Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2009 > December 2009 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 169986 : December 16, 2009] EYE REFERRAL CENTER (GLAUCOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC.), ARTURO BAYAYA AND ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDY BALDAGO AND ELVIRA OCUAMAN, RESPONDENTS.:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 16 December 2009:

G.R. No. 169986: EYE REFERRAL CENTER (Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc.), ARTURO     BAYAYA and ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, Petitioners, - versus - JUDY BALD AGO and ELVIRA OCUAMAN, Respondents.

This is a petition for review^[1] assailing the Decision^[2] promulgated on 30 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74502 as well as the Resolution^[3] promulgated on 29 September 2005. The appellate court granted the petition filed by herein respondents Judy Baldago (Baldago) and Elvira Ocuaman (Ocuaman) (collectively, respondents) and affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano (Arbiter Babiano) dated 31 March 2000. Arbiter Babiano declared that the dismissal of respondents was illegal, and ordered the reinstatement of respondents without loss of seniority rights and other privileges as well as payment of full backwages, unclaimed allowances and other benefits computed from the date their compensations were withheld up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Should reinstatement be no longer feasible, Arbiter Babiano ordered herein petitioners Eye Referral Center, Arturo Bayaya, and Alfredo T. Romualdez (collectively, petitioners) to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, with a fraction of six months considered as one whole year. Separation pay will be awarded in addition to respondents' full backwages.

The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:

On March 15, 1999, complainants Joaquin Carino Jr., Elvira Ocuaman and Judy Baldago filed a complaint for Illegal Suspension, Illegal Dismissal, claims for unpaid allowance, Service Incentive Leave Pay, 13^th Month Pay, moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees against respondents Eye Referral Center and/or Arturo Bayaya and Alfredo Romualdez.

Contained in the position papers of the complainants are the following allegations:

Complainant Joaquin Carino, Jr. averred that: he was first hired by respondent Eye Referral Center on December 2, 1985 as messenger; that his latest basic salary at the time he was summarily dismissed on March 5, 1999 was P7,200.00 monthly; that by virtue of a Memorandum dated March 3, 1999 signed by Mr. Arturo Bayaya, he was placed under preventive suspension for 15 days effective March 5, 1999 for the following reasons, we quote:

"2.1 Yesterday, ,you willfully and intentionally provoked argument with Mr. Alberto Santillan, OIC-Finance Dept;

2.2 Mr. Alberto Santillan holds a supervisory position in the organizational structure of the company;

2.3 It has been recorded that in the past, your penchant   for   provoking   a   fight had resulted in the destruction of company property and also the disruption of company operations, (rollo, p. 99)"

that on March 26, 1999, when he reported back to work, he was prevented by the security guard from entering the work premises upon the instruction of Mr. Bayaya; that he attempted to enter the premises on the succeeding days but to no avail; that on March 29, 1999, he received a Notice of Dismissal dated March 24, 1999 signed by Mr. Bayaya; and that except for the statement in the said Notice of Termination that "his termination of employment for cause," no hearing was conducted pursuant to the provision of the Rules implementing the Labor Code.

Complainant Elvira Ocuaman claimed: that she was hired by the respondent company on July 1989 as company's accountant; that her latest basic salary was P9,300.00 plus P2,700.00 transportation allowance or in the aggregate total sum of P12,000.00 monthly take home pay. On the other hand, complainant Judy Baldago alleged that: she was hired by respondent company on August 1, 1991 as Staff Nurse; on February 1994, she was promoted to the position of Supervisor; on June 1, 1998, she was appointed as OIC-Assistant Administrator with basic pay of P8,200.00 monthly plus P1,600.00 monthly transportation allowance.

The latter two complainants averred: that on February 3, 1999, they received copies of the new set of company policy from Mr. Arturo Bayaya dated January 29, 1999; that they did not agree on certain terms of the new policy specifically on transportation allowance which they made known to Mr. Bayaya, Dr. Agulto and Mr. Romualdez; that on March 5, 1999, complainant Ocuaman received a memorandum from respondent Bayaya charging her with AWOL, tardiness and deduction in her salary for the alleged AWOL and tardiness; on the same day, complainant Baldago received a warning from respondent Bayaya regarding her report to the top management dated March 2, 1999, the pertinent portion of the report provides, to wit:

"We are receiving some verbal complaints from our patients and some employees that Mr. Bayaya is roving-in to [sic] the hallway at 5^th floor undressed straight from comfort room he is using because he is using it sometimes as shower room as what Nilo Gabayeron said."

[I]n the said Memorandum, complainant Baldago was served a warning that should she fail to substantiate her written report and submit her evidence on or before March 10, 1999, she will be suspended for one (1) week for spreading false information; on March 8, 1999, both complainants received another Memorandum from Mr. Bayaya charging them [with] falsification of attendance; on March 9, 1999, they discovered that their personal files were missing: that they brought the incident to the attention of Dr. Agulto, Executive Director of the company and reported the same to the police; on March 10, 1999, in compliance with the Memorandum dated March 5, 1999, complainant Ocuaman filed her written Answer before Dr. Agulto; on March 11, 1999, complainant Ocuaman was served a copy of Memorandum signed by Mr. Bayaya which provides, we quote:

1. In reference (A)  [Memorandum dated March 5, 1999] you were directed to submit on or before March 10, 1999, your written explanation why you should not be meted disciplinary action for dishonesty/misappropriation of company funds.

2. In reference (B) [Memorandum dated March 6, 1999] you were directed to submit within twenty-four hours a written explanation why you should not be meted disciplinary action for malfeasance resulting to loss of company funds (sum of money).

3. In reference (C) you were directed to submit a written explanation why no disciplinary action should be meted against you for falsification of attendance.

4. It is very regrettable that you have not complied with the lawful directive of management.

5. In view thereof,  you  are  hereby  placed under suspension for thirty (30) days without prejudice from dismissal from service for cause, in accord with the provisions of "BOOK SIX" Post Employment, Title I, Termination of Employment, Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

6. By a copy of this memorandum, the following sectors are instructed to implement the following -

6.1 TIMEKEEPING & PAYROLL CLERK

- to withhold issuance of time card
- to compute the commensurate salary and transportation allowance with days worked

6.2  SECURITY ON DUTY

-advise Ms. Ocuaman that she has only one (1) [day]- March 11, 1999 - to turn-over company records under her custody

-that effective March 12, 1999 her entry into the ERC premises is suspended indefinitely (rollo p. 56-57)

[O]n the same day, complainant Baldago also received a Memorandum signed by Mr. Bayaya, which states:

1. In reference  (a)  [Memorandum dated March 5,1999] you were directed to submit on March 10, 1999, your written explanation why you should not be meted with disciplinary action for spreading malicious/slanderous/libelous report to Top Management.

2. In reference (b)  [Memorandum dated March 8,1999] you were directed to submit your written explanation why no disciplinary action should be meted on you. It is very regrettable that you failed to comply with the instruction within the reglementary period.

3. Pursuant to Article 282 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, you are hereby placed under immediate supervision for fifteen (15)  days,  without prejudice to dismissal from the service for cause.

4. By a copy of this memorandum, the following sectors are hereby instructed to implement the following:

a. TIMEKEEPING/PAYROLL CLERK

-to withhold issuance of timecard
-to compute the payroll of Ms. Baldago corresponding to her actual days of work

b. SECURITY GUARD

-to advise Ms. Baldago that she has only one (1) day- March 11,1999 to clear her things
-that effective March 12, 1999, her privilege inside the premises of ERC is suspended indefinitely, (rollo, p. 92)

that they reported to work on March 12, 1999 but they were told that they can no longer enter their office upon the instruction of Mr. Bayaya; and that they later went to Mr. Ramon Tulfo who referred them to IBP who helped them file the instant case.

In their Answer, respondents contended that:

In the case of Elvira Ocuaman, complainant tendered an irrevocable resignation on August 11, 1997; after about two months, she pleaded to return to work and was accepted as a consultant; that she intentionally did not deduct from, the payroll the amount for-absences (awol and tardiness) of her friends and herself; that she charged overtime work with pay for herself and her friends for staying in office without proper authorization; that she was habitually tardy and absent; that she falsified her attendance; and that on March 15, 1999, the letter of resignation of complainant dated August 11, 1997 was finally accepted by the Executive Director of respondent company.

In the case of Judy Baldago, she was given a warning on March 5, 1999 for spreading malicious and libelous rumor against an officer of the company; she, however, ignored to explain her side; she appeared to be in connivance with Elvira Ocuaman in withdrawing with full pay, days for absences without leave (awol), tardiness and overtime without proper authorization for a span of one year; she was issued a Memorandum on March 8, 1999. she was issued a memorandum for falsification of attendance; on March 11, 1999, she was issued a Memorandum of suspension.

It is the contention of respondents that all the complainants violated rules and regulations of respondent firm; that memoranda were issued by respondent firm against complainants for such violations but they either ignored or unsatisfactorily explained such violations; that complainants were suspended for causes and in accordance with law;, that the series of irregularities constitute serious misconduct; and that respondent has sufficient basis for losing its trust and confidence in the complainants.^[4]

In his Decision dated 31 March 2000, Arbiter Babiano declared that respondents were illegally dismissed, and that petitioners failed to prove their allegations with substantial evidence. The dispositive portion of Arbiter Babiano's decision stated that:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the dismissal of complainants Elvira Ocuaman and Judy Baldago to be without any just cause and, therefore, illegal; [and]

2. Ordering respondents to reinstate complainants Elvira Ocuaman and Judy Baldago to their respective former positions, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to pay them full backwages, unclaimed allowances and other benefits computed from the date their compensations were withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement[.]

xxx.

Should reinstatement be no longer feasible, respondents are directed to pay complainants Elvira Ocuaman and Judy. Baldago separation pay equivalent to one (!) month pay for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year. This will be in addition to their full backwages.

Complainants' entitlements as computed by the Computation and Examination Unit-NCR are as follows:

Name	Backwages	Transporation Allow.	Separation Pay	Financial   Assistance	TOTAL
ELVIRA OCUAMAN	P127,549.50	P34,182.00	P102,300.00	---	264,031.50
JUDY BALDAGO	119,320.50	20,256.00	78,300.00	---	217,876.50
JOAQUIN CARI�O	---	---	---	10,000.00	10,000.00
	P246,870.00	54,438.00	180,600.00	10,000.00	P491,908.00

The other claims of complainants are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.'^[5]

Respondents as well as petitioners appealed from the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC referred the present case to Labor Arbiter Cristeta D. Tamayo (Arbiter Tamayo) for review and submission of report for the NLRC's deliberation. The NLRC adopted Arbiter Tamayo's report, which stated that "[Arbiter Babiano] below seriously erred and abused his discretion when he declared that complainants Elvira Ocuaman and Judy Baldago were illegally dismissed."

The dispositive portion of the NLRC's decision reads:

WHERFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED. In addition to the adjudged valid dismissal of complainant Cari�o, the dismissal of complainants Ocuaman and Baldago are also hereby declared to be one for just cause hence valid. The complaints below are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.^[6]

The NLRC resolved to deny respondents' Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.^[7]

Respondents assailed the NLRC's decision and resolution before the appellate court. Respondents imputed grave abuse of discretion upon the NLRC as well as violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019)^[8] and Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code^[9] for rendering unjust judgment.

The appellate court found no reason to discuss respondents' imputation of violation of RA 3019 as it is not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. The appellate court found the assailed decision of the NLRC, which adopted the report and recommendation of Arbiter Tamayo, arbitrary. The appellate court granted respondents' petition, and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners in a Resolution promulgated on 29 September 2005.^[10]

Petitioners assign the following errors in their petition:

1. The Honorable Public Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in substituting its criteria for that of the NLRC in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence in the case at bar will be believed and served as basis for deciding the instant case.

2. The Honorable Public Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the NLRC's decision is not in accordance with law, or arbitrary.^[11]

The petition has no merit. Petitioners failed to show that the appellate court arbitrarily made factual findings and disregarded evidence on record.

Article 282 of the Labor Code reads as follows:

Termination by Employer.- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee  of the lawful  orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee  of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Section 2 of Rule XXVIII of The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that:

Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of due notice.- In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in .Article 282 of the Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

In case of termination, the foregoing notices shall be served on the employee's last known address.

We see no reason to deviate from the appellate court's finding and its consequent ruling. In an unlawful dismissal case, the employer has the burden of proving the lawful cause sustaining the dismissal of the employee. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.^[12] When the NLRC modified the Decision of Arbiter Babiano, it premised its findings on Ocuaman's alleged admission of her violations. However, Ocuaman's alleged admission was merely a reproduction of petitioners' notice issued to Ocuaman. There was nothing in the records which showed that petitioners were able to prove their charges against Ocuaman. In the same manner, the records are also bereft of evidence proving petitioners' charges against Baldago.

We quote the pertinent portions of the appellate court's decision below:

x x x In modifying the decision of Labor Arbiter Adolfo Babiano, the NLRC declared the dismissals of Ocuaman and Baldago to be one for just cause, hence, valid. The NLRC anchored its ruling on the alleged admission in the affidavit of Ocuaman as to the infractions allegedly committed by her which led to her dismissal. However, this finding was not adequately explained in the modified decision. With regard to petitioner Baldago, other than a sweeping statement that her dismissal was one for just cause, no other explanation was provided to justify the reversal of finding made by the Labor Arbiter. Considering that the NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter a quo, the modified decision must state the factual and legal foundation relied upon and the same must be supported by evidence. The NLRC failed in this regard. No ample justification was laid down by the NLRC in modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter.^[13]

We also noted that petitioners failed to observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing for a valid dismissal. The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM in toto the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 August 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 74502 as well as the Resolution promulgated on 29 September 2005.

SO ORDERED.

WITNESS the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chairperson, Honorable Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro (designated additional member per S.O. No. 776), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Roberto A. Abad,Members, Second Division, this 16^th   day of December, 2009.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 22-30. Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.

^[3] Rollo, pp. 44-46. Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.

^[4] Id. at 22-27.

^[5] Id. at 75-76.

^[6] Id. at 115

^[7] Id. at 127.

^[8] Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

^[9] Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.

^[10] Rollo, pp. 44-46.

^[11] Id at 8.

^[12] See Dizon v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 79554, 14 December 1989, 180 SCRA 52.

^[13] Rollo, pp. 29-30.