October 1965 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1965 > October 1965 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-21280 October 21, 1965 - PROCOPIO R. MORALES, JR. v. TORIANO PATRIARCA, ET., AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21280. October 21, 1965.]
PROCOPIO R. MORALES, JR., Petitioner, v. TORIANO PATRIARCA AND THE HON. JUAN R. LIWAG, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N *
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner filed herein on September 3, 1965 a "petition for relief" after entry of judgment on June 24, 1965 — praying that his second motion for reconsideration and the memorandum in support thereof considered on the merits.
The decision of this Court promulgated April 30, 1965 ruled that petitioner cannot be reinstated to the office of Justice of the Peace of San Andres, Quezon, since his present action for reinstatement was filed more than one year from his removal.
Against the foregoing, petitioner would argue, in his second motion for reconsideration and its supporting memorandum that (1) he was not removed at all, (2) that the present action is not for reinstatement; and (3) that, at any rate, the one-year period should be counted from October 26, 1962 when respondent Patriarca assumed the disputed office, for only then could petitioner have initiated quo warranto proceedings with a view to reinstatement.
1. As stated in the decision petitioner was ordered by then Secretary of Justice Diokno to vacate the office in question. On April 3, 1962 the Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said order to vacate. From April 3, 1962, therefore, at the latest, petitioner was dismissed from his office. A clear indication that petitioner was deemed removed from said date is the refusal of the Secretary of Justice thereafter to authorize payment of salaries and emoluments to him in any was as such Justice of the Peace. Consequently, whether petitioner was legally or illegally removed, the fact is that he was removed just the same. Petitioner may have continued discharging the functions of his office, but the same does not detract from the fact that he had been dismissed and that said dismissal had been implemented by non-recognition of his official capacity, and non-payment of salaries.
2. The present suit, entitled "Quo Warranto, Prohibition, Injunction, Etc.," is directed against the Secretary of Justice as well as petitioner’s successor in office. It seeks to compel the Secretary of Justice to recognize petitioner as Justice of the Peace of San Andres, Quezon, and to authorize payment to him of the salaries and emoluments appurtenant thereto. The suit is, therefore, in substance an action for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Justice to reinstate petitioner to the office from which the former had dismissed him.
As a matter of fact petitioner stated in his reply memorandum that the present action is for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the instant petition is not solely for quo warranto, but also for mandamus, prohibition, etc. as may be readily gathered from the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the petition. Verily, Section 3 of Rule 67, not to mention Section 1 of Rule 60, referring to injunction, authorizes the filing of a petition for mandamus against any person who `unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, . . .,’ while Section 2, also of Rule 67, likewise authorizes the filing of petition for prohibition against any person, `whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law . . .’ That exactly, is what the Department of Justice had done . . .
". . . as far as respondent Department of Justice is concerned, the action is not for quo warranto but for mandamus . . ." (Petitioner’s Reply Memorandum, pp. 1-2, 3.)
3. Petitioner could have brought his instant action for mandamus, to compel the Secretary of Justice to reinstate him, even on April 3, 1962, that is, even before respondent Patriarca assumed office. In mandamus, unlike quo warranto, there is no requirement that the respondent be actually holding the disputed office. The fact, therefore, that petitioner was not replaced by another for some time after his dismissal could not have precluded him from filing an action for reinstatement.
As pointed out in the decision, the one-year limitation for bringing an action for reinstatement has been applied as well to mandamus as to quo warranto proceedings (Unabia, v. Mayor, 53 O.G. 132).
Finally, examining once again the reason behind this period of limitation, we still find it equally obtaining in a case where no other incumbent has as yet been appointed to succeed, as where there is one. The rational is stated in Tumulak v. Egay, 46 O.G. 3693, 3695: "It is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty and the people’s interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as possible." After having been ordered to vacate his office and thereupon considered dismissed by the Secretary of Justice, petitioner could only have proceeded to discharge the functions of the office at issue under "continued uncertainty" as to his title. Consequently, he should have forthwith taken steps to question the legality of the order of removal, and his failure to do so within the time prescribed by law has rendered the present action untenable.
From the above discussion it results that even in the light of the arguments set forth in petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration and its supporting memorandum, the instant action still would not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition for relief is denied. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
The decision of this Court promulgated April 30, 1965 ruled that petitioner cannot be reinstated to the office of Justice of the Peace of San Andres, Quezon, since his present action for reinstatement was filed more than one year from his removal.
Against the foregoing, petitioner would argue, in his second motion for reconsideration and its supporting memorandum that (1) he was not removed at all, (2) that the present action is not for reinstatement; and (3) that, at any rate, the one-year period should be counted from October 26, 1962 when respondent Patriarca assumed the disputed office, for only then could petitioner have initiated quo warranto proceedings with a view to reinstatement.
1. As stated in the decision petitioner was ordered by then Secretary of Justice Diokno to vacate the office in question. On April 3, 1962 the Secretary of Justice denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said order to vacate. From April 3, 1962, therefore, at the latest, petitioner was dismissed from his office. A clear indication that petitioner was deemed removed from said date is the refusal of the Secretary of Justice thereafter to authorize payment of salaries and emoluments to him in any was as such Justice of the Peace. Consequently, whether petitioner was legally or illegally removed, the fact is that he was removed just the same. Petitioner may have continued discharging the functions of his office, but the same does not detract from the fact that he had been dismissed and that said dismissal had been implemented by non-recognition of his official capacity, and non-payment of salaries.
2. The present suit, entitled "Quo Warranto, Prohibition, Injunction, Etc.," is directed against the Secretary of Justice as well as petitioner’s successor in office. It seeks to compel the Secretary of Justice to recognize petitioner as Justice of the Peace of San Andres, Quezon, and to authorize payment to him of the salaries and emoluments appurtenant thereto. The suit is, therefore, in substance an action for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Justice to reinstate petitioner to the office from which the former had dismissed him.
As a matter of fact petitioner stated in his reply memorandum that the present action is for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the instant petition is not solely for quo warranto, but also for mandamus, prohibition, etc. as may be readily gathered from the allegations in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the petition. Verily, Section 3 of Rule 67, not to mention Section 1 of Rule 60, referring to injunction, authorizes the filing of a petition for mandamus against any person who `unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, . . .,’ while Section 2, also of Rule 67, likewise authorizes the filing of petition for prohibition against any person, `whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law . . .’ That exactly, is what the Department of Justice had done . . .
x x x
". . . as far as respondent Department of Justice is concerned, the action is not for quo warranto but for mandamus . . ." (Petitioner’s Reply Memorandum, pp. 1-2, 3.)
3. Petitioner could have brought his instant action for mandamus, to compel the Secretary of Justice to reinstate him, even on April 3, 1962, that is, even before respondent Patriarca assumed office. In mandamus, unlike quo warranto, there is no requirement that the respondent be actually holding the disputed office. The fact, therefore, that petitioner was not replaced by another for some time after his dismissal could not have precluded him from filing an action for reinstatement.
As pointed out in the decision, the one-year limitation for bringing an action for reinstatement has been applied as well to mandamus as to quo warranto proceedings (Unabia, v. Mayor, 53 O.G. 132).
Finally, examining once again the reason behind this period of limitation, we still find it equally obtaining in a case where no other incumbent has as yet been appointed to succeed, as where there is one. The rational is stated in Tumulak v. Egay, 46 O.G. 3693, 3695: "It is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty and the people’s interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as possible." After having been ordered to vacate his office and thereupon considered dismissed by the Secretary of Justice, petitioner could only have proceeded to discharge the functions of the office at issue under "continued uncertainty" as to his title. Consequently, he should have forthwith taken steps to question the legality of the order of removal, and his failure to do so within the time prescribed by law has rendered the present action untenable.
From the above discussion it results that even in the light of the arguments set forth in petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration and its supporting memorandum, the instant action still would not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition for relief is denied. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
