December 1998 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
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G.R. No. 115452 December 21, 1998 - INTL. CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. v. NLRC, ET AL.:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115452. December 21, 1998.]
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GABRIEL TANPIENGCO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI), through this special civil action for certiorari, prays for the modification of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 23 September 1993 by deleting therefrom that portion which orders it to pay private respondent Gabriel Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 up to the promulgation of the Decision despite his valid dismissal for cause.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Petitioner ICTSI is a corporation engaged in stevedoring. It operates the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) under a management contract with the Philippine Ports Authority. On 12 July 1988 it employed private respondent Tanpiengco as a CFS Priority pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with private respondent’s labor union, the Associated Ports Checkers Services and Workers Union (APCSWU). Tanpiengco has since then become a regular employee assigned either to a shipping line or bodega to strip and examine cargoes from abroad with usual working schedule from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. although in actual practice cleaning time would start at 4:30 p.m.
On 7 March 1990 Tanpiengco was assigned at Bodega I. When it was time for him to clean himself he took his T-shirt which was hanging from a post, tucked it at his waist and proceeded to the washroom. He was accosted by a security guard allegedly for behaving suspiciously. Tanpiengco was haled to the comfort room and frisked but nothing of value was found in his person. Nonetheless he was taken to the security office for further questioning; he was accused of taking a T-shirt marked "Gesim Corp." from one of the balikbayan boxes inside the container yard.
On 21 March 1990 Tanpiengco was referred to petitioner’s personnel department for investigation. According to petitioner, he admitted to the investigating officer that he took the "Gesim Corp." T-shirt valued at P100.00, but Tanpiengco insisted on his innocence claiming that he was coerced at knifepoint into admitting the theft. On 30 April 1990, after a brief suspension, Tanpiengco was dismissed for pilferage which petitioner considered as breach of trust, dishonesty and theft of property.
Tanpiengco sued the stevedoring firm for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and backwages. The Labor Arbiter, in his decision of 3 December 1990, found the dismissal to be totally unjustified as neither theft nor pilferage was committed by Tanpiengco. The Labor Arbiter gave credence to Tanpiengco’s allegation that the T-shirt he was accused of stealing actually belonged to him, having bought the same from one Maxima Icabandi, a businesswoman. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered to reinstate Tanpiengco with full back wages in the total amount of P91,078.00 from 2 July 1988 to 30 November 1990, with temporary adjustments as the need would arise until his actual reinstatement. 1
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint of Tanpiengco, in effect holding that his termination was legal, but ordered petitioner to pay him his wages from 25 January 1991 (date of filing of appeal with the NLRC) up to 23 September 1993 (promulgation of NLRC decision) pursuant to Art. 223 of the Labor Code. 2 Both parties moved for reconsideration but were denied on 6 April 1994. 3
Petitioner now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it awarded back wages to Tanpiengco from 25 January 1991 to 23 September 1993. Petitioner claims that the monetary award to Tanpiengco who was subsequently found to have been validly and legally terminated is "absolutely unwarranted and patently erroneous and unjustifiable." 4 While it is true that under the law the employer found to have illegally dismissed an employee is required to reinstate the employee either actually or through payroll at the employer’s option, this requirement according to petitioner needs execution or enforcement by the employee in coordination with the labor department. In the instant case, Tanpiengco never pursued the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter despite the fact that petitioner was perfectly willing to actually recall him during the pendency of the appeal to NLRC. No writ of execution was ever issued by the Labor Arbiter; neither was there any sheriff’s return. Thus, by his own inaction or lethargy, Tanpiengco prevented petitioner from actually reinstating him. There is therefore no reason to award him back wages for a failed reinstatement. 5
While we are not in full accord with the finding of the NLRC that Tanpiengco was validly dismissed for cause, he appears to have accepted the legality of his dismissal as he did not appeal therefrom. He now focuses his attention on collecting his back wages corresponding to the period when his case was pending appeal before the NLRC and in his Comment accuses petitioner of "delay(ing) the execution of the Orders and Decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission dated September 23, 1993 and April 6, 1994." Tanpiengco stresses that he did not waive his reinstatement. In fact he promptly filed on 27 February 1991 a motion for writ of execution with the NLRC but the Labor Tribunal failed to act on it. As a result, petitioner cannot fault him for NLRC’s inaction.
Private respondent Tanpiengco is correct. In its En Banc decision in Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC , 6 the Court veered away from Maranaw Hotel Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC ,7 cited in the succeeding cases of Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC ,8 and Purification Ram v. NLRC ,9 holding that although the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was immediately executory, it did not follow that it was self-executory. There must be a writ of execution which may be issued motu proprio or on motion of the interested party pursuant to Art. 224 of the Labor Code. However under the Pioneer case, now the law of the case, the reinstatement order is already considered self-executory.
Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA No. 6715 which took effect on 21 March 1989, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: . . . In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatemet provided herein . . .
On the other hand, Art. 224 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.
To be sure, the Court has not been consistent in its interpretation of Art. 223. The nagging issue has always been whether the reinstatement order is self-executory. Citing the divergent views of the Court beginning with Inciong v. NLRC 10 followed by the deviation in interpretation in Maranaw Hotel Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC , as reiterated and adopted in Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC and Purificacion Ram v. NLRC , the Court in the 1997 Pioneer case has laid down the doctrine that henceforth an order or award for reinstatement is self-executory, meaning that it does not require a writ of execution, much less a motion for its issuance, as maintained by petitioner. It proceeded to explain that Art. 224, adverted to in Maranaw as the basis for the need for a writ of execution, applies only to final and executory decisions which are not within the coverage of Art. 223. It further expounded on the objective of Art. 223 as envisioned by our lawmakers. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Art. 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It cannot relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Art. 223 contemplates. The provision of Art. 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for an issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Art. 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of a writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Art. 223. In other words, if the requirements of Art. 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or order contemplated by Art. 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve a specific purpose . . . In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R. A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employee’s reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not. 11
Thus, in the light of the Pioneer ruling, we hold that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering petitioner to pay Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 when he appealed to the NLRC, up to 23 September 1993 when the NLRC decision finding his dismissal valid was promulgated. That portion of the decision, which is the sole issue in this petition, should stand. Under Art. 223 as presently construed, the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, albeit under appeal, was immediately enforceable as a consequence of which, Petitioner, as the employer, was duty-bound to choose forthwith whether to re-admit Tanpiengco or to reinstate him in the payroll and to inform Tanpiengco of its choice to enable the latter to act accordingly. Failing to exercise the options in the alternative, petitioner must pay the salary of Tanpiengco which automatically accrued from notice of the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement until its ultimate reversal by the NLRC.
A final word. In the instant case, for some inexplicable reason, the NLRC failed to act on Tanpiengco’s motion for the issuance of a writ to execute the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order. It did not even mention the fact of its filing in its assailed Decision. While this may no longer adversely affect the cause of the dismissed employee under the Pioneer case, the Court cannot let this pass. The Commission’s inaction is a serious oversight for which it should be admonished. While it is incumbent upon the party to take an active role in his case and not adopt a wait-and-see attitude, the adjudicating body has the corresponding obligation to act promptly on all incidents brought before it.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition praying for the modification of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 23 September 1993 to delete therefrom that portion which orders petitioner International Container Terminal Services, Inc., to pay private respondent Gabriel Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 up to 23 September 1993 is DENIED. The Decision of the NLRC directing petitioner to pay private respondent Gabriel Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 to 23 September 1993 is SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Petitioner ICTSI is a corporation engaged in stevedoring. It operates the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) under a management contract with the Philippine Ports Authority. On 12 July 1988 it employed private respondent Tanpiengco as a CFS Priority pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with private respondent’s labor union, the Associated Ports Checkers Services and Workers Union (APCSWU). Tanpiengco has since then become a regular employee assigned either to a shipping line or bodega to strip and examine cargoes from abroad with usual working schedule from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. although in actual practice cleaning time would start at 4:30 p.m.
On 7 March 1990 Tanpiengco was assigned at Bodega I. When it was time for him to clean himself he took his T-shirt which was hanging from a post, tucked it at his waist and proceeded to the washroom. He was accosted by a security guard allegedly for behaving suspiciously. Tanpiengco was haled to the comfort room and frisked but nothing of value was found in his person. Nonetheless he was taken to the security office for further questioning; he was accused of taking a T-shirt marked "Gesim Corp." from one of the balikbayan boxes inside the container yard.
On 21 March 1990 Tanpiengco was referred to petitioner’s personnel department for investigation. According to petitioner, he admitted to the investigating officer that he took the "Gesim Corp." T-shirt valued at P100.00, but Tanpiengco insisted on his innocence claiming that he was coerced at knifepoint into admitting the theft. On 30 April 1990, after a brief suspension, Tanpiengco was dismissed for pilferage which petitioner considered as breach of trust, dishonesty and theft of property.
Tanpiengco sued the stevedoring firm for illegal dismissal, reinstatement and backwages. The Labor Arbiter, in his decision of 3 December 1990, found the dismissal to be totally unjustified as neither theft nor pilferage was committed by Tanpiengco. The Labor Arbiter gave credence to Tanpiengco’s allegation that the T-shirt he was accused of stealing actually belonged to him, having bought the same from one Maxima Icabandi, a businesswoman. Accordingly, petitioner was ordered to reinstate Tanpiengco with full back wages in the total amount of P91,078.00 from 2 July 1988 to 30 November 1990, with temporary adjustments as the need would arise until his actual reinstatement. 1
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint of Tanpiengco, in effect holding that his termination was legal, but ordered petitioner to pay him his wages from 25 January 1991 (date of filing of appeal with the NLRC) up to 23 September 1993 (promulgation of NLRC decision) pursuant to Art. 223 of the Labor Code. 2 Both parties moved for reconsideration but were denied on 6 April 1994. 3
Petitioner now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it awarded back wages to Tanpiengco from 25 January 1991 to 23 September 1993. Petitioner claims that the monetary award to Tanpiengco who was subsequently found to have been validly and legally terminated is "absolutely unwarranted and patently erroneous and unjustifiable." 4 While it is true that under the law the employer found to have illegally dismissed an employee is required to reinstate the employee either actually or through payroll at the employer’s option, this requirement according to petitioner needs execution or enforcement by the employee in coordination with the labor department. In the instant case, Tanpiengco never pursued the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter despite the fact that petitioner was perfectly willing to actually recall him during the pendency of the appeal to NLRC. No writ of execution was ever issued by the Labor Arbiter; neither was there any sheriff’s return. Thus, by his own inaction or lethargy, Tanpiengco prevented petitioner from actually reinstating him. There is therefore no reason to award him back wages for a failed reinstatement. 5
While we are not in full accord with the finding of the NLRC that Tanpiengco was validly dismissed for cause, he appears to have accepted the legality of his dismissal as he did not appeal therefrom. He now focuses his attention on collecting his back wages corresponding to the period when his case was pending appeal before the NLRC and in his Comment accuses petitioner of "delay(ing) the execution of the Orders and Decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission dated September 23, 1993 and April 6, 1994." Tanpiengco stresses that he did not waive his reinstatement. In fact he promptly filed on 27 February 1991 a motion for writ of execution with the NLRC but the Labor Tribunal failed to act on it. As a result, petitioner cannot fault him for NLRC’s inaction.
Private respondent Tanpiengco is correct. In its En Banc decision in Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC , 6 the Court veered away from Maranaw Hotel Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC ,7 cited in the succeeding cases of Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC ,8 and Purification Ram v. NLRC ,9 holding that although the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision was immediately executory, it did not follow that it was self-executory. There must be a writ of execution which may be issued motu proprio or on motion of the interested party pursuant to Art. 224 of the Labor Code. However under the Pioneer case, now the law of the case, the reinstatement order is already considered self-executory.
Art. 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA No. 6715 which took effect on 21 March 1989, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: . . . In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatemet provided herein . . .
On the other hand, Art. 224 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions.
To be sure, the Court has not been consistent in its interpretation of Art. 223. The nagging issue has always been whether the reinstatement order is self-executory. Citing the divergent views of the Court beginning with Inciong v. NLRC 10 followed by the deviation in interpretation in Maranaw Hotel Corporation (Century Park Sheraton Manila) v. NLRC , as reiterated and adopted in Archilles Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC and Purificacion Ram v. NLRC , the Court in the 1997 Pioneer case has laid down the doctrine that henceforth an order or award for reinstatement is self-executory, meaning that it does not require a writ of execution, much less a motion for its issuance, as maintained by petitioner. It proceeded to explain that Art. 224, adverted to in Maranaw as the basis for the need for a writ of execution, applies only to final and executory decisions which are not within the coverage of Art. 223. It further expounded on the objective of Art. 223 as envisioned by our lawmakers. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Art. 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory. It cannot relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Art. 223 contemplates. The provision of Art. 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for an issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Art. 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of a writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Art. 223. In other words, if the requirements of Art. 224 were to govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or order contemplated by Art. 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In enacting the law, the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law, one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve a specific purpose . . . In introducing a new rule on the reinstatement aspect of a labor decision under R. A. No. 6715, Congress should not be considered to be indulging in mere semantic exercise. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement order in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employee’s reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not. 11
Thus, in the light of the Pioneer ruling, we hold that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering petitioner to pay Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 when he appealed to the NLRC, up to 23 September 1993 when the NLRC decision finding his dismissal valid was promulgated. That portion of the decision, which is the sole issue in this petition, should stand. Under Art. 223 as presently construed, the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, albeit under appeal, was immediately enforceable as a consequence of which, Petitioner, as the employer, was duty-bound to choose forthwith whether to re-admit Tanpiengco or to reinstate him in the payroll and to inform Tanpiengco of its choice to enable the latter to act accordingly. Failing to exercise the options in the alternative, petitioner must pay the salary of Tanpiengco which automatically accrued from notice of the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement until its ultimate reversal by the NLRC.
A final word. In the instant case, for some inexplicable reason, the NLRC failed to act on Tanpiengco’s motion for the issuance of a writ to execute the Labor Arbiter’s reinstatement order. It did not even mention the fact of its filing in its assailed Decision. While this may no longer adversely affect the cause of the dismissed employee under the Pioneer case, the Court cannot let this pass. The Commission’s inaction is a serious oversight for which it should be admonished. While it is incumbent upon the party to take an active role in his case and not adopt a wait-and-see attitude, the adjudicating body has the corresponding obligation to act promptly on all incidents brought before it.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition praying for the modification of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 23 September 1993 to delete therefrom that portion which orders petitioner International Container Terminal Services, Inc., to pay private respondent Gabriel Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 up to 23 September 1993 is DENIED. The Decision of the NLRC directing petitioner to pay private respondent Gabriel Tanpiengco his wages from 25 January 1991 to 23 September 1993 is SUSTAINED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 50-58.
2. Id., pp. 13-20.
3. Id., p. 21.
4. Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 7.
5. Petition, pp. 7-8; id, pp. 8-9.
6. G.R. No. 118651, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 806.
7. G.R. No. 110027, 16 November 1994, 238 SCRA 191.
8. G.R. No. 107225, 2 June 1995, 244 SCRA 750.
9. G.R. No. 115759, 21 June 1996, 257 SCRA 546.
10. G.R. No. 88943, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 651.
11. Note 6, pp. 825-826.
