July 1972 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972 - LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS v. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA JR.:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-34132. July 29, 1972.]
LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMENTE G. RAMOS, Respondents.
T. R. Reyes & Associates for Petitioner.
Soleto J. Erames for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; LEGAL SEPARATION; SIX-MONTH BAN ON HEARING; HEARING ON ISSUANCE OF WRIT OR PROVISIONAL REMEDIES, NOT INCLUDED. — Art. 103 of the Civil Code which prohibits the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — A suit for legal separation must be distinguished from an ordinary suit. It involves a relationship in which the law for the best of reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss of affection on the part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against the life of the other, it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit of legal separation lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The healing balm of the time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — Article 103 of the Civil Code however remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself during the six-months’ ban on hearing. The question of management of the spouses’ respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is hereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — There is justification under Article 103 of the Civil Code for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphemal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — A suit for legal separation must be distinguished from an ordinary suit. It involves a relationship in which the law for the best of reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss of affection on the part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against the life of the other, it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit of legal separation lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The healing balm of the time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. — Article 103 of the Civil Code however remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself during the six-months’ ban on hearing. The question of management of the spouses’ respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is hereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. — There is justification under Article 103 of the Civil Code for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphemal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J.:
The question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit. Respondent Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, answered the question in the affirmative, in view of the absolute tenor of such Civil Code provision, which reads thus: "An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried be fore six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition." He therefore ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other respondent the husband Clemente G. Ramos, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed by petitioner at the same time the suit for legal separation was instituted. Petitioner, Lucy Somosa-Ramos, the wife who brought the action for legal separation would dispute such a ruling. Hence, this certiorari proceeding. As will be shown later, there is justification for such a move on the part of petitioner. The respondent Judge ought to have acted differently. The plea for a writ of certiorari must be granted.
The pleadings show that on June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, concubinage on the respondent’s part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the matter Then on September 3, 1971, petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Respondents were required to answer according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The answer was filed December 2 of that year. Then on January 12, 1972 came a manifestation from the parties in the case submitting the matter without further arguments.
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court that Article 103 of the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
1. It is understandable why there should be a period during which the court is precluded from acting. Ordinarily of course, no such delay is permissible. Justice to the parties would not thereby be served. The sooner the dispute is resolved, the better for all concerned. A suit for legal separation, however, is something else again. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best of reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss of affection on the part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against the life of the other, 1 it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit for legal separation lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." 2 There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, 3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. . . . The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." 4 At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
WHEREFORE, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the order of respondent Court of August 4, 1971, suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is set aside. Respondent Judge is directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction. Costs against respondent Clemente G. Ramos.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs, specially in view of the ruling in De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13, 24.
The pleadings show that on June 18, 1971, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 5274 in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent Clemente Ramos for legal separation, concubinage on the respondent’s part and an attempt by him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion, dated July 3, 1971, based on Article 103 of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by him in a pleading dated July 16, 1971, that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the matter Then on September 3, 1971, petitioner received an order dated August 4, 1971 of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is the order complained of in this petition for certiorari. Respondents were required to answer according to our resolution of October 5, 1971. The answer was filed December 2 of that year. Then on January 12, 1972 came a manifestation from the parties in the case submitting the matter without further arguments.
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court that Article 103 of the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
1. It is understandable why there should be a period during which the court is precluded from acting. Ordinarily of course, no such delay is permissible. Justice to the parties would not thereby be served. The sooner the dispute is resolved, the better for all concerned. A suit for legal separation, however, is something else again. It involves a relationship on which the law for the best of reasons would attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied. Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both of the spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss of affection on the part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. It is a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt of one spouse against the life of the other, 1 it recognizes, albeit reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit for legal separation lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is not all together abandoned. The healing balm of time may aid in the process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation is to be tried.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." 2 There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him. What was held by this Court in Araneta v. Concepcion, 3 thus possesses relevance: "It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. . . . The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused." 4 At any rate, from the time of the issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus there can be no more impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
WHEREFORE, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the order of respondent Court of August 4, 1971, suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is set aside. Respondent Judge is directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction. Costs against respondent Clemente G. Ramos.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs, specially in view of the ruling in De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13, 24.
Endnotes:
1 Article 97 of the Civil Code reads: "A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other."cralaw virtua1aw library
2 Art. 104, Civil Code.
3 99 Phil. 709 (1956).
4 Ibid., p. 712.
