July 2012 - Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions
[G.R No. 202143 : July 03, 2012]
FAMELA R. DULAY v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v. Judicial and Bar Council and Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., as Executive Secretary.). - This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by petitioner Famela R. Dulay against the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., raising the following issues:
- Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can legitimately, validly and constitutionally accepts (sic) application for nomination and interview of nominees for the position of a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court and, thereafter, submits (sic) short list of nominees to the President of the Republic of the Philippines for the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court;
- Whether the President of the Republic of the Philippines may legitimately, validly and constitutionally appoint a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court, in replacement of the removed and impeached Honorable Renato C. Corona;
- Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can constitutionally be headed by a retired Associate Justice of the Honorable Court, instead of an incumbent Chief Justice of the Honorable Court.[1]
We dismiss the petition.
At the outset, we look into the locus standi of petitioner to institute the present petition.
As held in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[5]
xxx In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.[6]
Indeed a liberal approach had been adopted in several notable cases. Petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others provided that she sufficiently demonstrates in her petition that she is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. The assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging an official action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general.[7]
In this case, however, petitioner has not shown in her petition that she is entitled to protection or relief from the Court. She did not even explain her capacity in instituting the present special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. Nowhere in her petition did she assert her right either as citizen or taxpayer filing her petition on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issues. Accordingly, she is wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition. Outright dismissal of the present petition is, therefore, warranted.
Even if we ignore the technical defect and we look into the merits of the case, the petition is still bound to be dismissed.
Simply stated, petitioner seeks the resolution of two substantive issues: (1) whether or not the President of the Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; and (2) whether or not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the incumbent Chief Justice.
We answer in the affirmative to both questions.
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Justices and Judges, to wit:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner considers only the Associate Justices as the "members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the Chief Justice from the President's appointing power. Said interpretation is baseless.
A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members" and "Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.
Section 4 (l),[8] Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme Court, namely, "a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members; Section 4 (2)[9] and (3)[10] describe the manner of conducting business in the Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7 (1)[11] enumerates the qualifications of the Members of the Court and the other members of the Judiciary; Section 11[12] provides for the security of tenure in the Judiciary; Section 12[13] states the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts; and Section 13[14] lays down the process of decision-making. In all of these provisions, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not only to the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9 of the same Article VIII on the appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen (14) Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power of the President. Although decided under a different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza[15] that "there can be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required x x x to compose the Supreme Court are the regular members of the Court."[16]
We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent Chief Justice and no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in the Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument that if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the same will not be filled because there will be no "incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.
We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary.[17] For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list.[18] Any vacancy in the Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.[19] This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally-named ex-officio Chairman does not sit in the JBC. This intention is evident from the exchanges among the Commissioners during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, viz.:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a complete complement.
MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon ratification of this Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council shall be in operation.
MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so.
MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members thereof is a Member of Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By the time this is ratified, Congress is not yet convened and there will still be an election; so there will still be a delay of more than 90 days. Maybe before the vacancies occur in the Supreme Court, they will be filled up by the President.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible.
MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take perhaps until November or December before the four other justices will be appointed, if we follow the Judicial and Bar Council. Or can the Judicial and Bar Council function without the presence yet of a member of Congress who is an ex-officio member?
MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without the ex-officio member because a majority would be enough, although it would be preferable if it were complete.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification of this Constitution, it is possible, and the President may do it by appointing the members of the Judicial and Bar Council without first a representative from Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can immediately fill up the four vacancies in the Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct.
MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for the record, that the vacancies in the Supreme Court be immediately filled up so that our backlog of cases can be immediately attended to.
x x x (Emphases supplied)[20]
Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of representation. The most Senior Justice of this Court who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should participate in the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally-named Ex-Officio Chairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:
Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we DISMISS the petition." (Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Abad and Sereno, JJ., no part, Peralta, J., presiding, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., present) cralaw
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
[1] Rollo, p. 8.[2] Id. at 9.
[3] Id. at 12.
[4] Id .at 12-13.
[5] G.R. Nos. 191002, 191032, 191057 and A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 666.
[6] De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra, at 722.
[7] Id. at 724-725.
[8] Section 4 (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
[9] (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis supplied.)
[10] (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
[11] Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (Emphases supplied.)
[12] Section 11.The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis supplied.)
[13] Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
[14] Section 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
[15] 80 Phil. 297 (1948).
[16] See: The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary by Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., 2003 Edition, p. 985.
[17] 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 8 (5).
[18] The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary by Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., 2003 Edition, p. 985.
[19] 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 4(1).
[20] Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, vol. V, pp. 632-633.
