April 1905 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. 2374 April 26, 1905 - RUBERT & GUAMIS v. JOHN C. SWEENEY
004 Phil 473:
004 Phil 473:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 2374. April 26, 1905. ]
RUBERT & GUAMIS, Petitioner, v. JOHN C. SWEENEY, Respondent.
C . W . Ney, for Petitioner.
J . W . Haussermann, for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JURISDICTION; ERROR; APPEAL. — The fact that a judge may have committed an error in disregarding the stipulation of the parties has nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction which by law the judge was authorized to exercise. If there was such error, it must be corrected by appeal.
D E C I S I O N
WILLARD, J. :
This is an original action of prohibition in this court.
One Lo Shui recovered a judgment in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Miss A. Hunter, and an execution upon such judgment was issued and delivered to the sheriff of Manila for service. Under this execution, the sheriff seized certain personal property belonging to Miss Hunter, and advertised it for sale. Before the sale was made the partnership of Rubert & Guamis commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the said Lo Shui and the sheriff. In their complaint in that action they allege that they were creditors of Miss Hunter, and as such creditors had a better right to the property seized by the sheriff than had Lo Shui. They asked for and obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the sheriff from proceeding with the sale until the further order of the court. After the injunction was granted, the said partnership of Rubert & Guamis and the said Lo Shui entered into a stipulation agreeing that, notwithstanding the injunction, the sale already advertised might take place and that the sheriff should hold the proceeds of said sale subject to the final judgment which might be entered in the case of Rubert & Guamis v. Lo Shui and the sheriff. This stipulation was approved by the judge who granted the injunction. The sale was made and the net proceeds thereof, amounting to P936.12, were in the hands of the sheriff when the defendants, Lo Shui and the sheriff, in the case against them made a motion for the dissolution of the injunction. This motion was heard and the court made an order modifying the injunction so as to require the sheriff to pay the money in his hands to the clerk of the court and requiring the clerk of the court to pay it over to Lo Shui upon his filing in court a bond with sureties satisfactory to the court, and with the condition that he hold the money subject to the orders of the court in that case, and pay the same in when so ordered.
Ten days after the making of the order modifying the injunction, Rubert & Guamis, the plaintiff partnership in the case below, commenced this action of prohibition in this court. The defendant judge has answered and the case is before us for determination upon the complaint and answer, there being no dispute as to the facts. No final judgment has been entered in the case of Rubert & Guamis v. Lo Shui and the sheriff, and it stands, so far as the record shows, where it did when the order modifying the preliminary injunction was made.
The court below had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of that suit and of the parties thereto. It had power by law to grant an injunction in the case and power to dissolve it or modify it. There can be no doubt of the correctness of these propositions, but it is claimed by the plaintiff in this suit that the stipulation made between the parties to the suit below to the effect that the sheriff should hold the money until the final judgment in that case, deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order modifying the injunction and requiring the sheriff to pay the money to the defendant Lo Shui upon his furnishing a proper bond.
When section 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of a tribunal exercising functions which are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, it covers those cases only in which such tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction which the parties may have attempted by stipulation to confer upon it, or in excess of a jurisdiction to which the parties may by stipulation have attempted to limit the court. The fact that the judge may have committed an error in disregarding the stipulation of the parties has nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction which by law the judge was authorized to exercise. If there was such an error in the action of the court below, it was an error that must be corrected by appeal. An action of prohibition can not be maintained in such cases. (Ivancich v. Odlin, 1. Phil. Rep., 284; Dy Chuan Leng v. Ambler, 1 Phil. Rep., 535; In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; Felizardo v. Justice of the Peace of Imus, 2 Off. Gaz., 529.) There is nothing in the case of Yangco v. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404), relied upon by the plaintiff, in conflict with this rule. As was stated in the case of Dy Chuan Leng v. Ambler above cited, the writ of prohibition was there granted upon the ground that in no case where the fact of marriage was denied did the Court of First Instance have any jurisdiction to grant temporary alimony.
Final judgment will be entered in this case in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, with the costs against the plaintiff.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his opinion.
One Lo Shui recovered a judgment in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Miss A. Hunter, and an execution upon such judgment was issued and delivered to the sheriff of Manila for service. Under this execution, the sheriff seized certain personal property belonging to Miss Hunter, and advertised it for sale. Before the sale was made the partnership of Rubert & Guamis commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the said Lo Shui and the sheriff. In their complaint in that action they allege that they were creditors of Miss Hunter, and as such creditors had a better right to the property seized by the sheriff than had Lo Shui. They asked for and obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the sheriff from proceeding with the sale until the further order of the court. After the injunction was granted, the said partnership of Rubert & Guamis and the said Lo Shui entered into a stipulation agreeing that, notwithstanding the injunction, the sale already advertised might take place and that the sheriff should hold the proceeds of said sale subject to the final judgment which might be entered in the case of Rubert & Guamis v. Lo Shui and the sheriff. This stipulation was approved by the judge who granted the injunction. The sale was made and the net proceeds thereof, amounting to P936.12, were in the hands of the sheriff when the defendants, Lo Shui and the sheriff, in the case against them made a motion for the dissolution of the injunction. This motion was heard and the court made an order modifying the injunction so as to require the sheriff to pay the money in his hands to the clerk of the court and requiring the clerk of the court to pay it over to Lo Shui upon his filing in court a bond with sureties satisfactory to the court, and with the condition that he hold the money subject to the orders of the court in that case, and pay the same in when so ordered.
Ten days after the making of the order modifying the injunction, Rubert & Guamis, the plaintiff partnership in the case below, commenced this action of prohibition in this court. The defendant judge has answered and the case is before us for determination upon the complaint and answer, there being no dispute as to the facts. No final judgment has been entered in the case of Rubert & Guamis v. Lo Shui and the sheriff, and it stands, so far as the record shows, where it did when the order modifying the preliminary injunction was made.
The court below had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of that suit and of the parties thereto. It had power by law to grant an injunction in the case and power to dissolve it or modify it. There can be no doubt of the correctness of these propositions, but it is claimed by the plaintiff in this suit that the stipulation made between the parties to the suit below to the effect that the sheriff should hold the money until the final judgment in that case, deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order modifying the injunction and requiring the sheriff to pay the money to the defendant Lo Shui upon his furnishing a proper bond.
When section 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of a tribunal exercising functions which are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, it covers those cases only in which such tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction which the parties may have attempted by stipulation to confer upon it, or in excess of a jurisdiction to which the parties may by stipulation have attempted to limit the court. The fact that the judge may have committed an error in disregarding the stipulation of the parties has nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction which by law the judge was authorized to exercise. If there was such an error in the action of the court below, it was an error that must be corrected by appeal. An action of prohibition can not be maintained in such cases. (Ivancich v. Odlin, 1. Phil. Rep., 284; Dy Chuan Leng v. Ambler, 1 Phil. Rep., 535; In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; Felizardo v. Justice of the Peace of Imus, 2 Off. Gaz., 529.) There is nothing in the case of Yangco v. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404), relied upon by the plaintiff, in conflict with this rule. As was stated in the case of Dy Chuan Leng v. Ambler above cited, the writ of prohibition was there granted upon the ground that in no case where the fact of marriage was denied did the Court of First Instance have any jurisdiction to grant temporary alimony.
Final judgment will be entered in this case in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, with the costs against the plaintiff.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his opinion.
