Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2010 > March 2010 Resolutions > [A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2739-RTJ : March 15, 2010] ATTY. ELMERGILIO N. YBALEZ V. JUDGE JESUS S. DELA PEÑA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 62, OSLOB, CEBU AND JUDGE GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 9, CEBU CITY, BOTH FORMER ACTING JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 27, LAPU-LAPU CITY. :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated  15 March 2010:

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2739-RTJ (Atty. Elmergilio N. Ybalez v. Judge Jesus S. dela Pe�a, Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Oslob, Cebu and Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, Both Former Acting Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City.). - For resolution is the Complaint filed by Atty. Elmergilio N. Ybalez charging Judges Jesus S. dela Pe�a and Geraldine Faith A. Econg with:

a) Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019, more particularly Sec. 3(e) thereof), as contemplated in Sec. 3(2), Rule 140 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure - i.e., with respect to Hon. Jesus dela Pe�a, for issuing the assailed order at a time when he was no longer the Acting Presiding Judge of the court; and, as regards Hon. Geraldine Faith A. Econg, for promulgating the assailed order despite her knowledge that the same was rendered by one who was already stripped of his judicial function as a result of and occasioned by his suspension - the only visible purpose for such complementary actions being to give undue favor to a party;

b) Knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment, as provided for in Sec. 3(4), Rule 140, supra - which Hon. Jesus dela Pe�a appears to have committed when he rendered the assailed order without the benefit of a hearing, in violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiffs to due process;

c) Gross ignorance of the law or procedure, pursuant to Sec. 3(9), Rule 140, supra - i.e., for taking action on a motion that has been rendered pro forma by the omission of the defendants to set the same for hearing and to include therein a notice of hearing addressed to the parties concerned, as required in Sec. 4 et seq., Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Complainant Atty. Ybalez's clients filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of settlement and sale instalment, annulment of certificate of title and reconveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lapu- Lapu City, Branch 27, where respondent Judge Dela Pe�a was designated as Acting Presiding Judge. Respondent Judge Dela Pe�a issued an Order dated August 12, 2005, which granted the motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action. Upon motion for reconsideration, respondent Judge Econg, who replaced respondent Judge Dela Pe�a, issued an Order dated February 9, 2007, upholding the Order dated August 12, 2005 of respondent Judge Dela Pe�a and, consequently, denied the complainant's clients' motion.  The complainant's clients interposed an appeal before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC Orders dated August 12, 2005 and February 9, 2007.  On the other hand, complainant Atty. Ybalez filed this administrative complaint alleging in the main that Judge Dela Pe�a had no authority to issue the assailed order of dismissal, as by then he was stripped of his judicial functions caused by a suspension order by the Court in a separate case.

In the Resolution dated April 2, 2008, the Court held in abeyance the evaluation of the instant case pending the resolution by the Court of Appeals of the appeal interposed by the complainant's clients raising exactly the same issues subject of the present administrative case.

In a Manifestation and Motion dated September 1, 2009, respondent Judge Dela Pe�a stated that the Court of Appeals has rendered a Decision dated July 30, 2009 affirming the assailed RTC Orders and prayed for the dismissal of the case and release of his retirement benefits.

From the foregoing, it is our considered view that the instant administrative matter against Judge Jesus S. dela Pe�a and Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg deserves no merit.

There is no evidence that would show that at the time of the issuance of the disputed Order, Judge Dela Pe�a was already suspended from service. For clarification, the sequence of events is as follows:

April 29, 2005 - The Supreme Court Third Division issued a Resolution ordering the suspension of Judge Dela Pe�a from office, in relation to an administrative complaint docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-05-1896;

June 7, 2005 - Acting on the motion of Judge Dela Pe�a to hold in abeyance his suspension, the Court granted the same and held in abeyance the implementation of the April 29, 2005 Order for Judge Dela Pe�a's suspension;

September 12, 2005 - The Court ordered the implementation of Judge Dela Pe�a's suspension which was held to take effect immediately upon receipt thereof.

Hence, considering that Judge Dela Pe�a's suspension was officially ordered only on September 12, 2005 and was to take effect only upon receipt thereof, complainant's accusation that at the time of the issuance of the disputed Orders, Judge Dela Pe�a was no longer clothe with authority to issue the same, is baseless. Clearly, at the time of the issuance of the disputed Order dated August 12, 2005, Judge Dela Pe�a was still the Presiding Judge of the court a quo.

Corollarily, in view of the above-mentioned circumstances, the administrative complaint against Judge Econg likewise stands on hollow ground. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, records do not show that Judge Econg assumed office as Acting Presiding Judge of the court a quo at the time of the issuance of the disputed Order. Thus, it can be construed that Judge Dela Pe�a has the authority to issue and sign the disputed Order and that the court a quo did not err when it proceeded to promulgate the same.

In any case, to constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.^[1] Likewise, for a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment to prosper, it must be shown that the judgment was unjust, and not that the judge committed an error of judgment.^[2] As to the charge of graft and corruption, the quantum of evidence required to hold respondents guilty of such violation is proof beyond reasonable doubt which complainants failed to adduce.^[3] In all these charges, we do not find any evidence to support complainant's accusations.

As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies.^[4]

We must emphasize that an administrative action, as in this case; is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all.^[5]

We will likewise reiterate that, in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. This Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation. While this Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.^[6]

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Judges Jesus dela Pe�a and Geraldine Faith A. Econg is DISMISSED. The prayer of Judge Jesus dela Pe�a for the release of his retirement benefits is REFERRED to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, within a non-extendible period often (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

WITNESS the Honorable Renato C. Corona, Chairperson, Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Hon. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Hon. Diosdado M. Peralta and Hon. Jose C. Mendoza, Members, Third Division, this 15^th day of March 2010.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Spouses De Guzman v. Judge Pamintuan, 452 Phil. 963, 971 (2003).

^[2] Sacmar v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 448 Phil. 37, 43 (2003).

^[3] Fernandez v. Verzola, A.M. No. CA-04-40, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 369.

^[4] Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 602, 605-606.

^[5] Spouses De Guzman v. Judge Pamintuan, supra note 1, at 969.

^[6] Ang v, Judge Quilala, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1476, February 4, 2003, 396 SCRA 645, 649.