June 1964 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
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G.R. No. L-19374 June 30, 1964 - PHIL. NATIONAL BANK v. JOSE F. MONROY:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-19374. June 30, 1964.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSE F. MONROY, doing business under the Trade Name and Style of "AVENUE ICE DROP FACTORY", Defendant-Appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jose K. Monroy in his own behalf as defendant-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. PRESCRIPTION; ACTION TO ENFORCE JUDGMENT; PERIOD OF PRESCRIPTION COUNTED FROM DAY JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL. — The ten-year period of prescription of an action to enforce a judgment in a civil case is to be counted from the day the judgment became final, not from the date the judgment was rendered.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Manila court of first instance dismissing a complaint of the Philippine National Bank.
Filed in March 1961, such complaint asked for revival of the same court’s judgment of May 1949, requiring Jose F. Monroy to pay said Bank the amount of P12,000.00 with interest at the rate of 7% from August 8, 1947, plus 10% attorney’s fees and costs.
The defendant Monroy having presented no answer, was defaulted. And conformably to the Rules, the Bank proved its allegations as to judgment and non-payment. However, the court ordered the dismissal of the action, holding that it had already prescribed since more than ten years had elapsed from May 1949 to March 1961.
The Bank seasonably appealed to this Court. Its brief extensively argues the proposition that as prescription was a defense and Monroy had made no answer, it is deemed waived; and the Court may not motu proprio apply it. To this argument, the appellee offered no reply because he had not been furnished a copy of the appellant’s brief, because he had defaulted in the court below. He might conceivably insist that as the dates appeared on the face of the complaint, the point was rather a legal one which needed no specific mention in the pleadings.
This particular issue we do not need to discuss, for the reason that supposing the judge could motu proprio decide in accordance with the factual allegations of the complaint, and that consequently the judge could properly declare that "more than ten years have elapsed since judgment . . . was rendered in May 1949, nevertheless, he drew a mistaken legal conclusion therefrom — prescription — because the ten- year period of prescription is to be counted from the day the judgment became final; 1 and the complaint made no allegation as to such date.
It was error, therefore, to declare that the plaintiff’s action had prescribed. And as there is no question as to the terms of the judgment and the non-payment thereof, the defendant-appellee is hereby ordered to pay the appellant the sum of P12,000.00 with interest at 7% per annum beginning August 8, 1947, plus 10% as attorney’s fees, and costs.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Filed in March 1961, such complaint asked for revival of the same court’s judgment of May 1949, requiring Jose F. Monroy to pay said Bank the amount of P12,000.00 with interest at the rate of 7% from August 8, 1947, plus 10% attorney’s fees and costs.
The defendant Monroy having presented no answer, was defaulted. And conformably to the Rules, the Bank proved its allegations as to judgment and non-payment. However, the court ordered the dismissal of the action, holding that it had already prescribed since more than ten years had elapsed from May 1949 to March 1961.
The Bank seasonably appealed to this Court. Its brief extensively argues the proposition that as prescription was a defense and Monroy had made no answer, it is deemed waived; and the Court may not motu proprio apply it. To this argument, the appellee offered no reply because he had not been furnished a copy of the appellant’s brief, because he had defaulted in the court below. He might conceivably insist that as the dates appeared on the face of the complaint, the point was rather a legal one which needed no specific mention in the pleadings.
This particular issue we do not need to discuss, for the reason that supposing the judge could motu proprio decide in accordance with the factual allegations of the complaint, and that consequently the judge could properly declare that "more than ten years have elapsed since judgment . . . was rendered in May 1949, nevertheless, he drew a mistaken legal conclusion therefrom — prescription — because the ten- year period of prescription is to be counted from the day the judgment became final; 1 and the complaint made no allegation as to such date.
It was error, therefore, to declare that the plaintiff’s action had prescribed. And as there is no question as to the terms of the judgment and the non-payment thereof, the defendant-appellee is hereby ordered to pay the appellant the sum of P12,000.00 with interest at 7% per annum beginning August 8, 1947, plus 10% as attorney’s fees, and costs.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Endnotes:
1. Sec. 6, Rule 39; Phil. Nat. Bank v. Silo, L-3498, March 19, 1951, and other cases cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 Ed.) Vol. II, p. 250.
