April 1968 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-26383 April 3, 1968 - PROGRESSIVE LABOR ASSOCIATION, ET AL. v. GUILLERMO VILLASOR, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26383. April 3, 1968.]
PROGRESSIVE LABOR ASSOCIATION, BERNARDO O. CALANG, DOMINADOR RUIZ and DELFIN N. MERCADER, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO VILLASOR, CEBU CARTAGE CORPORATION, ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, COMMANDING OFFICER OF 3RD PC ZONE & PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, MAYOR MARCELO BARBA and CHIEF OF POLICE OF TOLEDO CITY, Respondents.
Delfin N. Mercader, for Petitioners.
Salutario J. Fernandez and Ramon B. Ceniza for respondent Cebu Cartage Corporation.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Bello for Respondents.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Buenaventura J. Guevarra for respondents Col. Vicente R. Raval and Lt. Col. Jose R. Nazareno.
Patricio R. Aguilar for respondent Atlas Mining and Development Corp.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; INJUNCTIONS; MOOT QUESTION. — The petitioners here mainly assail the ex-parte preliminary injunction issued by the lower court on the principal ground that it was issued in a labor dispute without following the procedural requirements of Republic Act 875. Said injunction, however, has already lost its purpose and effectivity for what it seeks to restrain, i.e., the strike, picketing and all the concomitant acts thereof, are no longer existent as admitted by the very parties against which said injunction is directed and which sought this remedy against it. Thus, there is no necessity in further declaring void and ineffective what, of itself, is already ineffective.
2. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES. — Where the complaint praying for issuance of preliminary injunction seeks not only to enjoin strikers from blocking the entrance and the exits of the company’s premises in order that non- party petitioner to the labor dispute may fulfill its hauling contract with the former but also to recover damages from the strikers, the Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. The mere allegation, without supporting proof, that the labor dispute is connected with unfair labor practices, is insufficient to show that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction.
2. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; JURISDICTION; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITH DAMAGES. — Where the complaint praying for issuance of preliminary injunction seeks not only to enjoin strikers from blocking the entrance and the exits of the company’s premises in order that non- party petitioner to the labor dispute may fulfill its hauling contract with the former but also to recover damages from the strikers, the Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof. The mere allegation, without supporting proof, that the labor dispute is connected with unfair labor practices, is insufficient to show that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner Progressive Labor Association, in behalf of its nearly 4,000 members employed at the respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation ("ATLAS" for short) presented to the latter on March 31, 1966, a 19-point demand "for the well being and better terms of employment of the workers . . ." On account, allegedly, of unfair labor practices committed by ATLAS subsequently, a complaint therefor was instituted in the Court of Industrial Relations against the latter for (a) refusal to continue negotiations with petitioner union in connection with its demands; (b) inducing the union directors to oust Atty. Delfin Mercader as its counsel, and (c) refusal to turn over to petitioner the amount of P5.00 checked-off from the respective salaries of union members.
On June 15, 1966, a notice of strike against ATLAS was filed by petitioner union by reason, it is claimed, of the continuing unfair labor practices committed by ATLAS. This was followed by the staging of a strike and picketing, on July 11, 1966, around the premises of ATLAS in Toledo City, Cebu province.
However, on July 15, 1966, a complaint for injunction and damages was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu 1 against petitioner and its officials — co-petitioners herein — by co-respondent Cebu Cartage Corporation, which had a hauling contract with ATLAS and which sought to enjoin the picketing strikers from preventing its trucks and personnel to enter and leave the ATLAS premises. The next day, July 16, 1966, the lower court issued an ex-parte preliminary injunction directed against petitioner and its striking members.
On July 22, 1966, petitioners moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction and to dismiss the civil case on the ground that there was a labor dispute connected with unfair labor practices. The lower court denied both motions. A reconsideration was sought but it failed.
Alleging the foregoing facts, petitioners filed the present special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction asking this Court to: (a) dissolve the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court; (b) dismiss Civil Case R-9460; and (c) enjoin in the meantime, the lower court from taking any action in Civil Case R-9460 until further orders and also enjoin the other respondents Mayor and the Police Chief of Toledo City, the Philippine Constabulary Commanders, and their respective men from:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) harassing, manhandling and threatening with arrests the picketing union members;
(2) escorting the trucks and workers of Cebu Cartage inside the ATLAS premises by breaking thru the picket lines;
(3) recruiting strike breakers and scabs;
(4) breaking the picket line and dispersing the picketers, and
(5) interfering or in any other way obstructing the picketing and concerted action of the strikers.
The petition was given due course and preliminary injunction was issued by Us as prayed for against the lower court and the other co- respondents.
On September 1, 1966, Cebu Cartage filed its answer to the petition claiming that it was not at all involved, directly or indirectly, in the labor dispute between ATLAS and petitioner union and that it secured the preliminary injunction only in order to fulfill its hauling contract with ATLAS since the union picketers blocked the entrance and exits to the said company’s premises. The answer also contained an urgent, ex-parte motion for the dissolution or clarification and modification of the Supreme Court injunction on the ground that the dispute had already ended with the execution on August 27, 1966, of a return-to-work agreement by the newly elected officers of the union.
On September 7, 1966, petitioners sought to declare private respondents in contempt for having disobeyed the Supreme Court injunction. This Court, by resolution of September 12, 1966, directed (a) petitioner union to answer respondent Cebu Cartage’s motion and (b) the private respondents to answer the former’s petition to have them declared in contempt of court.
Then came the answers to the petition of the other private respondents. ATLAS claimed that the union already had a new set of officers and that they had executed a return-to-work agreement; that the picketing was not peaceful, and that the strike was economic, not due to unfair labor practices. The remaining respondents Mayor and the Police Chief of Toledo City and the Philippine Constabulary officers joined in asserting that the picketing was not peaceful.
On October 17, 1966, petitioners filed their answer to Cebu Cartage’s motion to dissolve or modify and clarify the Supreme Court injunction. The so-alleged election of new union officials, it insisted, was not valid and was merely a scheme of ATLAS. Petitioners also denied having authorized the use of violence in the conduct of the picketing, which generally, was peaceful.
The hearing of the case was set for November 21, 1966. The parties, however, asked and were allowed to file written memoranda.
Subsequently, or on June 13, 1967 to be exact, petitioners filed a "MOTION FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE BOND." In support thereof, it was asserted: 2
"1. That the strike and picketing staged by the petitioners against the Respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation formally ceased and ended on October 4, 1966 when the striking petitioners formally offered to return to work, stop their strike and lifted their pickets taking away all their placards and picket lines . . .
"2. That the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on August 11, 1966 3 by this honorable Supreme Court was for the purpose of enjoining the respondents from interfering, manhandling or in any way interfering with said strike and picketing, such that upon the termination and complete cessation of said strike and picketing (as they did since October 4, 1966), the purpose and reason for the existence of said preliminary injunction have also terminated and ceased." (Emphasis supplied)
Required to comment, respondents all manifested no objection to the foregoing motion. On August 18, 1967, We accordingly granted petitioners’ motion asking for the lifting of this Court’s injunction issued on August 23, 1966.
This development has perforce rendered the present case moot. The petitioners here mainly assail the ex parte preliminary injunction issued by the lower court on the principal ground that it was issued in a labor dispute without following the procedural requirements of Republic Act 875. Said injunction, however, has already lost its purpose and effectivity for what it seeks to restrain, i.e., the strike, picketing and all the concomitant acts thereof, are no longer existent as admitted by the very parties against which said injunction is directed and which sought this remedy against it. We see no necessity in further declaring void and ineffective what, of itself, is already ineffective.
The main case is also assailed for the lack of cause of action. This is no jurisdictional defect. And no doubt the lower court has jurisdiction over the main case insofar as the complaint seeks for damages. 4 While there is also an allegation in the petition that the labor dispute is connected with unfair labor practices, such allegation, without supporting proof, is insufficient to show that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction. 5
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C. J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
On June 15, 1966, a notice of strike against ATLAS was filed by petitioner union by reason, it is claimed, of the continuing unfair labor practices committed by ATLAS. This was followed by the staging of a strike and picketing, on July 11, 1966, around the premises of ATLAS in Toledo City, Cebu province.
However, on July 15, 1966, a complaint for injunction and damages was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu 1 against petitioner and its officials — co-petitioners herein — by co-respondent Cebu Cartage Corporation, which had a hauling contract with ATLAS and which sought to enjoin the picketing strikers from preventing its trucks and personnel to enter and leave the ATLAS premises. The next day, July 16, 1966, the lower court issued an ex-parte preliminary injunction directed against petitioner and its striking members.
On July 22, 1966, petitioners moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction and to dismiss the civil case on the ground that there was a labor dispute connected with unfair labor practices. The lower court denied both motions. A reconsideration was sought but it failed.
Alleging the foregoing facts, petitioners filed the present special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction asking this Court to: (a) dissolve the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court; (b) dismiss Civil Case R-9460; and (c) enjoin in the meantime, the lower court from taking any action in Civil Case R-9460 until further orders and also enjoin the other respondents Mayor and the Police Chief of Toledo City, the Philippine Constabulary Commanders, and their respective men from:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) harassing, manhandling and threatening with arrests the picketing union members;
(2) escorting the trucks and workers of Cebu Cartage inside the ATLAS premises by breaking thru the picket lines;
(3) recruiting strike breakers and scabs;
(4) breaking the picket line and dispersing the picketers, and
(5) interfering or in any other way obstructing the picketing and concerted action of the strikers.
The petition was given due course and preliminary injunction was issued by Us as prayed for against the lower court and the other co- respondents.
On September 1, 1966, Cebu Cartage filed its answer to the petition claiming that it was not at all involved, directly or indirectly, in the labor dispute between ATLAS and petitioner union and that it secured the preliminary injunction only in order to fulfill its hauling contract with ATLAS since the union picketers blocked the entrance and exits to the said company’s premises. The answer also contained an urgent, ex-parte motion for the dissolution or clarification and modification of the Supreme Court injunction on the ground that the dispute had already ended with the execution on August 27, 1966, of a return-to-work agreement by the newly elected officers of the union.
On September 7, 1966, petitioners sought to declare private respondents in contempt for having disobeyed the Supreme Court injunction. This Court, by resolution of September 12, 1966, directed (a) petitioner union to answer respondent Cebu Cartage’s motion and (b) the private respondents to answer the former’s petition to have them declared in contempt of court.
Then came the answers to the petition of the other private respondents. ATLAS claimed that the union already had a new set of officers and that they had executed a return-to-work agreement; that the picketing was not peaceful, and that the strike was economic, not due to unfair labor practices. The remaining respondents Mayor and the Police Chief of Toledo City and the Philippine Constabulary officers joined in asserting that the picketing was not peaceful.
On October 17, 1966, petitioners filed their answer to Cebu Cartage’s motion to dissolve or modify and clarify the Supreme Court injunction. The so-alleged election of new union officials, it insisted, was not valid and was merely a scheme of ATLAS. Petitioners also denied having authorized the use of violence in the conduct of the picketing, which generally, was peaceful.
The hearing of the case was set for November 21, 1966. The parties, however, asked and were allowed to file written memoranda.
Subsequently, or on June 13, 1967 to be exact, petitioners filed a "MOTION FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND FOR THE CANCELLATION OF THE BOND." In support thereof, it was asserted: 2
"1. That the strike and picketing staged by the petitioners against the Respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation formally ceased and ended on October 4, 1966 when the striking petitioners formally offered to return to work, stop their strike and lifted their pickets taking away all their placards and picket lines . . .
"2. That the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case on August 11, 1966 3 by this honorable Supreme Court was for the purpose of enjoining the respondents from interfering, manhandling or in any way interfering with said strike and picketing, such that upon the termination and complete cessation of said strike and picketing (as they did since October 4, 1966), the purpose and reason for the existence of said preliminary injunction have also terminated and ceased." (Emphasis supplied)
Required to comment, respondents all manifested no objection to the foregoing motion. On August 18, 1967, We accordingly granted petitioners’ motion asking for the lifting of this Court’s injunction issued on August 23, 1966.
This development has perforce rendered the present case moot. The petitioners here mainly assail the ex parte preliminary injunction issued by the lower court on the principal ground that it was issued in a labor dispute without following the procedural requirements of Republic Act 875. Said injunction, however, has already lost its purpose and effectivity for what it seeks to restrain, i.e., the strike, picketing and all the concomitant acts thereof, are no longer existent as admitted by the very parties against which said injunction is directed and which sought this remedy against it. We see no necessity in further declaring void and ineffective what, of itself, is already ineffective.
The main case is also assailed for the lack of cause of action. This is no jurisdictional defect. And no doubt the lower court has jurisdiction over the main case insofar as the complaint seeks for damages. 4 While there is also an allegation in the petition that the labor dispute is connected with unfair labor practices, such allegation, without supporting proof, is insufficient to show that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction. 5
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C. J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Cebu Cartage Corp. v. Calang. Et. Al., Civil Case No. R-9460.
2. Rollo, p. 227.
3. Should be August 23, 1966, when the writ was issued after petitioners posted the required bond.
4. Erlanger & Galinger v. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Ass’n., 104 Phil. 17, Cueto v. Hon. Ortiz, L-11555.
5. PAFLU v. Hon. Marcos, L-26213, March 27, 1968.
