October 2007 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence
G.R. No. 170853 - Sps. Vilma Disquit Ado etc. v. Jesus Cornelia
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 170853 : October 19, 2007]
SPOUSES ISMAEL DISQUITADO AND VILMA DISQUITADO, Petitioners, v. JESUS CORNELIA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a decision dated August 12, 1994 in Civil Case No. 9852,1 "Alba Bonillla et al. v. Rito Cornelia, Rufina Cornelia, Candida Cornelia et al.," for Reconveyance, Nullification of Documents, Cancellation of Certificates of Titles and Damages, Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dumaguete City dismissed the complaint against the therein defendants Rito Cornelia et al. which questioned their acquisition of portions of Lot Nos. 2626 and 2628 located at Boloc-Boloc, Sibulan, Negros Oriental. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held, inter alia, that the acquisition in 1939 by Rito Cornelia's father Andres Cornelia, who died on February 20, 1940,2 of portions of the two lots "remains valid and legal even as to the latter's heirs."3 The decision became final and executory after the Court of Appeals affirmed4 it by Decision of August 12, 1994.
In October 2003, Rito Cornelia and some of his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 9852 filed before the trial court a Motion for Approval of Project of Partition wherein Andres Cornelia, father of Rito Cornelia who in turn was the father of herein respondent Jesus Cornelia, was apportioned 24/180 shares or 1,774 square meters (sq. ms.) of Lot No. 2626, and 24/60 or 672 sq. ms. of Lot No. 2628. The trial court, by Order of February 11, 2002, approved the Project of Partition to which was attached a Sketch Plan indicating the location of the portions of the two lots adjudicated to Andres Cornelia.
In March 2003, respondent, with the approval of his siblings, fenced the 1,774 sq. ms. of Lot No. 2626 and 672 sq. ms. of Lot No. 2628 adjudicated to his grandfather Andres Cornelia, drawing petitioner spouses Ismael and Vilma Disquitado to file on August 14, 2003 a complaint for forcible entry and damages against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 482. In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that they had since 1989 been in possession of the two lots as tenants of all the co-owners thereof until the forcible entry by respondent.
Respondent countered that he, together with his siblings, had the right to fence the questioned areas, the same having been adjudicated to their grandfather Andres Cornelia from whom they derived ownership thereof.
To the Position Paper which they submitted before the MTC6 in support of their complaint for forcible entry against respondent, petitioners attached an October 11, 2003 Affidavit of Magdalena Aranas-Decano (Magdalena)7 reading:
x � �x � �x
1. That I am one of the legitimate surviving heirs of the late Alberto Aranas, a registered co-owner of Lot Nos. 2626 and 2628, located at Boloc-boloc, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, under Original Certificate of Title No. 15698;
2. That sometime in 1989, all the heirs of all the original registered owners of both lots agreed with spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado that the latter shall work on our co-owned lots aforesaid as tenants thereof;
3. That since 1989 up to the present, the subject lots have been tilled and tenanted by spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado and by virtue of which the latter have introduced various agricultural improvements thereon;
4. That the tenancy rights of spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado are still subsisting up to the present;
5. That sometime in March, 2003 we were informed by spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado that separate portions of Lot 2626 and Lot 2628, both of Sibulan, Negros Oriental were forcefully entered into by Mr. Jesus Cornelia;
6. That for almost fifteen years, the tenancy rights of spouses Vilma and Ismael Disquitado have never been questioned or terminated by any of the co-owners of the aforesaid lots;
x x x x8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The affiant is the same Magdalena who was one of the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Civil Case No. 9852 for reconveyance . . . against the therein defendant-co-owners of the two lots including Rito Cornelia-father of respondent, which case was dismissed by the RTC.
By Decision of October 17, 2003, the MTC decided the forcible entry case in favor of the plaintiffs-herein petitioners and against the defendant-herein respondent, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds preponderance of evidence for the [plaintiff -]Spouses Wilma R. Disquitado and Ismael Disquitado and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendant Jesus Cornelia and/or any person or persons acting in his behalf to vacate and demolish the fence, which he has constructed [on] the lots [sic] in question;
2. Ordering defendant Jesus Cornelia to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
3. Ordering defendant Jesus Cornelia to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
On appeal, Branch 40 of the RTC of Negros Oriental, by Decision dated June 18, 2004,10 reversed the MTC decision on the ground that the case involves a tenancy dispute which falls within the original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).11 It accordingly dismissed petitioners' complaint. The Court of Appeals, by Decision12 dated November 30, 2005, affirmed the RTC decision.
Petitioners thus filed the present Petition13 before this Court, faulting the Court of Appeals for "commit[ing] apparent error in the appreciation, interpretation, and application of the laws on jurisdiction, forcible entry, and agrarian disputes."
By petitioners' claim, they had since 1989 been tenants of all the co-owners of the two lots, in support of which they, as earlier stated, submitted the Affidavit of Magdalena. Magdalena, however, was, it bears repeating, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 9852 who assailed the acquisition of portions of the lots by the therein defendants Rito Cornelia et al., which case was, as stated early on, dismissed by Branch 39 of the Dumaguete RTC. Thus, in so far as the portions of the lots acquired in 1939 by and adjudicated to Andres Cornelia-grandfather of respondent, Magdalena and her co-heirs did not have the authority to institute in 1989 petitioners as tenants thereon. Parenthetically, the conclusion of Branch 40 of the RTC of Dumaguete City that herein petitioners "are tenants of Andres Cornelia" and that upon his death the leasehold relationship binds his heirs is unfounded, Andres Cornelia having died in 1940. Petitioners admittedly never shared with respondent and his siblings the farm products gathered from the questioned portions of the lots.14
Upon the other hand, in his Position Paper and Offer of Documentary Evidence filed before the MTC,15 respondent manifested that upon motion filed in Civil Case No. 9852, Branch 39 of the Dumaguete RTC, by Order of May 8, 2001, directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution and/or Possession over the questioned portions of the lots in favor of the therein defendant-co-owners Rito Cornelia et al. and "simultaneously command[ed] the [therein] plaintiffs-appellants [including Magdalena], members of their family relatives, trespassers, squatters, agents and other privies of the plaintiffs-appellants to vacate immediately . . . the . . . premises"; and that the Project of Partition, to which was attached a Sketch Plan indicating the location of the portions of the two lots adjudicated to Andres Cornelia, was prepared by Geodetic Engineer Jorge S. Suasin Sr. (Engr. Suasin) and was approved by the RTC by Order of February 11, 2002.
And respondent submitted the September 23, 2003 Affidavit of Engr. Suasin16 declaring that, inter alia, he conducted an actual survey of the questioned portions of the lots in March 2003 after informing all co-owners and occupants of the lots including herein petitioner Ismael "Nonoy" Disquitado; and that he pointed to the heirs of Andres Cornelia the location and monuments of the areas of the lots adjudicated to him (Lots 2626-C and 2628-A), which areas respondent later caused to be fenced.
Petitioners' claim then that they were instituted in 1989 as tenants of and by all the owners of the lots including the questioned portions thereof is bereft of merit. There is thus no tenancy relationship to speak of over which the DAR has original jurisdiction.
As petitioners' occupation of the questioned portions of the lots did not bear the imprimatur of respondent and his siblings-co-owners thereof, it may be deemed to have been merely by tolerance, to say the least. Petitioners must then be among those referred to by Branch 39 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 9852 as trespassers, squatters, agents, or privies of Magdalena et al. who were ordered to vacate the premises. Engr. Suasin's statement in his Affidavit that he advised petitioner Ismael Disquitado of the circumstances which culminated in the fencing of the questioned portions of the lots has not even been impugned.
In fine, petitioners' complaint for forcible entry against respondent does not lie.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another is rendered dismissing Civil Case No. 482 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
The case filed by petitioners is simply one for forcible entry within the jurisdiction of first level courts.
The Project of Partition mentioned above does not mention the name of Alberto Aranas, the alleged landlord of petitioners, as owners. Be that as it may, if petitioners had occupied that portion fenced by respondent which portion appears to have been part of the 1,744 sq. m. adjudicated to respondent's predecessor-in-interest Andres Cornelia then petitioners were either illegally occupying it or with tolerance. In either case, they should respect the rights of the owners thereof. In this light, this Court finds the complaint of petitioners bereft of merit.
On August 14, 2003, the petitioners filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental a Complaint17 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. They alleged that they have been actual possessors of Lot Nos. 2626 and 2628, both located at Boloc-boloc, Sibulan, Negros Oriental since 1989. As tenants of the heirs of Alberto Aranas,18 who was a registered co-owner of Lot Nos. 2626 and 2628 under Original Certificate of Title No. 15698, they planted mango, ghemelina, coconut, jackfruit, acacia, and mahogany trees; kalamansi; and herbal plants on the lots, and have been harvesting and appropriating the fruits from these crops together with their landlord.ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ
Sometime in March 2003, the respondent, together with his hired men, entered a portion of Lot No. 2626 and a portion of Lot No. 2628 through force, stealth, and strategy, and fenced in the lot with hogwire and barbed wire without the consent and authority of the petitioners. The petitioners called the respondent's attention to the intrusion, but the respondent, instead of making amends, derided the petitioners.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,19 the respondent admitted that the fencing was done with his knowledge, but claimed that his sisters, not he, caused it. He further claimed that he and his siblings are well within their rights to enter and fence in the lots as the heirs of a certain Andres Cornelia, a deceased registered co-owner of Lots No. 2626 and 2628 under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9785 and T-9786, respectively.20 The respondent also argued that the issue of ownership and possession of the lots have already been decided by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 9852 on August 12, 1994, which decision had already attained finality.21
In his Position Paper and Offer of Documentary Evidence,22 the respondent further argued:
It could not be claimed also that plaintiffs are tenants of the defendant's family. They have admitted that they have not been giving any share of the produce, which element of sharing is an essential element of tenancy. And should they be claiming tenancy, they should ventilate such a claim in the proper forum, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. But it is unfortunate that in such a circumstance, the controversy becomes an agrarian dispute and a case of Forcible Entry under Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure shall not apply.23
In Ramos v. Stateland Investment Corporation,24 this Court held that when a tenancy is merely averred as a special and affirmative defense to a complaint for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not automatically lose its jurisdiction over the said action.25 Similarly, in the case at bar, the mere claim by the petitioners that they are tenants of the lots in question place the case under the original jurisdiction of the DARAB. As this Court held in Suarez v. Saul:26
In order for a dispute to fall under the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the controversy must relate to "tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers['] associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements." There must be a tenancy relationship between the party litigants for the DARAB to validly take cognizance of a controversy.27
The conditions enumerated in the above-quoted portion of Suarez v. Saul do not attend the case at bar.
The respondent's allegations and evidence of ownership do not defeat the petitioners' cause. It is settled that
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsively the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence, or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivinvidicatoria.28
The respondent argued before the MTC that he and his family did not fence the lots through the use of force, intimidation, threat, stealth, or strategy, but by virtue of a judicially-approved partition that allotted Lot No. 2626-C and 2628-A to their predecessor-in-interest.29 This contention holds no water. Construing the phrase "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth", this Court held:
xxx The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcibl[e] entry and detainer can unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.30
That the respondent and his family acted by virtue of a final and executory decision, a Writ of Execution and/or Writ of Possession, and by a judicially-approved Project of Partition31 is of no moment. Article 536 of the Civil Code provides,
In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
In the case at bar, the respondent and his family should have exercised their right to ownership by executing the writ of execution and/or writ of possession allegedly issued by Branch 39 of the RTC of Negros Oriental, if such writ/s, indeed, been issued. As the MTC noted, no evidence of the said writ of execution and/or writ of possession had been attached to the respondent's pleadings.32 The MTC further observed:
xxx Besides, once a writ of execution is issued, Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "the writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full." Without such return, there can be no basis for stating that defendant has been placed in possession of the lots subject of the project of partition, which are the lots subject of this case. Even then, the plaintiffs were not parties to the said case in RTC Branch 39. As such, they cannot be ejected or their improvements on the land cannot be demolished pursuant to such writ if any has been issued without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 30, 2005 and the decision of Branch 40 of the Negros Oriental Regional Trial Court dated June 18, 2004 are REVERSED. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Simbulan, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental dated October 17, 2003 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1 Records, pp. 15-29.
2 Id. at p. 18.
3 Id. at p. 28.
4 Id. at 39.
5 Id. at 1-6 exclusive of annexes.
6 Id. at 61-70.
7 Id. at 71.
8 Ibid.
9 Id. at 78.
10 Id. at 133-139.
11 Id. at 137-139.
12 Penned by Court of Appeals then-Executive Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, with the concurrences of Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Enrico A. Lanzanas. CA rollo, pp. 110-118.
13 Rollo, pp. 9-27.
14 MTC Order of September 26, 2003, records, p. 48.
15 Id. at 49-55.
16 Id. at 59.
17 RTC records, pp. 1-6.
18 RTC records, pp. 61-62, 71.
19 RTC records, pp. 41.
20 RTC records, pp. 13-14, 38.
21 RTC records, p. 39. Vide RTC records pp. 15-30, 57-58..
22 RTC records, pp. 49-55.
23 RTC records, p. 52.
24 G.R. No. 161973, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 726.
25 Id., at 741.
26 G.R. No. 166664, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 628, 637.
27 Id., at 637.
28 German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NOS. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 494, 499.
29 Vide RTC records, p. 51.
30 David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 384, 399-400.
31 RTC records, p. 51. Vide RTC records, pp. 15-35, 56-60.
32 RTC records, p. 77.
33 Ibid. Citations omitted.
