September 1988 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 76001 September 5, 1988 - PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76001. September 5, 1988.]
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, ELEUTERIO YAP, FERDINAND LAZO, ROBERT TAN, ALBERTO BRILLO, FREDERICK CASES, MARILOU VILLENA, and ARLENE VILLARO, Respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General and Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GENERALLY ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT. — We have held in a long line of decisions that the findings of fact of the Department (Ministry) of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission are entitled to great respect, unless the said findings and the conclusions made therefrom are not supported by substantial evidence.
2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. — By "grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (G.R. No. 59880, George Arguelles [Hda. Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc.], September 11, 1987).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CASE AT BAR. — Considering all the foregoing, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the National Labor Relations Commission, and therefore we find no cogent reason to justify a reconsideration of our resolution.
2. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, CONSTRUED. — By "grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (G.R. No. 59880, George Arguelles [Hda. Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc.], September 11, 1987).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CASE AT BAR. — Considering all the foregoing, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the National Labor Relations Commission, and therefore we find no cogent reason to justify a reconsideration of our resolution.
D E C I S I O N
SARMIENTO, J.:
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is the resolution of this Court dated May 26, 1988 1 dismissing the petition for review on certiorari 2 on the ground that the same raises essentially factual issues and in view of the absence of any showing that the findings 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission were not supported by substantial evidence and that the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion.
The petitioner anchors its motion on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
RESPONDENT NLRC EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION IN THAT —
a) THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER VIRGINIA SON WHICH RESPONDENT NLRC MODIFIED IS ITSELF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONFIRMING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ USE OF VIOLENCE DURING THE STRIKE.
b) THE GOVERNING LAW WHICH RESPONDENT NLRC MISAPPLIED CATEGORICALLY IMPOSES DISMISSAL UPON EMPLOYEES GUILTY OF ILLEGAL ACTS IN THE COURSE OF A STRIKE.
The sole issue raised is whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it modified the Decision 4 dated March 12, 1985 of the Labor Arbiter. 5
The petitioner maintains that the dismissal of its petition was unwarranted. It argues that the very basis of the NLRC’s decision was the findings of the Labor Arbiter, that the strike of October 1, 1984 was illegal, as the same was attended by violence, coercion, intimidation, destruction of properties, and other unlawful acts which were all properly substantiated by it and which were not controverted by the respondents, hence, they were deemed to have been established. 6 It avers that on appeal the function of the National Labor Relations Commission, if it finds the Labor Arbiter’s decision to be supported by substantial evidence, is to affirm the same. 7 It asserts further that when the public respondent modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondents, it acted with grave abuse of discretion, as it in effect violated the provisions of sub-section (e) of Art. 265 (now Art. 264) 8 of the Labor Code. The petitioner-movant submits that the coercive picketing by private respondent cannot be viewed in isolation from the overall illegal conduct of the strikers and the climate of violence that characterized the strike, that the coercive picketing contributed to the heated strike atmosphere which induced the commission of other unlawful acts by strikers, who were ordered dismissed; and without such coercive picketing on the part of the respondent, the acts of grave threats, coercion and malicious mischief on the part of the other strikers would not have happened. 9
We have held in a long line of decisions that the findings of fact of the Department (Ministry) of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission are entitled to great respect, unless the said findings and the conclusions made therefrom are not supported by substantial evidence. 10
By "grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (G.R. No. 59880, George Arguelles [Hda. Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc.], September 11, 1987). 11
Considering all the foregoing, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the National Labor Relations Commission, and therefore we find no cogent reason to justify a reconsideration of our resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., no part. Son is a partner in law firm of petitioners counsel.
Padilla, J., no part due to existing lessor-lessee relationship with petitioner.
The petitioner anchors its motion on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I.
RESPONDENT NLRC EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RENDERING ITS ASSAILED DECISION IN THAT —
a) THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER VIRGINIA SON WHICH RESPONDENT NLRC MODIFIED IS ITSELF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONFIRMING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ USE OF VIOLENCE DURING THE STRIKE.
b) THE GOVERNING LAW WHICH RESPONDENT NLRC MISAPPLIED CATEGORICALLY IMPOSES DISMISSAL UPON EMPLOYEES GUILTY OF ILLEGAL ACTS IN THE COURSE OF A STRIKE.
The sole issue raised is whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it modified the Decision 4 dated March 12, 1985 of the Labor Arbiter. 5
The petitioner maintains that the dismissal of its petition was unwarranted. It argues that the very basis of the NLRC’s decision was the findings of the Labor Arbiter, that the strike of October 1, 1984 was illegal, as the same was attended by violence, coercion, intimidation, destruction of properties, and other unlawful acts which were all properly substantiated by it and which were not controverted by the respondents, hence, they were deemed to have been established. 6 It avers that on appeal the function of the National Labor Relations Commission, if it finds the Labor Arbiter’s decision to be supported by substantial evidence, is to affirm the same. 7 It asserts further that when the public respondent modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondents, it acted with grave abuse of discretion, as it in effect violated the provisions of sub-section (e) of Art. 265 (now Art. 264) 8 of the Labor Code. The petitioner-movant submits that the coercive picketing by private respondent cannot be viewed in isolation from the overall illegal conduct of the strikers and the climate of violence that characterized the strike, that the coercive picketing contributed to the heated strike atmosphere which induced the commission of other unlawful acts by strikers, who were ordered dismissed; and without such coercive picketing on the part of the respondent, the acts of grave threats, coercion and malicious mischief on the part of the other strikers would not have happened. 9
We have held in a long line of decisions that the findings of fact of the Department (Ministry) of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission are entitled to great respect, unless the said findings and the conclusions made therefrom are not supported by substantial evidence. 10
By "grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law (G.R. No. 59880, George Arguelles [Hda. Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc.], September 11, 1987). 11
Considering all the foregoing, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the National Labor Relations Commission, and therefore we find no cogent reason to justify a reconsideration of our resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., no part. Son is a partner in law firm of petitioners counsel.
Padilla, J., no part due to existing lessor-lessee relationship with petitioner.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, 99.
2. Rollo, 1-a.
3. Rollo, 14.
4. Rollo, 30.
5. Penned by Virginia Son, Labor Arbiter.
6. Rollo, 101-102.
7. Rollo, 103.
8. "No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation, or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
9. Rollo, 104.
10. Franklin Baker of the Phils. v. Hon. Cresencia B. Trajano, Et Al., No. 75039, Jan. 28, 1988 citing: (Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes, Et. Al. v. Camara Shoes, 2nd Heirs of Santos Camara, Et Al., No. 50985, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 477 [1927]; International Hardwood and Veneer Co. of the Philippines v. Leonardo, No. 57429, October 28, 1982, 117 SCRA 679 [1982]; Pan-Phil-Life, Inc. v. NLRC, No. 53721, July 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 866 [1982]; Pepsi-Cola Labor Union-BR LU-TUPAS Local Chapter N-896 v. NLRC, No. 58341, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 930 [1982]; Egyptair v. NLRC, No. 63185, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 125 [1987]; RJL Martinez Fishing Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 63550-51, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 455 [1984]; and Reyes v. Phil. Duplicators, G.R. No. 54996, November 27, 1981, 109 SCRA 489 [1981].
11. Id., G.R. 75039; Dulos Realty and Development Corp. v. CA., Et Al., G.R. No. 76668, Jan. 28, 1988, citing Emma Arguelles v. Romeo Yang, etc., September 11, 1987; Placida Peza, Et. Al. v. Hon. Federico Alikpala, G.R. No. L-29749, April 15, 1988; Robert Young, etc. v. The Hon. Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Et Al., G.R. 57839, June 27, 1988.
