November 1917 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1917 > November 1917 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-12696 November 19, 1917 - UNITED STATES v. PETRA TOLOSA
037 Phil 166:
037 Phil 166:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-12696. November 19, 1917. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRA TOLOSA, Defendant-Appellant.
Vicente de Vera for Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; GRAVE INSULTS. — Defendant, a woman of violent temper, hurled at the complainant, a respectable lady with young daughters, offensive and scurrilous epithets, including words imputing unchastity to the mother and tending to injure the characters of her daughters. Held: That defendant is guilty of the crime of injurias graves (grave insults). The history and principles of this crime are discussed in the opinion.
D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J. :
An all too frequent occurrence in the Philippines, in which a certain class of ignorant people seem to take a delight, is for two or more individuals to express loudly and in unabridged and forceful words, their frank opinion of each other’s characters and antecedents.
That something like such a neighborhood brawl occurred in this instance, we have little doubt. Two families, living in houses about 15 meters apart, had had altercations on various subjects. The defendant, whom the lower court describes in his decision as having the natural temperament, vehemence of expression, and other peculiar characteristics as indicate the kind of a woman that would stir up disturbances at the least provocation or whenever she feel offended, fanned the flame of her wrath with these quarrels. The result — defendant leaned from her window and hurled at the complainant offensive and scurrilous epithets, including words imputing unchastity to the mother and tending to injure the characters of her daughters.
The common scold was the denomination in by-gone days for women with loose and free tongues; their punishment was the ducking stool. The old common law rule was, that oral words imputing unchastity to a woman were not actionable without proof of special damage. After being denounced as barbarous by eminent English judges, this rule has, within recent years, been discarded in many progressive jurisdictions. In Great Britain, certain provinces of Canada, and certain States of the American Union, oral words imputing unchastity are per se actionable. The Spanish law reaches an identical conclusion.
"The imputation of vice or lack of morality, the consequences of which may greatly damage the fame, credit or interest of the offended party, being a serious insult (injuria grave) according to article 472; and the words with the caused hurled against her to the effect that the ’later’s house was one of ill fame.’ thereby undougbtedly prejudiced her name, fame, and credit, as they attributed lack of morality in her habits which belittles her in the public eye, etc." (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of November 22, 1873, and of February 4, 1878; Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, pp. 222 et seq.)
Under the Libel Law, a similar rule prevails in the Philippines. (U. S. v. Grino [1917], 36 Phil. Rep., 738.)
Two decisions of the court are brought to our notice. In the United States v. Ganzon ([1915] 30 Phil., 1), the defendant and appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor, instead of the crime of injurias graves, on the ground principally that the offensive language was not intended to be taken in its literal sense and neither of the parties so understood it. But in the United States v. Canleon ([1908] 11 Phil., 215), a man was convicted of injurias graves because of insulting words said to a woman.
Our present facts follow rather the latter case than the former. The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complaint. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance, apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and laud slander, which so debauches and degrades womanhood. Shrews must be tamed in the modern Philippines just as they were in the lines of Shakespeare. The words of the Good Book in Proverbs xxi, can also be read with profit.
Article 457, Nos. 2 and 3, in connection with article 458, last paragraph, of the Penal Code, define such grave insults and provide for their punishment. In accordance with these provisions of the law, the judgment of the lower court is modified by sentencing the defendant the appellant to destierro (banishment), to be served 25 kilometers beyond the municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, for the period of one year eight months and twenty-one days, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, or to suffer subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C,J., Johnson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.
CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur. I think it well, however, to indicate that in my opinion there is no real conflict in the doctrine announced in this case and the cases of the United States v. Ganzon (30 Phil. Rep., 1).
In the case of United States v. Ganzon decided in 1916 (supra) we said in the language of the syllabus.
"The use of insulting language in the course of a wordy brawl is a misdemeanor, and does not constitute the crime of injurias graves (grave insults) when there is reason to believe that the offensive language was not intended to be taken in its literal sense, and that neither of the parties so understood it," and in the body of the opinion we said; "after a careful review of all the evidence of record we think it is clear that the defendant, a woman who kept a tienda in her native town, had a bitter altercation with the complaining witness of this case, a woman named Maximina Mina; that in the course of this quarrel offensive and scurrilous epithets were hurled by each of the parties against the other in the heat of passion and without taking thought of the highly offensive character in the language used. We are satisfied that this offensive language was not intended to be taken in its literal sense, and that neither of the parties so understood it. They seem simply to have searched their memories for insulting and offensive expressions by which they could relieve their feelings of rage and animosity. Doubtless if some of the language used were deliberately applied by one woman with reference to another, it would constitute the grave insults (injurias graves) mentioned in the statute, but we think that used as this language was, without any reference to its real meaning and under all the circumstance, it should be treated rather as language constituting the misdemeanor defined and penalized in article 589 of the Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court in the present case having found that "the language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant;" and that the words were "uttered with evident intent to injure the complainant and ruin her reputation," and that the accused sought "to impute vice and immorality . . . to an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters;" there can be no question that the doctrine of the former case is not applicable in the present case.
The case are distinguished upon the facts and not upon the law by which they are governed.
That something like such a neighborhood brawl occurred in this instance, we have little doubt. Two families, living in houses about 15 meters apart, had had altercations on various subjects. The defendant, whom the lower court describes in his decision as having the natural temperament, vehemence of expression, and other peculiar characteristics as indicate the kind of a woman that would stir up disturbances at the least provocation or whenever she feel offended, fanned the flame of her wrath with these quarrels. The result — defendant leaned from her window and hurled at the complainant offensive and scurrilous epithets, including words imputing unchastity to the mother and tending to injure the characters of her daughters.
The common scold was the denomination in by-gone days for women with loose and free tongues; their punishment was the ducking stool. The old common law rule was, that oral words imputing unchastity to a woman were not actionable without proof of special damage. After being denounced as barbarous by eminent English judges, this rule has, within recent years, been discarded in many progressive jurisdictions. In Great Britain, certain provinces of Canada, and certain States of the American Union, oral words imputing unchastity are per se actionable. The Spanish law reaches an identical conclusion.
"The imputation of vice or lack of morality, the consequences of which may greatly damage the fame, credit or interest of the offended party, being a serious insult (injuria grave) according to article 472; and the words with the caused hurled against her to the effect that the ’later’s house was one of ill fame.’ thereby undougbtedly prejudiced her name, fame, and credit, as they attributed lack of morality in her habits which belittles her in the public eye, etc." (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of November 22, 1873, and of February 4, 1878; Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, pp. 222 et seq.)
Under the Libel Law, a similar rule prevails in the Philippines. (U. S. v. Grino [1917], 36 Phil. Rep., 738.)
Two decisions of the court are brought to our notice. In the United States v. Ganzon ([1915] 30 Phil., 1), the defendant and appellant was convicted of a misdemeanor, instead of the crime of injurias graves, on the ground principally that the offensive language was not intended to be taken in its literal sense and neither of the parties so understood it. But in the United States v. Canleon ([1908] 11 Phil., 215), a man was convicted of injurias graves because of insulting words said to a woman.
Our present facts follow rather the latter case than the former. The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complaint. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance, apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and laud slander, which so debauches and degrades womanhood. Shrews must be tamed in the modern Philippines just as they were in the lines of Shakespeare. The words of the Good Book in Proverbs xxi, can also be read with profit.
Article 457, Nos. 2 and 3, in connection with article 458, last paragraph, of the Penal Code, define such grave insults and provide for their punishment. In accordance with these provisions of the law, the judgment of the lower court is modified by sentencing the defendant the appellant to destierro (banishment), to be served 25 kilometers beyond the municipality of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, for the period of one year eight months and twenty-one days, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, or to suffer subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C,J., Johnson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur. I think it well, however, to indicate that in my opinion there is no real conflict in the doctrine announced in this case and the cases of the United States v. Ganzon (30 Phil. Rep., 1).
In the case of United States v. Ganzon decided in 1916 (supra) we said in the language of the syllabus.
"The use of insulting language in the course of a wordy brawl is a misdemeanor, and does not constitute the crime of injurias graves (grave insults) when there is reason to believe that the offensive language was not intended to be taken in its literal sense, and that neither of the parties so understood it," and in the body of the opinion we said; "after a careful review of all the evidence of record we think it is clear that the defendant, a woman who kept a tienda in her native town, had a bitter altercation with the complaining witness of this case, a woman named Maximina Mina; that in the course of this quarrel offensive and scurrilous epithets were hurled by each of the parties against the other in the heat of passion and without taking thought of the highly offensive character in the language used. We are satisfied that this offensive language was not intended to be taken in its literal sense, and that neither of the parties so understood it. They seem simply to have searched their memories for insulting and offensive expressions by which they could relieve their feelings of rage and animosity. Doubtless if some of the language used were deliberately applied by one woman with reference to another, it would constitute the grave insults (injurias graves) mentioned in the statute, but we think that used as this language was, without any reference to its real meaning and under all the circumstance, it should be treated rather as language constituting the misdemeanor defined and penalized in article 589 of the Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court in the present case having found that "the language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant;" and that the words were "uttered with evident intent to injure the complainant and ruin her reputation," and that the accused sought "to impute vice and immorality . . . to an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters;" there can be no question that the doctrine of the former case is not applicable in the present case.
The case are distinguished upon the facts and not upon the law by which they are governed.
