July 2009 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
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[G.R. No. 182928 : July 08, 2009] PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, SAMMY MALUNES, ET AL.,PETITIONERS, VS. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT.:
[G.R. No. 182928 : July 08, 2009]
PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, SAMMY MALUNES, ET AL.,PETITIONERS, VS. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 08 July 2009:
G.R. No. 182928 - PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, SAMMY MALUNES, et al., petitioners, versus LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, respondent.
Before us are the following incidents:
1. Motion to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated February 8, 2009;
2. Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009:
3. Motion for Clarification with Prayer to Set Case for Oral Argument dated March 30; 2009; and
4. An Open Letter dated February 3, 2009 to the Honorable Reynato S. Puno, Chief Justice,
filed by the petitioners and/or their representatives/counsels.
The issues or concerns the petitioners raised may be synthesized as follows:
(1) whether there is an inconsistency or conflict between the Second Division's ruling in the above-captioned case and the Third Division's ruling in Metro Transit Organization Inc., and Jose L. Cortez. Jr. v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, Sammy Malunes, et aL, G. R. No. 175460 (METRO v. PIGLAS); and
(2) whether the final and executory decision in METRO v. PIGLAS (G. R. No. 175460) has res adjudicata effect on the present case (G. R. No. 182928 -PIGLAS v. LRTA).
By way of background, the related cases originated from a complain! filed on October 7, 2003 by [he individual petitioners-members of the petitioner Pinag-isang Lakas ng mga Manggagawa ng Metro-National Federation of Workers' Union-Kilusang Mayo Uno (PIGLAS-NFWU-KMU)- the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO) - against the METRO and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and nonpayment of 13' month pay with claims for damages and attorney's fees.
On September 13, 2004, Labor Arbiter Ellas H. Salinas rendered a Decision finding that the individual petitioners were illegally dismissed; thus., the labor arbiter ordered the METRO and the LRTA to jointly and severally pay P208,235,682.72 in backwages and separation pay. All other claims were dismissed.
LRTA appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and posted a real properly bond covered by six (6) Transfer Certificates of Title. The NLRC conditionally accepted the property bond pending the submission by LRTA of several documents. METRO also appealed but did not post an appeal bond. The NLRC allowed METRO to file an appeal without an appeal bond, ruling as follows:
The individual petitioners moved to reconsider the NLRC decision. imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC's failure to dismiss the appeals for METRO'S lack of the required appeal bond and for insufficiency of the LRTA's real property bond .that was only worth P5,000,000.00. LRTA, for its part, moved for the suspension of the proceedings, requesting for extension of time to comply with the requirements on posting of the property bond, citing this Court's ruling in the consolidated cases of LRTA v. PERFECTO H. VENUS, JR., et al, and MTOI v. VENUS, JR., et al.[1]
On May 19, 2006, the NLRC.issued a Resolution dismissing LRTA's and METRO'S appeals for non-perfection on the reasoning that they failed to comply with the conditions required in the earlier Resolution allowing the posting of properly bond.
The remedies separately pursued by METRO and LRTA from the NLRC ruling spawned the related cases.
I. G. R. No. 175460 - METRO v. PIGLAS
METRO, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed CA-G.R. SP. No. 95665.- The CA however dismissed METRO'S petition on the ground that METRO did not first move to reconsider the NLRC ruling- a pre-condition for the filing of a Rule 65 petition; the CA additionally noted that: the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement are likewise not present in METRO'S case. The CA subsequently denied METRO'S motion for reconsideration. Thus, METRO elevated the dismissal of its CA petition to this Court via a Rule 45 petition. The petition was assigned to the Third Division.
The Third Division denied METRO'S petition in its Decision dated April 14, 2008, finding no reversible error in the CA.'s conclusion that METRO'S petition is procedurally flawed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Third Division concluded, too, that the NLRC did not err in denying METRO'S appeal for its failure to file a bond in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; METRO'S failure to comply with the conditions for the posting of a property bond is equivalent to the failure to post the bond required by law.
METRO moved to reconsider this Decision, but the Third Division denied the motion. Hence, the judgment was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 3, 2008.
II. G, R. No. 182928 (PIGLAS v. LRTA) - The Present Case
LRTA, on the other hand and likewise without filing a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling, also elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court; the case was docketed CA-G.R. SP. No. 95578. The LRTA claimed that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that it had jurisdiction over LRTA; and (2) in dismissing LRTA's appeal thereby effectively upholding the labor arbiter's decision holding LRTA jointly and severally liable with METRO for the illegal dismissal of complainants.
The CA found the petition meritorious and annuiled and set aside both the labor arbiter's and the NLRC's rulings, insofar as they hold LRTA jointly and severally liable with METRO for the constructive illegal dismissal of private respondents. It found - consistent with this Court's ruling in LRTA v, Venus, el al[2] - that the LRTA, as a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original,charter,[3] is subject to the Civil Service Law and not to the Labor Code; thus, the labor arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the LRTA. On the procedural aspect, the CA, relying on this Court's ruling in Miguel v. JGT Group, Inc.,[4] and harping on the ruling that substantial justice is better served by ruling on the merits of the case, relaxed the requirement of an appeal bond in light especially of the amount of (he money claims involved and the fact that LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation. On the LRTA's failure to move for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, the CA explained I hat the requirement may be waived where the decision is a patent nullity or where the issue raised is one purely of law. The case, it points out, fails within the jurisprudenially-recognized exceptions, since the labor arbiter's decision and the NLRC's are void for lack of jurisdiction over the LRTA. The individual petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but [heir motion was denied. Hence^ the present case.
In their petition, PIGLAS, et al. seek a reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
In our Resolution of October 6. 2008, we denied the petition for. among other reasons, the petitioners' failure to show any reversible error in the CA's ruling. The petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal of [heir petition. We denied this motion in our Resolution of February 4, 2009.
Undaunted. the petitioners filed the various pleadings now before us for consideration.
OUR RULING
A starting point in analyzing the issues and concerns the petitioners presented is the impact of our clear and categorical ruling in LRTA v. Venus[5] that the LRTA and METRO are two separate and distinct entities and. that legal consequences flow from their existence as different personalities.
LRTA v. Venus holds, that employment in LRTA should be governed only by civil service rules and not the Labor Code and be beyond the reach of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), since petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter.[6] METRO, on the other hand, is covered by the Labor Code despite LRTA 's subsequent acquisition thereof, as it was originally organized under the Corporation Code and became a government corporation only after LRTA 's acquisition and that even then, METRO is without an original charter. We said that the DOLE has jurisdiction over disputes arising from METRO'S employment of its workers, and the terms and condition of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. We thus concluded that the employees of METRO are not and cannot be considered employees of LRTA: the employment of METRO employees is governed by the Labor Code and fails under the jurisdiction of the DOLE, whereas the employees of LRTA. a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, are covered by the civil service rules; METRO'S workers cannot have the best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government employees of LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under our labor laws. The stubborn fact, we said, is dial METRO'S workers remained private employees with rights and prerogatives grained to them under the Labor Code, including the right to strike, which they exercised and from which the dispute in LRTA v. Venus arose.
We significantly rejected in LRTA y. Venus pleas to pierce the corporate veil of METRO; we said:
In the instant case, petitioner METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., was originally owned by the Manila Electric Company and registered with the Securities and Ex-change Commission more than a decade before the labor dispute, It then entered into a ten-year agreement with petitioner LRTA in 1984. And, even if petitioner LRTA eventually purchased METRO in 1989 both parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical personality and allowed the agreement to proceed. In 1990, this Court, in Light Rail Transit Authority v. Commission on Audit, even upheld the validity of the said agreement. Consequently, the agreement was extended beyond its ten-year period. In 1995. METRO'S separate juridical identify was again recognized when if entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the workers union. All these years, METRO'S distinct corporate personality continued quiescently, separate and apart from the juridical personality of petitioner LRTA.
The labor dispute only arose in 2000, after a deadlock occurred during the collective bargaining between petitioner METRO and the workers union. This alone is not a justification to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO and make petitioner LRTA liable to private respondent workers. There are no badges of fraud or any wrongdoing to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO.
xxx
Thus, the distinctive personalities of METRO and LRTA became the solid foundation of our conclusion in LRTA v. Venus that the LRTA cannot be held liable for employment-related obligations to METRO employees. Under the prism of this ruling can our conclusion in the present case be appreciated, particularly its difference from the Third Division ruling in METRO v. PIGLAS (G.R. No. 175460). Given their distinctions, the Third Division ruling is not contradictory to or in conflict with our ruling in the present case, and vice versa. To claim the contrary is to be dissociated from Legal realities.
The petitioners mainly insist in the motions under consideration on the application of the principle of res adjudicata. They argue that the Third Division's final and executory decision in METRO v. PIGLAS operates as res adjudicata on the present case insofar as the former upheld the Decision/Resolutions of the NLRC which dismissed the appeals of both LRTA and METRO for non-perfection. They cite, to support their res adjudicata argument, the following:
We see no merit in this argument, as we find the principle of res judicata inapplicable. The doctrine of res adjudicata applies if the following requisites are present:
To be sure, there is no identity of parties in METRO v. PIGLAS (decided by the Third Division of the Court) and the present case (PIGLAS v. LRTA), given the distinctive personalities of METRO and LRTA as discussed in LRTA v. Venus and explained above. METRO litigated for its own interests, not for LRTA's, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 95665, and could not have spoken in representation of LRTA. Specifically, METRO assailed via a Rule 65 certiorari petition, the dismissal of its own appeal - a remedy that clearly appears to be separate and distinct from LRTA's as shown by METRO'S filing with the NLRC of its very own Memorandum on Appeal.[9] Thus, any decision that the CA would render in CA-G.R. SP. No. 45665 would bind the parties to the proceedings only - METRO and PIGLAS. et al., and no other.[10] Only these parties, too, can appeal from an unfavorable CA decision or ruling.
For lack of the requisite identity of parties, there can be no application of the principle of res judicata in the present case.
The more significant implication however of the differing interests separately litigated by METRO and LRTA in the CA cases is the possibility of differing conclusion of facts and points of law. This becomes unavoidably probable given the difference in situations or circumstances of the LRTA and METRO.
The LRTA as the cited LRTA v. Venus shows, is beyond the labor arbiter's jurisdiction - this is a situation peculiar to LRTA. We cannot overemphasize the far-reaching implications of this circumstance in a labor case involving METRO'S employees. As the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over LRTA when he heard the illegal dismissal case (a defense the LRTA duly invoked before the labor arbiter),[11] the NLRC also has no jurisdiction over LRTA at the appellate level.
Any act done without jurisdiction is void and has no legal effect.[12] The NLRC's exercise of jurisdiction over LRTA therefore cannot produce legal effects because they are patently null and void. As the CA correctly held in CA--G.R. SP. No. 95578, which we affirmed in our Resolutions of October 6; 2008 and February 4, 2009, the patent nullity of the NLRC's action exempts the LRTA from the traditional requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration in order that recourse to a Rule 65 certiorari petition may be made validly. This is a circumstance peculiar to LRTA that METRO cannot validly invoke to justify its failure to file the required motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration issue - although common to both the METRO'S CA petition and the LRTA's petition - has every reason to be treated differently.
Beyond the motion for reconsideration requirement issue is the mandatory requirement for the posting of an appeal bond to perfect an appeal to the NLRC from the labor arbiter's decision. The petitioners allude to the Third Division's final ruling on this issue - that there was no perfected appeal that could prevent the labor arbiter's decision from becoming final and executory; the Second Division... in its own case, should therefore be bound and should respect this final Third Division ruling. In their letter dated February 3, 2009 to the Honorable Chief Justice, they cite this legal argument to ask for the stability of the Court's established doctrine on the jurisdictional requirement of an appeal bond on monetary claims. [13]
As stated above, the CA Division that heard CA-G.R. SP. No. 95578 differently ruled on this issue - taking into account the amount of the money claims involved, the fact that LRTA is a government-ow.'.ed and controlled corporation, and the supposed interest of substantial justice to hear the case on the merits - and allowed LRTA some leniency on the appeal bond requirement. Parenthetically, the same treatment could not be given to METRO as the considerations applicable to LRTA do not obtain in METRO'S case. Thus, our Third Division, when it recognized the validity of the CA ruling in the METRO case before it, effectively wrote finis to the issue but only insofar as METRO is concerned.
We agree with the CA's conclusion and reach the same result but under another approach. We find it unnecessary to still discuss LRTA's compliance with the appeal bond requirement, given the conclusion that the labor arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over LRTA. In other words, the nullity of the labor arbiter's decision and the resulting nullity of all NLRC actions on the case for lack of jurisdiction over LRTA effectively rendered the appeal bond issue moot. Any ruling on the issue, separately from the jurisdictional considerations, will have no practical value.
Finally, the petitioners presented non-legal considerations that they believe should also guide us in deciding the present case. They posit that funds have been previously allocated for the payment of METRO employees' claims but were reverted back to the National Treasurer to await this Court's definitive ruling on the claims. Any future allocation will be in jeopardy because of the Court's contrasting rulings and will put the Court in a bad Sight or self-defeating situation of depriving the illegally dismissed PIGLAS members-employees of the justice they long deserve.[14]
We respond to this non-legal sentiment by reiterating that no conflict exists between the Third Division's ruling and ours. We ruled differently because we were faced by different factual and legal situations, as already extensively explained above. Beyond a statement of these legal realities we cannot say more as this Court does not decide legal controversies on non-legal considerations. Our task is to say what the law is on every case that comes before us. We have spoken and maintain what we have said - the LRTA cannot be held liable for the illegal dismissal claims of METRO employees.
We put an end to the present case by reiterating that the CA correctly decided CA-G.K. SP. No. 9557S by invalidating the NLRC Resolution insofar as it finds the LRTA liable. No argument or submission in the petition or in the petitioners' subsequent submissions has changed this conclusion. For these reasons, we deny all the petitioners' motions now under consideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY for lack of merit the petitioners':
1. Motion to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated February 8, 2009;
2. Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009: and
3. Motion for Clarification with Prayer to Set Case for Oral Argument dated March 30. 2009.
Let entry of final judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the HonorableLeonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson, Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita Chico-Nazario (designated additional member per S.O. No. 658), Arturo D. Brion, and Teresita L. De Castro (designated additional member per S.O. No. 635), Members, Second Division, this 8th day of July, 2009.
G.R. No. 182928 - PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, SAMMY MALUNES, et al., petitioners, versus LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, respondent.
Before us are the following incidents:
1. Motion to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated February 8, 2009;
2. Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009:
3. Motion for Clarification with Prayer to Set Case for Oral Argument dated March 30; 2009; and
4. An Open Letter dated February 3, 2009 to the Honorable Reynato S. Puno, Chief Justice,
filed by the petitioners and/or their representatives/counsels.
The issues or concerns the petitioners raised may be synthesized as follows:
(1) whether there is an inconsistency or conflict between the Second Division's ruling in the above-captioned case and the Third Division's ruling in Metro Transit Organization Inc., and Jose L. Cortez. Jr. v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, Sammy Malunes, et aL, G. R. No. 175460 (METRO v. PIGLAS); and
(2) whether the final and executory decision in METRO v. PIGLAS (G. R. No. 175460) has res adjudicata effect on the present case (G. R. No. 182928 -PIGLAS v. LRTA).
By way of background, the related cases originated from a complain! filed on October 7, 2003 by [he individual petitioners-members of the petitioner Pinag-isang Lakas ng mga Manggagawa ng Metro-National Federation of Workers' Union-Kilusang Mayo Uno (PIGLAS-NFWU-KMU)- the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (METRO) - against the METRO and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and nonpayment of 13' month pay with claims for damages and attorney's fees.
On September 13, 2004, Labor Arbiter Ellas H. Salinas rendered a Decision finding that the individual petitioners were illegally dismissed; thus., the labor arbiter ordered the METRO and the LRTA to jointly and severally pay P208,235,682.72 in backwages and separation pay. All other claims were dismissed.
LRTA appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and posted a real properly bond covered by six (6) Transfer Certificates of Title. The NLRC conditionally accepted the property bond pending the submission by LRTA of several documents. METRO also appealed but did not post an appeal bond. The NLRC allowed METRO to file an appeal without an appeal bond, ruling as follows:
Moreover, we find to be without merit complainanls-appellees' contention that the appeal of respondent-appellant Metro Transit should be dismissed 'or failure to put up its own bond separate from the one put up by respondent-appellant LRTA. We lake note of the provisions of Article 223 of the Labor Code which provides that in case of judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by die employer would require a bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. Upon compliance of the conditions set forth above, we note that the properly bond put up by LRTA will already he equivalent of the monetary award in this case, which is aimed to satisfy complainants-appellees just and lawful claims. Hence, it separate bond need not be required of respondent-appellant Metro Transit.
The individual petitioners moved to reconsider the NLRC decision. imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC's failure to dismiss the appeals for METRO'S lack of the required appeal bond and for insufficiency of the LRTA's real property bond .that was only worth P5,000,000.00. LRTA, for its part, moved for the suspension of the proceedings, requesting for extension of time to comply with the requirements on posting of the property bond, citing this Court's ruling in the consolidated cases of LRTA v. PERFECTO H. VENUS, JR., et al, and MTOI v. VENUS, JR., et al.[1]
On May 19, 2006, the NLRC.issued a Resolution dismissing LRTA's and METRO'S appeals for non-perfection on the reasoning that they failed to comply with the conditions required in the earlier Resolution allowing the posting of properly bond.
The remedies separately pursued by METRO and LRTA from the NLRC ruling spawned the related cases.
I. G. R. No. 175460 - METRO v. PIGLAS
METRO, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed CA-G.R. SP. No. 95665.- The CA however dismissed METRO'S petition on the ground that METRO did not first move to reconsider the NLRC ruling- a pre-condition for the filing of a Rule 65 petition; the CA additionally noted that: the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement are likewise not present in METRO'S case. The CA subsequently denied METRO'S motion for reconsideration. Thus, METRO elevated the dismissal of its CA petition to this Court via a Rule 45 petition. The petition was assigned to the Third Division.
The Third Division denied METRO'S petition in its Decision dated April 14, 2008, finding no reversible error in the CA.'s conclusion that METRO'S petition is procedurally flawed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Third Division concluded, too, that the NLRC did not err in denying METRO'S appeal for its failure to file a bond in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; METRO'S failure to comply with the conditions for the posting of a property bond is equivalent to the failure to post the bond required by law.
METRO moved to reconsider this Decision, but the Third Division denied the motion. Hence, the judgment was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 3, 2008.
II. G, R. No. 182928 (PIGLAS v. LRTA) - The Present Case
LRTA, on the other hand and likewise without filing a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC ruling, also elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court; the case was docketed CA-G.R. SP. No. 95578. The LRTA claimed that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that it had jurisdiction over LRTA; and (2) in dismissing LRTA's appeal thereby effectively upholding the labor arbiter's decision holding LRTA jointly and severally liable with METRO for the illegal dismissal of complainants.
The CA found the petition meritorious and annuiled and set aside both the labor arbiter's and the NLRC's rulings, insofar as they hold LRTA jointly and severally liable with METRO for the constructive illegal dismissal of private respondents. It found - consistent with this Court's ruling in LRTA v, Venus, el al[2] - that the LRTA, as a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original,charter,[3] is subject to the Civil Service Law and not to the Labor Code; thus, the labor arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the LRTA. On the procedural aspect, the CA, relying on this Court's ruling in Miguel v. JGT Group, Inc.,[4] and harping on the ruling that substantial justice is better served by ruling on the merits of the case, relaxed the requirement of an appeal bond in light especially of the amount of (he money claims involved and the fact that LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation. On the LRTA's failure to move for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, the CA explained I hat the requirement may be waived where the decision is a patent nullity or where the issue raised is one purely of law. The case, it points out, fails within the jurisprudenially-recognized exceptions, since the labor arbiter's decision and the NLRC's are void for lack of jurisdiction over the LRTA. The individual petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but [heir motion was denied. Hence^ the present case.
In their petition, PIGLAS, et al. seek a reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
1. The CA erred in holding that the LRTA need not file a motion for reconsideration oi: the NLRC decision before instituting the Rule 65 petition.
2. The CA erred in reversing the decision of the NLRC despite LRTA and METRO'S non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of posting an appeal bond.
In our Resolution of October 6. 2008, we denied the petition for. among other reasons, the petitioners' failure to show any reversible error in the CA's ruling. The petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal of [heir petition. We denied this motion in our Resolution of February 4, 2009.
Undaunted. the petitioners filed the various pleadings now before us for consideration.
OUR RULING
A starting point in analyzing the issues and concerns the petitioners presented is the impact of our clear and categorical ruling in LRTA v. Venus[5] that the LRTA and METRO are two separate and distinct entities and. that legal consequences flow from their existence as different personalities.
LRTA v. Venus holds, that employment in LRTA should be governed only by civil service rules and not the Labor Code and be beyond the reach of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), since petitioner LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation with an original charter.[6] METRO, on the other hand, is covered by the Labor Code despite LRTA 's subsequent acquisition thereof, as it was originally organized under the Corporation Code and became a government corporation only after LRTA 's acquisition and that even then, METRO is without an original charter. We said that the DOLE has jurisdiction over disputes arising from METRO'S employment of its workers, and the terms and condition of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. We thus concluded that the employees of METRO are not and cannot be considered employees of LRTA: the employment of METRO employees is governed by the Labor Code and fails under the jurisdiction of the DOLE, whereas the employees of LRTA. a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter, are covered by the civil service rules; METRO'S workers cannot have the best of two worlds, e.g., be considered government employees of LRTA, yet allowed to strike as private employees under our labor laws. The stubborn fact, we said, is dial METRO'S workers remained private employees with rights and prerogatives grained to them under the Labor Code, including the right to strike, which they exercised and from which the dispute in LRTA v. Venus arose.
We significantly rejected in LRTA y. Venus pleas to pierce the corporate veil of METRO; we said:
In the instant case, petitioner METRO, formerly Meralco Transit Organization, Inc., was originally owned by the Manila Electric Company and registered with the Securities and Ex-change Commission more than a decade before the labor dispute, It then entered into a ten-year agreement with petitioner LRTA in 1984. And, even if petitioner LRTA eventually purchased METRO in 1989 both parties maintained their separate and distinct juridical personality and allowed the agreement to proceed. In 1990, this Court, in Light Rail Transit Authority v. Commission on Audit, even upheld the validity of the said agreement. Consequently, the agreement was extended beyond its ten-year period. In 1995. METRO'S separate juridical identify was again recognized when if entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the workers union. All these years, METRO'S distinct corporate personality continued quiescently, separate and apart from the juridical personality of petitioner LRTA.
The labor dispute only arose in 2000, after a deadlock occurred during the collective bargaining between petitioner METRO and the workers union. This alone is not a justification to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO and make petitioner LRTA liable to private respondent workers. There are no badges of fraud or any wrongdoing to pierce the corporate veil of petitioner METRO.
xxx
Thus, the distinctive personalities of METRO and LRTA became the solid foundation of our conclusion in LRTA v. Venus that the LRTA cannot be held liable for employment-related obligations to METRO employees. Under the prism of this ruling can our conclusion in the present case be appreciated, particularly its difference from the Third Division ruling in METRO v. PIGLAS (G.R. No. 175460). Given their distinctions, the Third Division ruling is not contradictory to or in conflict with our ruling in the present case, and vice versa. To claim the contrary is to be dissociated from Legal realities.
The petitioners mainly insist in the motions under consideration on the application of the principle of res adjudicata. They argue that the Third Division's final and executory decision in METRO v. PIGLAS operates as res adjudicata on the present case insofar as the former upheld the Decision/Resolutions of the NLRC which dismissed the appeals of both LRTA and METRO for non-perfection. They cite, to support their res adjudicata argument, the following:
a) The judgment of the Third Division sought to bar or reconsider the assailed Resolution in the instant case has already become final and executory as evidenced by the ENTRY OF JUDGMENT and an ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION was issued by the Labor Arbiter xxx;
b) There is identity of parties, or at least Metro Inc, in the first case, being the labor contractor of the LRTA, representing the same interest as that of the LRTA in the instant case, against herein petitioner employees. Likewise, there is identity of causes of actions or rights asserted and identity of subject matter;
c) There is identity of issues in the Metro, Inc. petition and in the instant case, as to the contravention of Metro, Inc. and LRTA of the procedural rule of filing a motion for reconsideration as a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and dismissal of the appeal for blatant refusal of Metro, Inc. and LRTA to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of appeal bond;
d) The first judgment in the Metro, Inc. case was rendered by the Third Division who had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. As established on record, petitioners, from the very beginning, identify themselves as employees of Metro, INC. which is wholly owned by the LRTA. Meaning, the employer-employee relations between respondents Metro, INC. and LRTA on the one hand and the petitioners on the other hand, has never become an issue here, unlike in the Venus case where the contrary is true, hence, the question of jurisdiction was correctly raised by LRTA;
e) The disposition of the first case by the ... Third Division was on the merits on the same set of facts between the same parties and same issues sought to be resolved by the Court of Appeals and the Honorable Court. [7]
We see no merit in this argument, as we find the principle of res judicata inapplicable. The doctrine of res adjudicata applies if the following requisites are present:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) the judgment must be on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[8]
To be sure, there is no identity of parties in METRO v. PIGLAS (decided by the Third Division of the Court) and the present case (PIGLAS v. LRTA), given the distinctive personalities of METRO and LRTA as discussed in LRTA v. Venus and explained above. METRO litigated for its own interests, not for LRTA's, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 95665, and could not have spoken in representation of LRTA. Specifically, METRO assailed via a Rule 65 certiorari petition, the dismissal of its own appeal - a remedy that clearly appears to be separate and distinct from LRTA's as shown by METRO'S filing with the NLRC of its very own Memorandum on Appeal.[9] Thus, any decision that the CA would render in CA-G.R. SP. No. 45665 would bind the parties to the proceedings only - METRO and PIGLAS. et al., and no other.[10] Only these parties, too, can appeal from an unfavorable CA decision or ruling.
For lack of the requisite identity of parties, there can be no application of the principle of res judicata in the present case.
The more significant implication however of the differing interests separately litigated by METRO and LRTA in the CA cases is the possibility of differing conclusion of facts and points of law. This becomes unavoidably probable given the difference in situations or circumstances of the LRTA and METRO.
The LRTA as the cited LRTA v. Venus shows, is beyond the labor arbiter's jurisdiction - this is a situation peculiar to LRTA. We cannot overemphasize the far-reaching implications of this circumstance in a labor case involving METRO'S employees. As the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over LRTA when he heard the illegal dismissal case (a defense the LRTA duly invoked before the labor arbiter),[11] the NLRC also has no jurisdiction over LRTA at the appellate level.
Any act done without jurisdiction is void and has no legal effect.[12] The NLRC's exercise of jurisdiction over LRTA therefore cannot produce legal effects because they are patently null and void. As the CA correctly held in CA--G.R. SP. No. 95578, which we affirmed in our Resolutions of October 6; 2008 and February 4, 2009, the patent nullity of the NLRC's action exempts the LRTA from the traditional requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration in order that recourse to a Rule 65 certiorari petition may be made validly. This is a circumstance peculiar to LRTA that METRO cannot validly invoke to justify its failure to file the required motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration issue - although common to both the METRO'S CA petition and the LRTA's petition - has every reason to be treated differently.
Beyond the motion for reconsideration requirement issue is the mandatory requirement for the posting of an appeal bond to perfect an appeal to the NLRC from the labor arbiter's decision. The petitioners allude to the Third Division's final ruling on this issue - that there was no perfected appeal that could prevent the labor arbiter's decision from becoming final and executory; the Second Division... in its own case, should therefore be bound and should respect this final Third Division ruling. In their letter dated February 3, 2009 to the Honorable Chief Justice, they cite this legal argument to ask for the stability of the Court's established doctrine on the jurisdictional requirement of an appeal bond on monetary claims. [13]
As stated above, the CA Division that heard CA-G.R. SP. No. 95578 differently ruled on this issue - taking into account the amount of the money claims involved, the fact that LRTA is a government-ow.'.ed and controlled corporation, and the supposed interest of substantial justice to hear the case on the merits - and allowed LRTA some leniency on the appeal bond requirement. Parenthetically, the same treatment could not be given to METRO as the considerations applicable to LRTA do not obtain in METRO'S case. Thus, our Third Division, when it recognized the validity of the CA ruling in the METRO case before it, effectively wrote finis to the issue but only insofar as METRO is concerned.
We agree with the CA's conclusion and reach the same result but under another approach. We find it unnecessary to still discuss LRTA's compliance with the appeal bond requirement, given the conclusion that the labor arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over LRTA. In other words, the nullity of the labor arbiter's decision and the resulting nullity of all NLRC actions on the case for lack of jurisdiction over LRTA effectively rendered the appeal bond issue moot. Any ruling on the issue, separately from the jurisdictional considerations, will have no practical value.
Finally, the petitioners presented non-legal considerations that they believe should also guide us in deciding the present case. They posit that funds have been previously allocated for the payment of METRO employees' claims but were reverted back to the National Treasurer to await this Court's definitive ruling on the claims. Any future allocation will be in jeopardy because of the Court's contrasting rulings and will put the Court in a bad Sight or self-defeating situation of depriving the illegally dismissed PIGLAS members-employees of the justice they long deserve.[14]
We respond to this non-legal sentiment by reiterating that no conflict exists between the Third Division's ruling and ours. We ruled differently because we were faced by different factual and legal situations, as already extensively explained above. Beyond a statement of these legal realities we cannot say more as this Court does not decide legal controversies on non-legal considerations. Our task is to say what the law is on every case that comes before us. We have spoken and maintain what we have said - the LRTA cannot be held liable for the illegal dismissal claims of METRO employees.
We put an end to the present case by reiterating that the CA correctly decided CA-G.K. SP. No. 9557S by invalidating the NLRC Resolution insofar as it finds the LRTA liable. No argument or submission in the petition or in the petitioners' subsequent submissions has changed this conclusion. For these reasons, we deny all the petitioners' motions now under consideration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY for lack of merit the petitioners':
1. Motion to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated February 8, 2009;
2. Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated February 9, 2009: and
3. Motion for Clarification with Prayer to Set Case for Oral Argument dated March 30. 2009.
Let entry of final judgment be made in due course.
SO ORDERED.
WITNESS the HonorableLeonardo A. Quisumbing, Chairperson, Honorable Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita Chico-Nazario (designated additional member per S.O. No. 658), Arturo D. Brion, and Teresita L. De Castro (designated additional member per S.O. No. 635), Members, Second Division, this 8th day of July, 2009.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA L. LAUREA
Asst. Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] G.R. Nos. 163782 and 163881. March 24, 2006. 485 SCRA 36.
[2] Id.
[3] Executive Order (E.O.) No. 603. s 1980.
[4] G.R. No. 157752. March 16, 2005. 455 SCRA 529.
[5] Penned by then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno: supra note I.
[6] E.O. No. 603 s. 1980 as amended.
[7] Rollo, pp. 1145-1146
[8] Cruz v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 164797. February 13. 2006. 482 SCRA 379.
[9] Rollo. pp. 270-295.
[10] Sec RULES OF COURT. Rule 39. Section 47 (b) and (c).
[11] See Rollo pp. 241-244 (LRTA's Reply in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-10)
[12] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900. October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 20
[13] Letter dated February 3, 2009.
[14] Supra note 9.
