August 1965 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-20986 August 14, 1965 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., ET AL:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20986. August 14, 1965.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE GUSTILO alias Peping, FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR. alias White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding and MAGNO MONTANO alias Edol, Respondents.
Davao Provincial Fiscal Alejandro. B. Ruiz and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Martin V. Delgra, Jr. for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; NOT HEARSAY IF PURPOSE IS MERELY TO ESTABLISH THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENT WAS MADE. — While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar where the purpose of the prosecuting officer is only to establish the fact that the accused had mentioned to the witness the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that said statement or the answer to be given by the witness would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with the accused, it is held that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar where the purpose of the prosecuting officer is only to establish the fact that the accused had mentioned to the witness the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that said statement or the answer to be given by the witness would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with the accused, it is held that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full.
D E C I S I O N
DIZON, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Baño, of the Police Force of Digos, Davao, was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca’s alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer’s motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that the above mentioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a further order directing said respondent judge to allow witness Baño to answer the question in full.
The question involved herein is one purely of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People v. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Baño the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca’s statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Baño would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, We believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction issued heretofore is hereby set aside.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
The question involved herein is one purely of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People v. Lew Yon, 97 Cal. 224; VI Wigmore 177-8).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Baño the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca’s statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Baño would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, We believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.
On the other hand, the fact which the prosecuting officer intended to establish would seem to be relevant to explain why the police force of the place where the offense was committed subsequently questioned and investigated the persons allegedly named by Puesca.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ is granted. The writ of preliminary injunction issued heretofore is hereby set aside.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
