Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2000 > November 2000 Decisions > G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000 - ARTHUR TE v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 1 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178 2 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in Civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. 3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella). 4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990. 5 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409. 6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already married to private Respondent. With respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still single. 8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The trial court denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused. 9 The RTC also denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. 10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petitioner for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971. 11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City. 12 When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16, 1991, 13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178. 14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. 15 The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy. 16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil case. 17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. 18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library



PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.



PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.



PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF. 19

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and rules. 20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 21 The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People v. Mendoza 24 and People v. Aragon 25 cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 26 In Landicho v. Relova, 27 we held that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists. 28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.chanrobles virtual law library

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil. 29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage. 30 The existence of these other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.chanrobles.com.ph : red

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place. 31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. 32 In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 33 In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense. 34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. 35 The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. 36 Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by both parties.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the same. According to petitioner, the judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. 37 In People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 38 this Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. 39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.cralaw : red

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. 40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

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1. Arthur Te, Petitioner, v. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and People of the Philippines, Respondents.

2. Arthur Te, Petitioner, v. Board of Civil Engineering, Professional Regulation Commission and Liliana Choa Te, Respondents.

3. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo, p. 29.

4. Ibid.

5. Id., at 29-30.

6. Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 1.

7. Rollo, pp. 29-30.

8. Id., at 30.

9. Records, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37.

10. Id., at 33.

11. Id., at 6-10.

12. These cases were: (1) Arthur Te, v. Liliana Choa-Te, Civil Case No. 90-6265 for Annulment of Marriage, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2) People of the Philippines v. Arthur Te, Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for Bigamy, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98.

13. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, p. 15.

14. Records CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 6-10.

15. Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.

16. Id., at 35.

17. Id., at 36.

18. Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 1996, Id., at 103.

19. Petition, Id., at 18-24.

20. Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).

21. Librado v. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).

22. Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997) citing Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).

23. The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. (REYES, LUIS B. THE REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, VOL. 2, Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)

24. 95 Phil. 843 (1954).

25. 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).

26. Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986).

27. 22 SCRA 731 (1968).

28. Id., at 734, Citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.

29. Ocampo v. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).

30. Records, CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 18-19.

31. Petition, Rollo, pp. 21-23.

32. People v. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).

33. People v. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).

34. Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.

35. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo, pp. 35-36.

36. People v. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra note 20 at 450.

37. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo, p. 33.

38. 309 SCRA 705 (1999).

39. Id., at 709-710.

40. Associacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 294.

41. Rule 3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.