Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2010 > September 2010 Resolutions > [G.R. No. 158750 : September 27, 2010] MASADA SECURITY AGENCY, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND GEN. MANAGER, COL. EDWIN S. ESPEJO, PETITIONER, VERSUS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT AND PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, SECRETARY, RIZALDY BELLEZA, RODERICK BELLEZA, GAUDIEL FELICITAS AND JESUS BABIDA, :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated 27 September 2010, which reads as follows:

G.R. No. 158750 - MASADA SECURITY AGENCY, INC., represented by its President and Gen. Manager, COL. EDWIN S. ESPEJO, petitioner, versus DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Secretary, RIZALDY BELLEZA, RODERICK BELLEZA, GAUDIEL FELICITAS and JESUS BABIDA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

Petitioner filed before this Court a petition under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to assail the June 23, 2003 Order^[1] of Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Secretary Sto. Tomas had affirmed the June 2, 2000 Order of DOLE-Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) Regional Director Brenda L. Villafuerte ordering petitioner to pay private respondents a total amount of P26,830.64 representing underpaid minimum wages, 13^th month pay and service incentive leave pay.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On January 26, 1998, Teddy Bayugo, Edwin Buenavista, Rodelito Barcena and private respondent Jesus Babida, security guards of petitioner Masada Security Agency, Inc. (MSAI), filed a complaint against petitioner c/o National Food Authority (NFA) Abra, Bangued, Abra, for violation of labor standards before the Office of the DOLE-CAR. Later, private respondents Rizaldy Belleza, Roderick Selleza and Gaudiel Felicitas also joined as complainants.

Acting on the complaint, a labor employment and welfare officer from DOLE-CAR conducted an inspection at the NFA Office in Abra where private respondents were detailed. Thereafter, petitioner was charged with: (1) underpayment of wages and other related wage benefits, and (2) nonpayment of night shift differential, rest day premium pay and service incentive leave pay. The parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers.

On September 10, 1999, Regional Director Villafuerte issued an Order^[2] in favor of private respondents and the other complaining security guards. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, respondent MASADA SECURITY AGENCY and NFA, Bangued, Abra are hereby ORDERED to pay jointly the above-mentioned seven (7) affected guards the computed deficiencies in the total amount of EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND SIXTEEN PESOS & 06/100 (P85,016.06) and to submit proof of payment within ten (10) calendar days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, a Writ of Execution shall be issued to enforce compliance of this Order.

Furthermore, respondent MASADA SECURITY AGENCY is ORDERED to submit within the same period its annual medical and annual work accident/illness reports, otherwise, its failure to comply with the following directives will compel this Office to take necessary action appropriate under the circumstances for the criminal prosecution of the respondent pursuant to  the penal provision of the Labor Code, as amended.

Let a copy of this Order be famished to PC-SUSIA Central Headquarters for information and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.^[3]

NFA and petitioner separately moved to reconsider the September 10, 1999 Order and both were given due course. The Regional Director found that at the time of inspection, Bayugo, Buenavista and Barcena were no longer employees of petitioner and held that the non-existence of employer-employee relationship divested the DOLE-CAR of jurisdiction over their respective cases. The Regional Director ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration filed separately by respondents are hereby given due course and the assailed Order of September 10, 1999 is hereby MODIFIED and Masada Security Agency is hereby ORDERED to pay within ten (10) calendar days the total amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY & 64/100 (Php 26,830.64) PESOS to Rizald[y] Belleza, Roderick Belleza, [Gaudiel Felicitas] and Jesus Babida . . . . Likewise, the cases filed by Messers. Teddy Bayugo, Edwin Buenavista and Rodelito Barcena are hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.^[4]

Petitioner appealed the Order of the Regional Director to the DOLE Secretary. However, by Order^[5] dated January 15, 2003, then DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Secretary's order, but the same was denied on June 23, 2003.

Hence, this petition.

It is worth noting that petitioner denominated its petition as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 despite alleging grave abuse of discretion, a ground proper for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. We thus treat the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as the allegations of the pleading prevail over its title in determining the character of the action taken.^[6]

Petitioner argues that the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion (1) when she awarded salary differentials to private respondents and used as basis for computing such award the 391.50 working-day formula found in the PADPAO Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 1999, and (2) when she dismissed petitioner's appeal on mere technicality, which dismissal if not rectified, would cause grave irreparable injury and damage to petitioner.

We deny the petition.

Petitioner's correct remedy from the Order of the Secretary of Labor was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme Court. As held in the case of National Federation of Labor v. Laguesma:^[7]

In two instances, however, there is specific mention of a remedy from the decision of the Secretary of Labor, thus:

(1) Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the amended implementing rules provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on appeal from the Med-Arbiter's decision on a petition for certification election shall be final and executory, but that the implementation of the Secretary's decision affirming the Med-Arbiter's decision to conduct a certification election "shall not be stayed unless restrained by the appropriate court."

(2) Section 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices provides that "the filing of a petition  for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the [appealed] order or decision unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court."

We perceive no conflict with our pronouncements on the proper remedy which is Rule 65 and which should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Accordingly, we read "the appropriate court" in Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the Implementing Rules to refer to the Court of Appeals.

Section 5, Rule V of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices specifying the Supreme Court as the forum for filing the petition for certiorari is not infirm in like manner or similarly as is the statute involved in Fabian v. Desierto. And Section 5 cannot be read to mean that the petition for certiorari can only be filed exclusively and solely with this Court, as the provision must invariably be read in relation to the pertinent laws on the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals in Rule 65 petitions.

In fine, we find that it is proceduraUy feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules be tiled initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of the courts, emphasized in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction."^[8] (Emphasis supplied.)

There being no showing of exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify a disregard of the hierarchy of courts, we find that petitioner inappropriately filed the instant petition before this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

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^[1] Rollo, pp. 288-290.

^[2] Id. at 339-343.

^[3] Id. at 342-343.

^[4] Id. at 403.

^[5] Id. at 292-294.

^[6] Tomas v. Santos, G.R. No. 190448, July 26, 2010, p. 5.

^[7] G.R. No. 123426, March 10, 1999, 304 SCRA 405.

^[8] Id. at 418-420.