April 1966 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1966 > April 1966 Decisions >
G.R. No. L-21762 April 29, 1966 IN RE: LEON C. SO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21762. April 29, 1966.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF LEON C. SO TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. LEON C. SO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A.G. Ibarra & Solicitor A.M. Amores, for oppositor and Appellant.
Moises S. Ocampo for petitioner and appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. NATURALIZATION; REQUIREMENTS; INCOME; ADJUSTED INCOME TO SUIT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS NOT PROOF OF LUCRATIVE INCOME. — The contract between applicant and his widowed mother and owner of a grocery store, increasing the former’s salary from P300.00 to P900.00 per month, executed after the trial court held in abeyance the oath taking of applicant as it entertained doubts as to the sufficiency of his income, cannot be accepted as proof of lucrative income because it is apparent that said contract was made for the sole purpose of adjusting appellee’s evidence to the view of the lower court to the effect that his income was insufficient to satisfy the legal requirement of a lucrative trade or profession.
2. ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE SHOWING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY. — Where it was shown that the 384-square meters land was bought by applicant’s mother and she alone receives the fruits derived therefrom; that even if the land is considered conjugal, the result would be that one-half thereof belongs to herself exclusively and the other half of herself and her thirteen (13) children so that he, applicant would own less than fourteen (14) square meters thereof; and that no evidence was adduced as to the value of said land, such circumstances do not justify the court’s conclusion that petitioner- appellee was a co-owner thereof, or its consideration of applicant’s interest therein as a factor indicative of a compliance with one of the requisite qualifications to be naturalized.
2. ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE SHOWING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY. — Where it was shown that the 384-square meters land was bought by applicant’s mother and she alone receives the fruits derived therefrom; that even if the land is considered conjugal, the result would be that one-half thereof belongs to herself exclusively and the other half of herself and her thirteen (13) children so that he, applicant would own less than fourteen (14) square meters thereof; and that no evidence was adduced as to the value of said land, such circumstances do not justify the court’s conclusion that petitioner- appellee was a co-owner thereof, or its consideration of applicant’s interest therein as a factor indicative of a compliance with one of the requisite qualifications to be naturalized.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, taken by the Government, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, granting the petition of appellee Leon C. So to be allowed to take his oath as citizen of the Philippines.
A decision having been rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on August 31, 1960, granting appellee’s application for naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines, on July 10, 1962, he moved that, after due hearing, he be allowed to take his oath and the corresponding certificate of naturalization issued to him. After said hearing, the lower court issued the aforementioned order, from which the Office of the Solicitor General has appealed, upon the ground that appellee has no lucrative employment or occupation.
Indeed, the record discloses that, when the petition for naturalization was originally heard in July and August, 1960, appellee was allegedly working as sales clerk in the S. So & Sons Grocery Store, which belonged to his widowed mother, with a yearly salary of P2,400.00, which was later increased to P3,000. At the aforementioned rehearing, in September 1962, he testified that his mother owns a land of about 384 square meters in Angeles, Pampanga, and that his salary had been increased to P300.00 a month. But, since appellee is married and has six (6) children, the lower court entertained doubts on the sufficiency of his income to warrant the conclusion that he has a lucrative trade or profession and justify his being allowed to take the requisite oath. So, on October 1, 1962, said court issued an order directing that his oath taking be "held in abeyance" and that "if he could prove a substantial means to be admitted to Philippine citizenship, he shall be allowed to take the oath as Filipino citizen."cralaw virtua1aw library
On "motion for reconsideration" filed by the appellee, the court set a date for the reception of additional evidence on his behalf. On said date, he produced an alleged contract (Exhibit M) between him and his widowed mother, and owner of S. So & Sons Grocery Store, dated October 25, 1962, increasing his salary to P900.00 a month, "effective November 1, 1962." Relying upon this evidence, and considering him a co-owner of the land aforementioned, the lower court issued the order appealed from, dated November 18, 1962, holding that appellee "has proven substantial means as required by law", and, accordingly, authorizing him to take his oath as Filipino citizen.
For reasons not explained in the record, His Honor, the trial Judge had, prior thereto, or on November 17, 1962, administered to the appellee the aforementioned oath. Consequently, on motion of the Government, which had, meanwhile, or on December 13, 1962, filed seasonably its notice of appeal, said oath and the certificate of naturalization issued in pursuance thereof, were, on December 29, 1962, ordered cancelled by the lower court.
It is obvious, however, that said contract (Exhibit M) was made for the sole purpose of adjusting appellee’s evidence to the view of the lower court to the effect that his income theretofore was insufficient to satisfy the legal requirement of a lucrative trade or profession. Indeed, considering that appellee’s employer is his own mother and that there has been not even an attempt to explain why his salary as sales clerk should be suddenly trebled, from P300 to P900 a month, no other logical explanation can be given for said increase (Velasco v. Republic, L-14214, May 25, 1960; Cu v. Republic, L-13344, July 21, 1962; Que Hoc Gui v. Republic, L-16884, September 30, 1961; Tan v. Republic, L-14860, May 30, 1961; Sy Ang Hoc v. Republic, 50 Off. Gaz., 5628.)
With respect to the land of which the lower court found the appellee to be a co-owner, suffice it to say that such finding is contrary to appellee’s own testimony, to the effect that said land had been bought by his mother, that it belong to her and that she alone received the income derived therefrom. Moreover, even if we assumed that it belonged to the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband, the result would be that one-half thereof would still belong to her exclusivity, and that the other half would have to be divided between her and her thirteen (13) children, so that the latter and, hence appellee herein, would own less than fourteen (14) square meters each, on the assumption that the estate of the deceased has no unpaid obligations, on which there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever. Then again, there is no competent evidence on the value of the said property. Hence, the lower court, at the first re-hearing, 1 considered the evidence for appellee concerning said land insufficient to authorize his oath taking. Precisely, for this reason, the appellee deemed its best to give up his claim of qualification based upon ownership of real estate, and to improve his position as regards his alleged income, by suddenly increasing his salary from P300 to P900 a month. It is thus manifest that the record before us does not justify either the conclusion that appellee is a co-owner of the land aforementioned or the consideration of his alleged interest therein as a factor indicative of a compliance with one of the requisite qualifications to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
Wherefore, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and petitioner’s motion to take his oath denied, with costs against said petitioner-appellee. Its is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
A decision having been rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on August 31, 1960, granting appellee’s application for naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines, on July 10, 1962, he moved that, after due hearing, he be allowed to take his oath and the corresponding certificate of naturalization issued to him. After said hearing, the lower court issued the aforementioned order, from which the Office of the Solicitor General has appealed, upon the ground that appellee has no lucrative employment or occupation.
Indeed, the record discloses that, when the petition for naturalization was originally heard in July and August, 1960, appellee was allegedly working as sales clerk in the S. So & Sons Grocery Store, which belonged to his widowed mother, with a yearly salary of P2,400.00, which was later increased to P3,000. At the aforementioned rehearing, in September 1962, he testified that his mother owns a land of about 384 square meters in Angeles, Pampanga, and that his salary had been increased to P300.00 a month. But, since appellee is married and has six (6) children, the lower court entertained doubts on the sufficiency of his income to warrant the conclusion that he has a lucrative trade or profession and justify his being allowed to take the requisite oath. So, on October 1, 1962, said court issued an order directing that his oath taking be "held in abeyance" and that "if he could prove a substantial means to be admitted to Philippine citizenship, he shall be allowed to take the oath as Filipino citizen."cralaw virtua1aw library
On "motion for reconsideration" filed by the appellee, the court set a date for the reception of additional evidence on his behalf. On said date, he produced an alleged contract (Exhibit M) between him and his widowed mother, and owner of S. So & Sons Grocery Store, dated October 25, 1962, increasing his salary to P900.00 a month, "effective November 1, 1962." Relying upon this evidence, and considering him a co-owner of the land aforementioned, the lower court issued the order appealed from, dated November 18, 1962, holding that appellee "has proven substantial means as required by law", and, accordingly, authorizing him to take his oath as Filipino citizen.
For reasons not explained in the record, His Honor, the trial Judge had, prior thereto, or on November 17, 1962, administered to the appellee the aforementioned oath. Consequently, on motion of the Government, which had, meanwhile, or on December 13, 1962, filed seasonably its notice of appeal, said oath and the certificate of naturalization issued in pursuance thereof, were, on December 29, 1962, ordered cancelled by the lower court.
It is obvious, however, that said contract (Exhibit M) was made for the sole purpose of adjusting appellee’s evidence to the view of the lower court to the effect that his income theretofore was insufficient to satisfy the legal requirement of a lucrative trade or profession. Indeed, considering that appellee’s employer is his own mother and that there has been not even an attempt to explain why his salary as sales clerk should be suddenly trebled, from P300 to P900 a month, no other logical explanation can be given for said increase (Velasco v. Republic, L-14214, May 25, 1960; Cu v. Republic, L-13344, July 21, 1962; Que Hoc Gui v. Republic, L-16884, September 30, 1961; Tan v. Republic, L-14860, May 30, 1961; Sy Ang Hoc v. Republic, 50 Off. Gaz., 5628.)
With respect to the land of which the lower court found the appellee to be a co-owner, suffice it to say that such finding is contrary to appellee’s own testimony, to the effect that said land had been bought by his mother, that it belong to her and that she alone received the income derived therefrom. Moreover, even if we assumed that it belonged to the conjugal partnership between her and her deceased husband, the result would be that one-half thereof would still belong to her exclusivity, and that the other half would have to be divided between her and her thirteen (13) children, so that the latter and, hence appellee herein, would own less than fourteen (14) square meters each, on the assumption that the estate of the deceased has no unpaid obligations, on which there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever. Then again, there is no competent evidence on the value of the said property. Hence, the lower court, at the first re-hearing, 1 considered the evidence for appellee concerning said land insufficient to authorize his oath taking. Precisely, for this reason, the appellee deemed its best to give up his claim of qualification based upon ownership of real estate, and to improve his position as regards his alleged income, by suddenly increasing his salary from P300 to P900 a month. It is thus manifest that the record before us does not justify either the conclusion that appellee is a co-owner of the land aforementioned or the consideration of his alleged interest therein as a factor indicative of a compliance with one of the requisite qualifications to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
Wherefore, the order appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and petitioner’s motion to take his oath denied, with costs against said petitioner-appellee. Its is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Before the introduction of additional evidence on the alleged increase in appellee’s monthly salary from P300 to P900.
