May 1976 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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A.M. No. 1022-MJ May 7, 1976 - REDENTOR ALBANO v. PATROCINIO C. GAPUSAN:
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. 1022-MJ. May 7, 1976.]
REDENTOR ALBANO, Complainant, v. MUNICIPAL JUDGE PATROCINIO C. GAPUSAN of Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte, Respondent.
Redentor Albano on his own behalf as complainant.
Patrocinio C. Gapusan on his own behalf as Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complaint charged respondent municipal judge with (1) incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized, five years before his appointment to the bench, a document providing for the personal separation of husband and wife and the extra judicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership and (2) having allegedly influenced a judge of the Court of First Instance in deciding two criminal cases by taking advantage of his intimacy with said judge.
The Supreme Court censured the respondent as a member of the bar, but dismissed the second charged for being speculative and unfair to the judge of the Court of First Instance. It rules that respondent’s notarization of the void separation agreement does not warrant any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments. It also ruled that whether the fraternization resulted in an unjust verdict due to the sinister or corruptive influence of the municipal judge cannot be shown by mere influence of conjecture but should be substantiated by sold evidence.
The Supreme Court censured the respondent as a member of the bar, but dismissed the second charged for being speculative and unfair to the judge of the Court of First Instance. It rules that respondent’s notarization of the void separation agreement does not warrant any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments. It also ruled that whether the fraternization resulted in an unjust verdict due to the sinister or corruptive influence of the municipal judge cannot be shown by mere influence of conjecture but should be substantiated by sold evidence.
SYLLABUS
1. PERSONS; MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AS SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS. — "Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution." The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects." Marriage and the family are the basis of human society throughout the civilized world.
2. ID.; ID.; CONTRACTS FOR PERSONAL SEPARATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE AND DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, VOID. — To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void, "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership." Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COVENANTS IN AGREEMENT IN INSTANT CASE, CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS. — The covenants in an agreement between husband and wife providing for their personal separation and extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership and stipulating that if either of them should commit adultery and concubinage, as the case may be, then the other are contrary to law, morals and good customs. These stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTARIZATION OF DOCUMENTS SUBVERTING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY CENSURABLE. — A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family. And in the case at bar, the respondent judge should be censured for having notarized a document providing for the personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
5. MUNICIPAL JUDGES; NOTARIZATION, PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT TO BENCH, OF VOID DOCUMENTS DOES NOT WARRANT DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST JUDGE. — Respondent municipal judge’s notarization, five years before his appointment to the bench, of a void document of separation between spouses does not warrant any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed in 1946 as justice of the peace) especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments.
6. ID.; FRATERNIZATION WITH JUDGE OF COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE NOT A CRIME OR UNETHICAL PER SE. — Where the complainant’s allegation that the respondent municipal judge influenced a judge of the Court of First Instance in deciding two criminal cases by taking advantage of his intimacy with the latter is anchored on mere suspicion, the administrative charged based thereon should be dismissed for being speculative and unfair to the said judge of the Court of First Instance. A person has freedom to choose his friends and to hobnob with them. It is not a crime nor unethical per se for a municipal judge to fraternize with a judge of the Court of First Instance. Whether the fraternization resulted in an unjust verdict rendered by the judge of the Court of First Instance due to the sinister or corruptive influence of the municipal judge cannot be shown by mere inference or conjecture. It should be substantiated by solid evidence. The unjustness of the decision should be indubitably established.
2. ID.; ID.; CONTRACTS FOR PERSONAL SEPARATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE AND DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, VOID. — To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void, "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership." Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COVENANTS IN AGREEMENT IN INSTANT CASE, CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS. — The covenants in an agreement between husband and wife providing for their personal separation and extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership and stipulating that if either of them should commit adultery and concubinage, as the case may be, then the other are contrary to law, morals and good customs. These stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTARIZATION OF DOCUMENTS SUBVERTING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY CENSURABLE. — A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family. And in the case at bar, the respondent judge should be censured for having notarized a document providing for the personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
5. MUNICIPAL JUDGES; NOTARIZATION, PRIOR TO APPOINTMENT TO BENCH, OF VOID DOCUMENTS DOES NOT WARRANT DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST JUDGE. — Respondent municipal judge’s notarization, five years before his appointment to the bench, of a void document of separation between spouses does not warrant any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed in 1946 as justice of the peace) especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments.
6. ID.; FRATERNIZATION WITH JUDGE OF COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE NOT A CRIME OR UNETHICAL PER SE. — Where the complainant’s allegation that the respondent municipal judge influenced a judge of the Court of First Instance in deciding two criminal cases by taking advantage of his intimacy with the latter is anchored on mere suspicion, the administrative charged based thereon should be dismissed for being speculative and unfair to the said judge of the Court of First Instance. A person has freedom to choose his friends and to hobnob with them. It is not a crime nor unethical per se for a municipal judge to fraternize with a judge of the Court of First Instance. Whether the fraternization resulted in an unjust verdict rendered by the judge of the Court of First Instance due to the sinister or corruptive influence of the municipal judge cannot be shown by mere inference or conjecture. It should be substantiated by solid evidence. The unjustness of the decision should be indubitably established.
R E S O L U T I O N
AQUINO, J.:
Redentor Albano in a verified complaint dated August 18, 1975 charged Municipal Judge Patrocinio C. Gapusan of Dumalneg and Adams, Ilocos Norte (1) with incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized a document providing for the personal separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership and (2) with having allegedly influenced Judge Zacarias A. Crispin of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte in deciding two criminal cases.
Malpractice as a notary. — In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Barrio 6, Vintar, Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other.
Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. (He was admitted to the bar in 1937).
There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs (Biton v. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7). Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family. "Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution." "The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects." (Arts. 52 and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are the bases of human society throughout the civilized world (Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee; 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864; Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254; Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168).
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extra-judicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void (Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15).
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family (Selanova v. Mendoza, Adm. Matter No. 804-CJ, May 19, 1975 64 SCRA 69; Miranda v. Fuentes, Adm. Case No. 241, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 802; Biton v. Momongan, supra; Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367; In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66; Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277).
Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured for having notarized the void separation agreement already mentioned.
However, his notarization of that document does not warrant any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed in 1946 as justice of the peace) especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments (See Ty v. San Diego, Adm. Matter No. 169-J, June 29, 1972).
Alleged misconduct in influencing CFI Judge. — Albano complains that Judge Gapusan took advantage of his intimacy with Judge Crispin. He implies that by reason of that intimacy Judge Crispin acquitted of frustrated murder the defendants in Criminal Case No. 102-III, People v. Freddie Gapusan Gamboa, Et. Al. and convicted Albano (complainant herein) of double frustrated murder with triple attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 70-III.
Albano said that Freddie Gapusan, an accused in the first criminal case above-mentioned and a complaining witness in the other case against Albano, is a relative of Judge Gapusan. He revealed that after the acquittal decision was rendered by Judge Crispin in Criminal Case No. 102-III, the relatives of the accused in that case were saying that their relationship to Judge Gapusan, a friend of Judge Crispin, proved to be "worthwhile and useful." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Judge Gapusan admitted in his answer that he is close to Judge Crispin because they used to be members of the Municipal Judges League (when it was headed by Judge Crispin) and because the latter used to be an Executive Judge (with supervision over municipal judges). Respondent said that his association with Judge Crispin "was purely official."
Judge Gapusan also admitted that Freddie Gapusan is his distant relative. He denied that he influenced Judge Crispin in rendering his decision in the two criminal cases.
It is manifest that Albano’s imputation that Judge Gapusan influenced Judge Crispin is anchored on mere suspicion. If he has any evidence that Judge Crispin committed any irregularity due to the alleged influence exerted by Judge Gapusan then Albano should have complained against Judge Crispin’s actuations. He should not vent his ire on Judge Gapusan alone.
"When an officer or court allows itself to enter upon the sea of suspicion, it permits itself to enter upon a sea which has no shore, and the embarkation is without a rudder or compass to control the direction or to ascertain its bearing." (Dy Keng v. Collector of Customs, 40 Phil. 118, 123).
A person has freedom to choose his friends and to hobnob with them. It is not a crime nor unethical per se for a municipal judge to fraternize with a Judge of the Court of First Instance. Whether the fraternization resulted in an unjust verdict rendered by the Judge of the Court of First Instance due to the sinister or corruptive influence of the municipal judge cannot be shown by mere inference or conjecture. It should be substantiated by solid evidence. The unjustness of the decision should be indubitably established.
The second charge should be dismissed for being speculative and unfair to Judge Crispin. (He retired in September, 1975).
WHEREFORE, respondent, as a member of the bar, is censured for having notarized the above-mentioned void agreement. The second charge is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Concur because the offense was committed thirty-five years ago. Otherwise, there should have been a heavier sanction.
Malpractice as a notary. — In 1941 or five years before his appointment to the bench, respondent Gapusan notarized a document for the personal separation of the spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta of Barrio 6, Vintar, Ilocos Norte and for the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
It was stipulated in that document that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action against the other.
Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement. He explained that the spouses had been separated for a long time when they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live together in case of reconciliation. His belief was that the separation agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents between the spouses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Albano in filing the malpractice charge is in effect asking this Court to take belated disciplinary action against Judge Gapusan as a member of the bar or as a notary. (He was admitted to the bar in 1937).
There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals and good customs (Biton v. Momongan, 62 Phil. 7). Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and the family. "Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution." "The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects." (Arts. 52 and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are the bases of human society throughout the civilized world (Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee; 43 Phil. 43; Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864; Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254; Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168).
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the law considers as void "any contract for personal separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code). Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extra-judicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void (Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15).
A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of marriage and the family (Selanova v. Mendoza, Adm. Matter No. 804-CJ, May 19, 1975 64 SCRA 69; Miranda v. Fuentes, Adm. Case No. 241, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 802; Biton v. Momongan, supra; Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367; In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66; Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277).
Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be censured for having notarized the void separation agreement already mentioned.
However, his notarization of that document does not warrant any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge (he was appointed in 1946 as justice of the peace) especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary was screened by the Commission on Appointments (See Ty v. San Diego, Adm. Matter No. 169-J, June 29, 1972).
Alleged misconduct in influencing CFI Judge. — Albano complains that Judge Gapusan took advantage of his intimacy with Judge Crispin. He implies that by reason of that intimacy Judge Crispin acquitted of frustrated murder the defendants in Criminal Case No. 102-III, People v. Freddie Gapusan Gamboa, Et. Al. and convicted Albano (complainant herein) of double frustrated murder with triple attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 70-III.
Albano said that Freddie Gapusan, an accused in the first criminal case above-mentioned and a complaining witness in the other case against Albano, is a relative of Judge Gapusan. He revealed that after the acquittal decision was rendered by Judge Crispin in Criminal Case No. 102-III, the relatives of the accused in that case were saying that their relationship to Judge Gapusan, a friend of Judge Crispin, proved to be "worthwhile and useful." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Judge Gapusan admitted in his answer that he is close to Judge Crispin because they used to be members of the Municipal Judges League (when it was headed by Judge Crispin) and because the latter used to be an Executive Judge (with supervision over municipal judges). Respondent said that his association with Judge Crispin "was purely official."
Judge Gapusan also admitted that Freddie Gapusan is his distant relative. He denied that he influenced Judge Crispin in rendering his decision in the two criminal cases.
It is manifest that Albano’s imputation that Judge Gapusan influenced Judge Crispin is anchored on mere suspicion. If he has any evidence that Judge Crispin committed any irregularity due to the alleged influence exerted by Judge Gapusan then Albano should have complained against Judge Crispin’s actuations. He should not vent his ire on Judge Gapusan alone.
"When an officer or court allows itself to enter upon the sea of suspicion, it permits itself to enter upon a sea which has no shore, and the embarkation is without a rudder or compass to control the direction or to ascertain its bearing." (Dy Keng v. Collector of Customs, 40 Phil. 118, 123).
A person has freedom to choose his friends and to hobnob with them. It is not a crime nor unethical per se for a municipal judge to fraternize with a Judge of the Court of First Instance. Whether the fraternization resulted in an unjust verdict rendered by the Judge of the Court of First Instance due to the sinister or corruptive influence of the municipal judge cannot be shown by mere inference or conjecture. It should be substantiated by solid evidence. The unjustness of the decision should be indubitably established.
The second charge should be dismissed for being speculative and unfair to Judge Crispin. (He retired in September, 1975).
WHEREFORE, respondent, as a member of the bar, is censured for having notarized the above-mentioned void agreement. The second charge is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Actg. C.J.), Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Concur because the offense was committed thirty-five years ago. Otherwise, there should have been a heavier sanction.
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