April 1906 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. 2309 April 19, 1906 - UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON TAYLOR
006 Phil 162:
006 Phil 162:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 2309. April 19, 1906. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDERSON TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
H. S. Terrell, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. ASSAULT; PUBLIC AUTHORITY; AGENT. — Paragraph 3 of article 250 of the Penal Code is only applicable in those cases where the person accused of an "attempt upon an authority" lays violent hands upon the authority himself, and is not applicable where he lays violent hands on an "agent of an authority."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICEMEN. — A policeman is not an authority as defined in the Penal Code, but an agent of an authority.
3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. — The fact that an offense was committed in an uncontrollable burst of passion (con arrebato y obcecacion) should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICEMEN. — A policeman is not an authority as defined in the Penal Code, but an agent of an authority.
3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE; PASSION AND OBFUSCATION. — The fact that an offense was committed in an uncontrollable burst of passion (con arrebato y obcecacion) should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts.
D E C I S I O N
CARSON, J. :
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively establishes the facts set out in the complaint, and it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, while resisting arrest, violently assaulted one Leoncio Martinez, a municipal policeman of the city of Manila.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the arrest was illegal, and that the policeman was therefore the aggressor, but it appears from the record that the accused and his companions, in violation of a lawful ordinance of the city of Manila, made use of threatening and insulting language on the public streets of the said city, in the presence and within the hearing of the said policeman, and that the said policeman was in the lawful performance of his duty when he attempted to make the arrest.
The trial court imposed the penalty under provisions of paragraph 3 of article 250 of the Penal Code. That paragraph is only applicable to those cases where the persons accused of an attempt upon the authority (atentado contra la autoridad) places violent hands upon the authority himself. It is not applicable to cases where the crime is committed against an agent of the authority agente de autoridad.) A policeman is not an authority as defined in the Penal Code, but an agent of the authority, and therefore the penalty should be imposed in accordance with the last paragraph of the said article.
The trial court was of opinion that in fixing the penalty the extenuating circumstance defined in paragraph 7 of article should be taken into consideration, because the accused committed the offense in an uncontrollable burst of sudden passion (arrebato y obcecacion), but the supreme court of Spain has repeatedly held that the fact that the offense was committed under the stimulus of a sudden burst of passion should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 15, 1878; March 8, 1884; August 20, 1885; October 11, 1887.) The arrest of the accused and his companions which gave rise to their indignation and anger was a lawful one, and therefore the trial court erred in finding the existence of the said extenuating circumstance.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed, and instead thereof we impose upon the said Anderson Taylor the medium degree of the penalty of "prision correccional in its minimum to its medium degree" — that is to say, one year eight months and twenty-one days’ imprisonment (prision correccional) and a fine of 375 pesetas and the costs of the proceedings on both instances.
The accused is entitled to and will be allowed a credit (abono) of one-half the period during which he has been held in detention pending the trial of his case and the hearing of his appeal, in accordance with the provisions of rule 93 of the Ley Provisional. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment let the record be remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the arrest was illegal, and that the policeman was therefore the aggressor, but it appears from the record that the accused and his companions, in violation of a lawful ordinance of the city of Manila, made use of threatening and insulting language on the public streets of the said city, in the presence and within the hearing of the said policeman, and that the said policeman was in the lawful performance of his duty when he attempted to make the arrest.
The trial court imposed the penalty under provisions of paragraph 3 of article 250 of the Penal Code. That paragraph is only applicable to those cases where the persons accused of an attempt upon the authority (atentado contra la autoridad) places violent hands upon the authority himself. It is not applicable to cases where the crime is committed against an agent of the authority agente de autoridad.) A policeman is not an authority as defined in the Penal Code, but an agent of the authority, and therefore the penalty should be imposed in accordance with the last paragraph of the said article.
The trial court was of opinion that in fixing the penalty the extenuating circumstance defined in paragraph 7 of article should be taken into consideration, because the accused committed the offense in an uncontrollable burst of sudden passion (arrebato y obcecacion), but the supreme court of Spain has repeatedly held that the fact that the offense was committed under the stimulus of a sudden burst of passion should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper acts. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 15, 1878; March 8, 1884; August 20, 1885; October 11, 1887.) The arrest of the accused and his companions which gave rise to their indignation and anger was a lawful one, and therefore the trial court erred in finding the existence of the said extenuating circumstance.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed, and instead thereof we impose upon the said Anderson Taylor the medium degree of the penalty of "prision correccional in its minimum to its medium degree" — that is to say, one year eight months and twenty-one days’ imprisonment (prision correccional) and a fine of 375 pesetas and the costs of the proceedings on both instances.
The accused is entitled to and will be allowed a credit (abono) of one-half the period during which he has been held in detention pending the trial of his case and the hearing of his appeal, in accordance with the provisions of rule 93 of the Ley Provisional. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment let the record be remanded to the court below for proper action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Willard, JJ., concur.
