April 2011 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Petitioner Romulo B. dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the August 22, 2007 Amended Decision¹ of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93115, and the March 18, 2008 Resolution² denying its reconsideration.

The antecedents -

Dela Rosa was hired by respondent Michaelmar Philippines, Inc., for and on behalf of its principal Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. (respondent), as 3^rd Engineer on board the vessel MT “Goldmar” for a period of nine months.³ He boarded MT “Goldmar” on February 15, 2003. However, on April 14, 2003, he was discharged for his alleged poor performance, and was repatriated to the Philippines.

Claiming termination without just cause and due process, Dela Rosa filed a complaint⁴ for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries/wages, payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees with the Labor Arbiter (LA), against respondents.

Traversing the complaint, respondents alleged that Dela Rosa was validly terminated. They averred that Dela Rosa’s work performance was unsatisfactory, and that despite the advice given to him by his superiors, Dela Rosa’s job performance did not improve; he continued to be incompetent and inefficient. On March 16, 2003, Chief Engineer Stephen B. Huevas (Engr. Huevas) issued a warning letter to Dela Rosa, but he refused to receive the same. Worse, on April 9, 2003, Dela Rosa simply stopped working. Left with no recourse, Engr. Huevas sent a letter dated April 9, 2003 to the principal, communicating his intention to disembark Dela Rosa. On April 14, 2003, Dela Rosa was repatriated upon payment of all the benefits due him. Respondents, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.⁵

On March 31, 2004, the LA rendered a decision⁶ dismissing the complaint. In so ruling, the LA made much of Dela Rosa’s failure to deny or rebut respondents’ allegations that he refused to receive the warning letter on March 16, 2003, and then stopped working on April 9, 2003, without any valid reason. Dela Rosa’s failure to rebut these serious allegations, the LA held, gave rise to an inference that the same were true. The LA further lent credence to the entries in the logbook and further declared that Dela Rosa already waived his right to contest the said entries because he refused to receive the warning letter addressed to him.

The LA disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the case for lack of merit.⁷

Dela Rosa appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On July 29, 2005, the NLRC issued a Resolution⁸ dismissing the appeal and affirming the LA. In so ruling, the NLRC sustained respondents’ claim that Dela Rosa neglected his duty as 3^rd Engineer and abandoned his job, justifying the termination of his employment.

Dela Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration,⁹ but the NLRC denied it on November 24, 2005.¹⁰

Dela Rosa then went to the CA via certiorari. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision¹¹ reversing the NLRC. It held that respondents failed to allege and prove with particularity the charges against Dela Rosa. The particular acts which would indicate Dela Rosa’s unsatisfactory performance were neither specified nor described in the warning letter and were never entered in the ship’s logbook. It declared respondents’ pieces of evidence as self-serving, which could not support the findings of lawful termination. The CA added that Dela Rosa’s alleged incompetence, disobedience, and refusal to work while on board MT “Goldmar” did not constitute a clear case of insubordination and abandonment of work that would warrant his termination.

The CA decreed that:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Petitioner Romulo B. dela Rosa is hereby declared to have been illegally dismissed from employment and private respondents are therefore ordered to pay him his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract. No costs.

SO ORDERED.¹²

Dela Rosa’s victory, however, was only fleeting because on a motion for reconsideration, the CA rendered an Amended Decision, viz.:

After a careful study of the grounds relied upon by [respondents], this court finds the instant motion meritorious, considering that the 24 November 2005 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission has already become final and executory on February 28, 2006 and the corresponding entry of judgment thereon issued on June 15, 2006.

Jurisprudence dictates that once a judgment becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the winning party be not be [sic] deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end [sic]controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

As such, it becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistake.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED and Our assailed decision considered academic.

SO ORDERED.¹³

Dela Rosa filed a motion for reconsideration on September 30, 2007. Pending resolution of petitioner’s motion, respondent Michaelmar Philippines, Inc. filed a Manifestation/Motion to Substitute Michaelmar Phils.,¹⁴ Inc. with OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. (OSG Shipmanagement). It alleged that OSG Shipmanagement is the new manning agent in the Philippines of Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc., and it assumes the full responsibility for all contractual obligations to seafarers originally recruited and processed by Michaelmar Philippines, Inc.¹⁵ The CA noted and granted the motion in its Resolution¹⁶ dated November 12, 2007, and accordingly ordered the impleading of OSG Shipmanagement as respondent, in substitution of Michaelmar Philippines, Inc.

On March 18, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution¹⁷ denying Dela Rosa’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal by Dela Rosa, arguing that:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN PROMULGATING THE AMENDED DECISION OF 22 AUGUST 2007 REVERSING AND SETTING THE EARLIER DECISION DATED 31 JANUARY 2007 ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE HAS ALREADY BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING THE JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN IN THE CASE OF SALVA VS. CA, 304 SCRA 632.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN ERRONEOUSLY APPRECIATING THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ON JUNE 15, 2006 THEREBY GIVING IT THE EFFECT OF DISMANTLING THE RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO REMEDIAL MEASURES IN PROTECTION OF HIS RIGHTS AS SET FORTH BY LAW.¹⁸

The CA dismissed Dela Rosa’s petition on ground of mootness. It considered the November 24, 2005 NLRC Resolution sustaining Dela Rosa’s dismissal as final and executory. As such, the resolution became immutable and unalterable.

The CA was wrong.

A decision issued by a court becomes final and executory when such decision disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, such as when after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, no appeal has been perfected.¹⁹

The period or manner of appeal from the NLRC to the CA is governed by Rule 65, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission.²⁰ Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, states that the petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed.

Record shows that Dela Rosa received a copy of the November 24, 2005 Resolution of the NLRC, denying his motion for reconsideration on December 8, 2005.²¹ He had sixty (60) days, or until February 6, 2006, to file his petition for certiorari. February 6, 2006, however, was a Sunday. Thus, Dela Rosa filed his petition the next working day, or on February 7, 2006. Undoubtedly, Dela Rosa’s petition was timely filed.

In Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater,²² we explained:

[J]udicial review of decisions of the NLRC is sought via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and the petition should be filed before the CA, following the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Under Rule 65, Section 4, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Thus, although the petition was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioners reasonably filed their petition for certiorari before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.

Further, a petition for certiorari does not normally include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon petitioners to satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.

The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision or resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or resolution never became final and executory.²³

Indubitably, the issuance of an entry of judgment by the NLRC cannot render Dela Rosa’s petition for certiorari as moot and academic. Thus, the CA erred for ruling otherwise.

On the merits of the case. Dela Rosa seeks a reversal of the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC. He insists that he was terminated without just cause and due process.

It is evident that the issue raised in this petition is the correctness of the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC. The rule is that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In a petition for review on certiorari, the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial review is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact.²⁴ This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases inasmuch as factual questions are mainly for the labor tribunals to resolve.²⁵ While this Court has recognized exceptions to this rule,²⁶ none of these exceptions finds application here.

Dela Rosa was dismissed for his alleged poor performance. To support the claim of valid dismissal, respondents presented the following entries²⁷ in the ship’s logbook, viz.:

WARNING LETTER WAS PRESENTED TO THIRD ENGINEER R. DELA ROSA CONCERNING HIS PERFORMANCE AS THIRD ENGINEER ON BOARD MT GOLDMAR. HOWEVER, HE REFUSED TO AFFIX HIS SIGNATURE OR ACKNOWLEDGE SAID WARNING LETTER, IN SHORT, HE HAS NO INTENTION OR WHATSOEVER TO IMPROVE.²⁸

@0800HRS 09 APRIL ’03 THIRD ENG’R R. DELA ROSA CEASES TO WORK WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE AND INSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS A VALID REASON NOT TO BE IN THE ENGINE ROOM TO CARRY OUT HIS ROUTINE DUTY/RESPONSIBILITIES.²⁹

Dela Rosa claims that the entries were fabricated. However, he did not bother to present proof to substantiate his assertion. In Talidano v. Falcon Maritime & Allied Services, Inc.³⁰ and Abacast Shipping & Management Agency, Inc. v. NLRC,³¹ we held that a ship’s logbook is a respectable record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and the procedure taken against employees prior to their dismissal. Therefore, the LA and the NLRC cannot be faulted for giving weight to the logbook entries.

It is trite to say that the factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are generally binding as long as they are supported substantially by evidence in the record of the case. This is especially so where, as here, the agency and its subordinate who heard the case in the first instance are in full agreement as to the facts.³² Dela Rosa failed to convince us that the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.

In Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc. v. Toston,³³ we held:

It is axiomatic that factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, when sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this Court. As long as their Decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties before them, all that is left is the Court’s stamp of finality by affirming the factual findings made by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.

Indubitably, Dela Rosa was dismissed from employment for a just cause. Accordingly, he is not entitled to any salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.

However, we note that Dela Rosa was not accorded due process. Under Article 277(b)³⁴ of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee, who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination, and must give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. For officers and crew who are working in foreign vessels involved in overseas shipping, there must be compliance with the applicable laws on overseas employment, as well as with the regulations issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, such as those embodied in the Standard Contract for Seafarers Employed Abroad (Standard Contract).³⁵ Section 17 of the Standard Contract supplies the disciplinary procedure against an erring seafarer:

SEC. 17. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES. – The Master shall comply with the following disciplinary procedures against an erring seafarer:

A. The master shall furnish the seafarer with a written notice containing the following:

1. Grounds for the charges as listed in Section 31 of this Contract or analogous act constituting the same.

2. Date, time and place for a formal investigation of the charges against the seafarer concerned.

B. The Master or his authorized representative shall conduct the investigation or hearing, giving the seafarer the opportunity to explain or defend himself against the charges. These procedures must be duly documented and entered into the ship's logbook.

C. If after the investigation or hearing, the Master is convinced that imposition of a penalty is justified, the Master shall issue a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it to the seafarer, which copies furnished to the Philippine agent.

D. Dismissal for just cause may be affected by the Master without furnishing the seafarer with a notice of dismissal if there is a clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or the vessel. The Master shall send a complete report to the manning agency substantiated by witnesses, testimonies and any other documents in support thereof.

In this case, there was no showing that respondents complied with the foregoing procedure. The only notice allegedly given to Dela Rosa was a letter warning³⁶ dated March 16, 2003. Such letter, however, did not cite the particular acts constituting Dela Rosa’s alleged poor performance. Likewise, there was no formal investigation of the charges. Certainly, respondents failed to observe the necessary procedural safeguards.

In Agabon v. NLRC,³⁷  we ruled that if the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal or ineffectual. The violation of petitioner's right to due process only warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, the amount of which is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, taking into consideration the relevant circumstances. Accordingly, we deem the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages sufficient vindication of Dela Rosa’s right to due process under the circumstances of this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Romulo B. dela Rosa is declared validly dismissed. However, respondent Michaelmar Shipping Services, Inc. and substitute respondent OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc. are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, petitioner Romulo dela Rosa P30,000.00, as nominal damages, for noncompliance with statutory due process.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
 

---

* See CA Resolution dated November 12, 2007; CA rollo, p. 268.

¹ Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-30.

²Id. at 41-42.

³ Records, p. 3.

⁴ Id. at 2.

⁵ Id. at 27-43.

⁶ Id. at 89-95.

⁷ Id. at 95.

⁸ Id. at 137-140

⁹ Id. at 145-153.

¹⁰ Id. at 172-174.

¹¹ CA rollo, pp. 180-190.

¹² Id. at 189.

¹³ Supra note 1, at 30.

¹⁴ CA rollo, pp. 220-222.

¹⁵ Id. at 223.

¹⁶ Id. at 268.

¹⁷ Supra note 2.

¹⁸ Rollo, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ Delima v. Gois, G.R. No. 178352, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 731, 738.

²⁰ 356 Phil. 811, 824 (1998).

²¹ See Registry Return Card; records, p. 179.

²² G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 182.

²³ Id. at 191-192.

²⁴ See German Machineries Corp. v. Endaya, 486 Phil. 545, 558 (2004).

²⁵ Eastern Overseas Employment Center, Inc. v. Bea, 512 Phil. 749, 754 (2005).

²⁶ See German Machineries Corp. v. Endaya, supra note 24, at 558.

²⁷ Annexes “C” and “D”; records, pp. 48 and 49, respectively.

²⁸ Id. at 48.

²⁹ Id. at 49.

³⁰ G.R. No. 172031, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 279, 297.

³¹ 245 Phil. 487, 490 (1988).

³² Mercidar Fishing Corporation v. NLRC, 358 Phil. 74, 82 (1998).

³³ 466 Phil. 153, 160-161 (2004).

³⁴ ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions.

x x x x

b. Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and valid and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. x x x.

³⁵ Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 180719, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 210, 222-223.

³⁶ Annexes “B” to “B-1”; records, pp. 46-47.

³⁷ 485 Phil. 248, 285 (2004).

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