September 1968 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-24155 September 28, 1968 - DELFIN SANTOS, ET AL. v. ROBERTO E. CHICO, ET AL.:
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-24155. September 28, 1968.]
DELFIN SANTOS, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, v. ROBERTO E. CHICO, ET AL., Respondents-Appellees.
Jose W. Diokno for Appellants.
Jesus L. Santos for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CIVIL SERVICE LAW; APPOINTMENTS; CLASSES THEREOF; DETERMINATION OF KIND OF APPOINTMENT VESTED ON APPOINTING POWER; SCOPE OF POWER OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER IN INSTANT CASE. — While the Civil Service Law (Republic Act 2260) recognizes three classes of Civil Service appointments, permanent, provisional and temporary (section 24), each class with requisites and effects of its own, the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by law with appointing power (the Municipal Mayor in case of local policemen) and not in the Commissioner of Civil Service. The statute could be scanned in vain for any authority on the part of the Commissioner to supersede the discretion of the appointing officer on the nature or class of the appointment to be extended. All that the Commissioner is empowered to do is to approve or reject the appointment depending upon its compliance with statutory requirements, and to review, correct or revise those made by provincial, municipal and city executives (Republic Act 2260, section 20), in order to make them conform thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER INTERFERED WITH DISCRETION OF APPOINTING POWER IN INSTANT CASE. — In the instant case, the act of the Civil Service Commissioner in approving as provisional the temporary appointment made by the Municipal Mayor constitutes an unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing officer and cannot be operative. Otherwise, the Commissioner would be exercising himself the power of appointment that the law has lodged elsewhere; it would make him the arbiter of what kind of appointments should be extended in every case. Certainly, nothing in the Civil Service Law indicates a legislative intent to this effect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; APPOINTEE ENJOYS NO FIXED TENURE. — Inasmuch as the appointment of petitioners is temporary, they enjoy no fixed or protected tenure and the appellee-respondent, Mayor Chico, had the right to terminate their services at any time, this condition being inherent in the temporary character of their appointment.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER INTERFERED WITH DISCRETION OF APPOINTING POWER IN INSTANT CASE. — In the instant case, the act of the Civil Service Commissioner in approving as provisional the temporary appointment made by the Municipal Mayor constitutes an unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing officer and cannot be operative. Otherwise, the Commissioner would be exercising himself the power of appointment that the law has lodged elsewhere; it would make him the arbiter of what kind of appointments should be extended in every case. Certainly, nothing in the Civil Service Law indicates a legislative intent to this effect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; APPOINTEE ENJOYS NO FIXED TENURE. — Inasmuch as the appointment of petitioners is temporary, they enjoy no fixed or protected tenure and the appellee-respondent, Mayor Chico, had the right to terminate their services at any time, this condition being inherent in the temporary character of their appointment.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its case No. 2900-M, dismissing appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain appellee Roberto Chico, as Municipal Mayor of Baliuag, Bulacan, from removing or separating appellants from their positions as municipal policemen and to compel appellee Elpidio Dalistan, Municipal Treasurer, to continue paying them their emoluments as such policemen, plus damages and costs.
The facts are not controverted, and are thus stated in the opinion of the court below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appears that petitioners (Delfin Santos, Josefino Legaspi, Ricardo Agapito and Conrado Aterado) were, on August 1, 1962, extended temporary appointments by the then municipal mayor, Felix R. Tiongson of Baliuag, with salaries at the rate of P1,620.00 per annum, which appointments were attested as provisional by the Commissioner of Civil Service (Exhs. A, B, C and D), subsequent to their respective original appointments. On January 15, 1964, said petitioners were served with memoranda of the incumbent municipal mayor, terminating their services as policemen of Baliuag as of said date (Exhs. E, F, G and H), which memoranda gave rise to the instant petition.
"The issues raised by the pleadings in this case are: (1) whether or not the appointments terminated are temporary in nature; and (2) whether or not petitioners who are non-eligibles may be replaced with other non-eligibles.
"Petitioners contend that although their appointments extended by the then municipal mayor of Baliuag partake of temporary ones, yet upon the approval by the Commissioner of Civil Service under the provisions of the New Civil Service Law, their said appointments became provisional in nature and as such they cannot be replaced by non-civil service eligibles like them."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court a quo denied the writ sought by petitioners-appellants, being of the belief that their original appointment was temporary and that the nature thereof could be changed by the Commissioner of Civil Service; that as temporary appointees, their services could be terminated at any time with or without cause. Hence, this appeal.
We find no error in the decision complained of. While the Civil Service Law (Republic Act 2260) recognizes three classes of civil service appointments, permanent, provisional and temporary (section 24), each class with requisites and effects of its own, the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by law with appointing power (the Municipal Mayor in case of local policemen) and not in the Commissioner of Civil Service. The statute could be scanned in vain for any authority on the part of the Commissioner to supersede the discretion of the appointing officer on the nature or class of the appointment to be extended. All that the Commissioner is empowered to do is to approve or reject the appointment, depending upon its compliance with statutory requirements, and to review, correct or revise those made by provincial, municipal and city executives (Republic Act 2260, section 20), in order to make them conform thereto.
In the case before us, the act of the Civil Service Commissioner in approving as provisional the temporary appointment made by the Municipal Mayor constitutes an unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing officer, and can not be operative. Otherwise, the Commissioner would be exercising himself the power of appointment that the law has lodged elsewhere; it would make him the arbiter of what kind of appointments should be extended in every case. Certainly, nothing in the Civil Service Law indicates a legislative intent to this effect.
It follows that the appointment of petitioners must be regarded as temporary as originally extended, and should be deemed approved as such by the Civil Service. As a result, the petitioners enjoy no fixed or protected tenure, and the appellee-respondent, Mayor Chico, had the right to terminate their services at any time, this condition being inherent in the temporary character of their appointment.
In Jimenea v. Guanzon, January 22, 1968, 22 SCRA 227, 229, PHILD 1968-A, pages 220-224, this Court, citing numerous precedents, ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Since his appointment is temporary, it did not confer upon appellant a vested right to occupy in a permanent character the position to which he was appointed. His civil service eligibility will avail him none. For a civil service eligible who accepts a position in a temporary capacity is not entitled to the protection accorded by Republic Act No. 557, 1 nor to the protection of security of tenure in office guaranteed by the Constitution 2 The undisturbed unanimity of the cases is that one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power without need to show that it is for cause." 3
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Petitioners-Appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., did not take part.
Zaldivar , J., on official leave, did not take part.
The facts are not controverted, and are thus stated in the opinion of the court below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appears that petitioners (Delfin Santos, Josefino Legaspi, Ricardo Agapito and Conrado Aterado) were, on August 1, 1962, extended temporary appointments by the then municipal mayor, Felix R. Tiongson of Baliuag, with salaries at the rate of P1,620.00 per annum, which appointments were attested as provisional by the Commissioner of Civil Service (Exhs. A, B, C and D), subsequent to their respective original appointments. On January 15, 1964, said petitioners were served with memoranda of the incumbent municipal mayor, terminating their services as policemen of Baliuag as of said date (Exhs. E, F, G and H), which memoranda gave rise to the instant petition.
"The issues raised by the pleadings in this case are: (1) whether or not the appointments terminated are temporary in nature; and (2) whether or not petitioners who are non-eligibles may be replaced with other non-eligibles.
"Petitioners contend that although their appointments extended by the then municipal mayor of Baliuag partake of temporary ones, yet upon the approval by the Commissioner of Civil Service under the provisions of the New Civil Service Law, their said appointments became provisional in nature and as such they cannot be replaced by non-civil service eligibles like them."cralaw virtua1aw library
The court a quo denied the writ sought by petitioners-appellants, being of the belief that their original appointment was temporary and that the nature thereof could be changed by the Commissioner of Civil Service; that as temporary appointees, their services could be terminated at any time with or without cause. Hence, this appeal.
We find no error in the decision complained of. While the Civil Service Law (Republic Act 2260) recognizes three classes of civil service appointments, permanent, provisional and temporary (section 24), each class with requisites and effects of its own, the determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official vested by law with appointing power (the Municipal Mayor in case of local policemen) and not in the Commissioner of Civil Service. The statute could be scanned in vain for any authority on the part of the Commissioner to supersede the discretion of the appointing officer on the nature or class of the appointment to be extended. All that the Commissioner is empowered to do is to approve or reject the appointment, depending upon its compliance with statutory requirements, and to review, correct or revise those made by provincial, municipal and city executives (Republic Act 2260, section 20), in order to make them conform thereto.
In the case before us, the act of the Civil Service Commissioner in approving as provisional the temporary appointment made by the Municipal Mayor constitutes an unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the appointing officer, and can not be operative. Otherwise, the Commissioner would be exercising himself the power of appointment that the law has lodged elsewhere; it would make him the arbiter of what kind of appointments should be extended in every case. Certainly, nothing in the Civil Service Law indicates a legislative intent to this effect.
It follows that the appointment of petitioners must be regarded as temporary as originally extended, and should be deemed approved as such by the Civil Service. As a result, the petitioners enjoy no fixed or protected tenure, and the appellee-respondent, Mayor Chico, had the right to terminate their services at any time, this condition being inherent in the temporary character of their appointment.
In Jimenea v. Guanzon, January 22, 1968, 22 SCRA 227, 229, PHILD 1968-A, pages 220-224, this Court, citing numerous precedents, ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Since his appointment is temporary, it did not confer upon appellant a vested right to occupy in a permanent character the position to which he was appointed. His civil service eligibility will avail him none. For a civil service eligible who accepts a position in a temporary capacity is not entitled to the protection accorded by Republic Act No. 557, 1 nor to the protection of security of tenure in office guaranteed by the Constitution 2 The undisturbed unanimity of the cases is that one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power without need to show that it is for cause." 3
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against Petitioners-Appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., did not take part.
Zaldivar , J., on official leave, did not take part.
Endnotes:
1. Hortillosa v. Ganzon, L-11169, Jan. 30, 1959.
2. Taboada v. Municipality of Badian, Et Al., L-14604, May 31, 1961.
3. Hojilla v. Mariño, Et Al., L-20574, Feb. 26, 1965; Aguila v. Castro, Et Al., L-23778, Dec. 24, 1965; Serrano, Et. Al. v. National Science Development Board, Et Al., L-19349, Mar. 31, 1964; Cuñado and Vallecera v. Gamus, Et Al., L-16782-83, May 30, 1963; Taboada v. Mun. of Badian, supra; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, Et Al., L-15144, May 26, 1960; Madrid v. Auditor General, Et Al., L-13523, May 31, 1960 (citing Mendez v. Ganzon, Et Al., L-10483, Apr. 12, 1957; University of the Philippines, Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., L-15416, Apr. 28, 1960; Agapuyan v. Ledesma, L-10535, Apr. 25, 1957); Quitiquit v. Villacorta, supra; Montero, Et. Al. v. Castellanes, L-12694, June 30, 1960; Ferrer v. De Leon, L-15076, Aug. 29, 1960 (citing Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780); Villanosa, Et. Al. v. Alera, Et Al., supra; Elegida v. Gacutara, supra; Cuadra v. Cordova, etc., L-11602, April 21, 1958, 54 O.G. 8063; Castro v. Solidum, L-7750, June 30, 1955.
