December 1930 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. 34428 December 29, 1930 - BALTAZAR MORALES v. ISIDRO PAREDES
055 Phil 565:
055 Phil 565:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 34428. December 29, 1930.]
BALTAZAR MORALES, Petitioner, v. ISIDRO PAREDES, Judge of First Instance of Pangasinan, ET AL., Respondents.
Nicolas Belmonte for Petitioner.
The respondent Judge in his own behalf.
Turner, Rheberg & Sanchez for respondents P. Gavino, R. Gavino and Prudencio Gavino.
SYLLABUS
1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECISIONS ON GROUND OF FRAUD. — The proper remedy in a case where a party has been deprived of his land or of any estate or interest therein, by reason of fraud, is to petition the court for a review under section 38 of the Land Registration Act. In the instant case, the plaintiff’s contention that such review cannot be had until the final decree has been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by this court. It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the ground of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud.
2. ID.; ID.; "OBITER DICTUM." — A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not be regarded as such.
2. ID.; ID.; "OBITER DICTUM." — A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not be regarded as such.
D E C I S I O N
OSTRAND, J.:
Pedro, Rosendo, and Prudencio Gavino applied for the registration of a parcel of land situated in the poblacion of the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, and on June 23, 1930, the application was granted and a decision to that effect rendered. Baltazar Morales now claims to be the owner of the land, but he was not advised of the registration proceedings and was not informed thereof until the early part of the month of September, 1930. He thereupon filed a motion on September 18 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for the reconsideration of the decision of June 23 and as far as the record shows the motion may still be pending. Without dismissal of the motion mentioned, the movant brought the present action praying that the aforesaid decision be set aside and that a new trial be granted in accordance with section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without deciding that the allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the proper remedy is to petition for a review under section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiff’s contention that such review cannot be had until the final decree has been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by this court. In the case of Rivera v. Moran (48 Phil., 836), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed ’within one year after entry of the decree.’ Giving this provision a lateral interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court’s decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Plurad v. Alcaide, G. R. No. 27545, 1 there is an indication that there can be no review until the final decree has been issued. This indication is only obiter dictum and was not voted upon by the court; the determination of the case rested on other grounds and the dictum was not taken into consideration by the court as a whole. A dictum not necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.
The plaintiff’s view of the extent of actions under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is erroneous. This court has no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that section if other adequate remedies are available, and such remedies are not lacking in the present case.
The case is therefore dismissed with the costs against the plaintiff. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
The plaintiff has unfortunately mistaken his remedy. Assuming without deciding that the allegations of fraud in his complaint are true, the proper remedy is to petition for a review under section 38 of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiff’s contention that such review cannot be had until the final decree has been issued is not in accordance with the view adopted by this court. In the case of Rivera v. Moran (48 Phil., 836), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the grounds of fraud must be filed ’within one year after entry of the decree.’ Giving this provision a lateral interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating that such petitions must be presented before the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court’s decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Plurad v. Alcaide, G. R. No. 27545, 1 there is an indication that there can be no review until the final decree has been issued. This indication is only obiter dictum and was not voted upon by the court; the determination of the case rested on other grounds and the dictum was not taken into consideration by the court as a whole. A dictum not necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force of an adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such.
The plaintiff’s view of the extent of actions under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure is erroneous. This court has no jurisdiction to reopen judgments under that section if other adequate remedies are available, and such remedies are not lacking in the present case.
The case is therefore dismissed with the costs against the plaintiff. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Promulgated December 24, 1927, not reported.
