August 1931 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 33770 August 8, 1930
PACIFICO VICTORIANO v. LEOPOLDO ROVIRA
055 Phil 1000:
PACIFICO VICTORIANO v. LEOPOLDO ROVIRA
055 Phil 1000:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 33770. August 8, 1930.]
PACIFICO VICTORIANO, Petitioner, v. LEOPOLDO ROVIRA and PEDRO MA. SISON, Judges of First Instance, FRANCISCO J. GONZALEZ, JOSE MARTINEZ DE SAN AGUSTIN, and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondents.
Adolfo Brillantes for Petitioner.
Jose Martinez de San Agustin in his own behalf and for respondent Gonzalez.
No appearance for other respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. DEED OF SALE OF REAL PROPERTY; CANCELLATION OF "LIS PENDENS." — Ordinarily a notice of lis pendens which has been filed in a proper case cannot be cancelled, while the action is pending and undetermined, except in cases expressly provided for by statute. But there may be exceptions, and it has been held that a court has the inherent power in the absence of statute to cancel a lis pendens in a proper case.
D E C I S I O N
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, the petitioner, Dr. Pacifico Victoriano, alleging that the respondent judges exceeded their jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
It appears from the records before us that on May 29, 1922, the petitioner purchased a lot, with the buildings thereon, from one Narciso Javier for the sum of P80,000. The property was incumbered with two mortgages to the total amount of P72,000, and the petitioner paid only P8,000 in actual cash and assumed the payment of the mortgages, the remaining part of the purchase money. In the meantime, the petitioner organized a school named "Colegio Liceo de Manila" of which he was the director, and the property referred to was used for the purposes of the school. The respondent Gonzalez also seems to have had an interest in the school and held one of the mortgages which was given as security for the sum of P47,000. The other mortgage was held by the Shanghai Life Insurance Company, Ltd., and it being a first mortgage, it seems that it eventually became necessary for Gonzalez to settle the matter with the insurance company in order to protect the second mortgage held by him.
The petitioner seems to have been unable to pay the interest on the mortgages, and in the beginning of May, 1928, Gonzalez threatened to foreclose the mortgages and thus compelled the petitioner to make a settlement so as to prevent the transfer of the school to other quarters. The accounts then showed that, including overdue interest, the amount due Gonzalez on the mortgages was P78,426.61, and on May 3, 1928, two documents were executed, one of which was a deed of sale to Gonzalez of the petitioner’s remaining interest in the aforesaid property in consideration of the payment of P2,500. The other document was a lease of the property executed by Gonzalez in favor of the petitioner, the stipulated rent being P700 per month. Two days later, transfer certificate of title to the property was issued in favor of Gonzalez.
The petitioner failed to pay the rent, and on May 2, 1929, an action of unlawful detainer was brought against him by Gonzalez in the municipal court of the City of Manila. Five days later, the petitioner brought an action against Gonzalez and the latter’s attorney, Jose Martinez de San Agustin, for the annulment of the documents executed on May 3, 1928, on the ground that he, the petitioner was led to execute said documents by reason of insidious and fraudulent machinations of the defendants and by their threats. As a result of similar allegations, the municipal court refused to take jurisdiction of the unlawful detainer suit and certified it to the Court of First Instance, where it eventually was consolidated with the action for the annulment of the aforesaid documents. The cases were assigned for hearing several times, but were continued at the instance of counsel for the herein petitioner, and no evidence was taken until February 27 of the present year, when Doctor Victoriano and three of his assistants testified. The cases were again continued, and, so far, no further evidence appears to have been presented.
Apparently becoming impatient, the defendant Gonzalez, on May 21, filed a motion in the Court of First Instance praying that the plaintiff, Pacifico Victoriano, be ordered to give a bond in the sum of P10,000 to respond for the damages resulting from the fact that said plaintiff, in connection with the action brought by him, had filed a notice of lis pendens with the register of deeds of Manila, which prevented Gonzalez from disposing of the property in question. Judge Rovira, the vacation judge, after hearing counsel, issued an order, the dispositive part of which reads as follows in translation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"You are hereby notified that on June 3, 1930, this court issued an order in the above-entitled case, to the plaintiff advising him that if he desired to have the lis pendens annotation continued, he must within five days from notice hereof give bond in the amount of five thousand pesos to answer for any damages that may be occasioned the defendant by such annotation; provided, however, that should he fail to do so, the register of deeds shall proceed to cancel the lis pendens annotation, leaving it without effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
A motion for reconsideration was presented by Doctor Victoriano’s counsel, but the then acting judge, Pedro Ma. Sison, denied the motion.
The present petition for a writ of prohibition was there-upon brought before this court, the petitioner maintaining that his notice of lis pendens was duly filed in accordance with the provisions of section 79 of the Land Registration Act and that under our laws, the courts had no power to order the cancellation of the notice before a final judgment of the case to which it related had been rendered.
At first sight, it may seem that the petitioner’s contention is correct; ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case cannot be cancelled, while the action is pending and undetermined, except in cases expressly provided for by statute (38 C. J., 45). But there may be exceptions, and it has been held that a court has the inherent power in the absence of statute to cancel a lis pendens in a proper case (Sternberger v. Tunison, 92 N. J. Eq., 159).
It may be conceded that the present case is rather close, but taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances, we do not feel justified in holding that the respondent judges exceeded their jurisdiction. The petitioner did not bring his action until over a year after the sale to Gonzalez, and the evidence he has presented up to the present time does not bear out the main allegations of the complaint. He must also be held responsible for most of the continuances of the trial of the two cases before the Court of First Instance, a matter which lends color to the assertion of counsel for the respondent that he desired to prolong the litigation with a view to hold possession of the property in question as long as possible without paying rent. When we further take into consideration that the rent stipulated in the lease was P700 per month and that the petitioner therefore must have owed Gonzalez over P17,000 in overdue rent, we cannot say that the court below erred in requiring him to give bond in the modest sum of P5,000 and in ordering the cancellation of the lis pendens in the event that the petitioner failed to present the bond.
There are also other circumstances which have important bearing on the matter now before us, but inasmuch as they are directly connected with the aforesaid undecided cases pending in the Court of First Instance, we refrain from discussing them at the present time.
Writs of prohibition go to the jurisdiction, and as we cannot hold that the court below exceeded such jurisdiction, the petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
It appears from the records before us that on May 29, 1922, the petitioner purchased a lot, with the buildings thereon, from one Narciso Javier for the sum of P80,000. The property was incumbered with two mortgages to the total amount of P72,000, and the petitioner paid only P8,000 in actual cash and assumed the payment of the mortgages, the remaining part of the purchase money. In the meantime, the petitioner organized a school named "Colegio Liceo de Manila" of which he was the director, and the property referred to was used for the purposes of the school. The respondent Gonzalez also seems to have had an interest in the school and held one of the mortgages which was given as security for the sum of P47,000. The other mortgage was held by the Shanghai Life Insurance Company, Ltd., and it being a first mortgage, it seems that it eventually became necessary for Gonzalez to settle the matter with the insurance company in order to protect the second mortgage held by him.
The petitioner seems to have been unable to pay the interest on the mortgages, and in the beginning of May, 1928, Gonzalez threatened to foreclose the mortgages and thus compelled the petitioner to make a settlement so as to prevent the transfer of the school to other quarters. The accounts then showed that, including overdue interest, the amount due Gonzalez on the mortgages was P78,426.61, and on May 3, 1928, two documents were executed, one of which was a deed of sale to Gonzalez of the petitioner’s remaining interest in the aforesaid property in consideration of the payment of P2,500. The other document was a lease of the property executed by Gonzalez in favor of the petitioner, the stipulated rent being P700 per month. Two days later, transfer certificate of title to the property was issued in favor of Gonzalez.
The petitioner failed to pay the rent, and on May 2, 1929, an action of unlawful detainer was brought against him by Gonzalez in the municipal court of the City of Manila. Five days later, the petitioner brought an action against Gonzalez and the latter’s attorney, Jose Martinez de San Agustin, for the annulment of the documents executed on May 3, 1928, on the ground that he, the petitioner was led to execute said documents by reason of insidious and fraudulent machinations of the defendants and by their threats. As a result of similar allegations, the municipal court refused to take jurisdiction of the unlawful detainer suit and certified it to the Court of First Instance, where it eventually was consolidated with the action for the annulment of the aforesaid documents. The cases were assigned for hearing several times, but were continued at the instance of counsel for the herein petitioner, and no evidence was taken until February 27 of the present year, when Doctor Victoriano and three of his assistants testified. The cases were again continued, and, so far, no further evidence appears to have been presented.
Apparently becoming impatient, the defendant Gonzalez, on May 21, filed a motion in the Court of First Instance praying that the plaintiff, Pacifico Victoriano, be ordered to give a bond in the sum of P10,000 to respond for the damages resulting from the fact that said plaintiff, in connection with the action brought by him, had filed a notice of lis pendens with the register of deeds of Manila, which prevented Gonzalez from disposing of the property in question. Judge Rovira, the vacation judge, after hearing counsel, issued an order, the dispositive part of which reads as follows in translation:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"You are hereby notified that on June 3, 1930, this court issued an order in the above-entitled case, to the plaintiff advising him that if he desired to have the lis pendens annotation continued, he must within five days from notice hereof give bond in the amount of five thousand pesos to answer for any damages that may be occasioned the defendant by such annotation; provided, however, that should he fail to do so, the register of deeds shall proceed to cancel the lis pendens annotation, leaving it without effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
A motion for reconsideration was presented by Doctor Victoriano’s counsel, but the then acting judge, Pedro Ma. Sison, denied the motion.
The present petition for a writ of prohibition was there-upon brought before this court, the petitioner maintaining that his notice of lis pendens was duly filed in accordance with the provisions of section 79 of the Land Registration Act and that under our laws, the courts had no power to order the cancellation of the notice before a final judgment of the case to which it related had been rendered.
At first sight, it may seem that the petitioner’s contention is correct; ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case cannot be cancelled, while the action is pending and undetermined, except in cases expressly provided for by statute (38 C. J., 45). But there may be exceptions, and it has been held that a court has the inherent power in the absence of statute to cancel a lis pendens in a proper case (Sternberger v. Tunison, 92 N. J. Eq., 159).
It may be conceded that the present case is rather close, but taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances, we do not feel justified in holding that the respondent judges exceeded their jurisdiction. The petitioner did not bring his action until over a year after the sale to Gonzalez, and the evidence he has presented up to the present time does not bear out the main allegations of the complaint. He must also be held responsible for most of the continuances of the trial of the two cases before the Court of First Instance, a matter which lends color to the assertion of counsel for the respondent that he desired to prolong the litigation with a view to hold possession of the property in question as long as possible without paying rent. When we further take into consideration that the rent stipulated in the lease was P700 per month and that the petitioner therefore must have owed Gonzalez over P17,000 in overdue rent, we cannot say that the court below erred in requiring him to give bond in the modest sum of P5,000 and in ordering the cancellation of the lis pendens in the event that the petitioner failed to present the bond.
There are also other circumstances which have important bearing on the matter now before us, but inasmuch as they are directly connected with the aforesaid undecided cases pending in the Court of First Instance, we refrain from discussing them at the present time.
Writs of prohibition go to the jurisdiction, and as we cannot hold that the court below exceeded such jurisdiction, the petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
