, the son of his eldest brother, was one of the examinees. Accordingly, the Court declared the forfeiture of 50% of the fees due him as Bar Chairperson. The disciplinary sanction was imposed upon him in the discharge of his duties as a Justice of the Court, albeit not pertaining to the strictly judicial function of adjudicating cases, in order to safeguard and ensure the integrity of the Bar Examinations which is a matter relating to the Court. With more reason should a Justice be sanctioned if he is remiss in his duties in the discharge of his adjudicatory functions, and is already retired from the service.
When Justice Reyes corapulsorily retired upon reaching the mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties and responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and, consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The fact that the Investigating Committee, created per Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the investigation during the incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no moment, as he was then not yet a respondent in an administrative matter against him. He was one of the 18 resource persons or witnesses invited to testify on the leakage oi his own unpromulgated ponencia. During the investigation proper, the purpose of the Committee was to ferret out the truth, evaluate the testimonies of the 18 witnesses and, thereafter, submit a Report with recommendation as to the appropriate disciplinary measures to be taken against those whose liability was sufficiently established. It was only after the termination of the investigation, when Justice Reyes ceased to be a magistrate, that the Committee was able to finally determine the extent of his culpability. Thus, the Court, in its Decision dated February 24, 2009, finding the Report of the Committee to be well taken, adopted with modification its recommendations, among others, of imposing upon Justice Reyes the fine of P500,000.00 for grave misconduct for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court, and indefinite suspension as a member of the Bar for gross misconduct for violating his lawyer's oath and Code of Professional Responsibility. A fortiori, the administrative sanctions imposed upon Justice Reyes were in order.
Third Justice Reyes contends that the penalties of removal from office or, in this case, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed in lieu of removal as he compulsorily retired during the pendency of the investigation, and disqualification from holding any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, pertain only to an impeachment proceeding.
This contention has no merit. Justice Reyes retired on December 18, 2008, although he would actually be 70 years old on January 3, 2009. Not infrequently has this Court encountered administrative cases wherein the respondent judge subsequently retired from the service upon reaching the mandatory age of 70 years pending the resolution thereof. In those cases, the Court would merely order that a portion of his retirement benefits be set aside to answer for the amount corresponding to the fine.
In In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging CA Associate Justice Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspecred Drug Queen: Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent,[7] Justice Demetria interceded on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, by requesting the State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, who was handling the case, to withdraw his motion seeking the inhibition of Judge Manuel T. Muio, therein Presiding Judge to whom the case was assigned. Justice Demetria was found guilty of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct [8] and ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned or controlled corporation.
Therefore, the imposition of the sanction of disqualification to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations is concomitant with the finding that Justice Reyes was guilty of the administrative offense he was being charged with.
Fourth, Justice Reyes avers that the Decision dated February 24, 2009 is void as he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process. He reiterates that as a Justice of this Court, he can only be removed through impeachment proceedings and, therefore, is beyond the administrative disciplinary authority of this Court. He assails the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur against him, declaring that the same pertains only to Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals; and to Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other inferior courts.
To the contrary, Justice Reyes was given ample opportunity to present his side. Together with the other Justices and the Court officials and employees, he testified before the Investigating Committee as a witness or resource person to determine the truth and the possible liability of the witnesses, if any. All gave statements to shed light as to the proper procedure undertaken from the inception of the draft decision of a case until its official promulgation, every step of the way. It left no stone unturned considering the gravity of the charge and the perceived negative image of the Judiciary generated by the issue. The Investigating Committee functioned like a task force or a fact-finding commission in charge of collating evidence and, thereafter, made an independent evaluation.
Moreover, Justice Reyes has been accorded ample chance to fortify his arguments. In compliance with the Court's Decision dated February 24, 2009 regarding the show-cause directive as to why he should not be disciplinary dealt with as a lawyer, Justice Reyes first filed, on March 2, 2009, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time for a period of 30 days, or until March 31, 2009, within which to file the appropriate motion or pleading. In the Resolution of March 3, 2009, the Court granted the extension until March 23, 2009 with a warning that no further extension would be given. On March 10, 2009, the Court noted his payment of the Court fine in the amount of P500,000.00. On March 16, 2009, he filed a Second Urgent Motion for Extension of Time until April 15, 2009 within which to file the appropriate pleading or motion. The Court's Resolution of March 17, 2009 granted the motion, but stated that the said extension would definitely be the last extension to be given. It was only on April 15, 2009 when he filed a Motion to Set Aside Decision with Motion for Time (for a period of 30 days) within which to File Supplement and Memorandum. Said third motion for extension of time was denied per Resolution of April 21, 2009. Clearly, it cannot be said that Justice Reyes was denied due process as he was given the fair chance to articulate his defense and be heard through the pleadings that he had filed.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.[9] When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[10] In the present case, the Court correctly applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur against Justice Reyes who clearly violated the rule on confidential information. The Report of the Investigating Committee pertinently states that:
In Poso v. Mijares,[13] therein complainant Oscar M. Poso filed an administrative complaint[14] against therein respondent Judge Jose H. Mijares in connection with a criminal case for murder wherein two versions of the subject Resolution of January 10, 1996 circulated. The Court found the defense of Judge Mijares, that the copy sent to Poso was a mere draft version while his copy was the official one, to be incredible. What was clear from the findings was that Judge Mijares, as an afterthought, modified the maximum range of the penalty to be imposed by deleting the phrase "and one (1) day of prision mayor" and replaced it with "of prision correctional," obviously to enable therein accused to qualify for probation. The questioned actuations of Judge Mijares and the attendant circumstances brooked no explanation consistent with good faith or lack of malice and had to be counted as constitutive of serious misconduct. Accordingly, Judge Mijares was dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of ail his retirement benefits, except the value of his earned leave credits which he was to be paid in full. The Court explained that proceeding from Judge Mijares' theory that the copy sent to Poso was a draft version, still, the ineptitude and incompetence of Judge Mijares and his sloven management of court records were, to say the least, deplorable. Poso's possession of the supposed draft version, which amounted to the premature publication of a distinct version of the said Resolution, had no doubt compromised the sanctity and confidentiality of the judgment process, to the detriment of every effort to promote trust and confidence in the decisions of judges. The error of Judge Mijares, more accurately his misconduct, veritably flouted Rule 3.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prohibiting judges from making public comments on any pending or impending case, when he allowed the public, i.e., therein complainant Poso, access to a draft version of his January 10, 1996 Resolution. Further, the Court held that as administrators of courts, judges should adopt a fail-safe system of confidential records management which is ever ready to fend off the unhampered scavenging of a judge's ideas and assessments from the glare and gore of publicity and pressure by interested parties. Not least of all, this mechanism is essential to protect the independence of decision-making by those tasked to exercise judicial power. The indiscriminate availability oi: even a draft resolution indicates no less than gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Judge Mijares and a violation of Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directing judges to perform administrative responsibilities diligently and to maintain professional competence assiduously in court management.
The Court is iron-clad in enforcing the rule on strict confidentiality of Resolutions and Decisions which are yet to be promulgated. Applying this ruling to the present case, Justice Reyes was indeed liable for grave misconduct as he willfully caused the premature leakage of his own decision prior to its official promulgation. He violated the cardinal rule of utmost confidentiality and miserably failed to live up to his stature as a magistrate. Horse trading or any unauthorized disclosure of internal deliberations during Court sessions, or premature information about decisions on cases that are yet to be promulgated officially, are anathema to the preservation of the integrity of the Court as the last bastion of justice. Definitely, the Court will not allow this isolated case to create a dent in its dignified and honorable administration of justice.
Fifth. Justice Reyes maintains that the rule on automatic conversion of administrative cases into disciplinary proceedings for suspension or disbarment under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, effective October 1, 2002, does not apply to Justices of this Court. He points out that the same pertains only to Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; and to Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and the other inferior courts.
This interpretation is erroneous. The source of authority of the Code of Professional Responsibility and its implementation lies with the Court, and included therein is its primordial duty to regulate the practice of law. We cannot disassociate the qualifications of a lawyer from those of a Justice. Although Justice Reyes has already retired from the Court, he is still a member of the Bar and, therefore, can be subjected to the disciplinary sanctions of the Court under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution. In expounding this further, the Report oi: the Investigating Committee recommended that Justice Reyes be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct on the basis of the following findings:
The matter is expounded in Heck v. Santos[17] where therein respondent Judge was found guilty of notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission, an act committed more than 20 years ago, and was fined P5,000.00. The Court amplified that A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC shall apply to administrative cases already filed, where the respondent has not yet been required to comment on the complaint; and that the same also applies to a judge who has retired from the Judiciary. The ruling states:
For his deliberate violations of the lawyer's oath,[18] Rule 1.01[19] and Rule 1.02 [20] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith in leaking his own unpromulgated ponencia, eight (8) Members of the Court voted that Justice Reyes' Motion to Set Aside the Decision dated February 24, 2009 be denied, and the stiff penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law be imposed upon him.
One (1) Member of the Court submitted a dissenting opinion which is hereby quoted as follows:
x x x x
The vote is to grant the Motion to Set Aside Decision of Justice Reyes; in the alternative, if the decision is permissible, the penalty of indefinite suspension is too harsh as it is already akin to disbarment and instead, opted for a suspension of five (5) years from the practice of law.
Three (3) other Justices of the Court agreed with the opinion of the majority that Justice Reyes' Motion to Set Aside Decision should be denied; however, they voted that the suspension of Justice Reyes be limited to five (5) years as the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law is deemed too harsh.
* Two (2) Justices of the Court took no part in the deliberations while two (2) Justices are on official leave, but one left the vote with the Chief Justice.
Justice Reyes seeks the kind benevolence of the Court, but the Court is not unmindful that even the grant of compassion itself must have an objective basis. The reprehensible misconduct Justice Reyes exhibited far outweighs what the grant of compassion might reasonably dispense in his favor under the circumstances. It is truly saddening that the Court, on this very rare occasion, is constrained to impose administrative sanctions upon a colleague who has risen from the ranks and devoted the best thirty-five years of his life to service in the government. But in so doing, we are well-minded of the seriousness and gravity of his misconduct, as well as of the basic need to prevent a possible recurrence of the same, to deter those in whose hands the dispensation of justice rests from engaging in the same or similar misdemeanor and, notably, to protect the entire mantle of judicial administration from unwarranted criticism and from being dragged into the quagmire of disrepute.
Indeed, imperative and sacred is the duty of those charged with the administration of justice to maintain the court's good name and standing as a temple of justice and rule of law. Hence, a conduct, act or omission that is repugnant to the norm of public accountability or, at least, tends to diminish the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary, must invariably be met not only with the appropriate sanction imposed by law, but also with the inevitable scorn that comes with it.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the explanation of Justice Ruben T. Reyes to the show cause directive as UNSATISFACTORY, and his Motion to Set Aside Decision, treated as motion for reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated February 24, 2009, is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Justice Reyes is found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law is imposed upon him.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Justice Reyes as a lawyer; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all couits in the countiy for their information and guidance.
This Resolution shall be immediately executory."
* Quisumbing and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official leave, but one left the vote with the Chief Justice. Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., no part.
"A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC (In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120)
RESOLUTION
Law and justice are no brooding omnipresence in the sky, for they are encountered in no other way than in human form, particularly through the officers of the court. The image of the court is inescapably etched in the conduct and actuations of those who compose it and who, in turn, are judged according to the public perception of accountability, responsibility and morality. Thus, to court officials, theirs is the unqualified and invariable duty to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of official functions in order to preserve the good name and standing of the Judiciary in the community.
For consideration is the Motion to Set Aside Decision dated April 15, 2009 of retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes by way of compliance and motion for reconsideration of the Decision of this Court dated February 24, 2009 directing him to show cause within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the said Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated February 24, 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and APPROVES WITH MODIFICATION the Recommendations of the Investigating Committee as follows:
1. Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings.
2. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Justice Reyes seeks to set aside and annul the Decision dated February 24; 2009, insofar as it pertains to him, on the following grounds:
I. THE DECISION IS VOID BECAUSE THE SUPREME COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO DISCIPLINE ITS OWN MEMBER FOR ACTS COMMITTED DURING HIS TENURE.A. Supreme Court Justices are impeachable officers.
B. Determination as to whether act committed is impeachable is a political question.
C. Power of the Supreme Court to discipline is limited to judges and justices of lower courts.
D. Penalties of removal from office and disqualification from holding any public office is the sole office of an impeachment proceeding.
E. Impeachment is still the mode of disciplining an impeachable officer despite resignation or retirement.
II. THE DECISION IS VOID BECAUSE MOVANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUB PROCESS WAS VIOLATED.A. Rule on Res Ipsa Loquitor inapplicable.
B. Decision rendered in violation of a person's right to due process is void.
III. THERE ARE NO LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES TO DISCIPLINE MOVANT AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR.A. Rule on automatic conversion of administrative cases as disciplinary proceedings for suspension or disbarment does not apply to Supreme Court Justices.
The Court finds the explanation to the show cause directive as unsatisfactory, and the Motion to Set Aside Decision, treated as motion for reconsideration, is denied with finality for lack of merit.
First. Preliminarily. Justice Reyes claims that the Decision dated February 24, 2009 should be set aside and struck down as a nullity for being violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution mandating that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based, and the following provisions of the law, to wit: Rules of Court (Section 1, Rule 36; Section 5, Rule 51; and Section 1, Rule 120), statute (Section 40, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980]), and Supreme Court circular (paragraph 5.3 of Administrative Circular No.1 dated January 28, 1988) for the following reasons � the Decision partakes of a "memorandum decision" (decision by adoption or incorporation) which is allowed only where the facts are uncontroverted and easily determined or in simple litigations; the Decision contains no clear, distinct explanation or citation of authority pertaining to a Supreme Court Justice in a similar situation as to why he is fined half a million pesos and disqualified to hold any office or employment in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This argument is flawed. Paragraph 5.3 of Administrative Circular No. 1 states that judges should make complete findings of fact in their decision, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna,[2] the Court explained that the constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, does not preclude the validity of a "memorandum decision" that adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It has sanctioned the use of "memorandum decision," a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Blg.129. as amended, on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience, and docket status of our courts.
In the present case, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, entitled Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, was able to obtain a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia, which prompted the Court in its Resolution dated December 10, 2008, to direct the creation of an Investigating Committee that would investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, Paras v. Nograles, and Villando v. COMELEC, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41, respectively, to determine who were responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal document of the en banc. The Investigating Committee, composed of the incumbent Honorable Justices of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson and Mme. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members, made the following findings and recommendations:
EVALUATION
The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert copy occurred between July 15, 2008, before it was brought to the OCJ or after it was retrieved on July 16, 2008 from the OCJ, and July 25, 2008. when the Office of Justice Reyes caused the preparation of the new cover page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that it was agendaed as Item No. 06 in the July 29. 2008 En Banc session, because the cover page of the photocopy in the possession of Biraogo, as well as the cover page of Justice Reyes's new copy, still bore the agenda date "July 15, 2008" and Item No. 52.
The committee likewise finds that the leakage was intentionally done. It was not the result of a copy being misplaced and inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or someone in his behalf. The committee notes that none of the offices to which the Gilbert copy was brought (OCJ and the Office of Justice Nachura) and which acquired control over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert form and released photocopies thereof to party litigants. In any event, as earlier reflected, page 1 of the Gilbert copy that was sent to the OCJ and Justice Nachura's Office and page 1 of Biraogo's photocopy differ.
To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was photocopied and that a copy thereof was intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As will be discussed below, the committee FINDS that the leak came from the Office of Justice Reyes.
It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the OCJ even if the Gilbert copy stayed therein from 3:30 p.m. on July 15, 2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2008. This is clear from the fact that page 1 of the copy in Biraogo's possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert copy which was forwarded to the OCJ. Thus, on page 1 of the Gilbert copy which contains the names of the Justices of the Court, there appear asterisks after the names of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna and Justice Dante O. Tinga. These asterisks have corresponding footnotes staling that Justice Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order No. 510 dated July 15, 2008 and Justice Tinga was likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated July 16. 2008. In contrast, page 1 of Biraogo's copy and Justice Reyes's new copy, glaringly contain no such asterisks and footnotes, which indicate that page 1 of Biraogo's copy was photocopied from page 1 of the draft prepared by Justice Reyes before it was finalized on Gilbert paper.
The leak also could not have come from the offices of the other Associate Justices, contrary to Justice Reyes's insinuation. Justice Reyes insinuated that because all the Justices were furnished with advance copies of the draft ponencia before the session of July 15, 2008, anyone from those offices could have leaked the decision. An examination of the copy in Biraogo's possession readily shows that every page thereof- pages 1 to 36 - contained Justice Reyes's authenticating initials while none of the advance copies furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated.
Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a working basis for deliberations are not initialed by the justice who prepares it. And they do not contain the signature of any of the Justices, except the one who prepared the draft, precisely because the Justices have yet to go over it and deliberate on it. As standard procedure, it is only after a draft decision has been adopted by the Court that it is finalized-printed on Gilbert paper and every page thereof is authenticated by the ponente, and circulated for signature by the other Justices.
It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity for anyone from the offices of the Associate Justices to photocopy the ponencia as none of said offices acquired possession of the document, except the Office of Justice Reyes and the Office of Justice Nachura. But based on testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia stayed in the Office of Justice Nachura only for less than five minutes, which did not suffice for it to be signed by Justice Nachura and to be photocopied. Again, and in any event, page 1 of the photocopy in Biraogo's possession does not match the same page of the Gilbert copy.
Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate Justices took hold of the Gilbert copy only briefly when they signed it at the En Banc conference room. At no other time did any of them hold the document long enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to standard procedure, only the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and his staff, took custody of the ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices before it was sent to the OCJ.
But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the unpromulgated ponencia? While the evidence shows that the chain of custody could not rule out the possibility that the Gilbert copy was photocopied by Del Rosario who had control and possession of it, and while there is no direct evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator of the leakage, the committee FINDS that based on the circumstantial evidence reflected above, particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a draft ponencia of the case soonest even before the memoranda of all the parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation of the poneucia was put on hold and, instead, allow the immediate promulgation after lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was arrived at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof.
x x x x
To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and circumstances constitute more than substantial evidence which reasonably points to Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence, as THE source of the leak. He must, therefore, be held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
x x x x
RECOMMENDATIONS
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating Committee respectfully recommends that:
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his oath as a member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar;
(2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and be FINED in the amount of P500,000, to be charged against his retirement benefits; and
(3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario be held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and be FINED in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[3]
The Investigating Committee, after evaluating the testimonies of the 18 witnesses or resource persons,[4] had thoroughly set forth in its findings of fact and conclusions of law that Justice Reyes was the one who caused the leakage of his own unpromulgated ponencia. Consequently, it recommended that he be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating his oath as a member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility and be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension as a member of the Bar; and that he be also found liable for grave misconduct for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and be fined in the amount of P500.000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits. Akin to adopting the "memorandum decision" or incorporating by reference a decision of a lower court or tribunal, the Court incorporated (he Report of the Investigating Committee to form part of its Decision for purposes of expediency and easy perusal of the public, so as to transparently bring to fore what actually transpired in the proceedings and to make the same of record.
Second. Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment. Since removal from office is a disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that there is no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for acts done during his incumbency. Considering that the power to impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, the Court is without authority to proceed against and discipline its former Member. He added that what constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage is not one of the impeachable offenses.
This postulate is misplaced. In Bar Matter No. 979 - In re 1999 Bar Examinations, Justice Fidel P. Purisima, then an incumbent Justice and Chairperson of the 1999 Bar Examinations, was censured by the Court en banc[5] in a Resolution dated March 22, 2000,[6] for failure to disclose that his nephew, the son of his eldest brother, was one of the examinees. Accordingly, the Court declared the forfeiture of 50% of the fees due him as Bar Chairperson. The disciplinary sanction was imposed upon him in the discharge of his duties as a Justice of the Court, albeit not pertaining to the strictly judicial function of adjudicating cases, in order to safeguard and ensure the integrity of the Bar Examinations which is a matter relating to the Court. With more reason should a Justice be sanctioned if he is remiss in his duties in the discharge of his adjudicatory functions, and is already retired from the service.
When Justice Reyes corapulsorily retired upon reaching the mandatory age of 70, his perceived mantle of protection and immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done only through impeachment, no longer exists. His duties and responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and, consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The fact that the Investigating Committee, created per Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the investigation during the incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no moment, as he was then not yet a respondent in an administrative matter against him. He was one of the 18 resource persons or witnesses invited to testify on the leakage oi his own unpromulgated ponencia. During the investigation proper, the purpose of the Committee was to ferret out the truth, evaluate the testimonies of the 18 witnesses and, thereafter, submit a Report with recommendation as to the appropriate disciplinary measures to be taken against those whose liability was sufficiently established. It was only after the termination of the investigation, when Justice Reyes ceased to be a magistrate, that the Committee was able to finally determine the extent of his culpability. Thus, the Court, in its Decision dated February 24, 2009, finding the Report of the Committee to be well taken, adopted with modification its recommendations, among others, of imposing upon Justice Reyes the fine of P500,000.00 for grave misconduct for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court, and indefinite suspension as a member of the Bar for gross misconduct for violating his lawyer's oath and Code of Professional Responsibility. A fortiori, the administrative sanctions imposed upon Justice Reyes were in order.
Third Justice Reyes contends that the penalties of removal from office or, in this case, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed in lieu of removal as he compulsorily retired during the pendency of the investigation, and disqualification from holding any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, pertain only to an impeachment proceeding.
This contention has no merit. Justice Reyes retired on December 18, 2008, although he would actually be 70 years old on January 3, 2009. Not infrequently has this Court encountered administrative cases wherein the respondent judge subsequently retired from the service upon reaching the mandatory age of 70 years pending the resolution thereof. In those cases, the Court would merely order that a portion of his retirement benefits be set aside to answer for the amount corresponding to the fine.
In In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging CA Associate Justice Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspecred Drug Queen: Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, respondent,[7] Justice Demetria interceded on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, by requesting the State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, who was handling the case, to withdraw his motion seeking the inhibition of Judge Manuel T. Muio, therein Presiding Judge to whom the case was assigned. Justice Demetria was found guilty of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct [8] and ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned or controlled corporation.
Therefore, the imposition of the sanction of disqualification to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations is concomitant with the finding that Justice Reyes was guilty of the administrative offense he was being charged with.
Fourth, Justice Reyes avers that the Decision dated February 24, 2009 is void as he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process. He reiterates that as a Justice of this Court, he can only be removed through impeachment proceedings and, therefore, is beyond the administrative disciplinary authority of this Court. He assails the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur against him, declaring that the same pertains only to Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals; and to Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and other inferior courts.
To the contrary, Justice Reyes was given ample opportunity to present his side. Together with the other Justices and the Court officials and employees, he testified before the Investigating Committee as a witness or resource person to determine the truth and the possible liability of the witnesses, if any. All gave statements to shed light as to the proper procedure undertaken from the inception of the draft decision of a case until its official promulgation, every step of the way. It left no stone unturned considering the gravity of the charge and the perceived negative image of the Judiciary generated by the issue. The Investigating Committee functioned like a task force or a fact-finding commission in charge of collating evidence and, thereafter, made an independent evaluation.
Moreover, Justice Reyes has been accorded ample chance to fortify his arguments. In compliance with the Court's Decision dated February 24, 2009 regarding the show-cause directive as to why he should not be disciplinary dealt with as a lawyer, Justice Reyes first filed, on March 2, 2009, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time for a period of 30 days, or until March 31, 2009, within which to file the appropriate motion or pleading. In the Resolution of March 3, 2009, the Court granted the extension until March 23, 2009 with a warning that no further extension would be given. On March 10, 2009, the Court noted his payment of the Court fine in the amount of P500,000.00. On March 16, 2009, he filed a Second Urgent Motion for Extension of Time until April 15, 2009 within which to file the appropriate pleading or motion. The Court's Resolution of March 17, 2009 granted the motion, but stated that the said extension would definitely be the last extension to be given. It was only on April 15, 2009 when he filed a Motion to Set Aside Decision with Motion for Time (for a period of 30 days) within which to File Supplement and Memorandum. Said third motion for extension of time was denied per Resolution of April 21, 2009. Clearly, it cannot be said that Justice Reyes was denied due process as he was given the fair chance to articulate his defense and be heard through the pleadings that he had filed.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.[9] When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.[10] In the present case, the Court correctly applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur against Justice Reyes who clearly violated the rule on confidential information. The Report of the Investigating Committee pertinently states that:
The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the task of preserving the confidentiality and integrity of court records. A number of rules and internal procedures are in place to ensure the observance of this task by court personnel.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, entitled Adopting the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, April 27, 2004) provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential informal ion acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers.
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.
SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule or administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.
SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not disclose confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person.
SEC. 4. Former conn personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them during their employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by current court personnel of the same information would constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this provisions shall constitute indirect contempt of court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Ineluctably. any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. If is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr., the Court stated that "[c]ourt documents are confidential documents. They must not be taken out of the court without proper authority and without the necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and integrity." Thus, the Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct. Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross misconduct destroy the good image of the judiciary so the Court cannot countenance them nor allow the perpetrators to remain in office. This same pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen v. Masangcay. Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court, it is but logical that a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza, in fact, commands persons who routinely handle confidential matters to be confidential employees. They are thus expected to be more careful than an ordinary employee in their day to day business. They are reposed such trust and confidence that a breach of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty amounts to breach of public (rust as the committee believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest.[12]
In Poso v. Mijares,[13] therein complainant Oscar M. Poso filed an administrative complaint[14] against therein respondent Judge Jose H. Mijares in connection with a criminal case for murder wherein two versions of the subject Resolution of January 10, 1996 circulated. The Court found the defense of Judge Mijares, that the copy sent to Poso was a mere draft version while his copy was the official one, to be incredible. What was clear from the findings was that Judge Mijares, as an afterthought, modified the maximum range of the penalty to be imposed by deleting the phrase "and one (1) day of prision mayor" and replaced it with "of prision correctional," obviously to enable therein accused to qualify for probation. The questioned actuations of Judge Mijares and the attendant circumstances brooked no explanation consistent with good faith or lack of malice and had to be counted as constitutive of serious misconduct. Accordingly, Judge Mijares was dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of ail his retirement benefits, except the value of his earned leave credits which he was to be paid in full. The Court explained that proceeding from Judge Mijares' theory that the copy sent to Poso was a draft version, still, the ineptitude and incompetence of Judge Mijares and his sloven management of court records were, to say the least, deplorable. Poso's possession of the supposed draft version, which amounted to the premature publication of a distinct version of the said Resolution, had no doubt compromised the sanctity and confidentiality of the judgment process, to the detriment of every effort to promote trust and confidence in the decisions of judges. The error of Judge Mijares, more accurately his misconduct, veritably flouted Rule 3.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prohibiting judges from making public comments on any pending or impending case, when he allowed the public, i.e., therein complainant Poso, access to a draft version of his January 10, 1996 Resolution. Further, the Court held that as administrators of courts, judges should adopt a fail-safe system of confidential records management which is ever ready to fend off the unhampered scavenging of a judge's ideas and assessments from the glare and gore of publicity and pressure by interested parties. Not least of all, this mechanism is essential to protect the independence of decision-making by those tasked to exercise judicial power. The indiscriminate availability oi: even a draft resolution indicates no less than gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Judge Mijares and a violation of Rule 3.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directing judges to perform administrative responsibilities diligently and to maintain professional competence assiduously in court management.
The Court is iron-clad in enforcing the rule on strict confidentiality of Resolutions and Decisions which are yet to be promulgated. Applying this ruling to the present case, Justice Reyes was indeed liable for grave misconduct as he willfully caused the premature leakage of his own decision prior to its official promulgation. He violated the cardinal rule of utmost confidentiality and miserably failed to live up to his stature as a magistrate. Horse trading or any unauthorized disclosure of internal deliberations during Court sessions, or premature information about decisions on cases that are yet to be promulgated officially, are anathema to the preservation of the integrity of the Court as the last bastion of justice. Definitely, the Court will not allow this isolated case to create a dent in its dignified and honorable administration of justice.
Fifth. Justice Reyes maintains that the rule on automatic conversion of administrative cases into disciplinary proceedings for suspension or disbarment under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, effective October 1, 2002, does not apply to Justices of this Court. He points out that the same pertains only to Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; and to Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and the other inferior courts.
This interpretation is erroneous. The source of authority of the Code of Professional Responsibility and its implementation lies with the Court, and included therein is its primordial duty to regulate the practice of law. We cannot disassociate the qualifications of a lawyer from those of a Justice. Although Justice Reyes has already retired from the Court, he is still a member of the Bar and, therefore, can be subjected to the disciplinary sanctions of the Court under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution. In expounding this further, the Report oi: the Investigating Committee recommended that Justice Reyes be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct on the basis of the following findings:
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Bane, the committee likewise finds Justice Reyes administratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Section 27,[15] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was committed by no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment. The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations. Once the said impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency. Thus, in Ca�ada v. Suerte, this Court ordered the disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed during his incumbency as a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyes's infractions may have been, the Committee finds the imposition of llie supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the determination of the tmposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the Court takes into account the primary purpose oi disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to the Court's sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penally of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case, the Committee finds the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law sufficient and proper.[16]
The matter is expounded in Heck v. Santos[17] where therein respondent Judge was found guilty of notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission, an act committed more than 20 years ago, and was fined P5,000.00. The Court amplified that A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC shall apply to administrative cases already filed, where the respondent has not yet been required to comment on the complaint; and that the same also applies to a judge who has retired from the Judiciary. The ruling states:
On the applicability of
Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar lor violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
x x x x
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of me bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.
The Retirement Or Resignation
Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still
Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.
For his deliberate violations of the lawyer's oath,[18] Rule 1.01[19] and Rule 1.02 [20] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable bad faith in leaking his own unpromulgated ponencia, eight (8) Members of the Court voted that Justice Reyes' Motion to Set Aside the Decision dated February 24, 2009 be denied, and the stiff penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law be imposed upon him.
One (1) Member of the Court submitted a dissenting opinion which is hereby quoted as follows:
x x x x
The leaking of confidential matters related to the adjudication of cases is truly a regrettable event that must not be tolerated. The Court properly created an Investigating Committee to examine the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes. The Investigating Committee made a laudable effort to discover the truth. My only apprehension is that movant Justice Reyes was sanctioned on the basis of the recommendation of the Investigating Committee, without a formal administrative charge against him and without affording him the opportunity to specifically refute the imputations against him
The Majority opines that due process was afforded Justice Reyes as he was given ample opportunity to present his side when "he testified before the Investigating Committee as a witness or resource person in the quest to ferret out the truth." To this, I differ.
While the essence of clue process is simply an opportunity to be heard,[21] such is qualified to the end that the presentation of one's side should be for refilling (lie charges leveled against him or to present evidence to support his defense. This was not the case here. Clearly, the Investigating Committee was created solely to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal document of the en banc.[22] Hence, the committee was merely a fact-finding body. For this reason, Justice Reyes was called as a witness or resource person only; and not as a respondent lo a charge of a gross misconduct not imputed against him.
Evidently, Justice Reyes was not given prior notice apprising him of the particular acls or omissions for which the sanction against him was imposed and neither was he given the opportunity lo specifically preseni evidence to his defense. Without doubt, the right of Justice Reyes to due process was not met.
Moreover, the Majority holds that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva, clarifies that:The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of providing the facts on which the inference of evil is base. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.[23]
True, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been used by the Court to assert its disciplining authority over some of its officers. 1, however, submit that this doctrine is inapplicable in this case. Notably, the administrative cases[24] cited by the Majority opinion emanated from a complaint or a charge of misconduct and the respondents therein were directed to respond or comment to such charge. In Justice Reyes' case, after his testimony as a "resource person" was given before the Investigating Committee, the next thing he knew was that he was already found guilty of grave misconduct and sanctioned with a fine. In this light, there was no administrative complaint to speak of and no respondent to exonerate or sanction.
x x x x
If prior notice of a complaint and opportunity to comment on it is given to a judge or justice of Ihe CA and Sandiganbayan, with more reason that such twin rights be afforded to a justice of the Supreme Court. To stress, violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings renders any judgment or order issued therein null and void and can be attacked in any appropriate proceedings.[25] Thus, the Decision dated February 24, 2009 should be set aside and. accordingly, Justice Reyes should be formally charged and given opportunity to answer the charges and adduce evidence in his defense.
A point of clarification on memorandum decisions, xxx.
x x x x
As can be gleaned from Solid Homes, memorandum decisions can be used only in decisions of appellate courts and not to decisions rendered in an administrative complaint by a court or quasi-judicial tribunal at the first level. The reason is simple � there is no decision yet that can be adopted by the Court or tribunal at that level.
The case at bar is different. The Fact Finding Committee authorized to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes simply submitted a report to the Court but did not decide any complaint against him. It merely made the finding that Justice Reyes is the source of the leak of the draft decision in question and nothing else. As such there was no decision to be adopted by incorporation or reference as a memorandum decision by the Court. I submit therefore that the Decision dated February 24, 2009 is flawed and contrary to Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Lastly, the decision dated February 24, 2009 should not have made use of the form of memorandum decision since this is used only in simple cases.
x x x x.
The administrative matter involving the alleged unauthorized release of the draft ponencia of Justice Reyes is a very serious matter that warrants the rendition of a decision strictly in accordance with Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution and Sec. 1 of Rule 36. The use of a memorandum decision in this case does not do justice to Justice Reyes.
Granting arguendo that the memorandum decision dated February 24, 2009 is permissible, I find the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law too harsh as such is already akin to disbarment. At most, suspension of five years is sufficient penalty, especially considering that there is no hard evidence that Justice Reyes indeed leaked the draft decision to Biraogo.
I vote to GRANT the Motion to Set Aside Decision and nullify the February 24, 2009 Decision. Justice Reyes should be given the right to answer the charge of gross misconduct and adduce evidence in support of his defenses. The disbarment proceedings should be held in abeyance until a decision is rendered in the administrative complaint.
The vote is to grant the Motion to Set Aside Decision of Justice Reyes; in the alternative, if the decision is permissible, the penalty of indefinite suspension is too harsh as it is already akin to disbarment and instead, opted for a suspension of five (5) years from the practice of law.
Three (3) other Justices of the Court agreed with the opinion of the majority that Justice Reyes' Motion to Set Aside Decision should be denied; however, they voted that the suspension of Justice Reyes be limited to five (5) years as the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law is deemed too harsh.
* Two (2) Justices of the Court took no part in the deliberations while two (2) Justices are on official leave, but one left the vote with the Chief Justice.
Justice Reyes seeks the kind benevolence of the Court, but the Court is not unmindful that even the grant of compassion itself must have an objective basis. The reprehensible misconduct Justice Reyes exhibited far outweighs what the grant of compassion might reasonably dispense in his favor under the circumstances. It is truly saddening that the Court, on this very rare occasion, is constrained to impose administrative sanctions upon a colleague who has risen from the ranks and devoted the best thirty-five years of his life to service in the government. But in so doing, we are well-minded of the seriousness and gravity of his misconduct, as well as of the basic need to prevent a possible recurrence of the same, to deter those in whose hands the dispensation of justice rests from engaging in the same or similar misdemeanor and, notably, to protect the entire mantle of judicial administration from unwarranted criticism and from being dragged into the quagmire of disrepute.
Indeed, imperative and sacred is the duty of those charged with the administration of justice to maintain the court's good name and standing as a temple of justice and rule of law. Hence, a conduct, act or omission that is repugnant to the norm of public accountability or, at least, tends to diminish the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary, must invariably be met not only with the appropriate sanction imposed by law, but also with the inevitable scorn that comes with it.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the explanation of Justice Ruben T. Reyes to the show cause directive as UNSATISFACTORY, and his Motion to Set Aside Decision, treated as motion for reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated February 24, 2009, is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Justice Reyes is found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law is imposed upon him.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Justice Reyes as a lawyer; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all couits in the countiy for their information and guidance.
This Resolution shall be immediately executory."
* Quisumbing and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official leave, but one left the vote with the Chief Justice. Del Castillo and Abad, JJ., no part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Decision dated February 24. 2009. pp. 49-50.
[2] G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008, 550 SCRA 613.
[3] Decision dated February 24. 2009, pp. 35-49.
[4] The 18 witnesses or resource persons who testified were: Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes; Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes; Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes; Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario; Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; ACA Jose Midas P, Marquez. Chief, Public Information Office; Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II [should be Executive Assistant III], Office of the Chief justice; Atty. Ma. Luisa D Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc; Major Eduardo V. Escala. Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of Administrative Services; Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court: Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court: Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura: Onofre C. Cuento, Process Sewer, Office of the Clerk of Court; Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker [II]. Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes; Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes; Fennin L. Segotier. [PET] Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura; and Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes.
[5] Composed of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan Vicente V. Mendoza, Artemio V. Panganiban, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Fidel P. Purisima (no part). Bernardo P. Pardo, Arturo B. Buena, Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, Consueio Ynares-Santiago, and Sabino R. de Leon. Jr.
[6] CONTINUATION OF SPECIAL EN BANC SESSION, 22 March 2000, 8:00 A.M., Bar Matter No. 979 - In re 1999 Bar Examinations - In its Resolution adopted on 19 March 2000 at the special en banc session began in Manila, the Court staled that said Resolution "is without prejudice to any further action that the Court may deem appropriate to take under the premises."
Resuming its en banc session in Baguio City on 21 March 2000 and today, 22 March 2000, the Court heard the explanation of Mr. Justice Fidel P. Purisima for his failure to seasonably disclose to the Court, as Chairman of the 1999 Bar Examinations Committee, the fact that his nephew, son of an older brother, was one of the examinees in the 1999 Bar Examinations. Mr. Justice Purisima admitted the lapse which he considered as an "error of judgment" and, for this reason, expressed his deepest apology to the Court.
Thereafter, the Court excused Mr. Justice Purisima from the session hall, and after due deliberation, and taking into account the apology of Mr. Justice Purisima. RESOLVED as follows:
- To CENSURE, as it hereby CENSURES, Mr. Justice Fidel P. Purisima for his failure to disclose on time his relationship to an examinee and for breach of duty and confidence; and
- To DECLARE, as it hereby DECLARES, forfeited fifty percent (50%) of the fees due him as former Chairman of the 1999 Bar Examinations Committee.
[7] A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001, 355 SCRA 366.
[8] Rule 2.04. - A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
[9] Re: Leaves of Absence Without Approval of Judge Eric T Colderon, MTC, Calumpit, Bulacan. A.M. No. 98-8-105-MTC, January 26, 1999, 302 SCRA 92, citing Re: Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena,. 282 SCRA 370 (1997), Macalintal v. Teh, 280 SCRA 623 (1997), and Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47 (1988).
[10] Cruz v. Yaneza, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1 175, March 9, 1999, 304 SCRA 285, citing Macalintal v. Teh, supra note 7.
[11] A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC (April 13, 2004), Canon II. The Code shall apply to all personnel in the judiciary who are not justices or judges, including former court personnel who acquired, while still so employed, confidential information, who are thereby made subject to Section 4 of Canon II.
[12] Decision dated February 24, 2009, pp. 40-41. (Citations omitted.)
[13] A.M. No. RTJ-02-1693. August 21. 2002. 387 SCRA 485.
[14] The antecedents are as follows: Therein accused Virgilio de Guia in Criminal Case No. 2477 for murder, entitled "People v. Virgilio De Guia," pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide during the pre-trial conference. On the same day of the pre-trial conference, without receiving evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Judge Mijares promulgated the judgment finding therein accused guiliy of homicide and applied three (3) mitigating circumstances, i.e., plea of guilty, voluntary surrender. and intoxication and. accordingly, sentenced the accused to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (I) day of prision mayor as maximum, and ordered him lo indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P40,000.00. Upon motion for reconsideration by therein accused. Judge Mijares granted the reduction of penalty in the Resolution dated January 10, 1996, from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Per findings of therein Investigating Justice, Poso received a signed copy of the January 10, 1996 Resolution bearing the grant of the reduced penally lo two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. However. Judge Mijares countered that his official copy of the January 10, 1996 Resolution reflected the correct reduced penally as two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as maximum.
[15] Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court: grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
[16] Decision dated February 24, 2009. pp. 45-47. (Citation omitted.)
[17] A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 329.
[18] The Attorney's Oath states that "I, _____________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines: I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not willingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same: I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."
[19] Rule 1.01. � A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[20] Rule 1.02. � A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
[21] Association of International Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 158000. March 3 1, 2005, 454 SCRA 701, 717.
[22] En banc Resolution dated December 10, 2008, p. 2
[23] A.C. No. MTJ-92-643, November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 121, 133.
[24] See Re: Leaves of Absence Without Approval of Judge Eric T, Calderon, MTC, Calumpit, Bulacan: A.M. No. 98-8-105-MTC, January 26, 1999. 3(12 SCRA 92; citing Re: Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, A.M. No. 95-9-98-MCTC, December 4, 1997, 282 SCRA 370; Macalintal v. Teh, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375, October 16. 1997. 280 SCRA 623; and Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano, A.M. No. R-66-RTJ, March 18, 1988, 159 SCRA 47.
[25] Villa v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 69871. August 24, 1990, 1 89 SCRA. 34.
* As revised.
