Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence


Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1982 > November 1982 Decisions > G.R. No. L-34517 November 2, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. SlMEON GANUT

203 Phil. 421:




PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-34517. November 2, 1982.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SlMEON GANUT, Defendant-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Alipio V. Flores and Emeterio T. Balguna, for Defendant-Appellant.

SYNOPSIS


One evening, Salvador Malaqui, together with two companions, went to a house where preparations for a wedding were being made. Upon entering the kitchen where appellant and two other men were chopping meat, Salvador requested that "kilawen," a raw meat delicacy, be made. This infuriated appellant who suddenly stood up and, with his bolo, hacked Salvador repeatedly which resulted in the latter’s death. The deceased sustained 25 wounds, eight frontally and 17 at the back. Accused-appellant was charged and subsequently found guilty of murder qualified by treachery, for which he was meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, appellant maintains that he killed the deceased in self-defense.

On review, the Supreme Court held; (a) that the number, nature and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased strongly belie appellant’s claim of self-defense; (b) that the fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected is not enough to constitute the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the evidence do not disclose that accused-appellant planned or made a preparation to hurt the victim in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate; and (c) absent any circumstance to qualify the killing, the crime committed is not- murder but homicide.

Decision appealed from, modified.


SYLLABUS


1. CRIMINAL LAW; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; PLEA BELIED BY THE NUMBER, NATURE AND LOCATION OF THE VICTIM’S WOUNDS; CASE AT BAR. — We sustain the findings of the trial court that the plea of self-defense claimed by the accused-appellant cannot be believed. For one thing, the number of wounds sustained by the deceased, twenty-five(25) in all, eight (8) wounds inflicted in front and seventeen (17) at the back, strongly be lie the assertion of self-defense. The nature and the number of wounds inflicted by an assailant has been constantly and unremittingly considered an important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. (See People v. Panganiban, 22 SCRA 817; People v. Constantino; People v. Somera; People v. Mendoza.)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROVING SAME SHIFTS TO THE ACCUSED. — Accused-appellant having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased, it is incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him-self-defense-to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. (People v. Atienza, G.R No. L-39777, August 31, 1982; both cases citing People v. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772.)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION; AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT THEREOF. —The foremost requirement of self-defense in order to be appreciated in unlawful aggression which is a sudden, unprovoked attack. The person attack must face a real threat to his life, safety or rights in the peril must be imminent or actual. If no unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The version at the defense stresses the point that after the accused allegedly tried to pacify the deceased, saying "What are you doing my son?" that was the time when he (the deceased) took his seat and then hacked the accused. Such version is difficult to believe in the light of human behavior and experience for a persons who intends to commit unlawful aggression would not take his seat first and thereafter inflict injury at the foot or leg of his adversary. If it i is as the intention of the deceased to attack the accused, the former would not base taken a lower position by sitting down. He would have attacked a vulnerable portion of the body of his adversary as his immediate target it instead of hitting just the leg of the accused.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL COURTS ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES, RESPECTED ON APPEAL. — It is well-settled that when there is an irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of witnesses, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court when the evidence of the successful party, considered by it self, is adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from. (People v. Morcina. 77 SCRA 238 citing People v. Tial-on. 112 Phil. 546.) The findings of the lower court as to the infliction of the would on the left leg of the accused himself must be respected and affirmed considering that said court had the opportunity to observe the behavior and deportment of the witnesses.

6. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; ELEMENTS. — In order that treachery may be appreciated, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is founded upon the concurrence of two (2) conditions, to wit: (I) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offender’s safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate (People v. Casalme, 17 SCRA 717; People v. Santos. 20 SCRA 1109; People v. Penzon, 44 Phil. 234.); and (2) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. (People v. Dadis, 18 SCRA 699; People v. Clemente, 21 SCRA 261.) There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising front the defense which the offended party might make. (Article 14, No. 16, Revised Penal Code)

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MERE SUDDENNESS OF AN ATTACK IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE SAME; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, although the attack was sudden and unexpected, evidence do not disclosed that the accused-appellant did plan or make a preparation to hurt a victim in such a manner to insure that the commission of the crime to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend him self or to retaliate. Mere suddenness of an attack is not enough to constitute the qualifying circumstance of treachery were it does not appear that the accused had consciously chosen the method of attack directly and himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. (See People v. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738, 742; People v. Gadiano, G.R. No. L-31818 , July 30, 1982, citing People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285, 302-303, and also people v. Latorre, 74 SCRA 106.)

8. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CRUELTY AND SCOFFING AT THE PERSON OR CORPSE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — As to the aggravating circumstances of evident cruelty and outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse, We agree with the trial court that the evidence is insufficient to justify an affirmative finding.

9. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; CASE AT BAR. — We rule that the proper crime committed by the accused, there being no qualifying Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the same to be imposed in its medium period.

10. ID.; ID.; PENALTY. — Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant found guilty of homicide with no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, should be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from (10) years and (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.


D E C I S I O N


GUERRERO, J.:


This is an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, convicting the accused Simeon Ganut for the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Salvador Malaqui in the amount of P 12,000.00 without subsidiary penalty under the following Information which reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte accuses Simeon Ganut of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows:cralawnad

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1970, in the municipality of Sarrat, Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused with intent to kill, and with treachery, evident cruelty, and/or outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack one Salvador Malaqui, inflicting upon him 25 wounds that caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Laoag City, April 20, 1971.

s/t L. D. CARPIO

Asst. Provincial Fiscal"

The version of the prosecution with respect to the events leading to the death of the victim is succinctly recited in the appellee’s Brief, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On October l7, 1970, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the deceased Salvador Malaqui, his brother, Nelson, together with Antonio Vista, went to the house of Pablo Lagutan where hectic preparations were taking place for a wedding to be celebrated the following day (t.s.n., p. 5, June 8, 1971; also t.s.n., p. 10, June 27, 1971). Salvador Malaqui went inside the kitchen and seated himself on the western side of the table while Nelson Malaqui and Antonio Vista remained outside the doorway of said kitchen (t.s.n., p. 8, ibid.). Inside the kitchen at that time was the appellant herein, Simeon Ganut, together with Florentino Lagutan and Marciano Lagutan who were then chopping meat (t.s.n., p. 12, July 27, 1971). When the deceased Salvador Malaqui had seated himself, he asked Marciano Lagutan to make some "Kilawen" which Marciano Lagutan answered, `You ask the Chief,’ referring to appellant Simeon Ganut. Without much ado, appellant Simeon Ganut stood up and hacked with his bolo Salvador Malaqui at the back of the left side of the body (t.s.n., p. 11, June 8, 1971) which he followed with a second blow that hit his (Ganut’s) leg (ibid). After the second blow, appellant said `Come now and let us kill him’ (t.s.n., p. 12, ibid). Immediately thereafter, the coleman lamp supplying the light in the kitchen was put out (t.s.n., p. 12, ibid). Antonio Vista and Nelson Malaqui hastily went down the kitchen, the former going to the house of the relative of those who were to be married while the latter went to their house to inform his mother about the incident (t.s.n., p. 14, ibid; also t.s.n., p. 15, July 27, 1971).

"Dr. Jovencio Castro who autopsied the cadaver of the deceased testified that the latter suffered 25 wounds, eight (8) of which were inflicted at the front while seventeen (17) wounds were inflicted at the back. The same doctor further declared that the cause of death was hemothorax, severe secondary to chopping injury lateral thoracic walls, left, incising the left auricle (t.s.n., PP. 53-54, ibid)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Specifically, the post-mortem report 1 showed the following findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Post Mortem Findings

1. Chopping injury 3" long, occiput, fracturing skull.

2. Chopping injury, 2.5" long incising the sternocleidomaatoid muscle.

3. Incised wound 2" long one inch below lesion No. 2.

4. Incised wound 1.5" long, scapular region, left.

5. Chopping injury 4" long incising scapular muscle, right.

6. Lacerated wound 2" long scapular region, right.

7. Lacerated wound, one inch long scapular region, right.

8. Abrasion 4" long, back right, level of the 8th rib.

9. Chopping injury 6" long lateral thoracic wall fracturing the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th rib, left and incising the left auricle.

10. Chopping injury 6" long anterior thoracic wall level of the left lumbar region.

11. Chopping injury 4.5" long, posterior thoracic wall, left lumbar region.

12. Chopping injury 3" long along the posterior axillary fold, left.

13. Incised wound 1.5" long left scapular region.

14. Chopping injury 3" long posterior aspect, upper third, forearm left.

15. Chopping injury 4" long lateral aspect, thigh, left.

16. Chopping injury 3" long lateral aspect, thigh, right.

17. Incised wound anterior aspect, left.

18. Lacerated wound l.5" long, foot, left.

19. Abrasion 1.5" long, lower third posterior aspect, hand, right.

20. Abrasion 0.5" long, middle third, posterior aspect, arm, right.

21. Abrasion upper third, posterior aspect forearm, right.

22. Abrasion 2" long lower third, lateral aspect, arm, right.

23. Abrasion 3" long, lateral aspect, arm, right.

24. Abrasion 0.5" long, posterior aspect, forearm, right.

25. Multiple abrasion at three points base of the right thumb.

x       x       x


Cause of Death:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Hemothorax, sever secondary to chopping injury lateral thoracic wall, left, incising the left auricle."cralaw virtua1aw library

The accused-appellant interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense and adduced the following version of the incident narrated in his Brief, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the night of October 17, 1970, Santiago Lagutan requested Simeon Ganut (accused), Salvador Malaqui (deceased), Marciano Lagutan, and Cardito Miguel to butcher a pig for the wedding of his (Santiago Lagutan) son which was to take place the next day, October 18, 1970 (Pp. 2, 29, 35 and 47, t.s.n., Rillera). The four were inside the kitchen of Pablo Lagutan cutting meat. Deceased Malaqui was cutting meat with bones with a short bolo (badang) on a low table (dulang); Cardito Miguel was building fire on the stove in the northern part of the kitchen (P. 2, t.s.n., Rillera); Accused Ganut was cutting meat on a high table; while Marciano Lagutan was washing the intestines of the pig on the low table where the deceased was (P. 34, t.s.n., Rillera). Deceased Malaqui asked Marciano Lagutan to make raw meat (kilawen) but Marciano told the deceased to ask the chief referring to the accused (P. 35, t.s.n., Rillera). At this point, the deceased Malaqui stood up and angrily said: `Who is the chief, I am the Chief,’ and simultaneously thereof hacked Marciano Lagutan on the right forearm. Marciano Lagutan sought cover behind Simeon Ganut who was behind him but the deceased followed him (Lagutan) with his bolo (Pp. 36-37, t.s.n., Rillera). When the deceased followed Marciano Lagutan the accused tried to pacify him by extending his two arms towards the deceased saying: `What are you doing my son,’ but instead the deceased sat down and simultaneously hacked accused Ganut on the left knee (P. 53 t.s.n., Rillera). Deceased then began hacking the accused but the accused was able to parry the blows by striking the deceased first whenever the deceased rushed at him to hack him (Ganut) since he could not stand up because after being hacked by the deceased on the left leg the accused fell on his knees and could not stand up (P. 53, t.s.n., Rillera). The accused and the deceased exchanged blows for one and a half minute and when the deceased continued rushing and hacking the accused, the accused hacked the deceased twice on the breast from right to left and left to right and the deceased stepped backward three meters from the accused (P. 54, t.s.n., Rillera). At that instant the accused went out of the kitchen towards the door of the batalan but the accused followed him with his bolo. Upon getting out of the kitchen the deceased again aimed at the accused but as the deceased hack him (Ganut), the deceased fell and when the deceased was in the act of falling the accused hacked him at the back of the head thinking that he was again hacked by the deceased (Pp. 54-55, t.s.n., Rillera). At that time the accused was no longer conscious and did not know what he was doing (ibid.). Santiago Lagutan was the person who answered the cry for help of Ganut and assisted Ganut from the main stairs of the house of Pablo Lagutan and there Ganut told Santiago Lagutan that he was hacked by the deceased and that he hacked the deceased in self-defense. (P. 26, t.s.n., Rillera)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court a quo refused to give credence to the plea of self-defense, holding that" (a)ccused Ganut claims that all the time that he inflicted the injuries on Salvador Malaqui at the breast and stomach, he was in a kneeling position. However, the number of the frontal wounds, eight of them, wounds, 9, 10, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25 especially wound No. 9 which is a "chopping injury 6" long lateral thoracic wall fracturing the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th rib, left and incising the left auricle’ (Exh. A) could not have been inflicted in a kneeling position. The Court is cognizant that a man in a kneeling position cannot give much force to his attacks and movements or effectively defend himself in such an incongruous position. It is so that the Court believes this claim is highly improbable, and indeed, it is utterly inconceivable that accused Ganut would be unscathed if this claim is true that there was an exchange of hacking between him and the deceased Malaqui; and, more likely than not, Malaqui was without any weapon with which to defend himself as shown by the twenty-five (25) wounds he sustained without having inflicted any. There is, likewise, an admission by accused Ganut that after his infliction of the wounds on the stomach and breast, Salvador seemingly frightened retreated some three (3) meters away. It was then that Ganut claimed he stood up and tried to go to the door to go down but Salvador followed him still with his bolo so Ganut hacked him at the neck which was the coup de grace. At the time of this ultimate hacking by Ganut, Salvador, with the twenty-four (24) wounds, was already helpless, and indeed, could have not held onto his bolo, even if he had any, and considering the one fatal wound, No. 9, a `chopping injury 6" long lateral thoracic wall fracturing the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th rib, left and incising the left auricle’ (Exh. A), it is sheer gullibility if one would yet believe that Malaqui still could have stood up, much less walk.

The accused Ganut did not explain, moreover, how deceased Malaqui sustained the wounds at the back, seventeen (17) in all, wounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 21. Antonio Vista, however, testified that accused Ganut hacked Salvador at the back of the left side of the body while the latter was seated at which he fell to the floor. The medical certificate, Exh. A, indeed shows wounds 4 and 13, Exh. B-2, on the left side of the body of Salvador and obviously the other injuries, wounds Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 21 being at the back had been inflicted also at this time; thus, the deceased Malaqui at the onset of the sudden attack by accused Ganut had no inkling of the aggression because in the first place he was talking to Ciano Lagutan, and secondly, the attacks were from his back, and conceivably all the wounds at the back were inflicted after Malaqui fell to the floor at the initial aggression of accused Ganut: thus, the Court is convinced that there was treachery in the commission of the crime qualifying the killing to murder. As to the other aggravating circumstances, the evidence is insufficient to justify an affirmative finding."cralaw virtua1aw library

Accused-appellant, appealing to Us, now seeks reversal of the lower court’s decision, interposing the plea of self-defense.cralawnad

We sustain the findings of the trial court that the plea of self-defense claimed by the accused-appellant cannot be believed. For one thing, the number of wounds sustained by the deceased, twenty five (25) in all, eight (8) wounds inflicted in front and seventeen (17) at the back, strongly belie the assertion of self-defense. The nature and number of wounds inflicted by an assailant has been constantly and unremittingly considered an important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. In People v. Panganiban, 2 this Court exhaustively underscored Our previous rulings exemplifying the bearings of multiple wounds vis-a-vis the plea of self-defense, to wit: "In the Gonzales case, the then Justice Torres considering the ten (10) wounds inflicted on the deceased correctly characterizes the allegation of self-defense as `incredible because it is improbable.’ In People v. Constantino, this Court, thru Justice Bengzon, had to reject the plea of self-defense which in his opinion was `belied and negatived’ by the ‘nature, number and location of the decedent’s wounds.’ People v. Somera, speaks to the same effect thus: ‘The theory of self-defense on the part of Pablo is clearly negatived by the numerous (19) wounds inflicted upon Felix. Upon the other hand, such wounds are indicative of aggression and of the participation therein of appellant . . .’ In another opinion of this Court in People v. Mendoza, it was persuasively stressed: ‘Finally, the number of wounds on the body of the deceased, and their location as registered in the autopsy report, expose the inherent weakness of the claim of self-defense. There were in all fifteen wounds, one in the neck, two in the abdomen, seven in the chest and the others in the various parts of the arms.’"

Appellant Simeon Ganut, testifying as to the manner how he inflicted the twenty-five wounds or the victim Salvador Malaqui, declared as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Atty. Flores:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q. And how did you hack Salvador Malaqui?

A. Whenever he rushed towards me, sir, I could reach him and hack also like this. (Witness with his right hand on top of his left shoulder swung it forward)

Q Is that the only position you have in hacking Malaqui?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q. You mean to say you were never able to stand up?

A No. Your Honor." 3

On cross-examination by the fiscal, Simeon Ganut reiterated his stance: 4

"FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q. You stated previously that when you were hacked already, you were in a sitting position, kneeling with your right leg and then left leg stretched forward and all the time you were in that position when you said that the deceased Malaqui was hacking you for several times. did I get you right?

A. I was in a sitting position, sir.

Q. The question is: when you started hacking this Malaqui, you were always in a kneeling position?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you were in that position all the time when you were parrying?

COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

He said that."cralaw virtua1aw library

Accused-appellant having admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased, it is incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him — self-defense — to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. 5

The foremost requirement of self-defense in order to be appreciated is unlawful aggression which is a sudden, unprovoked attack. The person attacked must face a real threat to his life, safety or rights and the peril must be imminent or actual. If no unlawful aggression attributable to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.

The version of the defense, as previously related earlier, stresses the point that after the accused allegedly tried to pacify the deceased, saying "What are you doing my son?" that was the time when he (the deceased) took his seat and then hacked the accused. (tsn, p. 61, Sept. 9, 1971). Such version is difficult to believe in the light of human behavior and experience for a person who intends to commit unlawful aggression would not take his seat first and thereafter inflict injury at the foot or leg of his adversary. If it was the intention of the deceased to attack the accused, the former would not have taken a lower position by sitting down. He would have attacked a vulnerable portion of the body of his adversary as his immediate target instead of hitting just the leg of the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We cannot accept the claim of the appellant that his injury on the leg was inflicted by the deceased Salvador Malaqui. According to the accused, he was in a sitting position when he was wounded on the left leg (tsn., p. 50, Sept. 9, 1971). However, the scar of the incised wound allegedly inflicted by the deceased is an elongated one, five inches in length, located on the left leg, upper third, anterior aspect (tsn, p. 20, ibid.), hence, the wound would not have been inflicted in such a position considering that the accused himself testified that the bolo thrust came from downward. The testimony of Dr. Federico Campos on this point is deserving of greater probity when he declared that from the position and nature of the wound, it is possible that the accused holding a bolo with his right hand may have inflicted the wound on the left leg. (tsn, p. 20, ibid.) The testimony of the doctor confirms the claim of the witnesses Antonio Vista and Nelson Malaqui that in hacking the deceased the second time, the appellant hit his left leg instead (tsn, p. 12, June 8, 1971; p. 14, July 27, 1971).

Again, the findings of the lower court as to the infliction of the wound on the left leg of the accused himself must be respected and affirmed considering that said court had the opportunity to observe the behavior and deportment of the witnesses. It is well settled that when there is an irreconcilable conflict in the testimony of witnesses, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial court when the evidence of the successful part, considered by itself, is adequate to sustain the judgment appealed from. 6

With respect to the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery which the trial court appreciated in convicting the accused of the crime of murder, We do not agree with the lower court’s holding that: "The medical certificate,. . . . indeed shows wounds 4 and 13 . . . on the left side of the body of Salvador . . . thus, the deceased Malaqui at the onset of the sudden attack by the accused Ganut had no inkling of the aggression because in the first place he was talking to Ciano Lagutan, and secondly, the attacks were from his back and conceivably all the wounds at the back were inflicted after Malaqui fell to the floor at the initial aggression of accused Ganut; thus, the Court is convinced that there was treachery in the commission of the crime qualifying the killing to murder." 7

In order that treachery may be appreciated, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is founded upon the concurrence of two (2) conditions, to wit: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offender’s safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; 8 and (2) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. 9 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. (Article 14, No. 16, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, although the attack was sudden and unexpected, evidence do not disclose that accused-appellant did plan or made a preparation to hurt the victim in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. "Mere suddenness of an attack is not enough to constitute the qualifying circumstance of treachery where it does not appear that the accused had consciously chosen the method of attack directly and specially to facilitate the perpetration of homicide without risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. As indicated in People v. Tumaob (83 Phil. 738, 742) the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. 10

We find no evidence or circumstance shown by the prosecution that the accused Ganut knew, much less expected, the coming of the deceased Salvador Malaqui to the kitchen where the preparations for the coming wedding were being made. In fact the evidence of the prosecution show that it was immediately after Salvador Malaqui had requested that "Kilawen" be made that infuriated the accused Simeon Ganut to strike the deceased with his bolo. Accused-appellant, therefore, was not afforded sufficient opportunity to deliberate and consciously adopt a method of attack which would directly and specially facilitate the killing of his victim without risk to himself or make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.

As to the aggravating circumstances of evident cruelty and outraging or scoffing at the person or corpse, We agree with the trial court that the evidence is insufficient to justify an affirmative finding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

We rule that the proper crime committed by the accused is homicide, punishable by reclusion temporal under Articles 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the same to be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in that the accused-appellant Simeon Ganut is hereby found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The rest of the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:



1. Exhibit A for the prosecution, folder of exhibits.

2. 22 SCRA 817.

3. TSN, p. 53, September 9, 1971.

4. Ibid., p. 62.

5. People v. Atienza, G.R. No. L-39777, August 31, 1982; People v. Hisugan, G.R. No. L-38687, August 31, 1982; both cases citing People v. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772.

6. People v. Morcina, 77 SCRA 238 citing People v. Tial-on, 112 Phil. 546.

7. Records, p. 90.

8. People v. Casalme, 17 SCRA 717; People v. Ramos, 20 SCRA 1109; People v. Penzon, 44 Phil. 234.

9. People v. Dadis, 18 SCRA 699; People v. Clemente, 21 SCRA 261.

10. People v. Gadiano, G.R. No. L-31818, July 30, 1982, citing People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285, 302-303, and also People v. Latorre, 74 SCRA 106.




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    203 Phil. 421

  • G.R. No. L-39518 November 2, 1982 - AGRICULTURAL & INDUSTRIAL MARKETING, INC., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 436

  • G.R. No. L-44039 November 2, 1982 - ROLANDO A. DATUIN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 442

  • G.R. No. L-47460 November 2, 1982 - AMELIA DELEGENTE v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 447

  • G.R. No. L-48196 November 2, 1982 - ROLANDO BAUTISTA v. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 469

  • G.R. No. L-50298 November 2, 1982 - JOSEPH Y. PUNAY v. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 475

  • G.R. No. L-50358 November 2, 1982 - SHIPSIDE, INCORPORATED v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 481

  • G.R. No. L-52823 November 2, 1982 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. MIDPANTAO ADIL, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 492

  • G.R. No. L-53465 November 2, 1982 - ANTONIO NITURA v. JOSE C. COLAYCO, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 503

  • G.R. No. L-54439 November 2, 1982 - PEOPLE Of THE PHIL. v. JESUS N. MONTEZ

    203 Phil. 508

  • G.R. No. L-55645 November 2, 1982 - RICARDO CENIZA v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 521

  • G.R. No. L-56909 November 2, 1982 - FLORENCIA B. SAN VALENTIN v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 534

  • G.R. No. L-58578 November 2, 1982 - JOSE GEROMO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 539

  • G.R. No. L-59054 November 2, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. MUSTAPA ALIBASA, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 559

  • G.R. No. L-34597 November 5, 1982 - ROSITO Z. BACARRO, ET AL. v. GERUNDIO B. CASTAÑO, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 563

  • G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982 - IN RE: APOLONIO TABOADA v. AVELINO S. ROSAL, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 572

  • G.R. No. L-61870 November 5, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. CONSTANTINO D. PERALTA

    203 Phil. 580

  • G.R. No. L-49004 November 10, 1982 - NG LIT v. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 592

  • A.M. No. 702-CTJ November 15, 1982 - ELISA VDA. DE OCHOA, ET AL. v. GERINO M. TOLENTINO

    203 Phil. 600

  • G.R. No. L-26325 November 15, 1982 - PACWELD STEEL CORPORATION v. ASIA STEEL CORPORATION

    203 Phil. 606

  • G.R. No. L-31366 November 15, 1982 - ASIAN SURETY AND INSURANCE CO., INC. v. ISLAND STEEL, INC., ET AL.

    203 Phil. 611

  • G.R. No. L-34834 November 15, 1982 - ARTURO H. TROCIO v. LUIS D. MANTA, ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-39258 November 15, 1982 - RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, ET AL. v. AMANTE P. PURISIMA, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 625

  • G.R. No. L-42540 November 15, 1982 - VICTOR NEPOMUCENO, ET AL. v. JUAN B. MONTECILLO, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 632

  • G.R. No. L-52325 November 15, 1982 - CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 639

  • G.R. No. L-53060 November 15, 1982 - ROSARIO T. MAMERTO, ET AL. v. AMADO G. INCIONG, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 644

  • G.R. No. 55771 November 15, 1982 - TAHANAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 652

  • G.R. No. L-56479 November 15, 1982 - SOCORRO L. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA v. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 708

  • G.R. Nos. L-56695-98 November 15, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. GIBSON A. ARAULA, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 719

  • G.R. No. L-61663 November 15, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. WILFREDO L. REGLOS, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 724

  • G.R. No. L-61997 November 15, 1982 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL., ET AL. v. ELFREN PARTISALA, ET AL.

    203 Phil. 750

  • A.C. No. 641 November 19, 1982 - FRANCISCO RADOMES v. FERNANDO FABRIGARAS

    204 Phil. 1

  • A.C. No. 1675 November 19, 1982 - BELEN A. RIVERA v. ORLANDO LATONERO

    204 Phil. 4

  • A.M. No. P-1935 November 19, 1982 - BENJAMIN DAAG v. HONORIO SERRANO

    204 Phil. 9

  • G.R. No. L-30690 November 19, 1982 - BF HOMES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 15

  • G.R. No. L-30854 November 19, 1982 - PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 21

  • G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982 - MODESTA CALIMLIM, ET AL. v. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, ET AL.

    204 Phil.25cralaw:red

  • G.R. No. L-35718 November 19, 1982 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL., ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 38

  • G.R. No. L-37712 November 19, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ERNESTO SYQUIOCO

    204 Phil. 42

  • G.R. No. L-38258 November 19, 1982 - LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN v. MARCELO ENTERPRISES, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 50

  • G.R. No. L-39503 November 19, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. LUCRESIO CARDENAS

    204 Phil. 88

  • G.R. No. L-39528 November 19, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JIMMY MONAGA, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 98

  • G.R. No. L-44686 November 19, 1982 - MACARIO MANUEL, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 110

  • G.R. No. L-44817 November 19, 1982 - LEA PAZ TUAZON v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 117

  • G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982 - LAUSAN AYOG, ET AL. v. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., ET AL.

  • G.R. No. L-49140 November 19, 1982 - QUASHA ASPERILLA ANCHETA VALMONTE PEÑA & MARCOS v. CELESTINO P. JUAN, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 141

  • G.R. No. L-54158 November 19, 1982 - PAGASA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 162

  • G.R. No. L-55079 November 19, 1982 - METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY v. FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 172

  • G.R. No. L-55539 November 19, 1982 - DIOSA DE LEON v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 180

  • G.R. No. L-55624 November 19, 1982 - BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 194

  • G.R. No. L-56761 November 19, 1982 - MARIANO TOLEDO, ET AL. v. BERNARDO P. PARDO, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 203

  • G.R. No. L-57170 November 19, 1982 - KO BU LIN v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 211

  • G.R. No. L-57440 November 19, 1982 - D. D. COMENDADOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. MARCELINO N. SAYO, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 227

  • G.R. Nos. L-57477-78 November 19, 1982 - HEIRS OF WILLIAM SEVILLA, ET AL. v. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 237

  • G.R. No. L-57707 November 19, 1982 - PHILEX MINING CORPORATION v. DOMINGO CORONEL REYES, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 241

  • G.R. No. L-58506 November 19, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. NILO DE JESUS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 247

  • G.R. No. L-59463 November 19, 1982 - PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA v. IMPERIAL MINING COMPANY, INC.

    204 Phil. 262

  • G.R. No. L-59596 November 19, 1982 - NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION, ET AL. v. NLRC, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 268

  • G.R. No. L-60950 November 19, 1982 - J.D. MAGPAYO CUSTOMS BROKERAGE CORP. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 276

  • A.M. No. P-292 November 25, 1982 - ISIDRO G. ARENAS v. MANUEL RESULTAN, SR.

    204 Phil. 279

  • A.C. No. 2662-CFI November 26, 1982 - FLAVIANO A. PELMOKA v. FELIX T. DIAZ, JR.

    204 Phil. 283

  • G.R. No. L-30391 November 25, 1982 - ASSOCIATED SUGAR, INC., ET AL. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 289

  • G.R. No. L-35630 November 25, 1982 - PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. v. GALAURAN & PILARES CONSTRUCTION CO., ET AL.

    204 Phil. 296

  • G.R. No. L-35757 November 25, 1982 - LUCIA LUSUNG v. SUSANA VDA. DE SANTOS

    204 Phil. 302

  • G.R. No. L-36364 November 25, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. JUANITO DASCIL, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 309

  • G.R. No. L-38423 November 25, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. SAMUEL PIMENTEL

    204 Phil. 327

  • G.R. No. L-38449 November 25, 1982 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. DOMINADOR MANZANO

    204 Phil. 339

  • G.R. No. L-50548 November 25, 1982 - CONCHING ALVARO, ET AL. v. HOSPICIO ZAPATA, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 356

  • G.R. No. L-56025 November 25, 1982 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. v. ARSENIO M. GONONG, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 364

  • G.R. Nos. L-56224-26 November 25, 1982 - PURISIMA GESTOSO CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 372

  • G.R. Nos. L-61067-68 November 25, 1982 - MITSUI & CO., LTD. v. MANUEL G. ABELLO, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 384

  • G.R. No. L-33724 November 29, 1982 - ELIGIA BATBATAN. v. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAGADIAN, ET AL.

    204 Phil. 379