August 1992 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 100643 August 14, 1992 - ADEZ REALTY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100643. August 14, 1992.]
ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Morong, Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, Morong, Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO EUGENIO, Respondents.
Benjamin M. Dacanay for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL UPON LAPSE OF REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF APPEAL AND NO APPEAL PERFECTED. — Petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner’s failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal. It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN REM; PERSONAL NOTICE NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. — As early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO VEST COURT JURISDICTION. — In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED TWICE BY VARYING FORMS OF ACTION. — Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioner’s action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF DECISION. — However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN REM; PERSONAL NOTICE NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. — As early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO VEST COURT JURISDICTION. — In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED TWICE BY VARYING FORMS OF ACTION. — Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioner’s action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENT CONTENTS OF DECISION. — However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
R E S O L U T I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The petition filed on December 28, 1990, by Adez Realty Incorporated before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to annul the order of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, dated November 20, 1984, allowing the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12662. The petition likewise sought to set aside in effect the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 dated July 31, 1990.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On June 26, 1991, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent court, in dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the issues raised before it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no motion for reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court was filed, the same became final and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on October 11, 1990; and, (b) the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the issue then being one of venue and not of jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises four (4) issues which nevertheless may be simplified into the following: whether the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings involving real property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of the notice of the petition in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.
Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner’s failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.
It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In fact, in Dueñas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court may have committed an error in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to the parties in this case, but considering that their judgments are now final, the error, assuming that one was committed, can no longer be amended or corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok, 6 We ruled that even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become final. We have also declared that, subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court of amend or reverse a decision which has attained finality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed, every litigation, CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 included, must come to an end.
Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the trial court when its Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, filed more than a year after the issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the trial court, however erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief granted. Petitioner then simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said decision to become final.
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. 10 Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 11 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, 12 We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioner’s action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 13
Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having become final and executory. Accordingly, We affirm the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution issued June 26, 1991, by respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel purports to quote, as he does, the questioned decision when he alleges —
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated November 20, 1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, granting the applicant’s petition for reconstitution in the name of the deceased Elias Eugenio’" (Italics supplied)
However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 14 this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On June 26, 1991, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent court, in dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the issues raised before it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no motion for reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court was filed, the same became final and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on October 11, 1990; and, (b) the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the subject matter, the issue then being one of venue and not of jurisdiction, which can be waived if not timely objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises four (4) issues which nevertheless may be simplified into the following: whether the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution proceedings involving real property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of the notice of the petition in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette and its posting in the bulletin board of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is sufficient compliance with Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.
Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became final and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner’s failure to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.
It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same. 4 In fact, in Dueñas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court may have committed an error in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to the parties in this case, but considering that their judgments are now final, the error, assuming that one was committed, can no longer be amended or corrected." In Icao v. Apalisok, 6 We ruled that even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become final. We have also declared that, subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court of amend or reverse a decision which has attained finality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed, every litigation, CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 included, must come to an end.
Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the trial court when its Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, filed more than a year after the issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the trial court, however erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief granted. Petitioner then simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not file a timely appeal from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said decision to become final.
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. 10 Thus, while it may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect. 11 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br. 170, 12 We said that" [t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
Shorn of its finery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which as become res judicata. Verily, petitioner’s action to annul the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal became final and executory due to petitioner’s failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 13
Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having become final and executory. Accordingly, We affirm the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution issued June 26, 1991, by respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review filed in behalf of petitioner Adez Realty, Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel purports to quote, as he does, the questioned decision when he alleges —
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
‘After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated November 20, 1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, granting the applicant’s petition for reconstitution in the name of the deceased Elias Eugenio’" (Italics supplied)
However, the phrase "without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 14 this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5) days from notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Twelfth Division, penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera (Chairman) and occurred in by Associate Justices Regina C. Ordoñez Benitez and Cancio C. Garcia.
2. Twelfth Division (old composition), penned by Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and concurred in by Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno and Artemon D. Luna.
3. Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu, G.R. No. 77243, October 26, 1989, 178 SCRA 692, among a litany of other cases.
4. Marquez v. CA, G.R. No. 79743, November 6, 1989, 178 SCRA 74, citing International School, Inc. v. Min. of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 54243, July 21, 1989, 175 SCRA 507.
5. G.R. No. 65889, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 530.
6. G.R. No. 59581, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 680, citing Castillo v. Donato, G.R. No. 70230, June 24, 1985, 137 SCRA 210.
7. See Sealand Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90500, October 5, 1990, 190 SCRA 347.
8. Fabular v. CA, G.R. No. 52118, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 329, citing Fariscal Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, No. L-26095, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 470.
9. 17 Phil. 49.
10. This ruling has been reiterated in Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Sepagan v. Dacillo, 63 Phil. 412, and in a host of much later cases decided by the Supreme Court.
11. See PNB v. De la Vina and Zamacona, 109 Phil. 342.
12. G.R. No. 88623, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 788.
13. Ibabao v. IAC, G.R. No. 74848, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 76, 85, citing Valera v. Bañez, No. L-27886, September 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 648 and Ramos v. Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc., No. L-26986, September 30, 19777, 79 SCRA 170.
14. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
